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Preface and Acknowledgments 
Preface 
On the evening of 15th October 1979, Glen Burton Ake and Steven Keith Hatch 
committed a heinous and atrocious crime. They entered the rural Oklahoman 
residence of the Douglass family, tied up Mr. and Mrs. Richard Douglass and their 
sixteen year old son, Brookes and attempted to rape their twelve your old daughter, 
Leslie. After their attempts failed, they tied up the daughter and placed her next to her 
family. Ake ordered Hatch to go outside and get the car ready and "listen for the 
soun . "I Hatch left the house, turned the car around and then waited. Ake then shot 
each of the four family members as they lay tied. Mrs. Douglass died instantly, and 
Mr. Douglass died from a combination of the bullet wound and strangulation by a 
binding around his neck. Leslie and Brookes survived this horrific event and made 
their way to a nearby doctor's house. Ake and Hatch fled from Oklahoma, but they 
were eventually arrested in Colorado and brought back to the state to stand trial. 
The suspects were tried separately. Ake was found guilty at trial and sentenced to 
death. However, Ake's mental health was in question, but the trial court denied him a 
44 court appointed psychiatrist" to determine whether he was fit to stand trial. He 
appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court and it ruled that Ake should have been provided 
with a psychiatrist to assess his competence. At a re-hearing he was found to be 
incompetent and his death sentence was commuted. 2 On the other hand, Hatch, who 
did not commit murder was found guilty of the two murders and sentenced to forty- 
1 Oral evidence presented at trial. See, Ake v. State, 663 P. 2d 1(1983) 
2 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U. S. 68 (1985). 
five years for each crime, and also, the death penalty by lethal injection. 3 Seventeen 
years later, Hatch had lodged numerous appeals which were denied by the Oklahoma 
Court of Criminal Appeals, the I Oth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the U. S. Supreme 
Court. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeal then set Hatch's execution date for 
9th August 1996 .4 
At this time I was a law student from England working as a legal researcher for the 
public defenders responsible for Hatch's clemency petitions. We filed the arguments 
for clemency to the State Governor and State Pardon and Parole Board. It was bizarre 
to me that Ake, who actually killed Mr. and Mrs. Douglass, could not be legally 
executed, but that the man who sat in the get-away car was about to have his life cut 
5 
short . Apart 
from the blatant fact that Hatch did not commit murder, he had on many 
occasions stated that he did not know what Ake was going to do. But the State of 
Oklahoma demanded his death, the judicial system obliged, and the Governor and the 
Pardon and Parole Board stamped their seal of approval by denying clemency and 
announced for the execution to proceed. 
What Ake and Hatch did was vile, repugnant and inhumane, and no family should 
ever experience the catastrophic events the Douglass family endured. But it was also 
detestable for the State of Oklahoma to act in the way it did. Throughout this 
insidious experience I could not relinquish the feeling that the state should be setting 
3 Hatch v. State, 662 P. 2d 1377 (1983) 
4 Hatch v. State, 924 P. 2d 284,289 (1996). By this time, Brookes Douglass had made a remarkable 
recovery from the early traumatic events in his life and became a State Senator. 
5 Upon witnessing an execution in Burma, George Orwell stated, "[flt is curious, but until that moment 
I had never realised what it means to destroy a healthy, conscious man. When I saw the prisoner step 
aside to avoid the puddle, I saw the mystery, the unspeakable wrongness of cutting a 
life short when it 
is in full tide, " in A Hanging, p. 16, George Orwell, George Orwell: Essays, (ed, Bernard Crick) 
(London: Penguin, 2000) 
an example which promotes 'life. ' But all it did was to show that revenge could 
encompass the repugnant talionic cry of a life for a life. 
The night of the execution I attended a candle-light vigil outside the Oklahoma State 
Capitol Building with some of the lawyers and local anti-death penalty activists. I was 
the only non-American (my passport displayed I was a citizen of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain, and also, of the European Community). We sat in a circle on the 
cold marble floor under the large Corinthian style pillars crowned by the tapered 
pediment, and the conversation was awkward. The light was on in the Governor's 
room in the magnificent building. One of the lawyers told me, "when you see that 
light go out, it means that the prison has called the Governor's office telling them it is 
done. " We held candles and the flickering flames danced our shadows around us. I 
remember watching our silhouettes as a lady gasped and called-out, "he's gone! " 
Everyone looked up to see that the light had been switched off. We hugged for a 
while and tears fell. As the group parted, a lady I did not know came up to me and 
said, "thank you for trying. " Her whispered "you" would have been out of place if she 
had been speaking to a fellow Oklahoman, a fellow 'Sooner. ' But she had spoken to 
me as a foreigner, as a British citizen, as a European. 
Over the next few days the lawyers in the office and other people, strangers to me, 
would say it was remarkable that a foreigner would come over and care about 
American lives, or in the words of one of the lawyers, "come from over the pond to 
give a damn. " In the end, this sentiment is what I try to hold onto. I can only say that 
even for all the world's troubles, I would prefer to begin with caring about life. I want 
to be part of the promotion of life rather than death, and I now join the growing 
European multitude who feel that they have an ethical and/or legal responsibility to 
44give a damn. " It is with this sentiment that I embarked upon an investigation not as a 
European questioning the death penalty in the United States, but, as should always be 
the first step, wanting to help ensure that the morally, and legally, correct example is 
given within one's own "back-yard. " 
To this end, this study investigates the processes of the removal of the death penalty 
within the Council of Europe and its Member States. An evaluation is conducted of 
the relationship of sovereignty and the death penalty in this region, and the 
significance of the Council's attempts to penetrate this relationship is analysed. The 
foremost motivation of this study is to understand how solid the removal of the death 
penalty is, and to reveal what can be learned from the legislative activity of the 
Member States and the various Parliamentary Assembly and Committee of Ministers' 
enactments, and the case-law of the European Commission of Human Rights and the 
European Court of Human Rights. It is my hope that this study will help ensure that 
the death penalty remains removed from this European region. 
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Chapter One: 
Introduction 
I- lhtroduction 
1.1 General Theme of Enquiry 
This thesis investigates the remarkable claim that the Council of Europe (hereinafter, 
"Council")' has established a "death penalty-free area', 2 within the borders of its 
Member States. There has not been an execution in this region since 1997,3 and such 
a position appears to provide a bulwark against the punishment for approximately 800 
million inhabitants. 4 On the surface this suggests nothing short of a penological 
K 
revolution, as at no other time in the history of Europe has a collective sovereign state 
pronouncement against the death penalty been witnessed. 
European history and political philosophy from Ancient Greece, 
5 
the Roman Empire 
6 
8 
and the Enlightement, ' through to the nineteenth century, and continuing right up to 
1 The Council was established under the Statute of the Council of Europe, London, 5. V. 1949. A 
complete list of Council of Europe legislation can be found at http: //conventions. coe. int. The 
Statute of the Council of Europe is numbered "I" in the European Treaty Series. Amendments 
and texts of a statutory character adopted later have been numbered 6,7,8 and 11. 
2 Council of Europe, Death is Not Justice, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2007). 
' The last Council Member State to impose an execution was the Ukraine on I VhMarch 1997, 
see Chapter Seven below. 
4 Walter Schwimmer, Forward, p. 5, in Council of Europe, Death Penalty Beyond Abolition, 
(Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2004). 
' See, Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, (trans: Rex Warner) (London: Penguin, 
1972), p. 219; Aristotle, The Politics, (trans: T. A. Sinclair) (London: Penguin, 198 1), p. 227; 
Plato, The Republic, (trans: Desmond Lee) (London: Penguin, 1987), pp. 355-360. 
6 Plutarch, The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans, (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 
I 
1952), p. 70; Cicero, Murder Trials, (trans: Michael Grant) (London: Penguin, 1990), p. 273. 
I 
World War Two, 9 reveals a genealogy of the death penalty as a manifestation of 
sovereign power over life and death. Intrinsic to this power was the acceptance that 
Europe governments had the right to administer the death penalty for criminal 
offences. Hence, the choice of whether or not to impose the punishment, and the 
scope of its application, was reserved to the ruling governments from the oligarchs of 
Ancient Greece, to the nation states of twentieth century Europe. 
IL 
However, this monolithic history has apparently taken a turn in a manifest way. Since 
the end of World War Two, when the sovereign's right of the death penalty was most 
legitimated for Nazi war criminals and their followers, a turning point occurred as 
European governments gradually turned their backs on the punishment. It is perhaps 
the unique epoch which Albert Camus hoped would happen as Europe became 
unified when he stated, "[fln the unified Europe of the future, the solemn abolition of 
11 
See, Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 141; John Locke, 
Second Treatise of Government, (ed. C. B. Macpherson) (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co. 
1980), p. 8; Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, in, The Social Contract and 
Discourses, (trans: G. D. H. Cole) (London: Everyman, 2004), p. 209; Cesare Beccaria, An Essay 
on CriMes and Punishment, (Chicago: Brandon Pres, 1983), Chpt. 28. 
' See, Frangois Guizot, 'A Treatise on Death Punishments, ' in ibid, General History of 
Civilisation in Europe: From the Fall of the Roman Empire Till the French Revolution, 
(Edinburgh: William and Robert Chambers Press, 1848); Jeremy Bentham, To His Fellow 
Citizens of France on Death Punishments, (London: Robert Heward, 183 1). 
9 See, §. Margery Fry, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in Holland and Scandinavia, 
(London: Howard League for Penal Reform, 1925); Arthur Koestler, Reflections on Hanging, 
(London: Gollancz, 1956); Viscount Templewood, The Shadow of the Gallows: The Case 
Against Capital Punishment, (London: Victor Gollancz, 195 1). 
2 
the death penalty ought to be the first article of the European Code we all hope for. ' 0 
By 1981, Camus's, and many other's hopes, had began to be realised when Western 
Europ ean states appeared to independently chose to not apply the punishment for 
ordinary crimes. " 
Following this apparent change the Council began to develop a centralised anti-death 
penalty strategy, which enhanced human rights standards under the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter, 
"Convention" )12 and in 1983 Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the abolition of the death 
penatty (hereinafter, "Protocol No. 6") 13 was adopted which provides for abolition of 
the punishment in peacetime, and then in 2002, Protocol No. 13 to the Conventionfor 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the abolition 
of the death penalty in all circumstances (hereinafter, "Protocol No. 13") 14 was 
adopted which provides for abolition in all circumstances. After 1994, when the 
Council's membership expanded through Central and Eastern Europe, the process of 
the removal of the death penalty spread. 
10 Albert Camus, 'Reflections on the Guillotine, ' in ibid, Resistance, Rebellion and Death, (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1998), p. 182. 
11 Belgium was the anomaly which reserved the death penalty within its statutes, but did not 
apply it as all death sentences were automatically commuted. The death penalty in Belgium was 
officially abolished in 1996. 
V. 
12 CETS No. 005, Rome, 4 November, 1950. Text as modified by Protocol 11. 
13 CETS No. 114, Strasbourg, 28hApril 1983. 
14 CETS No. 187, Vilnius, 3d May 2002. 
3 
This thesis provides a legal history of the genesis of this penological movement and 
identifies the formulation of human rights mechanisms which appears to have 
contributed significantly to the dismantling of the punishment across the European 
region. The starting point is taken to be the creation of the Council in 1949, and the 
legal genealogy then continues through to April 2008. 
Two main subjects of enquiry are juxtaposed throughout the thesis. The first is the 
changing nature of the sovereign state's "right" of the death penalty. Second is the 
extent to which the Council's human rights legislation and policies have contributed 
to this recent sovereign penal decision, and thus possibly influenced the change. 
1.2 Lacunae in Current Analysis 
11 
One of the key reasons for embarking on this study is that there are identifiable 
lacunae within the current published literature. Firstly, there is no monograph which 
critically evaluates the process of abolition within the Council and its Member States. 
The ýosthurnous publication of Hans Gbran Franck, The Barbaric Punishment: p 
Abolishing the Death Penalty, which was edited by William Schabas, 15 provides an 
extremely useful overview of the death penalty in Europe up until 1996, with an 
analysis of international law and state practice. The book has great value as a general 
1ý 
overview of the Council's anti-death penalty strategies. Franck was one of the 
influential architects of the expansion process of the Council to encompass Central 
15 Hans Goran Franck, The Barbaric Punishment: Abolishing the Death Penalty, (ed, William 
Schabas) (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2003). 
4 
and Ehstern European states post 1994, and he stalwartly argued for the requirement 
that the death penalty should be abolished by new members. 
However, Franck's work did not consider a critical reading of the historical, political 
and philosophical influences which contributed to the removal of the death penalty in 
this region, and the developments within the Council have gone beyond what was 
considered. Furthermore, only the main Parliamentary Assembly and Committee of 
Ministers provisions, including recommendations and resolutions, are provided, but a 
comprehensive reading of all the enactments was not presented. 
Secondly, the available literature provides insufficient investigation into how the 
death penalty was adopted as an acceptable practice at the creation of the Council. 
Why , was the punishment implicit within the Statute of the Council of Europe 
(hereinafter, the "Statute" )? 16 There is also limited information concerning the 
drafting of the Convention. To what extent was the death penalty a matter of the 
politics of Member States, and not an exclusive question of human rights? This 
question must involve an analysis of the apparent complete abandonment of the 
death 
penalty for ordinary crimes 
17 in Western Europe by 1981, before the Council enacted 
any centralised human rights policies on the punishment. There is a clear absence of 
scholarship engaging with the relationship of state politics and the anti-death penalty 
discouýrse between 1949 and 1981. 
16 See, Statute, above, fn. 1. 
17 The term "ordinary crimes" generally refers to crimes which are committed in peacetime. 
It 
4 
does not cover crimes such as treason or other offences against 
the state. 
5 
I know of no scholarly articles which critique this specific issue during this period, 
and the literature which engages with the development of European human rights 
mostly points to the historical fact of when the Council's policies were formulated, 
predominately following Carl Lidbom's 1980 report to the Parliamentary Assembly, 18 
and through the adoption of Protocol No. 6 in 1983. This literature is correct in its 
identification of the change in the prominence of human rights, but it does not explain 
"why" the changes happened, and what the significance is for the sovereign state's 
right of the death penalty. 19 
There are scholarly articles which focus on municipal processes for application and 
remova , 
20 and there was also the British Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 
18 Repo'rt on the abolition of capital punishment, Doc. 4509, (2 nd and 3 rd sittings), 22 April 1980. 
Perhaps Franklin Zimring's chapter on Europe comes the closest to providing analytical 
critique when he identifies that no centralised position was created before Protocol No. 6. 
However, he does not engage with the question of what the significance of this finding is for the 
relationship of sovereignty and the death penalty, see, The Contradictions ofAmerican Capital 
Punishment, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 27. 
20 For example, see the articles on Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Holland in, Fry, above, fn. 9; 
the various articles which are referred to in this thesis in the Council of Europe, Death Penalty: 
Beyond Abolition, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Press, 2004); ibid, the Death Penalty: 
Abolition in Europe, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 1999) Roger Hood and Carolyn 11 
Hoyle, The Death Penalty A Worldwide Perspective, 4 th ed, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008); R. Fawn, 'Death Penalty as Democratization: is the Council of Europe Hanging Itselff 
Democratization, vol. 8, No. 2,75-76 (Summer, 200 1) and, Peter Hodgkinsoi), 'Europe -A 
Death Penalty Free Zone: Commentary and Critique of Abolitionist Strategies, ' 26 Ohio. N. UL. 
Rev. 62ý5 (2000). 
6 
1ý 
between 1949-1953, which provided some municipal comparative analysis. 21 
However, there is no literature which seeks to engage the municipal activities with the 
early life of the Council. As one of the fundamental issues for investigation is the 
remoy. al of the death penalty before any official Council edicts on the punishment 
were formulated this study fills a theoretical lacunae. 
Thirdly, there has been insufficient scholarly enquiry identifying the significance of 
the relationship between the Member States' governments and the Committee of 
Ministers. The Committee is the decision making organ of the Council and it 
comprises the foreign ministers of the Member States. Under the Statute of the 
Council of Europe, Article 15 (a), the Committee of Ministers shall "consider the 
actiort required to further the aim of the Council of Europe, including the conclusion 
of conventions and agreements. " As such, there is a real potential for the interests of 
the states to be intricately incorporated within human rights legislation. Indeed, this is 
a major theme that is explored within Chapters Five to Seven. 
The literature does not engage effectively with the Committee of Minister's 
legislative activity concerning the drafting and adoption of Protocols No. 6 and No. 
13. This study has uncovered specific frictions between the Parliamentary Assembly 
and the Committee of Ministers with regards to the drafting of Protocols No. 6 and 
No. 13, the amendment of Convention Article 2(l), the prerequisites for membership 
during expansion post- 1994 and the issue of compliance with human rights standards 
expected of Council observer states. In each case, it is suggested that the underlying 
cause I. bf the friction, and in some cases, significant disagreements, between the two 
21 Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953, (London: HMSO, 1953). 
7 
Council organs fundamentally concerns the relationship of the sovereignty of nation 
states with the right of the death penalty. It is proposed that an adequate 
understanding of this friction within the Council can only be achieved through an 
investigation into the manifestation of sovereignty within the Council and its Member 
States. Hitherto, the published scholarship has not undertaken this theoretical task. 
Fourthly, a large part of the scholarship analyses the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights (and former European Commission of Human Rights), and 
predominantly the landmark cases of Soering v. the United Kingdom, 22 and Ocalan v. 
Turkey. 23 These cases are significant because they both provide interpretations of 
Articles 2(l) and 3, following the enactment of the two protocols: Soering considered 
22 Soering v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 14038/88, Commission decision, 19 January 
1989, and Court decision, 7 July 1989. For a selection of commentaries on the case, see, Richard 
B. Lillich, 'The Soering Case', 85 A. JI. L. 128 (1991); Ann Sherlock, 'Extradition, Death Row 
and thqý Convention, ' E. L. Rev. 1990,15 87; Christine van den Wyngaert, 'Applying the 
European Convention on Human Rights to Extradition: Opening Pandora's BoxT 39 1. C. L. Q 3, 
757 (1990); Susan Marks, 'Yes, Virginia, Extradition May Breach the European Convention on 
Human Rights, ' 49 Cam. L. J (1990) 194; William A. Schabas, 'Soering's Legacy: The Human 
Rights Committee and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council Take a Walk Down Death 
Row, ' 43 1. C. L. Q. 4,919 (1994); Jon Yorke, 'Europe's Judicial Inquiry in Extradition Cases: 
Closing the Door on the Death Penalty, ' E. L. Rev. 2004,29 (4) 546 
230calan v. Turkey, Application No. 46221/99, Chamber Judgment, 12 March 2003; Grand 
Chamber Judgment, 12 May 2005. For a selection of commentaries on the case see, Stefano 
Manacorda, 'Restraints on Death Penalty in Europe: A Circular Process, ' I JLC. J. 263 (2003); 
Joan Fitzpatrick, 'Speaking Law to Power: The War Against Terrorism and Human Rights, ' 
E. JI. L. 14(2) 241-264 (2003); Alastair Mowbray, 'The Creativity of the European Court of 
Human Rights, ' 5 H. R. L. R.. 57 (2004); William A. Schabas, 'International Law, Politics, 
Diplomacy and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, ' 13 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 417 
(2004). 
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the Member State ratifications of Protocol No. 6 in 1989, the Ocalan Chamber 
considered the ratifications of Protocol No. 13 in 2003, and the Ocalan Grand 
Chamber considered the developments in 2005. However, the vast majority of the 
literature on these cases is confined to a case-law analysis and focuses on the basic 
mechanisms of ratification. The political and legal factors which may challenge the 
ratifications are not adequately explored. As such there is further scope for a 
consideration of the wider penological framework of the Council relationship with the 
Member States' right to choose whether or not to impose a death penalty. 
Fifthly, the literature has charted the remarkable development of human rights, but it 
appears that the possibility of the return of the death penalty is not engaged with. This 
is because the human rights orthodoxy has not adequately considered the relationship 
between sovereignty and the death penalty, but also, the specific relationship between 
the law and the death penalty. This thesis aims to strengthen the human rights 
1. 
discourse by revealing these two positions to demonstrate that constructing human 
rights standards against the punishment must be viewed as a continuous political 
project even in those states which have removed the punishment. As such, the current 
literature has not investigated the possibility of political vicissitudes which may 
challenge the very legitimacy of the Council texts and undermine the absolute 
ý'k abolition of the death penalty. 
The Parliamentary Assembly has on numerous occasions, and the Committee of 
Ministers has in more restricted terms, claimed that it is possible to achieve 
9 
Cýabolition" of the death penalty. 24 These claims have been, on the whole, uncritically 
accepted by the orthodox human rights scholarship. For instance, the two Council 
publications on the death penalty, The Death Penalty Abolition in Europe 25 and 
Death Penalty Beyond Abolition 26 have not specifically addressed the question of 
what the Council intends the word "abolition" to mean. Of course, Protocol No. 13 
does mandate for the abolition of the death penalty "in all circumstances, " but when 
this phrase is placed next to the debates between the Parliamentary Assembly and the 
Committee of Ministers with regards to the amendment of Article 2(l), the extent of 
the protocol becomes problematic and the current scholarship has not adequately 
contrasted these legislative developments. This crucial issue is considered in detail 
within Chapters Five, Six and Eight. 
This question of abolition should be deconstructed as it presumes that the Council has 
a singular view on the term. It is suggested that, because of the identified frictions 
between the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly, the two organs 
do not have a completely harmonious view of the processes for the removal of the 
punishment. This may have significant implications for whether the punishment is 
"abolished" or not. Also, the jurisprudence of the European Commission and 
European Court of Human Rights, has, for example, not adhered to the interpretation 
provided within various Parliamentary Assembly recommendations and resolutions of 
both Articles 2(l) and 3. The Assembly has sought to create radical human rights 
24 The various Council claims and the specific instruments of the Parliamentary Assembly and 
the Committee of Ministers are considered throughout this research. 
25 See, The Death Penalty: Abolition in Europe, above, fn. 20. 
26 See, Death Penalty: Beyond Abolition, ibid 
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boundaries, while the Court (and Committee of Ministers), has on numerous 
occasions, restricted the practical implementation of these statements. The human 
rights standards created by the Council have contributed to the removal of the death 
penalty within the region, but it needs to be questioned whether the Council is 
unanimous on what it means when it states the death penalty is "abolished. " It is 
suggested that the Council is yet to produce a unified position, and as such, this may 
reveal fractures within the Council's human rights discourse. 
The vast majority of the literature provides an analysis of the death penalty through a 
positive law construct, as it focuses on the case-law of the European Court of Human 
Rights and the interpretation of the Council provisions. This work will highlight 
frictions within the formulation of human rights standards within the Council. For 
example, the provisions proposed by the Parliamentary Assembly for prerequisites of 
state membership post 1994, were not explicitly agreed to by the Committee of 
Ministers. However, the Assembly persisted without complete support and created its 
own standards for future state applicants. As such, it may be observed that within the 
Council's discourse against the death penalty we witness the development of various 
fora of human rights standards and this study presents this friction within the 
organisation. 
Furthermore, there is limited enquiry into the philosophy of the legitimacy of the 
death penalty. The current literature has not explored the significance of the 
Enlightenment theory of the social contract and the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) for 
the understanding of how the Member States protected the right of the punishment at 
the genesis of the organisation. In addition, it has not been explored whether this 
II 
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theoretical construct manifests today. This work investigates whether in 1949 the 
formation of a European social contract which preserved the right of the death penalty 
to the governments was present. It is appropriate to investigate the extent to which the 
Enlightenment theory of the social contract may have contributed to the development 
of penology and the death penalty in this period. Possible departures from the 
Enlightenment arguments legitimising the sovereign state right to choose to impose 
the death penalty will be analysed. There has been no significant literature which 
engages with these theoretical aspects. 
From the viewpoint of the Council and the death penalty, this study attempts to prove 
that there are a lot of new things to be said. For instance, the work of Jacques Derrida 
on the issue of political sovereignty has not been embraced adequately, if at all, by 
any scholar specifically investigating the Council and the death penalty. 27 There is 
some scholarship which has focused on a critical analysis of the death penalty in the 
United States. Austin Sarat, 28 Peter Fitzpatrick 29 and Adam Thurschwell3o have 
applied selected Derridarian readings to the United States capital judicial system. 
27 1 have briefly considered Derrida's work in, 'Blanchot, Foucault, Levinas and Derrida: French 
Philosophy and the Deconstruction of the Death Penalty, ' 12 Amicus Journal (2004) 16. 
28 Austin Sarat, When the State Kills: Capital Punishment and the American Condition, 
(Princeýon: Princeton University Press, 200 1). 
" Peter Fitzpatrick, "'Always More to Do: " Capital Punishment and the (De)Composition of 
Law' in Austin Sarat (ed), The Killing State: Capital Punishment in Law, Political and Culture, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
30 Adam Thurschwell, 'Ethical Exception: Capital Punishment in the Figure of Sovereignty, ' in 
Austin'Sarat and Jennifer Culbert, (ed) Killing States: Lethal Decisions, Final Judgments, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) (forthcoming). 
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Fundamentally, Derrida has made the claim (from reading the Enlightenment social 
contract theorists which this work will refer to in later chapters) that it is impossible 
to separate Western European sovereignty from the death penalty. 3 1 Derrida has 
deconstructed this tradition of Western philosophy and has declared: 
it is impossible to separate political sovereignty from the power over life and 
death 
... In order to maintain an essential aspect of its sovereignty, the state must 
32 reserve the right to impose the death penalty, at least in exceptional cases . 
To date, no scholarship has attempted to reconcile Derrida's observations with the 
Council edicts which provide "abolition in all circumstances. " On its face, an 
-1 
incompatible penological scenario is presented which needs to be investigated. It is 
argued that because the literature has not dealt with this incompatibility, the 
scholarship has only identified the fact that the death penalty has been removed from 
municipal statutes, but it has not investigated the way in which it has been removed. 
As a general observation the existing literature charts the lineage of the removal of 
the death penalty in Council Member States without exploring what effects political 
1 The "Work of Jacques Derrida will be relied upon within this thesis. For example, see Jacques 
Derrida, 'Capital Punishment: Another "Temptation of Theodicy, "' p. 197, in Seyla Benbabib 
and Nancy Fraser (eds) Pragmatism, Critique, Judgment: Essaysfor Richard J. Bernstein, 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2004); Jacques Derrida and Elisabeth Roudinesco, 'Death 
Penalties, ' pp. 139-165, in ibid, For What Tomorrow ... A Dialogue, 
(Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2004); Keryon Huigens, 'Derrida on the Death Penalty, ' Cardozo Life, Winter 
2001, www. cardozo. net/life/winter2oolderrida 
32 Kyron Huigens, ibid 
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threats may have on the existing human rights discourse and state removal of the 
punishment. What this literature predominantly offers is the observation that states 
may at one time abolish the death penalty, and at another time reinstate the 
punishment, and possibly oscillate back and forth. The reasons for such change are 
not explored or adequately explained. This thesis is an attempt to fill this lacunae by 
offering explanations as to why and how the penological changes have occurred in 
Council Member States. It is the understanding of the why as well as how which leads 
to effective programmes to help ensure that the punishment remains "abolished. " 
1.3 Thesis Questions 
The fundamental question of this research is therefore: has the Council's human 
rights discourse penetrated the sovereign Member State "right" whether or not to 
choose to impose the death penalty in a specific case? If the Council has penetrated 
this right, is it a penetration which has led to a severing of the right from the Member 
States or is it only a penetration which contributes to a suspension of the punishment? 
The significance being that if a severance has occurred then the death penalty can 
never return. But if only a suspension has resulted, then the punishment can be re- 
visited following changes in Political and legal circumstances in the Member 
States. 
The distinction between severance and suspension may be a mere matter of time. It 
could be argued that the death penalty is currently severed 
from the Member States, 
and thus, a literal "abolition" has occurred. Or it may 
be that only a suspension has 
been achieved, and as such the term, abolition, does not mean 
its Latin etymological 
14 
root of abole-re "to destroy" which attracts a certain finitude in that the death penalty 
is for'ýver done away with. It does appear that the term "abolition" has historical 
significance, and as such it is used because we are familiar with it and it is merely the 
best word we currently have; even if it is an imperfect word. This thesis accepts this 
latter position when it analyses the extent of the Council's abolitionist discourse. 
However, it will be appropriate to investigate what the Council means through the use 
of "abolition" in its protocols and communications. 
The theoretical excavation cannot remain at this point, because we need to ask: is 
there an official Council position on the use of the word "abolition" or are there 
differing opinions within the various Council organs? Do the communications by the 
Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers demonstrate a common use 
of the word? Is there disagreement between the different Council organs or even 
ambiValence to suit specific political circumstances? If the Council has established 
the eternal removal of the death penalty through Protocol No. 13, the punishment is 
literally "abolished. " But if Protocol No. 13 does not have the effect of maintaining 
the removal of the death penalty then its very purpose (abolition in all circumstances) 
will be called into question. Furthermore, on the possible identification of "abolition" 
under Protocol No. 13, has the European Court of Human Rights contributed to an 
understanding of the penological processes? Does the jurisprudence provide clarity on 
the use of "abolition" or merely identify a further fora of ambivalence or 
contradiction? 
The Council has been debating the specific issue of whether the death penalty should 
be abolished in all circumstances since 1994. However, after fourteen years of 
15 
attempts to remove the death penalty from Article 2(l), we still have it. Why? Is 
there agreement among all the Council organs on its application? Do all the Council 
organs agree that the article needs amending? If so, what should be amended? And 
what are the mechanisms for amendment? This thesis is concerned with discovering 
within the juxtaposition of the Council and the Member States where the locus of the 
ultimate power to use the death penalty lies. If the death penalty is still intricately 
connected to sovereignty, the issue is to identify to what extent the Council has 
reduced the sovereignty of the sovereign Member States. 33 Is it to a degree which 
prevents the imposition of the punishment under every circumstance? 
1.4 Thesis Proposed 
In the 1970s Michel Foucault, the French philosopher, observed that: 
giving up the death penalty while citing the principle that no public authority 
has the right to take anyone's life (any more than any individual does) is to 
engage an important and difficult debate. 
and he questioned at the dawn of the removal of the punishment in France in 1981 
that: 
[d]o we want the debate on the death penalty to be anything other than a 
discussion on the best punitive technologies? Do we want it to be the occasion 
I. 
33 See both references to Derrida, above, fn. 3 1. 
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for the beginning of a new political reflection? Then it must take up the problem 
of the right to kill at its root, as the state exercises that right in its various forms. 
The question of more adequately defining the relations of individual freedom 
and the death of individuals must be taken up anew, with all its political and 
ethical implications. 34 
This thesis is, in part, a response to Foucault's demand. It attempts to take the subject 
of the Council and its discourse against the death penalty, and the apparent Member 
State relinquishing of its right to impose the punishment, to its root. Foucault 
identified that the state fundamentally has a right of the death penalty. He did not 
specifically engage with the Convention in 1981, but he called for the political and 
ethical implications of the punishment to be debated. This thesis is a contribution to 
the debates on the removal of the punishment within the Council. 
The analysis is therefore divided into three parts. Part One "Establishing the 
European Sovereign Right of the Death Penalty, " affirms the traditional argument that 
the death penalty is fundamentally a sovereign state issue. In Chapter Two, the 
creati on of the Council through the signing of the Statute in 1949 and the drafting of 
the Convention between 1949 and 1950 are considered. The Statute was a 
masterstroke in European liberalism which facilitated the interests of state 
sovereignty, and also implicitly allowed the continuation of the death penalty 
following the catastrophic events of World War Two. Statute Articles I and 3 provide 
34 Michel Foucault, Against Replacement Penalties, p. 459-460, in Michel Foucault, Power 
Essential Works ofFoucault, 1954-1984, Vol. 3, (ed, James D. Faubion) (London: Penguin, 
1994). 
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for the identification of a European "common heritage" and the promotion of the 
"rule of law, " and as the death penalty was both historically accepted, and also 
judicially applied, it was mandated as a legitimate punishment. 
It is argued that to understand how the death penalty was preserved at the creation of 
the Council, we need to consider the Enlightenment social contract theory and the 
rights of sovereign states established 300 years earlier at the Treaty of Westphalia in 
1648.35 Both the social contract and the treaty sought to legitimise sovereign rule. 
Although there are differing contract theories, and the nuances are explored in 
Chapter Two, they all agreed that for the sovereign to be able to rule effectively, it 
must encompass the right over life and death. This would include the right to 
judicially put to death. It appears paradoxical, but during the Enlightem-nent, in order 
for governments to protect the right of life of its subjects, it needed ultimate control 
and authority. To combat the threat of death and thus protect life the right to impose 
death was vested. 
35 The arguments for both the utility of the social contract and the Treaty of Westphalia for this 
thesis are constructed by paralleling political processes which resulted in 1949 with what 
happened in 1648, and also the arguments proposed by the Enlightenment philosophers. In 
support of these arguments, see Steven Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights: 
Achievements, Problems andProspects, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 2. 
Greer argued that the formation of the Council was a product of the Enlightenment liberalising 
process; see also, Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno, (eds), Beyond Westphalia? State 
Sovereignty and International Relations, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1995); Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty How Ideas Shaped Modern International 
Relations, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 200 1); Martin Loughlin, The Idea of Public 
Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 73-75. 
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The acceptance of the punishment within the drafting debates of the Convention, is 
then considered as a manifestation of these historical readings. The punishment was 
unanimously accepted during the drafting of Article 2(l), and also under Article 3, no 
arguments were proposed to identify that it violated the prohibition against 
"inhuman 
... punishment. " Although the Convention was created for the protection of 
individual rights, the drafters were clear that the document also protected the right of 
the state to choose whether or not to apply the death penalty. Significantly, at the 
beginning of the Council, it acquiesced in this Penological position and thus it was 
not considered to be a violation of human rights. 
Chapter Three then turns to the removal of the death penalty in Western Europe, with 
France being the final country to refuse to apply the punishment for ordinary crimes 
in 1981. The chapter chronicles this development and argues that although the 
Convention came into force in 1953, during the intervening 28 years this geopolitical 
region removed the punishment without any specific reference to the text of the 
Convention. Hence, it appears that the human rights instrument did not directly 
contribute to the penological evolution and thus something else produced the 
hegemonic arguments which changed the minds of European governments. 
Post-war there was a proliferation of arguments questioning the morality of the 
punishment, including highlighting the possibility that innocent people have and 
could be executed, and also the general brutalizing effect of the punishment was 
emphasised. This chapter aims to show that as Europe became more stable and 
peaceful, the prominent argument which was used in removing the death penalty was 
that it lost its utilitarian quality and was not a greater deterrent to murder than a prison 
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sentence. 36 Hence the death penalty was removed for normal criminal offences but 
still reserved by most states for wartime offences if the punishment was required for 
state protection. This revolution in Western European penal policy was not as a result 
of any centralised and established Council position against the punishment, but the 
state government decisions being made independently and with minimal state-to-state 
dialogue. 
However, the possibility of accurate historical rendition must always include the 
nuances of the story. This legal genealogy is no exception. Although the above 
arguments will be presented through the use of references to the historical texts on the 
death penalty, they do not tell the whole story. We must also look behind the texts to 
see that although the specific Convention did not directly contribute to abolition, the 
humanistic sentiments interwoven within the instrument did have a significant 
impact. 37 The humanism inherent within the right to life and the prohibition against 
h 
inhuman treatment certainly provided cogent claims to which governments became 
susceptible. It is through an interweaving of the discourses that we realise how the 
Convention and the complete ideology of the Council established under the Statute 
evolved to open the door for the death penalty to be encompassed as a question of, 
and thus scrutinised by, human rights. 
For example, see, H. L. A. Hart, 'Murder and the Principles of Punishment: England and the 
11 
United States, ' in ibid, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968). 
37 The great work of the Italian humanist Cesarea Beccaria was liberally referred within the 
Council and the references are included in the research below. 
1. 
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This specific development is then charted in Part Two "The Genesis and Evolution of 
the European Discourse Against the Death Penalty. " The Convention human rights 
discourse evolved to produce arguments to dissect, restrict, and renounce, the 
punishment within Member States, and also importantly, in cases where criminal 
I 
suspects held in Member States could be extradited to third states to face a capital 
trial. Human rights became a powerful tool for the anti-death penalty movement in 
the Council and the Member States. The jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights also evolved to contribute significantly to the anti-death penalty 
1. 
debate. 
Chapter Four therefore focuses on the establishment and promotion of a centralised 
Convention human rights discourse. Three historical periods are considered. Firstly, 
1957 to 1972, where there was an absence of any specific human rights curtailment of 
the punishment. Up until the removal of the death penalty in Western Europe, the 
Council appeared unsure how to use the Convention to provide human rights scrutiny. 
The first case before the European Commission on Human Rights concerning a 
Member State application of the death penalty, but in a colonial region, was Greece v. 
the United Kingdom. 38 The Commission held that following the aftermath of the 
'Cyprus Revolt' from 1954-56, the British executions of revolutionaries did not 
38 Application by the Government of the Kingdom of Greece, lodged against the Government of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, No. 176/56, Application of the 
European Convention ofHuman Rights and Fundamental Freedoms to the Island of Cyprus, 
Report'of the European Commission ofHuman Rights, Doc. No. A 42.048, (Article 31 of the 
Convention) (Strasbourg, 26 September, 1958). 
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violate the Convention . 
39 Such distancing of the death penalty from human rights 
analysis was furthermore seen in the first official Council report on the death penalty 
in 1962, which was authored by Marc Ancel, the French criminologist. The report 
was restricte in its mandate and confined to pointing to the fact that the death 
penalty was a "Problem. , 40 Then the Committee of Ministers instructed the European 
Committee on Crime Problems to investigate the matter further. Both the 
Commission's decision and the report did not consider the death penalty as a human 
rights issue, but a sovereign state question. 
In the second period between 1973 and 1979, the first debates on the punishment 
within the Parliamentary Assembly are considered. It is seen that the Assembly was 
unable to agree on how to proceed with a human rights analysis of the punishment, 
and so the question was dropped from its agenda. At this time the death penalty was 
still thought of as an anomaly which the human rights discourse had difficulty 
rectifying. The work of the European Committee on Crime Problems was considered 
to have been ineffective in solving this "problem. " However, in the third period, 
between 1980 and 1983, a substantial meeting of the minds occurred within the 
Parliamentary Assembly, and they began to formulate the arguments that the 
4. 
punishment possibly violated Article 2(l) and Article 3. What then occurred through 
the adoption of Protocol No. 6 in 1983, which provides for abolition of the death 
penalty in peacetime, is a gradual development of human rights standards aimed at 
39 See, Robert Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
11 
1998); Nancy Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Strugglefor Union with Greece, 
(London: George Allen & Urwin, 1978). 
40 See, Marc Ancel, The Death Penalty in European Countries: Report of the European 
Committee on Crime Problems, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 1962). 
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restricting state choice over the punishment. The tide had firmly turned, and human 
rights were seen as providing a platform from which the punishment could be 
denounced. 
Cases before the European Commission of Human Rights and European Court of 
Human Rights grew exponentially, and Chapter Five analyses the judicial 
interp'r-etation of Article 2(l) which protects the "right to life. " The Commission and 
Court grappled with the paradoxical element in that this fundamentally deontological 
provision which focuses on the premier individual right, also incorporated the 
possibility of judicial executions. The complication of the discourse does not end 
there, as the Parliamentary Assembly now argues that Article 2(l) is inapplicable 
because of the evolved human rights standards, and so the death penalty should be 
removed from the Convention. However, the Committee of Ministers stalled the 
legislative process for the amendment of the text, and even following the adoption of 
Protocol No. 13 which abolishes the death penalty in "all circumstances, " Article 2(1) 
still remains intact. 
As a consequence, it is argued that the current anomaly appears to leave the door ajar 
V. 
for the punishment to be implemented, and this possibility is reflected within the 
strongly worded recommendations which the Parliamentary Assembly has presented 
to the Committee of Ministers on the issue. However, the final conclusion of this 
chapter is that from a jurisprudential perspective, although the European Court of 
Human Rights has hitherto refused to apply judicial amendment to the text of the 
Convention by holding that Article 2(l) is now obsolete, the possible imposition of 
the punishment appears to be more a theoretical than practical possibility. 
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The interpretation of Article 3's prohibition on inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment is considered in Chapter Six. It is argued that in juxtaposition to the 
differing interpretations of Article 2(l), there is a conflict of interpretation concerning 
the threshold of Article 3. What the different positions demonstrate is that the Council 
is yet to harmonise successfully Article 2(l) and Article 3. It is argued that the key 
disjunctive factor is the Council's inability to grapple with the question over the 
state's right to impose the death penalty. The debates ultimately revolve around 
whether the inhuman punishment provision provides a per se ban on the death 
penalty. This chapter analyses the different organ interpretations, the 
recommendations and resolutions on this question. 
The Iýarliamentary Assembly has called for the death penalty to be declared a per se 
violation of Article 3, but the Committee of Ministers has not specifically accepted 
this absolute position. The restrictive holdings of the European Court on Human 
Rights have similarly confined the scope of the Article to curtail the punishment but 
not uýed to attack its very foundation. However, the case-law has been effective in 
renouncing the punishment following unfair trials, to considering that prolonged 
detention is inhuman, and that certain conditions on death row are also a violation of 
Article 3. 
Furthermore, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and 
Degrading Treatment or Punihsment has initiated beneficial investigations of the 
different aspects of the Member States' capital judicial systems, with specific 
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focusing on prison conditions and the mental health of inmates. 41 Its work has been 
invaluable for aiding the Court in its findings. Article 3 has proved to be effective in 
restricting the scope of the punishment to such an extent that, as with Article 2(l) 
ni... above, the possibility of the punishment is more theoretical than of practical 
possibility. 
Finally, Part Three, "The Global Promotion of the Council's Discourse Against the 
Death Penalty, " considers the expansion of the Council post-1994, and also the h z 
widening of its focus to support the international initiatives of the European Union 
and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Chapter Seven 
continues to explore the friction between the Parliamentary Assembly and the 
ComTittee of Ministers during the expansion of the Council. It is argued that the 
Parliamentary Assembly initiated the requirement that joining states must sign and 
ratify Protocol No. 6 within three years. 
Howqyer, it is revealed that the Committee of Ministers was not in complete 
agreement concerning this precondition. It is demonstrated that this disagreement is 
also present with regards to the human rights standards expected of observer states. 
Furthermore, even though the majority of states have complied with the Council's 
mernkership regulations, there is still, within some states, an underlying political 
z 
discomfort in adopting the abolitionist stance. 
41 See, The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, at www. cpt. coe. j. nt. 
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But even with these identified fractures within the discourse the Council has not been 
prevented from achieving a remarkable removal of the punishment within its region. 
It is perhaps difficult to highlight the problems with the discourse and not recognise 
the value of what the Council has achieved as a collective political body. Indeed, a 
remarkable penal change has been accomplished, and in evidence of this success the 
Council has joined the anti-death penalty initiatives of the European Union and the 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Both of these organisations are 
now promoting abolition for their Member States and beyond. The European Union 
has had a significant impact with filing amicus curiae briefs within the U. S. Supreme 
Court, and has also played a crucially important role in the United Nations General 
Assembly adoption of the Resolution on a moratorium of the use of the death penalty 
on 18 December 2007.42 The Council has supported these initiatives, and this 
internýttional exposure has a significant impact for the legitimacy and strengthening of 
the discourse within its own region. 
The Conclusion in Chapter Eight reviews this legal genealogy of the relationship of 
the soyereign state right of the death penalty, and the penetration of this relationship A 
by the Council. It is argued that the Council's anti-death penalty initiatives have 
evolved to contribute significantly to the demise of the punishment within the region. 
In fact, the Council's discourse can now be read to modify the Enlightenment social 
contract theory, and the rights of sovereign states within the Treaty of Westphalia. 
The removal of the punishment can be seen as a fundamental change in the 
understanding of what is the rule of law and the common heritage from Europe in 
42 Moratorium on the use of the death penalty, A/RES/62/149,76hPlenary Session, 18 
'. 1 
December 2007. 
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1949, to what has manifested in 2008. As a consequence, the Council has created a 
regional political and legal situation where the death penalty is no longer part of 
legitimate rule in Europe, and so it has penetrated the sovereignty of the sovereign 
state to the extent that it has removed the punishment. 
However, the final observation of this thesis is that the Council's discourse, and the 
anti-death penalty arguments within Member States, should not disappear when the 
punishment disappears. This is because the removal of the death penalty is a 
continuous political project. If the human rights community becomes complacent, the 
punishment may return when the governments are confronted with circumstances 
which'. threaten their legitimate political rule. As such, the Council's discourse has 
achieved a suspension of the punishment from the Member States, and as a 
consequence, the anti-death penalty discourse must be viewed as a never-ending 
political project. 
11 
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Chapter Two: 
The Creation of the Council of Europe and the Preservation of 
the Death Penalty 
2. The Creation of the Council of Europe and the Preservation 
of the Death Penalty 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a historical story which reveals that post-World War Two 
European politics and human rights considered the death penalty in a very different 
light to how we perceive it today. In 1949 the Council was created and within its 
project for promoting peace, stability and security in Europe, the construct of a 
system of human rights was one of its foremost aims. Within this, the parameters for 
the continued application of the death penalty were considered. The aim of this 
chapter is to investigate to what extent the sovereign gover=ent's right to choose 
whether or not to impose the death penalty was present at firstly, the creation of the 
Council of Europe, and secondly, when the Convention was drafted. The Statute and 
the Convention drafting debates in the published travaux preparatoires I are 
considered, and specifically for these investigations, it is analysed to what extent the 
death penalty came to be thought of as part of a Council "common heritage" and the 
"rule of law. " 
To achieve this, selected readings of European history, Enlightenment politics 
through the construction of state rights within the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, and 
the theory of the social contract, are applied to the Statute and the Convention. Also, 
1 Council of Europe, The Collected Edition of the "Travaux Priparatoires " of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975). Hereinafter "TP, " with the 
volume number following. 
28 
the drafter's adaptation of natural law and the debates concerning "reason of state" 
are analysed. Identifying what is a legitimate state response when it is threatened is a 
fundamental issue for these investigations. This chapter aims to assess the foundation 
of the state right of the death penalty, because, as the further chapters of this thesis 
demonstrates, the challenge for the human rights arguments against the death penalty 
today, is ultimately about dismantling this central issue of right. 
2.2 The Statute of the Council of Europe and the Preservation of the Death 
Penalty 
On 5 th May 1949 the Statute was signed in London by ten European governments, 
and the Council was created. 2 The most important aim of this new human rights 
organisation was seen to be the promotion of unity among European states and 
facilitate the healing of the social and political ruptures caused by World War Two. 3 
A recognisable feature of this process was the shift in emphasis on sovereign state 
rights in international law, to the protection of individuals through a new regional 
system of human rights. 
The original ten signatory states were: Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
3 See, Europe is threatened, Europe is divided, and the greatest danger comesftom her 
divisions, declaration of the Congress of Europe, 7 to 10 May 1948, in Alastair Mowbray, Cases 
and Materials on the European Convention on Human Rights, 2 nd ed, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), pp. 1-2. 
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One of the first projects the Council undertook was to formulate the Convention to 
mandate human rights. To achieve this the Committee on Legal and Administrative 
Questions was established in 1949 and Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe was appointed as 
chairman and Pierre-Henri Teitgen as rapporteur. During the initial quorum of the 
drafting meetings, Teitgen took the floor and identified the intrinsic value of Statute 
Articles I and 3 to the proceedings. 4 Article 1 states: 
The aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its 
members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles 
which are their common heritage and to facilitate their economic and social 
progress (emphasis added). 
and Article 3 states: 
Every member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of 
law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, and collaborate sincerely and effectively in the 
realisation of the Council (emphasis added). 
Teitgen argued that these two Statute Articles provided the guiding legislative 
5 framework which Maxwell-Fyfe approved. It will become clear that the Statute 
Speech by Pierre-Henri Teitgen, rapporteur, the Committee on Legal and Administrative 
Questions, TP, 1, above, fn. 1, pp, 38,290, 
ibid, p. 114; Furthermore, A Jaquet, a French representative, identified the importance of the 
two Articles, p. 134; and Article I was specifically mentioned in a Committee questionnaire, p. 
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Article I identification of a European "common heritage" and Article 3 promotion of 
the "rule of law" provided the life-line for the drafting of the Convention text. 
The Article I search for a "common heritage" of the Council was identified as a 
desired aim within the Statute Preamble. The second paragraph makes reference to 
44spiritual and moral values which are the common heritage of their peoples, " and that 
"although heterogeneous in many respects ... they have a certain tradition of history 
and civilisation which is common to all of them. ,6 This notion of a common heritage 
has been recognised by the European human rights scholars, Steven Greer 7 and 
Alastair Mowbray, 8 to be part of the core principles which underpinned the Council's 
creation. To achieve a more complete picture of how this common heritage was 
created, different readings are proposed for guidance, including ancient European 
history, Christian history, the contribution of the Enlightem-nent through the Treaty of 
Westphalia and the social contract theory. 
156, and M. Wold, the representative from Norway, discussed the binding nature of Article 3 on 
the drafting process, in TP, 2, above, fn. 1, p. 170. 
Preambles to treaties often reveal the political objectives of the contracting parties as, J. G. 
Merrills and A. H. Robertson stated it is "useful for locating the political obligations that follow 
in a historical context, " in Human Rights in Europe: A study of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, 4h ed, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), p. 1. 
7 See, Steven Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights. - Achievements, Problems and 
Prospects, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 15-16. 
8 Alastair Mowbray has also stated that the "major aim of the Council of Europe was to achieve 
greater unity between the Member States, " in Cases and Materials, above, 
fn. 3, p. 2. 
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The Group of Officials of the Secretariat (hereinafter, "Group") outlined what the 
essential aspects of such historical heritage were and observed that "undoubtedly the 
cumulative influence of Greek philosophy, Roman law, the Western Christian 
Church, the humanism of the Renaissance and the French Revolution, " moulded the 
initial structure of the Council and its relationship with its Member States. 9 One 
reading of the Group's philosophical and historical genealogy would point to the 
moral and ethical arguments for the promotion of peace, wellbeing and mutual 
respectful relationships both between individuals and between states. Such a lineage 
may be observed through key publications within these different historical periods, by 
considering Aristotle's The Politics, 10 Plato's The Republic, " Thomas Aquinas's 
Summa Theologica, 12 Immanuel Kant's Perpetual Peace, 13 and Thomas Paine's The 
Rights of Man. 14 But this reading alone would not encompass all aspects of a common 
heritage, and for the present investigations, the genealogical manifestation of the 
sovereign state's right to choose whether or not to implement the death penalty in 
certain circumstances. 
9A Group of Officials of the Secretariat, Manual of the Council of Europe: Structure, 
Functions 
and Achievements, (London: Stevens and Sons, Ltd, 1970), p. 
8. 
10 Aristotle, The Politics, (trans: T. A. Sinclair)(London: Penguin, 198 1). 
11 Plato, The Republic, (tranns: Desmond Lee)(London: Penguin, 1987). 
12 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 5. vols. (Resource for Christian Living, 2000). 
13 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, pp. 93-125, in H. S. Reiss 
(ed), 
Kant: Political Writings, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). 
14 Thomas Paine, The Rights ofMan, pp. 201-364, in The Thomas Paine 
Reader, (ed, Michael 
Foot and Isaac Krammick, (London: Penguin, 
1987). 
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The subject of the death penalty is a major part of European history. Historical 
records recount the acceptance of the punishment in ancient Greek philosophy by 
Aristotle, when he identified that "sovereign powers ... cover decisions as to ... the 
penalties of death. " 15 Plato stated that for "impious deeds that bring about the ruin of 
the state ... the penalty is death. " 
16 In Roman law, the sanguine use of the death 
penalty in the Draconian Code circa 621 BCE was recorded by Plutarch, the ancient 
Roman historian. He observed the dramatic impact of Draco's laws as, "death was 
appointed for almost all offences, insomuch that those that were convicted of idleness 
were to die, and those that stole a cabbage or an apple to suffer even as villains that 
committed sacrilege or murder. " 17 
In Roman legal history, the right to put to death has been identified as being derived 
from the principle of the patria potestas which granted the father the absolute right to 
kill his own children and slaves. J. L. Strachan-Davidson, the Roman legal historian, 
stated that the patria potestas "with its consequent right of personal chastisement and 
its fullest powers of life and death, " 18 were transferred to the Roman state. Michael 
Foucault was in agreement with this historical interpretation when he noted that "[flor 
a long time, one of the characteristic privileges of sovereign power was the right to 
decide life and death. In a formal sense, it derived no doubt from the ancient patria 
15 Aristotle, above, fn. 10, para 1298a3, p. 227. 
16 Plato, The Laws, (trans: Trevor J. Saunders)(London: Penguin, 1975), Book 8, s. 16, pp. 355- 
360. 
17 Plutarch, The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans, (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 
1952), p. 70. 
18 J. L. Strachan -Davidson, Mommsen's Roman Criminal Law, The English 
Historical Review, 
Vol. 16, No. 62, (Apr. 190 1), p. 222. 
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potestas that granted the father of the Roman family the right to "dispose" of the life 
of his children and his slaves. "19 This position has also recently received support from 
the Italian philosopher, Giorgio Agamben 
. 
20 The influence of Roman law on the 
municipal legal systems demonstrates there are strong grounds for arguing that the 
origin of the modem European sovereign's claim to the death penalty arose from this 
historical position. 
However, there are further aspects of this European common heritage which are 
relevant and contribute in significant ways. The power of the death penalty mutated 
as Christian religion and then secular governments evolved. Christianity embraced 
the Inquisition and derived the legitimacy for mass executions from, predominantly, 
the Catholic Church's interpretation that the Christian God endorsed such 
punishment. 21 The Enlightem-nent witnessed the evolution of the Kantian categorical 
imperative of the death penalty being required for the satisfaction of the lex talionis. 22 
This reading of the Group's identified historical lineage also requires qualification 
through a juxtaposed argument which will percolate throughout these investigations. 
Just as the above reveals that the sovereign right to choose whether or not to use the 
19 Michael Foucault The Will to Knowledge: The History ofSexuality vol. I (trans: Robert 
Hurley)(London: Penguin, 1976) p. 135. 
20 See, Giorgio Agarnben, Homo Sacer. - Sovereign Power and Bare Life, (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1995), p. 128. 
21 James J. Megivem, The Death Penalty An Historical and Theological Survey, (New York: 
Paulist Press, 1997), pp. 97-122. 
22 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 154-159, in H. S. Reiss (ed) Kant: Political 
Writings, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). 
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death penalty is an intricate part of European legal, political, philosophical and 
religious historY, so too are the arguments against the punishment. 
The earliest recorded European debate on the death penalty is provided by the ancient 
Greek historian, Thucydides, which occurred in Athens in 427 BCE. The rýesult was 
23 that the Mytilenian revolt was not punished with death by the Athenians. After 
Cleon, the son of Cleaenetus, had fervently spoken in the Areopagus in favour of 
executing the Mytileanians, Diodotus, the son of Eucrates, gave a passionate plea for 
the sparing of their lives. He argued, "[w]e must not ... come to the wrong conclusions 
through having too much confidence in the effectiveness of capital punishment, and 
we must not make the condition of rebels desperate by depriving them of the 
possibility of repentance. , 
24 
Furthermore, the ancient Roman jurist, Marcus Tullius Cicero, during his infamous 
oratory in Roman courts, and his "lifelong practice as counsel for the defence, ý, 25 
powerfully argued against the death penalty. He stated his anti-death penalty position 
in that: 
[n]othing in the world could give me greater satisfaction than the knowledge 
that I myself, during this present consulship of mine, had succeeded in expelling 
the executioner from the Forum ... What I ... assert 
is that the presence of an 
23 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, (trans: Rex Warner) (London: Penguin, 1972), 
pp. 194-223. 
24 ibid, p. 22 1. 
25 Cicero, Murder Trials, (trans: Michael Grant)(London: Penguin, 1990), p. 267, 
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executioner must never, come what may, pollute the places where the Assembly 
,, 26 meets. 
Arguments against the death penalty were also heralded in early Christianity as the 
27 Waldensian sect were opposed to the Catholic imposition of the punishment. As the 
Enlightenment continued the Italian humanist, Cesarea Beccaria, presented his 
28 famous criminological treatise which inter alia argued against the punishment , and 
Voltaire exported the Italian's humanistic arguments to France. 29 Before he turned to 
a sanguinary use of the guillotine once in power, Maximilien Robespierre had 
vehemently renounced the punishment. 30 In 1831 Jeremy Bentham adapted his 
utilitarian theory to specifically attack the efficacy of the French use of the 
guillotine. 
31 
However, reviewing this historical period we are left with a brutal story which reveals 
that across Europe the states' power prevailed over the anti-death penalty arguments. 
The exercise of power was entrenched through a legitimising process intricately 
26 ibid, p. 273. 
27 Megivem, above, fh. 2 1, pp. 99-103. 
28 Cesare Beccaria, An Essay on Crimes and Punishment, (1775: Chicago: Branden Press, 1983), 
Chapter. 28. 
29 Voltaire, Commentary on the book 'On crimes and punishments, ' by aprovincial lawyer, pp. 
244-279, in David Williams (ed), Voltaire. - Political Writings, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994). 
30 Jean Matrat, Robespierre: Or the tyranny of the Majority, (trans: Alan Kendal ])(London: 
Angus and Robertson, 1975), p. 106-107. 
31 See generally, Jeremy Bentham, To His Fellow Citizens of 
France on Death Punishment, 
(London: Robert Heward, 183 1). 
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revealed within political philosophy. It will not be until the later part of the nineteenth 
century that European governments began to question their right of the death penalty, 
and the state renunciation of the punishment is the subject of the next chapter. So a 
vast political history reveals that the state has acquired the right of making capital 
laws. 
Placing the above history within the Enlightenment, we can see that at the dawn of 
the modem nation state, the death penalty was accepted as a legitimate punishment of 
the governing sovereigns. The European monarch's signing of the Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648 lays the specific legal foundation for this enquiry. Steven Greer 
has identified that the formation of the Council was a product of the Enlightenment 
liberalising process. 32 To further understand how this process contributed to the 
identification of the death penalty as being part of the common heritage and rule of 
law of theCouncil in 1949, it is necessary that we briefly outline the significance of 
the treaty. The American death penalty scholar, Adam Thurschwell, has argued the 
relevance of such legal-political history for an analysis of the death penalty. He has 
observed: 
there is a remarkable consensus in Western political philosophy, from the 
beginnings of post-Westphalian modemity to the present day, that identifies the 
essence of political sovereignty with the sovereign power to kill. 
33 
32 Greer, above, fn. 7, p. 2. 
33 Adam Thurschwell, Ethical Exception: Capital Punishment in the Figure ofSovereignty, p. 
11, in Austin Sarat and Jennifer Culbert, (ed) Killing States: Lethal Decisions, Final Judgments, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008) (forthcoming). 
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Thurschwell has noted a lineage for enquiry from this period in modemity through to 
contemporary penological analysis. He states that the political philosophy interpreting 
this lineage of sovereign power "is not only consistent over time, but more 
remarkable yet, across widely divergent traditions of thought [including the] liberal 
social contract theory. , 34 Thurschwell's observation on the relevance of the Treaty of 
Westphalia and the social contract theory to contemporary research on the death 
penalty can be applied to the drafting of the Convention. Let us therefore first 
consider the treaty, and then the social contract in this context. 
In 1949 the governments had, in efflect,, presented to the Council their heritage 
emanating from the Treaty of Westphalia. It is generally accepted that the origin of 
35 the modem state can be charted to this late medieval period, as it marked the 
ceasing of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), which encompassed the bloody 
religious struggles between the Catholic and Protestant Churches. The Treaty of 
Westphalia was signed to install peace in Europe. A politico-legal modernising 
project was initiated which dwindled the authority of natural and ecclesiastical law, 36 
through the formulation of positive law within specific territories. 37 This was the 
34 
ibid. 
35 See, Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno, (ed) Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty 
and International Relations, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), p. 5; 
Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 200 1), p. 23; Martin Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 73-5. 
36 See, Megivem, above, fn. 2 1, pp, 51-97. 
37 See, Loughlin, above, fh. 35, pp. 73-5. 
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genesis of the liberal state, as the "right to life and death" was prised away from the 
Catholic Church and placed within the hands of the sovereigns governing individual 
territories. 
Exclusive territorial control was reserved to the royal monarchs as outlined in the 
38 Treaty of Westphalia, Articles 64,65 and 67 which initiated: a) exclusive territorial 
rule, b) the prohibition of external interference of this rule, c) treaty making rights, d) 
exclusive rights for the formulation and interpretation of municipal laws, and e) as a 
result, each state was free to install their own criminal (including capital) judicial 
systems. 39 M. D. A. Freeman argued that the Treaty of Westphalia created a new "legal 
order" in Europe. 40 Martin Loughlin suggested that "an important aspect of this 
modemising project was the manner in which law was deployed. 5ý41 Positive law 
became an important tool for the government of the modem state and so the role of 
38 The Treaty of Westphalia 1648, Article 64, "... every one of the Electors, Princes and States of 
the Roman Empire, are so establish'd and confirm'd in their antient Rights, Prerogatives, 
Libertys, Privileges, free exercise of Territorial right... " Article 65, "They shall enjoy without 
contradiction: the Right of Suffrage, interpretation of laws, declaration of wars, imposing of 
taxes, levying or quartering of soldiers, erecting new fortifications in the Territorys of the States. 
Article 67, "They shall without molestation keep ... full jurisdiction within the inclusure of their 
walls and territorys. " 
39Article 44, "But for those who are subjects ... shall 
be obliged to confrom, and submit 
themselves to the laws of the Realms, or particular Provinces they shall belong to. " 
40 M. D. A. Freeman has confinned the politico-legal ideology of the Westphalian system in that, 
firstly the independence of states was established which rejected the feudal and papal authority, 
and secondly, that a new legal order was established, in Lloyd's Introduction to Jurisprudence, 
7'h Ed, (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 200 1), p. 199. 
41 See, Loughlin,, above, fh. 35, p. 75. 
39 
positive law would then become intertwined within the legitimising of the death 
penalty. Richard Evans noted that during this early modem period: 
[c]apital punishment's relationship with state formation seems to have been 
positive rather than negative. With the rise of the modem state, the right of 
execution, of power over life and death, came to be monopolised by the state 
and treated as an essential aspect of sovereignty. 42 
The Treaty of Westphalia formulated the model of modem European state power over 
life and death. This power evolved to produce a legitimate legal principle which 
allowed the sovereign state to formulate capital laws in 1648. 
Enlightenment philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, 
43 John Locke 44 and Jean- 
Jacques RousseaU45 provided a "scientific calculation" for the formation of society 46 
which can be historically discerned as following the political mechanisms set in place 
by the Treaty of Westphalia. Although these theorists proposed differing political 
approaches to both society and the state, without exception they identified that the 
42 Richard J. Evans, Rituals ofRetribution: Capital Punishment in Germany, 1600-1987, 
(London: Penguin, 1997), p. 893. 
43 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, (edited: J. C. A. Gaskin) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) 
44 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, (edited: C. B. Macpherson) (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Co, 1980). 
45 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, in The Social Contract and Discourses, (trans: 
G. D. H. Cole) (London: Everyman, 2004). 
46 Philip Ball, Critical Mass. - How One Thing Leads to Another, (London: Arrow Books, 2005), 
p. 33. 
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new political entities were created for the protection of the lives of those within the 
demarcated territories. Jean-Jacques Rousseau stated, "[flook into the motives which 
have induced men, once united by their common needs in a general society-you will 
find no other motive than that of assuring the property, life and liberty of each 
member by the protection of all, 147 and John Locke stated that the formation of the 
Commonwealth to promote the "public good of society. It is a power that hath no 
other end but preservation. , 48 Steven Greer observed that the "natural rights theorists 
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries argued ... everyone has an equal 'natural 
right' to survive, ' the 'right to life. 5iý49 Micheline Ishay, the human rights scholar, has 
similarly affirmed the emanation of natural rights from this period. 50 
The social contract theorists were also unanimous on that for the sovereigns to 
promote the right to life, it must be able to have ultimate rule over life, and this would 
include the right to put to death. In what can be seen as adopting the Westphalian 
ideology, Locke plainly stated the manifestation of the right in that "[p]olitical power, 
then, I take to be the right of making laws with penalties of death. ýý5 1 Hobbes argued 
through the creation of the Leviathan that the "sovereign power of life, and death, is 
47 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, A Discourse of Political Economy, p. 135, in The Social Contract and 
Discourses, (trans: G. D. H. Cole) (London: Everyman, 2004). 
48 Locke, above, fn. 44, Chapter 11. 
49 Greer, above, fn. 7, p. 2-3. 
50 Micheline R. Ishay, stated, "the liberal worldview first emerged out of the struggle for 
freedom of religion and opinion ... laying the groundwork 
for subsequent claims for a universal 
right to life, " in The History ofHuman Rights. - From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), p. 65. 
51 Locke, above, fh. 44, p. 8. 
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neither abolished or limited ... And therefore it may, and doth happen in 
commonwealths, that a subject may be put to death by the command of the sovereign 
power. , 52 Rousseau stated that "putting the guilty to death" was a right of the 
sovereign. 53 Immanuel Kant went so far as to exclaim that "[a]ll murderers ... must 
,, 54 suffer the death penalty. 
Adopting the principles from the Treaty of Westphalia and the social contract, the 
state captured a monopoly of legitimate action in national defence and the death 
penalty. In the early Twentieth Century, the sociologist, Max Weber, argued the 
identification of the state as being the holder of the "monopoly of legitimate physical 
force, , 55 and that the state must hold the ultimate authority to impose sanctions for 
violation of its laws. Weber described: 
[t]he modem position of political association rests on the prestige bestowed on 
them by the belief, held by their members, in a specific consecration: the 
'legitimacy' of that social action which is ordered and regulated by them. This 
prestige is particularly powerful where, and in so far as, social action comprises 
physical coercion, including the power to dispose over life and death. 
56 
52 Hobbes, above, fn. 43, Chapter 2 1, para 7. 
53 Rousseau, above, fh. 45, p. 209. 
54 Kant, above, fn. 13, p. 157. 
55 Max Weber, 'Politics as a Vocation, ' p. 78, in From Max Weber, (trans: H. H. Gerth and C. 
Wright Mills, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958). 
56 Max Weber, Economy and Society, (ed: Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich) (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1978), pp. 903-4. 
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Weber's sociological legitimising of the death penalty encompasses the Westphalian 
legislative and interpretive "monopoly" over criminal sanctions . 
57 Writing during the 
same time as Weber, the philosopher, Walter Benjamin explicitly identified the death 
penalty as a manifestation of legitimate violence. 58 Hence at the formation of the 
Council, the death penalty can be seen as accepted as a "legitimate" form of 
punishment and thus within the "rule of law. " Such philosophical and sociological 
observations place the sovereign state and the death penalty within the form of a 
symbiotic relationship. It is argued that the original Council Member States came 
armed with this political theorem. 
The various theoretical approaches presented above suggest the philosophical context 
within which the European governments approached the signing of the Statute with 
an acceptance that both the common heritage and the rule of law encompassed the 
right to make capital laws. Under the Statute the Member States had successfully 
retained the right of the death penalty. But could the Member States still claim this 
right during the first legislative project of the Council? Was this position reflected in 
the drafting of the Convention between 1949 and 1950? This is considered below. 
57 This sociological analysis has been accepted by the death penalty scholars, see, Austin Sarat, 
'Introduction: On Pain and Death as Facts of Legal Life, ' p. 3, Austin Sarat, (ed) Pain, Death 
and the Law, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 200 1); Timothy V. Kauftnan- 
Osborn, From Noose to Needle. - Capital Punishment and the Late Liberal State, (Ann Arbor: 
The University Of Michigan Press, 2002), pp. 50-52. 
" Walter Benjamin, 'Critique of Violence, ' p. 239, in Marcus Bullock and Michael Jennings, 
Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings, vol 1.1913-1926, (Belknap: Harvard University Press, 
1997). 
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2.3 The Drafting of the Convention 
2.3.1 The Aim of the Minimal Definition Requirement 
Some scholars argue that the Convention drafting debates published in the travaux 
preparatoires generally provide limited use for its interpretation . 
59However, when 
the death penalty is specifically considered what was said and not said during the 
drafting debates is of particular significance for an understanding of the application of 
the punishment. The travaux preparatoires provide information which uncover how 
the Member State's right to choose whether or not to impose executions appeared 
within the formation of the Convention. In Soering v. the United Kingdom, the 
landmark case concerning an Article 3 analysis of the death penalty, the European 
,, 60 Court of Human Rights specifically considered what was "intended by the drafters. 
William Schabas has also referred to the published debates in his authoritative work 
on the death penalty in international law. 61 Indeed, we will see that the published 
travaux preparatoires are extremely useful for understanding the specific Convention 
59 See for example, Andrew Z. Drzemczewski, European Human Rights Convention in Domestic 
Law: A Comparative Study, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 48; Clare Ovey and Robin C. A. 
White, Jacobs and White, The European Convention on Human Rights, 4 th ed, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), p. 40. 
60 Soering v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 1403 8/88,7"' July, 1989, para 103. This case 
is considered in detail in Chapters Five and Six. 
61 William A. Schabas, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law, 3 rd ed, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Urliversity Press, 2002), pp. 262-264, 
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protection of the Member State right to choose of whether or not to administer the 
punishment. 
The drafters of the Convention ensured that the Member States had a wide freedom to 
choose penological sanctions. To facilitate this they sought a basic, restricted, 
articulation of rights. 62 It is clear from the outset that the various drafting discussions 
could not accommodate all the necessary investigations to scrutinise fully how 
government policies and actions would affect each human right. A triage process was 
adopted to produce the Convention in an expedient manner. Teitgen stated: 
[w]e should need years of mutual understanding, study, and collective 
experiments, even to attempt after many years, with any hope of success, to 
formulate a complete and general definition of all the freedoms and all the rights 
which Europe should confer on the Europeans. Let us therefore discard for the 
moment this desirable maximum. Failing this, however, let us be content with 
the minimum which we can achieve in a very short period, and which consists in 
defining the seven, eight or ten fundamental freedoms that are essential for a 
democratic way of life and which our countries should guarantee to all their 
people. It should be possible to achieve a common definition of these 
(emphasis 
adde ). 
63 
62 Gordon Weil, The European Convention on Human Rights: Background, Development and 
Prospects, (Leyden: Sythoff, 1963), p. 28, 
11 TP, 1, above, fn- 1, p. 44. 
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Maxwell-Fyfe affirmed that the Convention was needed to come into "existence 
reasonably soon, 3ý64 and Teitgen further emphasised "the current year is the critical 
year ... we should do what we consider to be our duty towards Europe quickly, and we 
hope, effectively. , 65 However, the speed of the drafting debates did not allow for all 
the aspects of the rights to be discussed, and this included the compatibility of the 
right to life with the application of the death penalty. 
The published travaux preparatoires demonstrate that the drafters were under 
pressure from governments not to infringe national sovereignty, although they were 
also aware that the very creation of the Council and the drafting of the Convention did 
produce some surrender of domestic rule. Teitgen recounted that it had been "pointed 
out to us that we must pay attention to state sovereignty, ýý66 but Maxwell-Fyfe plainly 
stated to the drafting committee, "[flike all treaties, the proposed Convention would 
involve some voluntary surrender of sovereignty. , 67 Nevertheless, one clear position 
concerned the sovereign states' right of the death penalty. If sovereignty was to be 
surrendered this was not to include the right to impose the punishment. Natural law 
arguments were used to support this approach. 
Natural law was particularly important as a guiding methodology for the drafting 
process. Teitgen had argued, "who does not appreciate that these rights are 
fundamental, essential rights, and that there is no State which can, if it abuses them, 
64 ibid, TP, 1, p. 116. 
65 ibid, TP, 1, pp. 58-60. 
66 ibid, TP, 1, p. 294. 
67 ibid, TP, 1, p. 122. 
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claim to respect natural law and the fundamental principles of human dignity? " 
(emphasis added)68 Teitgen proposed natural law as an unproblematic concept 
grounded in the Enlightenment realisation of the right to life (as identified above), 
and he attempted swiftly to establish the contribution of natural law in formulating 
the "minimum" standard of the definition of human rights when he stated in the 
-1 - drafting discussions: 
[y]ou will allow me, I hope, not to enter into a philosophical discussion ... 
but in 
my Report I touched on the principles of natural law. In the preamble, I 
preferred not to make any sort of definition of this natural law. It has a history 
as old as the world and as our civilisation; it is the natural law of Antigone; it is 
also that of Cicero ... 
Then there is the natural law of Christianity and of 
humanism. These are the principles and ideals upon which our Statute is 
based. 69 
This promotion of natural law did not allow for any debates on what it actually was, 
or what the drafters thought it was. But to be compatible with the above historical 
considerations, natural law had to have been interpreted as confirming the acceptance 
of the death penalty, and neither be applied to restrict nor reject it. Sophocles's 
Ancient Greek theatrical tragedy, the Antigone, may be seen as providing the origin 
of natural law, includes the possibility of the death penalty in the dialogue between 
Ismene and Antigone. Ismene stated: 
68 ibid, TP, 1, pp. 268-70. 
69 ibid, TP, 2, p. 32. 
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[n]ow look at the two of us, left so alone 
Think what a death we'll die, the worst of all 
If we violate the laws and override 
the fixed decree of the throne, 
its power-We must be sensible, 
70 
Costas Douzinas, the scholar of legal theory, has offered a reading of Antigone which 
coincides with the presence of the death penalty in natural law, when he stated: 
[i]f Antigone is the foundation of Western law and jurisprudence, her stone is a 
burial stone that both conceals and reveals the deathbound nature of legality. It 
is this sepulchral quality of law that makes Walter Benjamin say there is 
'something rotten in law. ' 71 
70 Antigone, p. 62 in, Sophocles, The Three Theban Plays, (London: Penguin, 1948); and again, 
when Creon declares: 
Imagine it: I caught her in naked rebellion 
the traitor, the only one in the whole city 
I'm not about to prove myself a liar 
not to my people, no, I'm going to kill her 
Creon, lines 730-734, p. 94. 
71 Costas Douzinas, Law Deathbound. - Antigone and the Dialectics ofNomos and Thanatos, p. 
164, in Desmond Manderson (ed), Courting Death: The Law ofMorality, (London: Pluto Press, 
1999). 
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Douzinas's reference to Walter Benjamin's phrase explicitly connects natural law to 
the death penalty, as Benjamin had identified that it was the death penalty itself which 
revealed the rotten element in law. He stated, "an attack on capital punishment assails 
not legal measure, not laws, but law itself in its origin ... 
in this very violence 
something rotten in law is revealed. ýý 
72 
Furthermore, Teitgen's identification of the natural law of Christianity, may also be 
interpreted as accepting the death penalty. The punishment applied within 
Christianity is referred to above, and the French philosopher, Jacques Derrida has 
argued that "[u]p until the twenty-first century, almost without exception, the 
Catholic Church has been in favour of the death penalty, ý73 and that "the death 
penalty has always been the effect of an alliance between a religious message and the 
,, 74 sovereignty of a state . 
The drafters also did not provide any arguments that the punishment was per se 
incompatible with European humanism. The humanist, Cesarea Beccaria, is renowned 
as the herald of the Enlightenment arguments against the death penalty but he also 
maintained, in an oft ignored passage by modem day abolitionists, that there is one 
exception where the death penalty may be applied, "when though deprived of his 
liberty, he has such power and connections as may endanger the security of the 
72 Benjamin, above, fh. 58, p. 242. 
73 Jacques Derrida, 'Capital Punishment: Another "Temptation of Theodicy, "' p. 197, in Seyla 
Benhabib and Nancy Fraser (eds) Pragmatism, Critique, Judgment., Essaysfor Richard 
J 
Bernstein, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2004). 
74 ibid, p. 200. 
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nation. ýý75 As such, Beccaria was arguing that the death penalty can be limited to 
circumstances of national self-defence. Specifically engaging with Beccaria's 
statement, Derrida went so far as to say, "when it is inspired by the logic of Beccaria, 
as is almost always the case, the abolitionist argumentation weakens itself, , 76 and 
that, "[c]an these lines not be read as one of the most effective pleas for the death 
penalty? "77 Of this circumstance, Derrida stated further, "I will dare to say that the 
death penalty has always answered deeply "humanist" pleas. This is how it is in 
European law. , 78 
Derrida's reference here applied to the Convention and it can be used to explain this 
particular historical application. He enables us to conclude that the drafters did not 
consider that humanistic arguments prevented the death penalty from being 
incorporated into the Convention. We can therefore identify that the drafters 
possessed little inclination to challenge the death penalty. It was accepted through 
1950s interpretations of natural law, Christian natural law and humanism. The 
apparent anomaly of Cicero, mentioned above, was not adequately considered by the 
drafters and there are no published records to suggest that they specifically engaged 
with Cicero's speeches. What then occurred was an acceptance of the death penalty 
within the drafting of Article 2(l). 
" Beccaria, above, fn. 28, Chapter 28. 
76 Derrida, above, fn. 73, p. 206. 
77 ibid, p. 22 1. 
78 
ibid. 
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2.3.2 Article 2(1) and the Death Penalty 
From the very beginning of the drafting debates there was a conflict of opinion on 
how they should approach the question of the right to life. The civil lawyers argued 
for an enumeration of rights, but the common law lawyers stated that a definition of 
the extent of the right was necessary. Elizabeth Wicks has stated that this 
"disagreement may be in part a legacy of the different approaches to the common law 
,, 79 and civil law systems. The debate resulted in a stalemate and two Convention 
drafts were then submitted to the Secretariat General. 80 Draft Alternative A presented 
an enumeration of rights, 81 and Draft Alternative B provided a definition of rights. 82 
The right to life, and the death penalty as a possible infringement of this right, 
provi es a good example of the friction between the two drafting techniques proposed 
and A. H. Robertson argued that the civil lawyers: 
79 Elizabeth Wicks, 'The United Kingdom Government's Perception of the European 
Convention on Human Rights at the Time of Entry, ' P. L. 43 8 (2000), p. 43 9. 
80 For the issue of the different drafting techniques, the Secretariat General stated "As regards 
the substance of the collective guarantee, the Assembly and its Legal Committee were faced 
with two problems: 1) the enumeration of the rights to be guaranteed, the list of rights to be 
covered by the guarantee system; 2) the definition of those rights in terms of extent and content, 
both nationally and internationally, " in the Preparatory Report by the Secretariat General 
concerning a preliminary draft convention to provide a collective guarantee of human rights, 
(Doc. B22), TP, 3, above, fn. 1, p. 6. 
81 
ibid, P. 312. 
82 ibid, p. 320; ibid, TP 4, p. 16, states, "the Committee decided to submit both texts to the 
Committee of Ministers, without indicating its preference, since it was not able to decide 
unanimously in favour of one or other of these systems. " 
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were content to incorporate these words textually in the draft Convention. The 
common lawyers, on the other hand, thought that a statement of the 'right to 
life, 5 necessitated a statement of the circumstances in which someone may be 
83 legally deprived of his life. 
The drafters adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (hereinafter, 
"UDHR")84 as a template of the rights which they thought appropriate to discuss in 
the initial drafting quorum. Teitgen opened the first session and set out what he 
believed to be the most important rights for debate, and borrowing from the UDHR, 
identified ten initial "rights .,, 
85 The first proscribed 'right' was to "ensure ... security of 
the person, in accordance with Articles 3-5, and 8 of the United Nations 
Declaration. , 86 Concerning the "right to life, " UDHR Article 3 stated, "Everyone has 
8' A. H. Robertson, The European Conventionfor the Protection ofHuman Rights, (1950) 
B. YLL. 145, p. 15 1. As a result of this idiomatic conflict two drafts were finally sent to the 
Committee of Ministers, "Alternative A" provided an enumeration of rights, and "Alternative B" 
a definition, see TP, 3, above, fn. 1, p. 312,320, and ibid, TP, 4, p. 10. 
84 GA Res. 217 A (111), UN Doc. A/8 10; A/RES/62/149,76hPlenary Session, 18 December 
2007. 
85 The ten rights were taken from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They were: a) 
security of the person; b) immunity from all arrest, detention or arbitrary exile; c) exemption 
from all slavery and servitude, and from all forced labour of discriminatory nature; d) freedom 
of speech and in general of the expression of opinion; e) freedom of religious belief, practice and 
teaching; f) freedom of association and meeting; g) natural rights appertaining to marriage, 
paternity and the family; h) inviolability of domicile; i) equality before the law; j) protection 
against all discrimination based on religion, race, national origin, profession of political opinion 
or other opinion, see, TP, 1, above, fn. 1, p. 160. 
86 
ibid, p. 296. 
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the right to life, liberty and security of the person" but this was interpreted as not 
prohibiting the death penalty. 87 
In Teitgen's enumeration of rights, he did not explicitly use the words "right to life, " 
the "death penalty" or "capital punishment. " But concerning the possibility of the 
punishment, what occurred within the debates was a gradual move away from the 
enumeration of the right to life, to a definition of when the state may legally impose 
executions. As we will see, this shift in emphasis was predominantly guided by the 
delegates from the United Kingdom, and Wicks argues that the different drafting 
negotiators were "in no doubt about the strength of the feeling on the part of the 
United Kingdom, " and that the precise definitions were an "essential prerequisite to 
any Convention. , 88 The importance of this may be nuanced, but what was achieved 
was that the Member State right to choose whether or not to impose the death penalty, 
instead of being implied within the Convention text, was to be explicitly mandated. 
The text first evolved towards a definition when the European Movement worded 
their Draft European Convention on Human Rights, Article I as, "[e]very state party 
to this Convention shall guarantee to all persons within its territory the following 
rights: a) Security of life and limb... "89 "Security" did not yet represent a "right" to 
life, but merely, that the government should secure the life of its citizens. 
87 Schabas, above, fn. 61, p. 41. 
" Wicks, above, fn. 79, p. 440. 
89 Draft European Convention on Human Rights, Conventionfor the collective protection Of 
individual rights and democratic liberties by the states, Members of the Council of 
Europe, and 
for the establishment of a European Court of Human Rights to ensure the observance of the 
Convention, prepared by the European Movement, cited in TP, 1, above, 
fn. 1, p. 296. 
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Then in the United Nations drafting debates of the International Covenant of Civil 
and Political Rights, on 4 January 1950, the Secretary General received a report from 
the governments of Australia, Denmark, France, Lebanon and the United Kingdom. 
This report recommended that the Article on the right to life should include a textual 
explanation which more clearly defined the administration of the death penalty. The 
United Kingdom government presented this UN report to the Convention drafting 
meeting as a Working Paper. The provisions concerning the death penalty stated: 
1. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally, 
2. There shall be no exception to this rule save where death results in those States 
where capital punishment is lawful, from the execution of such a penalty in 
accordance with the sentence of a court. 90 
The United Kingdom proposal was an attempt to define when the right to life can be 
restricted and began to establish the parameters for state application of the 
punishment. The proposal can be read as identifying that the language of human 
rights should encompass an explicit mandate legitimising the state's choice over the 
use of the punishment. Furthermore, the declaration "in those States where capital 
punishment is lawful, " endorsed the death penalty as ultimately a municipal issue. 
The United Kingdom therefore confirmed that any new human rights discourse in 
1950 could not override the state's internal monopoly over the legislation of capital 
crimes. Following further drafting discussions, this specific phrasing was modified by 
90 Annex 11 of the Report of the Commission, (E/1371), cited in ibid, TP 3, p. 158. 
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a subsequent United Kingdom proposal. However, the purpose of maintaining 
municipal authority remained unchanged as it stated: 
[t]he Government of the United Kingdom desire that the Convention, which the 
present Committee have been asked to draft, should contain certain articles 
which appear in the text of the latest draft of the United Nations Convention of 
Human Rights 
... Article 5 of the latest version of the United Nations draft 
Covenant refers to punishment of offenders including deprivation of life. If the 
Committee should desire to include this article in the proposed new Convention, 
the United Kingdom desire that the text of it should be as follows: 
1) No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of the 
sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which his penalty is 
defined by law (emphasis added). 91 
This new proposal confirmed the sovereign state's right to legislate capital crimes, 
but it removed the words "capital punishment" and "death" from the specific 
Convention draft. These words which were formally adequate descriptions identifying 
r the punishment and its consequence were substituted. The travaux preparatoires do 
not explain why the phrases were changed and there are no specific records of any 
debates on whether the application of the death penalty was inconsistent with the 
formation of the Convention text. 
91 
ibid, p. 186. 
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Torkel Opsahl noted that the "United Kingdom proposal was not opposed and there 
are no signs that restrictions nor limitations on its use were intended or even 
discussed. 5592 All we have is the tabled proposal and then the amended proposal. He 
further stated, "[flf there was any discussion of what was intended [concerning the 
death penalty] the published travaux preparatoires reveal little of it.,, 93 J. E. S. Fawcett 
has also confirmed "there is almost no reported discussion on the drafts. 5994 
What the travaux preparatoires do chronicle are numerous side-comments related to 
the death penalty. These comments included the execution of the Greek philosopher, 
Socrates, discussed by Mr. Maccus, the Greek representative at the first session of the 
Consultative Assembly. 95 At the presentation of questions concerning Teitgen's 
original report, what the rapporteur meant by "security of person" was not debated or 
whether an execution violated this "security. , 96 In the same debate the Turkish 
representative, Mr. Diistinsel, questioned the validity of "so-called popular courts 
condemning to death and executing deputies" and stated that this was a "travesty of 
justice. " 97 But these comments were not picked up as essential for formulating any 
specific debate on whether the death penalty was a possible violation of the text. 
92 Torkel Opsahl, The Right to Life, p. 217, in R. St. J. Macdonald, (et al, ed) The European 
.1- 
for the Protection of Human Rights, (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1993). Svstem 
93 ibid, p. 208; see also, B. G. Ramcharan, (ed) The Right to Life in International Law, 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), pp. 57-61. 
94 U. S. Fawcett, The Application of the European Convention on Human Rights, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 34. 
95 TP, 1, above, fn. 1, p. 108. 
96 ibid, p. 160. 
97 ibid, TP, 2, p. 30. 
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There are also no specific discussions dealing with the scope of the death penalty. In 
theory, even under the new Convention system of human rights, the punishment could 
be applied to any crimes which were legislated as a 'capital crime. ' Brian Simpson 
argued, within his authoritative study on the Convention, that Article 2(1) "had 
nothing to say as to what crimes could be capitally punished. ýM The drafters did not 
mention the mandatory or discretionary application of the punishment or whether it 
was appropriate for an appeals process to be guaranteed or whether capital laws could 
be retroactively applied. 99 Also no mention of whether human rights prohibit any 
specific execution method, including the guillotine, gas chamber, hanging or 
shooting. There was also no mention of whether clemency petitions should be 
guaranteed. 100 
Furthermore, the subsequent fourteen proposals to amend Article 2 did not challenge 
the Member State right of the death penalty. 101 Only four proposals considered 
Article 2 generally but did not refer to the punishment. 102 In the subsequent proposed 
9' A. W. Brian Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis ofthe 
European Convention, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 876. 
99 Although following the retroactive application of the Nuremburg Charter in the sentencing of 
the defendants at the Nuremburg Tribunal, it cannot be stated that at this time the Convention 
would prevent retroactively applied death sentences, see Hans Kelsen, 'Will the Judgment in the 
Nuremburg Trial Constitute a Precendent in International LawT I Int. L. Q. 153 (1947). 
100 See, Weil, above, fn. 62, p. 46. 
101 See TP, 3, above, fn. 1, p. 190, 
102 Luxembourg (A 783); Ireland (A 778) Ireland and Turkey (A 776) and Italy (A 786), see, 
Index of Amendments Proposed, (Doc A 795), ibid, p. 198. 
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drafts of the Convention text there were only small amendments shifting the right to 
life from a position of Article number 3 to number 2, and whether it should be all one 
sentence or include a subsection. However, the effect of the wording was left 
unchanged, and the final wording of Article 2(l) is: 
Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of 
his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his 
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 
This is essentially the same mandate as provided in the final United Kingdom 
proposal. What is added is the right to life at the beginning of the Article, and the 
word "defined" is replaced by "provided" by law. Both adjectives appear to provide 
the same result as they confirm that a capital crime must be legislated in the civil 
codes and statutes, or be developed through the common law of Member States. It 
also provides that the death penalty must be "provided by law, " and that a "court" 
only has competence to pass such a sentence. If these provisions were met, at this 
moment in European history the death penalty was an acceptable punishment by 
virtue of the specific wording of Article 2(l). We now consider how Article 3 was 
weighed within this acceptance of the punishment. 
2.3.3 Article 3 and the Absence of the Death Penalty 
Questions concerning the prohibition of torture and circumstances of inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment can be read as originally fused within Teitgen's 
58 
proposal of "[s]ecurity of life and limb. " 103 However, the two issues of the right to 
life and inhuman punishment, were separated in the Convention with Article 2(l) 
corresponding with UDHR Article 3. Convention Article 3, was then drafted 
independently to mirror UDHR Article 5, which stated, "[n]o one shall be subjected 
to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. " During the 
presentation of Article 3, a debate on the state imposition of "torture" occurred, and 
the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Cocks, argued: 
[t]he Consultative Assembly takes this opportunity of declaring that all forms of 
physical torture, whether inflicted by the police, military authorities, members 
of private organisations or any other persons, are inconsistent with civilised 
society, are offences against heaven and humanity and must be prohibited. It 
declares that this prohibition must be absolute and that torture cannot be 
permitted for any purpose whatsoever, either for extracting evidence, to save 
life or even for the safety of the state. The Assembly believes that it would be 
better even for society to perish than for it to permit this relic of barbarism to 
remain 104 (emphasis added). 
The United Kingdom proposed a recommendation that the article should be worded 
as, "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
103 ibid, TP, I p. 160. 
104 Proposal by Mr. Cocks, Doc. No. 113, in ibid, TP, 2, p. 3 6. Antonio Cassese stated, "Mr. 
Cocks emphasised that his proposals were intended as a barrier against a return to barbarism 
such as that experienced by Europe on account of Nazi atrocities, " 
in, Prohibition of Torture and 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, pp. 227, in Macdonald, above, 
fn. 92. 
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or punishment. " 105 The wording was eventually modified to "[n]o one shall be 
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. "' 06 The 
r word "cruel" was removed but the travaux preparatoires do not explain why though 
Fawcett argued that it was a repetitive phrase next to "inhuman. " 107 
The travaux preparatoires reveal little of the discussions concerning what categories 
of "punishment" may contravene this Article. Following Mr. Cocks's submissions5 
the debates almost exclusively focused upon torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment. As the drafters had accepted that the death penalty was included in Article 
2(l), it appears they had not ventured to debate whether the prohibition against 
"inhuman punishment" should be interpreted to prohibit the application of executions 
in any way. It is argued that in 1950 Article 2(l) permitted the sovereign state choice 
of the death penalty to remain in the Convention, as long as it was applied within the 
confines of the rule of law and administered by an impartial court. However, under 
Article 3 at the time of the drafting of the Convention any possible scrutiny of the 
death penalty was unclear. 
From the silence of the drafters on the issue, it appears that they did not address this 
human rights and penological conundrum. Either the drafters were not aware of the 
potential difficulties of reconciling Articles 2(l) and 3 or they were aware but did not 
know how to resolve any potential conflicts. Or, as detailed above, the two positions 
105 Amendments to Article 2 of the Recommendation of the Consultative Assembly proposed by 
the expert of the United Kingdom, Doc. A 798, TP, 3, abovýe, fn. 1, p. 204. 
106 Draft Convention Appended to the Draft Report Doc. CM/WP 4 (50) 16, in ibid, TP 4, p. 
218. 
107 See, Fawcett, above, fn. 94, p. 42. 
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provided under the two Articles were a demonstration of the purported "minimum" to 
be achieved, and not the "maximum" encompassing of all possible scenarios of 
Article 3 violations. What is evident is that the drafters were content to present the 
Articles as they were and leave any potential controversies for further resolution as 
Teitgen stated that complete interpretations of the Articles would need years of 
"mutual understanding, study and collective experiments. " 108 
As this thesis reveals in Chapters Five and Six, the different organs of the Council 
have evolved their interpretation of both Articles 2(1) and 3 to severely restrict and 
renounce the death penalty. But at this time the punishment was not acknowledged to 
be a violation of the "right to life" or against the prohibition of "inhuman 
punishment, " and this would also include the application of the death penalty in times 
of emergency. 
2.3.4 Article 15 and the Use of the Death Penalty in Times of Emergency 
In situations which may be interpreted as constituting a political "emergency, " the 
states wanted to ensure that they could dictate their own actions, and derogate from 
the Convention. In the 'Preliminary Draft Convention, 
"09 Alternative A, which set 
out a definition of the rights did not include a derogation clause, but Alternative 
B 
which provided an enumeration of rights did. It stated: 
108 TP, 1, above, fh. 1, p. 44. 
109 Doc. CM/VvP 1 (50) 14, in ibid, TP 3, p. 312. 
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[i]n time of war or other public emergency threatening the interests of the 
people a State may take measures derogating from its obligations under this 
Convention to the extent strictly limited by the exigencies of the situation, 
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under 
international law (emphasis added). 
Alternative B provided for possible wide derogation. If the "interests of the people" 
are threatened, then the state may "take measures" against this threat. What the 
"interests" were may have been interpreted to encompass a wide variety of 
circumstances which the state could argue are emergency situations. However, the 
wording finally evolved into a more defined and restricted definition. In order to 
allow signatory states to derogate from the Convention, Article 15(l) provided: 
[i]n time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any 
High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations 
under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other 
obligations under international law (emphasis added). 
The inclusion of Article 15 goes to the root issue of legitimate state reactions against 
threats within, and from outside,, its municipal jurisdiction, and must be seen as a 
manifestation of state control over life and death. Greer notes that "Article 15 is based 
on a presumption that the public interest in the preservation of 'the life of the nation' 
should take precedence over all but a handful of non-derogable rights whenever this 
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is 'threatened' by 'war or other public emergency. "' 110 Thurschwell argues that the 
state's right to impose the death penalty "remains in reserve, " and that "here we see 
the fundamental connection between the practice of capital punishment and the 'state 
of emergency. """ When the state is threatened by emergency situations, such as war, 
it wants to reserve within its arsenal effective response. In 1949, such response must 
be interpreted to include the possibility to choose the death penalty. 
However, Article 15 does place certain restrictions on Member State action in 
derogation. Specifically concerning the death penalty and inhuman punishment, 
Article 15(2) states that there can be "no derogation from Article 2, except in respect 
of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from [Article 3]. " Both paragraphs I 
and 2 support the view that death sentences and executions can be legitimised as long 
as they comply with Articles 2(l) and 3. Hence no derogation may be made against 
war criminals facing a "court of law" and they cannot be executed by any extra- 
judicial means. 
The emphasis of providing war criminals due process of law can be seen when the 
Director of the Penal Branch of the Legal Division of the British Control Commission 
argued for the observance of due process for war criminals, and stated, "[u]nder no 
circumstances will anyone be executed regarding whom there is any possible 
doubt. " 112 Article 15 is therefore vital to the analysis of whether the application of the 
110 Greer, above, fn. 7, p. 180. 
111 Thurschwell, above, fn 3 3, p. 15. 
112 PROTO 1060/244: Confidential Draft from the Director, Penal Branch, to Mr, J. C. 
Piegrome, 27 February 1948. Subject: Executions, cited in Evans, above, fh. 42, p. 743. 
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death penalty, within emergency situations, was considered a legitimate state 
application of the punishment or an illegitimate one. The parameters set by Article 
2(1) are extremely important for establishing legitimacy in the state application of the 
punishment in emergency situations. 
Although the drafting debates record few specific discussions on the death penalty, 
we can point to many drafting discussions on the distinction in emergency situations 
between "reason of state" and state actions of "self-defence. " 
In 1949-50 the drafters were still acutely aware of the need to protect against threats 
to peace and security in Europe. They were particularly concerned with attempts to 
distinguish between an illegitimate response and a legitimate response by the state. 
For them an illegitimate government action was what they termed "reason of 
state. " 113 This was seen to occur when a government promoted totalitarian political 
ideologies, such as Nazism, Fascism or Communism, and cause mass human rights 
violations. Hence the drafters can be seen to attempt to mandate that it was not 
legitimate to expect European citizens to agree to laws which were destructive of 
their own life, liberty and property. This is reflective of the Enlightenment social 
contract theorists which argued that the modem European sovereign was created for 
the protection of the life of its citizens. Such totalitarian sentiments were in conflict 
with this political theory. 
On 19 August 1949, Teitgen addressed the Consultative Assembly and identified that 
the first and prominent enemy of human rights derived from what he termed "reason 
113 TP. 1, above, fn. I, p. 38. 
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of state. " Arguing for the implicit promotion of the right to life within his view of 
natural law, he maintained, "every man, by reason of his origin, his nature and his 
destiny, has certain indefensible rights, against which no reason of state may 
prevail. "' 14 On 7 September 1949 Teitgen presented a report to the drafting 
committee and explained that "reason of state" occurred when: 
[the state] intervenes to suppress to restrain and to limit these freedoms 
for 
... reasons of state; to protect itself according to political tendency which it 
represents, against an opposition which it considers dangerous; to destroy 
fundamental freedoms which it ought to make itself responsible for co- 
ordinating and guaranteeing, then it is against public interest if it intervenes. 
Then the laws which it passes are contrary to the principle of the international 
guarantee. 
115 
Teitgen was attempting to identify human rights violations which appear to occur 
outside of any democratic, constitutional (legal), authority. However, what Teitgen 
and the drafters had not appeared to realise was that "reason of state" was achieved, 
through and implemented, by law. How this "reason of state" was created by the 
114 ibid Teitgen further stated, I think we can now unanimously confront 'reason of state. ' TP 
1, p. 50; Later in the Committee on Legal and Administrative Questions, he reinforced his point 
by arguing that the Convention would provide, "protection against a possible return of those 
aggressions, made for reason of state, " ibid, TP 1, p. 292; . Marie-Benedict 
Dembour, argued 
that reason of state, "can all too easily become a pretext for 'vicious' actions" on the part of the 
state, in Who Believes in Human Rights? Reflections on the European Convention, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 40. 
115 TP. 1, above, fn. 1, p. 278. 
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National Party in Germany was through what Teitgen identified as the "doctrines of 
death. " 116 
This doctrine of death was manifest within the jurisprudence of the "suspension of the 
constitution" 117 advanced by the German Professor of Public Law, Carl Schmitt. It is 
useful to engage with Schmitt's theories as his theories were initially adopted by the 
Reich as a mechanism to formulate its Nazi agenda. However, the analysis of Schmitt 
is confined to aspects which are specifically relevant to the interpretation of the 
drafting of the Convention. 
118 The suspension of the constitution thus produces for 
Schmitt an "exceptional" circumstance which operated contrary to the norm of liberal 
constitutionalism: the orthodox liberal principles which promote democracy and the 
promotion of equality and the right to life. He grounded this theory within the 
application of Article 48 of the 1919 Weimar Constitution. He stated: 
116 Teitgen stated, "Fascism and Hitlerism have unfortunately tainted European public opinion. 
These doctrines of death have infiltrated into our countries, They have left their mark. They have 
poisoned certain sections of public opinion, " ibid, p. 40. 
117 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, (trans: 
George Schwab) (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1988), p. 7. 
118 Carl Schmitt's public law theories are resurfacing through legal and philosophical critique, 
see Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer. - Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 
(Staford: Stanford 
University Press, 1998); ibid, State of Exception, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); 
Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The political philosophy of cosmopolitanism, 
(London: Routl edge- Caven dish, 2007); and Bill Bowring, The Degradation of the 
International 
Legal Order? The Rehabilitation of Law and the Possibility of Politics, (Abington: Routledge- 
Cavendish, 2008), pp. 132,143-144. 
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[a]ccording to Article 48 of the German Constitution of 1919, the exception is 
declared by the president of the Reich but is under the control of the parliament, 
the Reichstag, which can at any time demand its suspension. This provision 
corresponds to the development and practice of the liberal constitutional state, 
which attempts to repress the question of sovereignty by a division and mutual 
control of competences. But only the arrangement of the precondition that 
governs the invocation of exceptional powers corresponds to the liberal 
constitutional tendency, not the content of Article 48. Article 48 grants 
unlimited power. 
119 
The granting of "unlimited power" was a dangerous situation which the new 
Convention human rights system attempted to curtail, because once the Reichstag 
suspends the constitution through the exception, there is no check on the Reich's 
exercise of power. However, this jurisprudential problem was not resolved by the 
Convention drafters, and here we can identify a legislative deficiency through their 
refusal to delve into questions of political philosophy and legal theory. They had, in 
effect, rendered the state of exception being potentially unconfined by the 
Convention, because the exceptional circumstances were mandated by "law. " 120 Thus 
the death penalty in the state of exception, in theory, would not be a violation of 
Article 2(l) because it is imposed through capital laws, and such an argument would 
" Schmitt, above, fn, 117, p. 11. 
120 1 am in agreement with Rainer Maria Kiesow, who argues that the exception itself is a legal 
act (and this would be consistent with Article 48), see, Law and Life, p. 251 in Andrew Norris 
(ed), Politics, Metaphysics, and Death. - Essays on Giorgio Agamben's Homo Sacer, (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2005). 
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be in accord with Brian Simpson's observation that the under emergency 
circumstances death penalty could be potentially applied for any crimes at all. "' 
Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution was "law. " The fundamental principle here is 
the presence of an apparent unfettered sovereign recourse to Article 48 "which can at 
any time" be resorted to, and Schmitt later confirmed, "[s]overeign is he who decides 
on the exception. " 122 The exception marks the locus of ultimate power within the 
state, and concerning law, "All law is situational law. The sovereign produces and 
guarantees the situation in its totality. He has the monopoly over this last decision. " 123 
Schmitt maintained that a "philosophy of concrete life must not withdraw from the 
exception and the extreme case, but must be interested in it to the highest degree, " 124 
and that "in the exception the power of real life breaks through. " 125 Derrida agreed 
that "no sovereignty [exists] without the right to the exception, without the right, 
Schmitt will say, to suspend the law, " 126 and that this "is how Schmitt defines the 
sovereign: the ability to decide the exception, and the right to suspend the law. " 127 In 
his scholarship on the death penalty, Thurschwell has observed that the "resurgence 
of interest in the relationship between sovereignty and the rule of law has led to a re- 
engagement with Schmitt's theories, " and that "this currently influential branch of 
121 Simpson, above, fn. 98, p. 876. 
122 Schmitt, above, fn. 117, p. 5. 
123 ibid, P. 13. 
124 ibid, P. 15. 
125 ibid. 
126 Derrida, above, fh. 73, p. 199, 
127 ibid, p. 201. 
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Political philosophy necessarily passes through the question of the state's power to 
kill 
... capital punishment is highly relevant here. " 
128 
Therefore, if Schmitt is correct, it needs to be identified whether the drafters 
attempted to ensure that the state of exception was confined and repudiated. Or 
whether any prevention of the state of exception was possible at all? The Article 2(l) 
mandate may be read as an attempt to establish a prohibition against the sovereign 
Member States from stepping outside basic constitutional procedural safeguards 
before imposing a death penalty: which would include the requirement of a capital 
law and the imposition of that law by a competent court. As such it is argued that, 
although the drafters had not explicitly engaged with the issue, it would have been 
their sentiment that Article 2(l) would accept all death penalties. 
Relevant to this position, Derrida has identified that this "sovereign exception, this 
absolute immunity, is something that many national laws and certain international law 
are tending, very laboriously and at the price of many contradictions, again to place in 
question. " 129 Although it was not stated in the drafting debates, it is argued that the 
drafters tried to call the state of exception, through the renunciation of reason of state, 
into question. But they were apparently unsure how to achieve this fully. So we return 
to the "minimal" requirement, and the need for future political experiments to achieve 
more thorough definitions. 
12' Thurschwell, above, fn. 33. p. 14, fn 38. 
129 Derrida, above, fh. 73, p. 210. 
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What we can ascertain through this above analysis is that the Convention did not 
renounce the sovereign right of the death penalty, but the drafters wanted to try to 
penetrate the sovereign right when it was interpreted as imposing executions outside 
of normal protections of liberal constitutionalism. 
But even though the drafters wanted to penetrate this sovereign action, they appeared 
not to have adequately articulated how this was to occur under the Convention. The 
best we can identify, is that the drafters attempted to deal with this jurisprudential 
issue as a distinction between "reason of state" and state actions in "self-defence. " 
In opposition to the liberal identification of illegitimate actions of "reason of state, " 
an action of state "self-defence" was recognised as both legitimate and necessary. The 
drafters considered it an essential component of the protection of human rights and a 
possible combat against "reason of state. " In the first session of the Consultative 
Assembly drafting debates, Mr. Maccus, the Greek representative, outlined the 
fundamental position of the state being able to defend itself legitimately. He argued: 
[t]he freedom of Europe in general, both for the States which compose it and for 
the citizens who form those States, is dependent on their capacity to defend 
themselves ... for freedom to exist there must 
be security ... Otherwise freedom 
would perish in suici e. 
130 
then Maxwell-Fyfe agreed with Maccus and stated: 
TP, 1, above, fn. 1, p. 108. 
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[the Convention] provides a system of collective security against tyranny and 
oppression. It is not enough to possess freedom: positive action must be taken to 
defend it ... by this Convention we give a warning, a challenge and a first 
counter-stroke to the intending tyrant. " 131 
These arguments in the Consultative Assembly must be understood in the light of the 
drafters' concern about "reason of state. " As Maccus further maintained the "tyrannic 
acts of those who misuse power, " must be condemned and "when stating our rights, 
let us also state our duties; when proclaiming our freedom, let us also proclaim our 
will to defend and to safeguard it. -) ý 
132 Maccus' language possesses philosophical 
undertones when he speaks of the "duties" of the state and the need for the state to 
"defend" the rights of the citizens. This principle of political philosophy was affirmed 
as Teitgen argued, "[w]hen the state defines, organises, regulates and limits 
freedoms 
... 
in the interests of, and for the better insurance of, the general well-being, 
it is only fulfilling its duty. This is permissible: this is legitimate. " 133 Following the 
war, and during the administration of the executions of war criminals, the relationship 
of the death penalty with the state action of self-defence was a strong manifestation of 
the psychology of govemment at the time. 
The traditional philosophical analysis of "defence" is located in the discourse on the 
sovereign's right to punish the individual(s) in order to protect the majority, against 
individuals such as Benjamin's "great criminal" who contests the state's monopoly of 
131 ibid, p. 120. 
132 ibid, p. 110. 
133 ibid, P. 278. 
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legitimate physical force. 134 The limit question which reached the core of the self- 
defence of the state was utilitarian. A deontological human right became secondary to 
this consideration. In effect, the Convention drafters asked: when the life of the state 
is threatened which should perish, the threatening individual(s) or the state? 
Consequentially, Convention Article 15 allowed for the state to determine the answer 
to this question, and Article 2(l) allowed the governmental choice to include the 
possibility of the death penalty as an action of self-defence. 
Here we may see how the Convention extends the principle of national defence under 
Statute Article I(d), which states, "[m]atters relating to National Defence do not fall 
within the scope of the Council of Europe. " The Convention was being debated as 
war criminals had been and were being executed following the Nuremburg Tribunal 
and in numerous municipal courts around Europe. 135 In 1945, the Charter of the 
Nuremburg Tribunal accepted the death penalty as an appropriate punishment, 136 and 
numerous trials and executions of war criminals across Europe occurred. In 1946, the 
Supreme Court of Norway ruled in Public Prosecutor v. Kling, 137 that even though 
134 Benjamin, above, fh. 58, p. 241. 
135 For example, the execution of Marshal Pdtain, the leader of the Vichy government in France 
for the collaboration with the Nazis, was discussed in, Lehideux and Isorni v. France, 
(55/1997/839/1045) 3 September 1998. 
136 The death penalty was included as an appropriate punishment within the Charter of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal, Article 27, which gave to the judges, "the right to impose... death or such 
other punishment as shall be determined... " Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 59 
Stat. 1544,82 U. N. T. S. 279 (1945). 
137 (1946) 13 Ann. Dig. 262 (Supreme Court, Norway), cited in William Schabas, The Abolition 
of the Death Penalty in International Law, 3 rd Ed, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 
2002), P. I 
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the death penalty was not applicable for ordinary crimes, international law allowed 
for the death penalty in times of war. In 1945-1946 the National Coalition for the 
Abolition of the Death Penalty, based in the United Kingdom, recorded that Norway, 
Denmark, Holland and Belgium reserved the death penalty for "the worst crimes of 
collaboration with the enemy. " 138 Such executions, according to Richard Evans, were 
"as much a means of public education in Germany as an instrument of justice in the 
world community. " 
139 
If the drafters of the Convention had attempted to place any infringement on the death 
penalty, this would have been politically dangerous considering the arguments of the 
need for executions. The military government in Germany argued forcefully for the 
use of the death penalty. The post-war arguments for the removal of the death penalty 
for ordinary crimes in the United Kingdom (which forms the subject of the next 
chapter), were not welcomed by the military who argued that the punishment was 
required in the occupied zone and that the, "[m]ilitary government [in the British 
Zone of Germany] may be expected to react strongly against any proposal to abolish 
the death penalty in the zone. , 
140 
138 Annual Report of the National Councilfor the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 1945-46 
(NCADP, 1946), p. 4. 
139 Evans, above, fn. 42, p. 742-743. 
140 Germany-Death Penalty, memo of 7 December, 1947, p. 2, PRO/FO 937/156, cited in ibid, p. 
742. 
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Articles 2(1) and 3 may then be viewed as expressing a specific political 
sentimentality 141 or psychology following the war. In the drafting debates Maxwell- 
Fyfe noted, that it is "the eternal truth which we must all remember; that barbarism is 
never behind us, it is underneath us. " 142 Teitgen categorically confirmed, "[djoes this 
mean ... that today after victory, all danger is henceforth banished? Allow me to say 
that we do not think so. " 143 He further asked "[c]an we possibly remain indifferent in 
the face of the memories of such a recent past and the knowledge of such a 
sanguinary present? " 144 In this period of European history, the predominant political 
sentimentality was that the state needed to be continually prepared for such danger, 
and to combat such dangers with the possibility of the sovereign state's right to 
choose whether or not to impose the death penalty. The original Convention text did 
not take this "right" away. 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter engages with various historical and political processes which allowed for 
the acceptance of the death penalty in 1949 within both the Statute and the 
Convention. This right of the death penalty was encompassed within Articles 2(l), 3 
and 15, and it was therefore not determined to be a per se violation of the right to life, 
141 Richard Rorty has also argued for the use of sentimentality in creating the boundaries of 
human rights, see, 'Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality', in Shute, S. and Hurley, S 
(ed) On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993, (New York: Basic Books, 1993) 
142 TP 2, above, fn. 1, p. 42. 
143 ibid, p. 40. 
1" ibid, p. 64. 
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or to be an inhuman punishment. Also in emergency situations, as along as it was 
pronounced by an impartial court of law, it was legitimate. The historical records and 
political and philosophical readings of the formulation of the Convention provided in 
this chapter demonstrate that the sovereign right of the punishment was protected and 
not renounced. However, this observation may be placed within its historical context, 
and we will see that the European political sentiments and the evolution of 
Convention human rights will renounce the punishment. But it is not an 
unproblernatical story, as the intricate sovereign state's right of the death penalty 
established in this chapter will be a continuous issue which the Council and its organs 
will grapple with. 
The next issue to consider is how this argument is to be placed within the 
renunciation of the punishment for ordinary crimes in Western Europe by 1981. The 
fundamental issue will be to determine whether the states chose to remove'the 
punishment themselves, or whether the Convention can be interpreted to have played 
a role in this penological change. 
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Chapter Three: 
The Renunciation of the Death Penalty by 
Western European States 
3. The Renunciation of the Death Penalty in Western 
Europe 
3.1 Introduction 
By 1981 the Western European states had renounced the death penalty for ordinary 
crimes. ' A penological evolution had occurred and for the first time a uniform geo- 
political position against the punishment was witnessed. This chapter aims to 
investigate the extent to which the Convention, which had come into force in 1953,2 
can be seen to contribute to this penal change. In order to achieve this, the 
humanism and natural rights within the text, the specific legal provisions of Article 
2(l) and 3, and also the mechanism of allowing individual petition before the 
European Commission of Human Rights and European Court of Human Rights, will 
be considered. 3 
It will be investigated whether the theories of the state monopoly over penal 
decisions, and/or natural law and humanism, outlined in the previous chapter, had 
' Some countries had reserved the punishment for crimes against the state, for example, treason. 
Also, Belgium maintained the death penalty for ordinary crimes but it was not applied and its 
application fell into disuse. Belgium finally abolished the punishment in 1996. 
2 The Convention came into force on 3 September 1953 with the ratifications of Germany, 
Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
3 The European Commission of Human Rights was included within the original Convention, 
Article 25, and the European Court of Human Rights within Article 46. In 1998 Protocol No. II 
discontinued the Commission and all applicants are heard by the Court. 
11 
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an impact on the governments finally choosing to discontinue the punishment. 
There are two predominant schools of thought which demonstrate how the death 
penalty was removed; firstly, that it was a policy consideration based upon 
utilitdtian arguments, and secondly, that the punishment was a violation of 
humanistic sentiments. Both arguments are put forward, but a third reading is 
proposed which seeks to determine the extent to which the Convention contributed 
to this change. It will be investigated whether the human rights document can be 
seen to have had an explicit impact or whether it had minimal effect, with the 
humanism interwoven within the text producing the hegemonic discourse. 
As such, the main aim of the chapter is to discover the reasons for the penological 
change. In this respect it considers the contribution to the change by the collection 
of comparative materials from countries which had removed the punishment, the 
change in goverm-nental policy on the deterrent effect of the punishment, the demise 
of the acceptance of the death penalty as a form of retribution, the possibility of the 
U 
execution of innocent people, the perceived phenomenon that the punishment 
brutalizes society, and the search for a humane execution method. In the final 
section, the significance of the acceptance by the United Kingdom and France to the 
Convention enforcement mechanisms is considered. It is analysed whether they 
allowed the Convention to have direct application in order to scrutinise their capital 
judicial systems. 
3.2 The Removal of the Death Penalty in Western Europe 
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It is difficult to pinpoint a general penological theory to suggest why the death 
penalty was renounced within Western Europe by 1981. In his extensive research 
154 for the United Nations, Roger Hood noted that "there has been no one pattern. He 
point6d to various methods being reflected with some countries abandoning the 
death penalty in one political act when new regimes came into power, and other 
countries going through a process of restriction, moratoria and final abolition. 5 
William Schabas is in agreement when he stated, "[t]here are many paths to 
aboliflon ... There appears to be no formula to follow as each country finds its own 
path. ýý6 
The countries which had removed the death penalty for ordinary crimes had 
restricted the scope of the death penalty by reserving it for possible application in 
times of war or for other crimes which may be described as being against the state, 
e. g., treason, were the Netherlands, who had removed the death penalty for ordinary 
crimes in 1870, and in Norway (1905), Sweden (192 1), Iceland (1928), Denmark 
(1933), Switzerland (1942), West Germany (1949), Italy (1947), Finland (1949), 
and Austria (1950). Of these nine countries, seven were original signatories of the 
European Convention, 7 and these countries could be regarded as developing an 
alternative European penological discourse. 
4 Roger Hood, The Death Penalty: A Worldwide Perspective, 3 rd Ed, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), p. 25. 
ibid, p. 24. 
William A. Schabas, 'International Law, Politics, Diplomacy and the Abolition of the Death 
Penalty, ' 13 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J, (2004), 417, p. 444. 
The seven countries who had removed the death penalty for ordinary crimes, and who were 
original signatories of the European Convention were: Denmark, West Germany, Iceland, Italy, 
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Following the adoption of the Convention, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Portugal, 
Spain, ý and the United Kingdom were the final countries which retained the death 
penalty in Western Europe. In identifying a penological genealogy of the 
renunciation of the death penalty in Western Europe by 1981, Belgium and 
Luxembourg may be viewed as an anomaly. 8 There had been no executions in 
Belgium since 1950 and even though the punishment was available the courts did 
not impose it and the final removal of the punishment from the criminal statutes was 
in 1996. In Luxembourg the death penalty was also reserved for ordinary crimes, 
but it was not applied at all and finally abolished in 1979. Belgium's capital laws 
had fallen into disuse and thus the epoch of no executions for ordinary crimes in 
Western Europe in 198 1, is maintained. 
There had not been any executions in Portugal since 1867 and the punishment was 
only dvailable under military law and for crimes against the state between 1867 and 
1976.9 The British Foreign Office attempted to obtain information for the British 
the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. Each of the countries had ratified the Convention in 
1953, qnd it came into force that year, except for the Netherlands who submitted their 
ratification in 1954, and Italy who submitted its ratification in 1955. 
Belgium had ratified the Convention in 1955 and Luxembourg in 1953. See also, Marc Ancel, 
'The Problem of the Death Penalty, ' p. 10, in, Thorsten Sellin, (ed) Capital Punishment, (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1967); For Belgium's non-application of the death penalty, see, Report 
of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953, (London: HMSO 
1953), Appendix 
13: Extenuating Circumstances in Belgium and the Union of South Africa, pp. 475-481. 
9 Peter Hodgkinson and Andrew Rutherford, Capital Punishment: Global Issues and Prospects, 
(Winchester: Waterside Press, 1996), p. 206. 
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Select Committee on Capital Punishment in 1930, on the abolition process in 
Portugal, but did not receive any. ' 0 Furthermore in his research on the death penalty 
in Europe, Arthur Koestler simply says that no statistics were available for 
Portugal. " In its report on the death penalty in 1989, Amnesty International 
recorded the 1976 adoption of the new Portuguese Constitution, Article 25(l) states 
"Human life is inviolable, " and (2) "In no case will there be the death penalty. 02 In 
this year Portugal signed the Convention and in 1978 posted its ratification. In 
response to my question of whether he thought that the Convention contributed to 
the abolition of the death penalty in Portugal at any stage, Raquel Vaz-Pinto from 
the Catholic University of Portugal replied that the Convention "had no influence on 
the abolition of the death penalty in Portugal" and that up until 1976: 
the military death penalty was only maintained after World War One by the 
dictatorship 
... The total abolition 
in 1976 was, in a way, a continuation of a 
10 The Foreign Office stated in a memorandum that it did, "not anticipate that the Portuguese 
Government will be in a position to furnish any statistics or other information of value, since the 
capital penalty was abolished in Portugal in the middle of last century and the question seems to 
arouse little interest, " in Report of the Select Committee of Capital Punishment, 1930 (London: 
HMSO, 1930), p. 603 (hereinafter, "SCCP"); see also, E. Roy Calvert, The Death Penalty 
Enquiry The Evidence Reviewed, (London: Gollancz, 193 1), pp. 36-37. 
" Arthur Koestler, Reflections on Hanging, (London: Gollancz, 1956), p. 172. In my 
commu 
ft 
nications with Roger Hood on the availability of information for Spain and Portugal, he 
stated that there is no new evidence except for the abolition dates. Email communication 20th 
January 2008. 
)2 Amnesty International, When the State Kills... The Death Penalty: A Human Rights Issue, 
(New York: Amnesty International, 1989) p. 193. 
80 
process which was 'interrupted' by Salazar. In fact, there was not much 
discussion and all of it went back to the arguments in the nineteenth century. 13 
There is a similar scholarship lacuna for Spain which removed the death penalty 
from its statutes in 1978 following the fall of the Franco regime. 14 Eric Prokosch, 
the AnInesty International expert on the death penalty, noted that following the 
removal of the death penalty in 1932, it was reinstated in 1938 under the Franco 
regime, and that "Spain's last executions date to September 17,1975, when five 
men were executed by firing squad. ý915 Spain's adoption of the Convention similarly 
followed Portugal's, in that it posted it signature in 1977, and then ratified it two 
years later in 1979. 
In the United Kingdom, the death penalty was suspended in 1965,16 and formally 
k, 
removed from the statute books in 1969 for ordinary crimes. This was introduced 
" Information form an email communication by Dr. Raquel Vaz-Pinto, Institute for Political 
Studies, Catholic University of Portugal, Palma de Cima, January 23 rd 2008. 
14 Roger Hood, The Death Penalty: A Worldwide Perspective., A Report to the United Nations 
11 Committee on Crime Prevention and Control, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) p. 9; see also, La 
pena de muerte y su abolici6n en Espaha (Los Libros de la Catarata, 1995). This book was 
edited by Amnesty International, Spanish Section, Madrid. It includes essays on the death 
penalty in wartime, a study of the death penalty in Spain in the 17th and l8th centuries, and an 
account of Amnesty International's campaign for the abolition of the death penalty under the 
Spanish military penal code. 
15 Eric Prokosch, 'Death Penalty Developments, ' p. 67, in William A. Schabas, The 
International Sourcebook on Capital Punishment. - 1997 Edition, (Boston: Northeastern 
University Press, 1997). 
Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965. 
81 
under a new Labour government. The removal followed intense campaigning from 
anti-death penalty organisations and individual politicians from a variety of political 
parties. " 
France abandoned the death penalty four years after the execution of Hamida 
Djandoubi in 1977, and his was the final execution in Western Europe. 18 The death 
penalty was included in the Criminal Code of 1810, but when Franqois Mitterrand 
came 
"I 
into power he appointed Robert Badinter as Minister of Justice, who is an 
I 
ardent abolitionist, and the death penalty was removed by the French National 
Assembly in 1981.19 France had been one of the original signatory states to the 
Convention in 1950, but it had not ratified the text until 1974. With the United 
KingQom, it imposed executions for ordinary crimes after ratification. 
It therefore took III years from the Netherlands in 1870 to France, in 198 1, for 
Western Europe to join together in this penological change and renounce, or de 
facto, 
ýabolish 
the death penalty for ordinary crimes. In attempt to understand the 
z 
reason(s) for this development, five key factors present themselves. These are 
considered in the following sections. 
3.3 The Comparison of the Capital Judicial Systems 
17 The political debates are discussed below. 
Michel Forst, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in France, p. 112, in Council of Europe, The 
Death Penalty: Abolition in Europe, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 1999). 
19 Hood, above, fn. 4, p. 25. 
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One of the main mechanisms which the anti-death penalty movement deployed to 
refute the government arguments on the effectiveness of the death penalty was the 
accumulation, and reliance on comparative materials which outlined various 
country's experiences with the failure of the death penalty to demonstrate any 
special deterrent quality, that it is impossible to ensure that innocent people are not 
executed, that the punishment produces a demonstrable brutalizing of society, and 
that execution methods are inhumane. 
This material contributed to an increase of the transparency of the British and 
French capital judicial systems: it provided support for arguments against the 
governmental practice. 20 As the United Kingdom and France, leading up to the 
'K 
removal of the death penalty, went through a period of intense public and political 
debates,, the arguments generated from comparative material became a tool for the 
anti-death penalty movements. Most of the available scholarship is from Britain and 
France, but we can identify comparable material from earlier studies and see how 
they became beneficial for the anti-death penalty strategies. 
20 The §ignificance here is not so relevant for Portugal and Spain as they applied the death 
penalty under dictatorship rule, which vehemently protected their internal jurisdictions, so the 
comparative material could be argued to have had limited effect under the closed governmental 
systems of Spain and Portugal. What was required for the abolition of the punishment was a 
regime change, and following the removal of Salazar and Franco, the death penalty was removed 
N. 
in a sinýle event in both countries. See, Franklin Zimring, The Contradictions ofAmerican 
Capital Punishment, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 23. 
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The Howard League for Penal Reform conducted a limited study on Northern 
Europe in 1928 .21 The 1930 Select Committee on Capital Punishment conducted a 
more extensive study and considered its primary task as being that "it might most 
carefully investigate all the facts and figures relative to the abolition of capital 
punishment in various countries of the world. 9522 However, after World War Two 
interrupted the process of collation of materials, there was renewed vigour in 
Switiýrland, the UK and France. 
From 1946, Professor Jean Graven sought to unite the European anti-death penalty 
movement and form a research institute in Switzerland at the University of Geneva. 
The Pirst International Congress on Social Defence met in San Remo in 1946 and 
Graven, as rapporteur to the Congress, outlined the aims as inter alia the 
"progressive abolition of the death penalty. , 23 The Congress provided impetus for 
the International Centre for Criminological Studies at Geneva, and Graven set up a 
1ý 24 
program of data collection from legal academics and sociologists. 
21 S. Margery Fry (ed), The Abolition of the Death Penalty in Holland and Scandinavia, 2 nd Ed, 
(London: the Howard League for Penal Reform, 1928). 
22 SCCP, above, fn. 10, p. 1xvii. 
23 James Avery Joyce, The Right to Life: A Worldview of Capital Punishment, (London: Victor 
Gollancz Ltd, 1962), p. 99 Albert Camus noted that Graven argued in a law journal that the 
European anti-death penalty advocates "must not rely on the old arguments, but on present day 
application, " in 'Reflections on the Guillotine, ' in, Resistance, Rebellion and Death, (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1998), p. 174. 
" Jean Graven, New Reflections on the Death Penalty, (Institute of Comparative Law, 
University of Paris, 1961), reviewed in the postscript in Joyce, ibid. 
84 
After giving evidence to the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment in 1949-53, 
Lord Templewood reiterated that what was needed was a "study of the lessons to be 
derived from the experiences of other countries where the death penalty has been 
abolished, 5525 and that the arguments supplied by the abolitionist countries "needs to 
be repeated over and over again. ý, 
26 H. L. A. Hart, the Oxford jurist, engaged with all 
of the' above reports 27 and stated that in 1953, the discussions on the death penalty 
had "introduced altogether new standards of clarity and relevance into discussions 
of a subject which had too often been obscured by ignorance and prejudice. ýý28 A 
symposium in Paris organised by Arthur Koestler and Albert Camus in 1957, 
entitled "Reflections on Capital Punishment, "29 provided a further platform for 
discussions. Arthur Koestler confirmed that by 1956, the comparative evidence 
presented by the Select Committee and the Royal Commission was "summarized 
with previously unequalled thoroughness. , 30 In affinnation, Franklin Zimring has 
2' Lord Ternplewood, The Shadow of the Gallows: The Case Against Capital Punishment, 
(London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 195 1), p. 13. 
26 ibid, 85. 
27 H. L. A. Hart, 'Murder and the Principles of Punishment: England and the United States, ' p. 55, 
in, ibid, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy ofLaw, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1970). 
28 ibid, p. 58. 
29The symposium resulted in the publication, Arthur Koestler and Albert Camus, Reflections sur 
lapeine Capitale, (Calmann-Levy, 1957), cited in Albert Camus, Reflections on the Guillotine, 
p. 175 in Resistance, Rebellion, and Death, (trans: Justin O'Brien) (New York: Vintage 
Intemational, 1988). 
30 Arthur Koestler, Reflections on Hanging, (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd, 1956), p. 60. 
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argued that the "Royal Commission's report ... was the launching pad for rethinking 
ý13l capital punishment throughout the developed world 11 
What is significant is that the compilation of evidence from different governments, 
was demonstrating that firstly, those countries which had removed the death penalty 
for ordinary crimes had come to the conclusion that it was no longer a legitimate 
punishment for ordinary crimes, and secondly, they were providing this information 
for implicit challenges to retentionist countries. In effect, what we witness is a 
growing challenge to the right of municipal governments to the monopoly of 
internal jurisdiction. 
I., 
This challenge to the sovereignty of internal jurisdiction can be seen in the debates 
within the United Kingdom. In the political debates the government was fighting 
back. 
KSir 
John Anderson, Permanent Under Secretary of State of the Home Office, 
stated that the evidence supplied by countries which had removed the death penalty 
would not be of particular use because, "it is doubtftil whether, if complete statistics 
could be obtained, they would be of any use for the purpose of this present 
inquiry. , 32 Such attempts to thwart politically the value of the material for the 
4', 
British judicial system appeared to have been successful as Koestler noted "we have 
heard very little of the evidence that these countries have made available. In the 
Parliamentary debates, foreign comparisons were either ignored or regarded as 
inapplicable to our own case. , 33 Christopher Hollis, a British M. P., stated in 1953, 
31 Zimring, above, fn, 5, p. 20. 
32 SCCP, above, fn, 10, Minutes, p. 32. 
" Koestler, above, fn. 30, p. 80. 
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that in the political debates on the death penalty in Parliament that, "it is an 
astonishment to me how infrequently"34 the experiences of foreign countries are 
considered. The British government had attempted to protect its right to impose the 
death penalty as a manifestation of its municipal, internal, penal policy. Such 
intern, al jurisdiction, did not have to comply with, or even consider, the experiences 
of other countries. 
In France in the 1970s, Michel Foucault, joined the anti-death penalty campaign 
4. 
demanding that the arguments in France reflect modem European sentimentalities. " 
Foucault made allusions to the fact that France was only just "catching-up" with the 
rest of Western European removal of the punishment. He stated, "[t]he oldest 
penalty in the world is in the process of dying in France ... It is a catching-up .... We 
1. are now trying to conform ourselves to the average profile. "" Comparative abolition 
rates were the measure for Foucault's analysis and the consensus was almost 
complete. Foucault's observation of the death penalty being the "oldest penalty" 
brings us back to the acceptance of the punishment at the creation of the Council, 
-1 
34 Christopher Hollis, Epilogue, p. 261, in R. T. Paget and S. S. Silverman, Hanged-And 
Innocent? (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1953). 
35 See, Anne Ferrazzini and Michel Forst, 'Abolition in France, ' pp. 191-198, in Council of 
Europe, Death Penalty - Beyond Abolition, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2004); 
Jon Yorke, 'Blanchot, Foucault, Levinas and Derrida: French Philosophy and the Deconstruction 
of the Death Penalty, ' 13 Amicus Journal (2005) 28, p. 30-33. 
36 Michel Foucault, 'Against Replacement Penalties, ' in James D. Faubion (ed), Michel 
Foucault, Power. - Essential Works ofFoucault, 1954-1984, vol. 3, (London: Penguin, 1994), p. 
z 
459. 
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but that by 1981 the profile or common heritage of Europe had completely evolved 
and France was to change with it. 
11, 
Abolition in Western Europe took 36 years to complete after World War Two. 
James Megivern noted, "[t]he old argument used to justify the theoretical legitimacy 
of the state's right to execute continued to be repeated by defenders of capital 
punishment, but it would never sound the same after Hitler. "" What had occurred 
was a 
1ý 
gradual turning away from the state's right to impose the punishment, and the 
length of time of 36 years was an incredibly short time for abolition when one 
considers the vast history of the punishment within this region. Carole Steiker has 
recognised the acceptance of arguments following the war when she observed, 
"Europeans and others who have recently and vividly experienced terrible abuses of 
state power may see more reasons to remove the death penalty from the state's 
1138 
arsenal of sanctions. 
Gradually, each govemment, from Northem Europe through the rest of Westem 
Europe, accepted that it no longer had the right to impose the punishment. The 
comparative materials aided in this change in penology. We now consider the 
specific arguments which contributed to this change. 
37 James Megivern, The Death Penalty An Historical and Theological Survey, (New York: 
Paulist Press, 1997), p. 282. 
38 Carol S. Steiker, 'Capital Punishment and American Exceptionalism, ' in, Michael Ignatieff, 
(ed) American Exceptionalism and Human Rights (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 
83. 
88 
3.4 The Death Penalty and the Special Deterrence Claim 
There is scholarly agreement that in this period the essential question revolved 
around the defence of the state or rebuttal of the utilitarian notion that the 
punishment possessed a unique deterrent quality. Christopher Hollis argued that 
"the whole case stands or falls" on whether the death penalty was a deterrent or 
not. 39Hart affirmed: 
[i]n any public discussion of this subject the question that is likely to be the 
central one is 'What is the character and weight of the evidence that the death 
penalty is required for the protection of society? What is the evidence that it 
has a uniquely deterrent force compared with the alternative of 
imprisonment? 
... we should consider what is implied if this question is treated 
- as undoubtedly most ordinary men now treat it - as the root of the matter, as 
the fundamental question in considering whether the death penalty should be 
lal-. 
40 
abolished or retained. 
Hart's argument is a recollection of what was heralded across Western Europe. In 
1928 the Howard League for Penal Reform compiled comparative municipal data 
from European governments who had removed the death penalty, which appeared to 
indicate that the evidence collated could not by itself, "prove either the utility or 
futility of Capital Punishment as a deterrent, " but that "we can obtain evidence of 
probability, almost amounting to proof, that its abolition does not permanently raise 
'9 Hollis, above, fn. 34, p. 259. 
40 Hart, above, fn. 27, p. 71. 
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[the murder rate]. ýý 
41 Carl Torp, Professor of Penal Law at the University of 
Copenhagen, succinctly stated that in Denmark, the absence of the death penalty 
had "not in any way contributed to an increase in the number of such crimes which 
were formally punished by death ., 
A2 In Holland, Dr. J. Simon Van der Aa, pointed 
out that, "since the abolition of capital punishment, the number of life sentences 
passed has shown a tendency to diminish. ý, 43 Victor Almquist, the Head of the 
Swedish Prison Administration, argued that "[t]he reduction in the number of 
capital sentences and the final abolition of the penalty so far from leading to an 
increase of offences of this kind was actually followed by a noticeable decrease in 
crimes legally punishable by death. ý, 
44 
The ý'elect Committee on Capital Punishment in 1930 continued to present evidence 
to renounce the unique deterrent claim. It cited, Professor Herbert Speyer of the 
University of Brussels, who stated, "in Belgium the infliction of the death penalty is 
not necessary for the protection of society and the reduction of crime .,, 
45 Similarly 
the Belgium Minister of Justice said, "[i]t seems inconceivable that a Minister of 
Justice should ever think it possible to re-establish a penalty the uselessness of 
which, to put it no higher, has been amply demonstrated. 546 The Danish goverm-nent 
1 Fry, above, fn. 2 1, p. 4. Also, in 183 1 Jeremy Bentham had argued that the death penalty was 
z 
"inefficient" and questioned its deterrent value, see, To His Fellow Citizens of France on Death 
Punishment, (London: Robert Heward, 183 1). 
42 Carl Torp, 'The Abolition of Capital Punishment in Denmark, ' in ibid, Fry, p. 5. 
43 j. Simon van der Aa, 'The Abolition of Capital Punishment in Holland, ' p. 8, in, ibid 
44 Victor Almquist, 'The Abolition of Capital Punishment in Sweden, ' p. 15, in ibid. 
45 SCCP, above, fn. 10, p. 257. 
46 ibid) p. 353. 
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stated, "it seems unnecessary to propose the retention of capital punishment for the 
,, 47 sake of public security. Sweden confirmed, "the state did not require the death 
penalty for its protection, " and that this "hitherto had not been contradicted by 
4 
experience. " 8 The Select Committee reviewed this evidence and concluded that 
"capital punishment may be abolished in [Britain] without endangering life or 
property, or impairing the security of society.,, 49This comparative material was thus 
interpreted to provide evidence that the utilitarian arguments of deterrence had not 
any provable special application. 
The conclusions of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment in 1953 were 
essentially the same, although more cautiously expressed, Their terms of reference 
via the Royal Warrant prevented them from considering the question whether 
capital punishment should be abolished or not; they were only allowed to make 
recommendations concerning changes in existing capital law. 
50 Professor Thorsten 
Sellin from the University of Pennsylvania, who was an authority on the death 
penalty and interpreting statistics on its deterrent value, gave evidence to the 
Royal 
Commission. He stated that it was impossible to draw any inferences, "that there is 
any relationship ... 
between a large number of executions, small number of 
executions, continuous executions, no executions, and what 
happens to the murder 
'h 
rates. ý; 
51 
47 ibid 
48 ibid, p. 358. 
49 ibid, P. Xcvi. 
50 The Royal Warrant is reproduced in RCCP, above, En. 8, pp. 
iii-iv. 
51 ibid, p. 22. 
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Following Sellin's testimony, the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 
concluded that, "there is no clear evidence in any of the figures we have examined 
that the abolition of capital punishment has led to an increase in the homicide rate, 
or thk its reintroduction has led to a fall, 5152 and that, "[w]e recognise that it is 
impossible to arrive confidently at firm conclusions about the deterrent effect of the 
,, 53 death penalty. 
The European governmental statements demonstrated the failure of the death 
penalty to have any special or significant deterrent value. This was a collective 
turning away from the sovereign's sanguine "common heritage" identified in 
Chapter Two, and moving towards an acceptance that the death penalty was no 
longe'r' to be viewed as an effective and efficient Penological tool. Indeed, Lord 
Templewood reviewed the evidence presented by the various foreign governments 
to the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, and stated that the "conclusion 
seems to be inescapable that, whatever may be argued to the contrary, the existence 
of the 1. -death penalty makes little or no difference to the security of life. "54 
This utilitarian calculation on whether the death penalty provided a beneficial penal 
policy for the protection of society was perhaps the most important issue 
for 
European governments at this time. The arguments put forward by the abolitionists 
became more scientific, and they can be seen as juxtaposed with, or even, elevated 
52 ibidV. 23. 
53 ibid, p. 24. 
54 Templewood, above, fti. 25, p. 85. 
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above, the traditional arguments based upon humanitarian grounds. Koestler is 
illuminating here: 
[tjo give it a fair hearing, we must set all humanitarian considerations and 
charitable feelings aside, and examine the effectiveness of the gallows as a 
deterrent to potential murderers from a coldly practical, purely utilitarian point 
of view ... it will be seen that the theory of hanging as the best deterrent can be 
refuted on its own purely utilitarian grounds, without calling ethics and charity 
55 
to aid . 
Koestler here is isolating the humanistic standards in order to focus upon rebutting 
the death penalty under policy considerations. But he was aware of the humanistic 
arguments, he just considered that the policy attacks were a more fruitful line of 
critique. In agreement, Elizabeth Tuttle, in her detailed study on the campaign 
against the death penalty in Britain, noted that in this period humanitarian z 
considerations were present, but that the driving force for abolition was provided 
through policy calculations. She stated: 
fs]ince abolition was delayed, the movement had to become more modem and 
scientific. Reformers began to base many of their arguments on sociological 
and psychological data. Although abolitionists still argued from a moral and 
humanitarian basis in the twentieth century, they also set out to prove 
55 Koestler, above, fn. 30, p. 53. 
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I objectively and scientifically that the abolition of capital punishment would be 
56 advantageous to the nation. 
It is argued that both the policy and the humanitarian arguments were deployed in 
juxtaposition. Each complemented the other. However, as argued in Chapter Two, 
the relationship of the sovereign state and the death penalty, was ultimately 
manifested during this period, and so the application of the relationship needs to be 
deconstructed. Even with the arguments that the punishment was not now required 
for society's protection, even after World War Two, the goverm-nents began to 
accept it was loosing its utilitarian value. The sentiments expressed to the Select 
Committee and the Royal Commission, were now being repeated. 
As such the confirmation that the punishment was now not necessary for the 
protection of society, was a policy reason for the goverm-nents to relinquish the 
penalty. However, it would be accurate to state that this reason for abolition was 
contingent upon peace and the absence of threats to society: as detailed 
in the 
previous chapter. As Europe became more peaceful following the war, this 
argument was holding up. Consequentially, this policy argument was the one which 
opened the door for abolitionists: as was argued by Northern European countries 
and it percolated through Western Europe. Because the punishment 
lost its utility, 
the governments would now entertain arguments based upon humanitarian groun 
56 Eliz; ýbeth Orman Tuttle, The Crusade Against 
Capital Punishment in Great Britain, (London: 
I 
Stevens and Sons, 196 1), p. 144. 
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The humanitarian arguments provided extra confirmation for the European 
governments. This is why, even if the policy considerations were considered to be 
the most important considerations, the abolitionists still referred to the natural law 
and humanistic positions. Koestler refers to the importance of the "period of the 
Enlighterm-lent" for him and his abolitionist colleagues. 57 Leslie Hale considered the 
humanism of Voltaire, 58 Michel Foucault was heavily influenced by Jeans-Jacques 
Rousseau 59 and Albert Camus affirmed that: 
[h]ow can European society of the mid-century survive unless it decides to 
defend individuals by every means against the state's oppression? [and as a 
consequence] ... we cannot be too wary of the humanitarian ideology in 
dealing with a problem such as the death penalty. 60 
Camus has it just right. The humanistic arguments must be included for adequate 
understanding of this period. Indeed, even though the policy arguments can be 
viewed as prominent, the humanistic theories were required for the deployment of 
h 
44every means against" the punishment. As such, the analysis which follows 
concerns policy and humanistic arguments within: (a) the possible execution of 
57 Koestler, above, fn. 30, p. 22. Koestler refers to Beccaria, Montesquieu and Voltaire. Also, 
ArthurýKoestler and C. H. Rolph, who observed that "Beccaria's teaching gained a profound 
influence over Europe, from Russia to France, from Sweden to Italy, " in Hanged by the Neck, 
(Hammondsworth: Penguin, 196 1), p. 5 1. 
58 Leslie Hale, Hanged in Error, (London: Penguin, 196 1), p. 13. 
59 See, Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, (London: Penguin, 
1976), p. 90. 
60 Camus, above, fti. 29, pp. 228,230. 
95 
innocent people; (b) the renunciation of the retributive theory; (c) the extent to 
which the punishment causes a brutalization of society, and; (d) the failure of the 
search for a humane way to execute people. 
3.5 The Possible Execution of Innocent People 
For some abolitionists in this period, the possibility of innocent people being 
executed in Europe went to the root of the question of the effectiveness of the 
capital justice system. Before 1981, the arguments focused on the practical failure 
of the system rather than of the need to protect a possible "right" to "life" of the 
K 
innocent person, Arthur Koestler neatly sums up the arguments of 1950s Europe. 
These included; (a) those who say hanging an innocent person doesn't really matter; 
(b) those who say that the risk of hanging an innocent person is so small that it must 
be accepted; and (c) that judicial error is inherent - so the abolition of the death 
penalty is imperative. 61 Koestler made this observation in 1956, three years after the 
Convention came into force, but he does not base his considerations upon human 
rights, including a specific "right to life. " What Koestler was demonstrating was 
that the anti-death penalty discourse of this period attempted to situate the execution 
of the innocent within a practical failure of the capital judicial system and not a 
question of human rights but as a means of "justice" within humanitarian principles. 
The possibility of innocent people being executed had been a troubling issue for the 
Select Committee on Capital Punishment. It gave thorough attention to the debates, 
61 Koestler, above, fn. 30, p. 110. 
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and concluded that "the evidence before the Committee was unable completely to 
dispel these disquieting and awful considerations. ýý62 Sir Herbert Samuel aptly 
summarised the position when he stated, "I do not think that we can ever say that no 
innocent man has been executed for murder in the past, nor can we have an absolute 
assurance that no innocent man will be convicted and executed in the future. 5563 The 
Solicitor's Journal in 1930 stated that if the infallibility of the justice system was 
"essential to the case in favour of Capital Punishment that no mistake can possibly 
be rnýde, Capital Punishment stands condemned. , 64 Lafayette famously said in the 
French Assembly, "I shall ask for the abolition of the punishment of death until I 
have the infallibility of human judgment demonstrated to me, "65 and Roy Calvert, 
similarly identified, "no human institution is infallible, and that we have no right to 
, 66 inflict' a penalty which is completely irrevocable. Lord Shaw of Dunfermline 
articulated, " [e]very human judgment is mingled with human error, and in the issues 
of life and death no judge should be charged with an irreparable doom. , 67 
62 SCCP, above, fn, 10, p. xlix. 
63 ibid. 
64The Solicitor's Journal, 4hJanuary, 1930, cited in ibid, p. 1. 
65 Statement in the French Chamber of Deputies, August 1930, cited in ibid, p. 222. In the 1928 
Howard League Report, Dem-nark similarly stated, "the now commonly accepted view that 
capital punishment is irreparable, " and that "later it may be discovered that sentence was passed 
unjustly, " ibid, p. 6. 
66 Evidence on behalf of the National Council for the Abolition of the Death Penalty, ibid, p. 
147. 
67 ibid, p. x1ix. 
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As such the anti-death penalty arguments were used to attack the death penalty from 
a principled position: the state is responsible for the protection of the life of its 
citizens, and such executions would be antithetical to this aim. However, there have 
been arguments which claim that even if innocent people were executed, this was 
not in-and-of-itself a reason for discontinuing the punishment. The Select 
Committee recorded Archbishop Paley's crude statement that, "he who falls by a 
,, 68 mistaken sentence may be considered as falling for his country. Paley wanted to 
ensure that the equilibrium of society was maintained, and even innocent people 
being executed did not constitute an appropriate circumstance to disrupt society's 
balance. This was also the position put forward by Maurice Hamblin Smith in 
evidence to the Select Committee. He stated, "I think the possibility of a man being 
wrongly hanged is not of sufficient moment to weigh against Capital 
Punishment ... 
If you really thought it the best form of deterrent, then I would not 
allow, the possibility of the occasional execution of an innocent man to stand in the 
way. '69 For Hamblin Smith, the determination of "innocence" as a measure of 
effective penal policy, was only a "means" to demonstrate the 
legitimacy of the 
punishment, and not an "end" with which to call for its abolition. 
Of course, the former United States President, Benjamin Franklin would 
have 
disagreed entirely, when he stated in a letter to Benjamin Vaughan 
in 1785, that, "it 
is better 100 guilty persons should escape than that one innocent person should 
68 Paley's Works, 1825, vol 11, "Crimes and Punishments, " p. 388, cited 
in ibid, p. 1. 
69 ibid, p. li. 
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suffer. ýý70 Hart had also argued against the execution of innocent people based upon 
utilitarian grounds. His position clearly refutes the claims by Paley and Hamblin 
Smith, when he observed, "[t]he state of general alarm and terror which might arise 
in society if it were known that the innocent were likely to be seized and subjected 
to the pains of punishment in order to serve the needs of society might be worse 
than any advance in security or social welfare brought about by these means could 
outweigh. ý71 
European history records many probable miscarriages of justice. 72 There are cases 
in different European countries where people have been found guilty of murder, and 
after spending long prison terms had their cases overturned. These include, the 
Austrian case of Leopold Hilsner who was found guilty of murder in Vienna in 
1910 and his conviction was quashed eighteen years later in 1928. In Holland, a Mr. 
Tuennisen and Mr. Klundert, were convicted of murder in 1923 and found to be 
innocent in 1929. In Hungary the case of Steven Tonga, who was hanged in 1913 
for the murder of his daughter, was subsequently found innocent after the discovery 
of his daughter's suicide note. 73 In both England and France highly publicised cases 
of theý. execution of possible innocent people questioned the efficacy of the judicial 
systems. The British conviction and execution of Timothy John Evans was subject 
70 See, letter to Benjamin Vaughan, of 14 March 1785, p. 443 in Benjamin Franklin, Works, 
vol. VIII, cited in ibid. 
Hart, above, fn. 27, p. 76. 
72 See, Templewood, above, fh. 25, pp. 66-7; and Koestler, above, fn. 30, pp. 109-138. 
73 
ibid, Templewood, p. 66-7. 
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1. 
to intense political and media debate. 74 Following the denial for reprieve from the 
Home Secretary, Chuter Ede, Evans was executed on November 8,1949 for the 
death of his wife. Evans had confessed to the killing but there was doubt concerning 
his mental state. Then in 1953, the bodies of six women were found in the house 
and grounds of 10 Rillington Place, where Evans had lived, but another occupant of 
the house, John Reginald Halliday Christie, was charged with their murders and he 
confessed. They were all found to have been strangled, and then Christie confessed 
to killing Evans's wife. This confession resulted in a call for an investigation into 
Evans's execution. 75 
74 Timothy Evan's execution was heavily debated in the House of Commons, and numerous 
books and chapter sin books critique the case including, R. T. Paget and S. S. Silverman, Hanged- 
And Innocent; Michael Eddowes, The Man on Your Conscience, (London: Cassells, 195 5); 
Leslie Hale, I-langed in Error, (London: Penguin, 196 1); Ludovic Kennedy, Ten Rillington 
Place,, (London: Gollancz, 196 1) and the film 10 Rillington Place was inspired by Kennedy's 
written account. 
75 It is interesting to note that Sir John Anderson gave evidence on the appropriateness of the 
Home Secretary giving reasons for granting reprieve to a condemned prisoner to the Select 
Committee on Capital Punishment and stated that there may be a type of case where, "though a 
man had been rightly convicted on the evidence, there remained what had been called a "scintilla 
of doubt": he had in mind a case of a man who had been convicted mainly on the evidence of 
another person with criminal antecedents, who undoubtedly was the man who committed the 
crime if the accused man was innocent, If in such a case there was a risk that later it might 
transpire that the other person was the guilty man, "the Home Secretary would not be justified in 
1ý 
exposing the whole system of capital punishment to that risk, but such an explanation could 
never be given in public, " Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, above, fh. 8, p. 211. 
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The Aome Secretary at the time was Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, the same person who 
was prominent in the drafting of the Convention as Chairman of the Committee on 
Legal and Administrative Questions. As has been discussed in Chapter Two, the 
travaux preparatoires do not reveal any detailed discussion on the legitimacy of the 
death 4 ýpenalty, but Maxwell-Fyfe's statements on his opinion on the punishment in 
the House of Commons are recorded in Hansard. Not only did Maxwell-Fyfe 
engage in the debates surrounding the question of Evans's innocence, but before this 
debate he had made his opinions known in 1948 when he responded to a question on 
the possibility of innocent people being executed in England. He stated: 
[a]s a realist I do not believe that the chances of error in a murder case, with 
these various instruments of the State present, constitute a factor which we 
must consider ... Of course, a 
jury might go wrong, the Court of Appeal might 
go wrong, as might the House of Lords and the Home Secretary: they might 
all be stricken mad and go wrong. But that is not a possibility which anyone 
can consider likely. The honourable and learned member is moving in a realm 
of fantasy when he makes that suggestion. 76 
This statement provides an insight into his high opinions of the capital judicial 
process and what possible credence he would have given in the Convention drafting 
A% 
debates to anyone who would have made the claim that innocent people are 
executed in Europe. Maxwell-Fyfe, as the British Home Secretary, attempted to 
76 Parliamentary Debates, Hansard, HC, 14 April, 1948, Official Report, vol. 449, col. 1077. 
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sweep under the political carpet the question of Evans's innocence. 77 He appointed 
Mr. J. Scott Henderson, Q. C., to chair an inquiry into Evans's case. 78 Sydney 
Silverman M. P. had called for a full public hearing into the case '79 but Maxwell- 
Fyfe ordered that the inquiry should be private. It took only twelve days from the 
beginning of hearing evidence to the publication of the Report, and Henderson 
concluded that the case presented at Evans's trial was an overwhelming one, and 
that Christie's confession was unreliable and untrue. 80 However, seven years later, 
the former Home Secretary, Chuter Ede, stated in the 1955 debate on the death 
penalty that: 
I was the Home Secretary who wrote on Evan's papers, "The law must take its 
course. " I never said, in 1948, that a mistake was impossible. I think Evans's 
case shows, in spite of all that has been done since, that a mistake was 
possible, and that, in the form in which the verdict was actually given on a 
particular case, a mistake was made. I hope that no future Home Secretary, 
while in office or after he has left office, will ever have to feel that although he 
77 In commenting on Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe's actions, Leslie Hale stated, "[t]he fact that an 
error cannot be rectified instead of putting the authorities on their guard against the hideous 
possibility of hanging an innocent man rather seems to drive them to incredible lengths in order 
to deny and to keep from the public the idea that a mistake can happen, " in above, ffi. 5 8, p. 10. 
78 Mr. J. Scott Henderson, Report of an inquiry into certain matters arising out of the deaths of 
Mrs, Beryl Evans and Geraldine Evans and out of the Conviction of Timothy Evansfor the 
murder of Geraldine Evans, Command Paper, 8896 (London: HMSO, 1953). 
79 Parliamentary Debates, above, fn. 76,1 July 1953, vol. 517, col. 4 10. 
80 Henderson, above, ffi. 78, paragraph 49. 
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did his best and no one could accuse him of being either careless or inefficient, 
he sent a man to the gallows who was not "Guilty as charged. , 81 
I 
The fundamental issue in the British Parliamentary debates on the death penalty was 
the efficacy of the judicial system, in that even with the greatest efforts to guarantee 
due process, innocent people can still be judicially killed. This case would have 
demonstrated a clear breach of Evans's "right to life" under Article 2(l) of the 
Convention. Maxwell-Fyfe would have been fully aware of what Article 2(1) stated 
when he discussed Evans's case, but there was no admission by him, or claim by 
any other Member of Parliament, that his "human rights" may have been violated if 
he was indeed innocent. 
A further example of a possible violation of Article 2(1) can be seen in France in the 
case of Christian Ranucci who was executed on July 28,1976. During a 24 hour 
interrogation, Ranucci confessed to the murder of Marie-Dolores Rambla, but then 
later retracted his statement. In 1978, the French Lawyer, Jean-Denis Bredin asked 
Gilles Perrault to investigate Ranucci's case and Perrault published his findings in 
the book Le Pull-over Rouge (The Red Sweater). 82 Foucault took issue with the 
81 1ý Parliamentary Debates, above, fn. 76,10 February 10,1955, vol. 536, col. 2084; see the 
appeal for the posthumous overturning of Bentley's sentence in, R. v. Bentley (Deceased) [200 1] 
I Cr, App. R. 2 1. Lord Bingham stated, "The Court had come to the decision that the summing up 
as a whole had been such as to deny the applicant a fair trial which is the birthright of every 
British citizen. " 
82 Michel Foucault wrote a book review of Le Pull-over Rouge, entitled, 'The Proper Use of 
Criminals, ' in James D. Faubion (ed), Michel Foucault, Power: Essential Works ofFoucault, 
1954-1984, vol. 3, (London: Penguin, 1994), pp. 429-434. 
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process obtaining the confession. In his usual probing rhetoric he claimed that the 
crimipal justice system did not want to get to the bottom of the case, but that the 
"cult of the confession" drained the legal system of wanting to ensure that the truth 
of the case was discovered. 83 
HencQ the investigatory deficiencies rendered the possibility of innocent people 
being executed. Ranucci's final words to his lawyer before he was executed was 
.,, 
84 
ilm of the same name ýýclear my name Perrault's book was made into af, Le Pull 
over Rouge, 85 and the public sentiment created by these media accounts were still 
present when in 1981, President Francois Mitterrand removed the death penalty for 
ordinary crimes. But Ranucci's lawyers had not brought a claim that his death 
violated Article 2(l), even though they thought he was innocent, and also, in his 
analysis of the case, Foucault did not claim that his death was a violation of the right 
to lifeunder the Convention. 
There is therefore some significant evidence to demonstrate that during the British 
and French executions post 1953, even when the innocence of the convict was 
maintained, those arguing the cause did not rely on the new human rights standards, 
but upon challenges to the efficacy of the capital judicial system as a whole. 
93 Foueault, The Proper Use of Criminals, p. 429, in Faubion, ibid. 
84 See, 'Lid Lifted on Links in Infamous French Serial Killer Case, ' New Zealand Herald, 
http: //subs. nzheraid. co. nz/author/stoiy. cftn? a id=173&ObjectlD=10366059 (last visited, 
January 4,2007). 
"Le Pull-over Rouge (1979) directed by Michel Drach. 
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3.6 Týe Theory of Retribution 
Retribution as a legitimate reason for the death penalty is traditionally grounded in a 
proportionality analysis. The father of this penological assessment was Immanuel 
Kant'who argued that, in the formulation of his lex talionis, if an individual had 
"committed murder, he must die. In this case, no possible substitute can satisfy 
justice ... This equality of punishments is therefore possible only if the judge passes 
the death sentence in accordance with the strict law of retribution. , 86 Kant's 
formqlae would prima facie be most cogently legitimated through the executions of 
war criminals. However, during, and immediately following World War Two, the 
retributive function of punishment in killing war criminals was being questioned. 
In 19,48, the British Control Commission, based in occupied Germany, noted, 
"[t]here is a strong possibility that before long a great deal of attention is likely to be 
,, 87 focused on our executions at Hameln. In the House of Lords debates, Lord 
Douglas of Kirtleside, said that he had as Military Governor in Germany, dealt with 
86 Immanuel Kant, 'The Metaphysics of Morals, ' p. 156, in H. S. Reiss (ed) Kant: Political 
Writings, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). The Royal Commission on Capital 
Punishment noted that the traditional interpretation of retribution as a principle of punishment, 
can de divided into the theories of "vengeance" and "reprobation. " Vengeance is normally 
attributed to the individual's desire to be avenged and the state thus imposes revenge through 
punishrent. Reprobation occurs when the state does not accept the breaking of 
its laws by 
imposing a punishment which is proportionate to the gravity of the crime, RCCP, above, 
fn. 8, p. 
17. 
87 Confidential Draft from the Director, Penal Branch, to Mr. J. C. Piegrome, 27 February, 1948. 
Subject: Executions: PRO/FO 1060/244, cited in Richard Evans, Rituals of Retribution: Capital 
1ý 
Punishment in Germany, 1600-1987 (London: Penguin, 1997) p. 743, 
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hundreds of death sentences and "became sickened with the magnitude of the legal 
-1 
slaughter. "88 This uneasiness expressed was also affirmed by the US Commander in 
Germany, General Lucius D. Clay, who noted: 
[a]s a result of delays in review, stay of sentence pending possible appeal to 
the Supreme Court ... there are now in excess of five hundred awaiting 
execution ... I 
find it difficult to adjust my own mental processes to requiring 
what looks to be almost a mass execution of more than five hundred persons. I 
believe it also gives an appearance of cruelty to the United States even though 
there is no question in my mind that the crimes committed fully justify the 
death sentenýce. 
89 
Clay proposed that these sentences be commuted to life imprisonment "in 
substantial measure. "90 His observations challenged the prima facie legitimate post- 
war use of the death penalty. The main argument was that the application of 
retribution had "an appearance of cruelty. " The "eye-for-an-eye" proportional 
principle of punishment, did not have the same legitimacy following the war. 
The 
ý4 old argument" as identified by Megivern above, was falling 
from grace. Here we 
find that the municipal governments were turning their back on retribution as a 
legitimate reason to impose the death penalty. Germany provides a good example. 
Evans suggests that retribution: 
41 
18 Templewood, above, fn, 25, p. 128. 
89 Jean Edward Smith (ed), The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany 1945-1949, 
(Bloomington, Indiana, 1974), pp. 658-59, cited in Evans, above, fh. 87, p. 745. 
90 
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had a venerable biblical and above all philosophical tradition, incorporated in 
the writings of Immanuel Kant ... the problem with this argument is that there is 
ho obvious reason why the retributive principle should apply to murder and to 
no other crime. 91 
Germany refuted the retribution argument partly because of the post-war acceptance 
of itsImpractical application. Later in Britain, Koestler and Rolph argued "we do 
not commit indecent assault on men convicted of indecent assault, or bum down the 
house of a person convicted of arson. , 92 So Kant's proportionality analysis was 
found deficient. 93 
-1 
Furthermore, Lord Templewood had stated to the Royal Commission on Capital 
Punishment that, "the reforming element has come to predominate. ý94 Here we see 
that the traditional appeals to the humanitarian notions of civilized society were also 
present. Although Sir John Anderson did not argue for the removal of the death 
penalty, his testimony clearly demonstrates a renunciation of retribution when he 
91 
ibid,, p. 907. 
92 Arthur Koestler and C. H. Rolph, above, fn. 57, p. 143, 
93 Jacques Derrida made a specific criticism of Kant's lex talionis and how it applied to the death 
penalty, and he stated, "Kant fails, in my view ... to produce a principle of equivalence, and 
therefore of calculability, " in 'Capital Punishment: Another "Temptation of Theodicy, " p. 209, 
in Seyfa Benhabib and Nancy Fraser, (ed) Pragmatism, Critique, Judgment: Essaysfor Richard 
J Bernstein, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2004). 
94 RCCP, above, fn. 8, p. 17. 
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1. 
stated, "[t]here is no longer in our regard of the criminal law any recognition of such 
primitive conceptions as ... retribution. , 
95 Sir Herbert Samuel similarly stated: 
I do not hold the view ... that a murderer ought to be put to death simply as 
retribution for his crime, that what he has done to some member of society, 
society ought to do to him by way of retribution. I do not think that that is an 
attitude which a civilised community should take or that we ought to base our 
system of justice on tit for tat. 96 
The governments were accepting that retribution failed on purely practical reasons 
in that it fails on proportionality grounds, but the humanitarian arguments were still 
stated and so are to be seen as supporting, or being part of, the practical and policy 
reasons for the failure of retribution as a legitimate reason for the continuation of 
the punishment. Retribution as a penal ideology did not promote the sentiment 
following the war of the promotion of a civilised society, and also it was considered 
that the death penalty was also thought to "brutalise" society. 
3.7 The Death Penalty as a Means of Brutalization of Society 
The renunciation of retribution as an official state policy also has pedagogical 
functions as it reduces the manifestation of societal vengeance and anger, and 
contributes to the promotion of a "civilised" and more peaceful way of 
life. It 
95 
ibid 
96 SCCp' above, fn. 10, Evidence, p. 2348. 
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should be conceded that this position is difficult to prove empirically, but the vast 
amount of the argument during this period demonstrates that it was a generally 
accepted phenomenon. 
Viktor Almquist, the Chief of the General Administration of Prisons in Sweden, 
stated to the Select Committee in 1930, "[t]he retention of Capital Punishment 
seems not to be in accord with the best interests of civilised society. , 97 The Select 
Committee plainly concluded that the death penalty has a "brutalising effect on the 
,, 98 population at large . Lord Buckmaster argued that the effect of the publications of 
executions in the British press caused a "most demoralising influence, " but he could 
not condone a limitation on the publications because the public had a right to know 
4 
what went on. 99 Roy Calvert told the Select Committee that there was a "degree of 
morbid sensationalism" with regards to executions, "which would have been 
absolutely nonexistent if capital punishment had been abolished. "100 Furthermoreq 
the Howard League for Penal Reform Memorandum stated: 
97 
ibid, p. 495. 
98 ibid, , p. xx. Thomas Paine noted that the death penalty was a "sanguine punishment that 
corrupts mankind, " in Thomas Paine, The Rights of Man, p. 213, in Michael Foot and Isaac 
Kramnick (eds), Thomas Paine Reader, (London: Penguin Books, 1987). For the brutalizing 
effect of the death penalty in the United States see, William C. Bailey, Murder, Capital 
Punishment and Deterrence: A Review of the Literature, p. 154-5, in Hugo Adam Bedau, The 
Death Penalty in America. - Current Controversies, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
99 SCCP, above, fn. 10, Evidence, para. 4651. 
loo ibid, para. 1768. 
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[t]he existence of the death penalty throws a glamour over murder trials, 
enlists public sympathy on the side of the murderer, and engenders a morbid 
interest in crime, especially on the part of the less stable-minded members of 
the community. This concentration of thought on the evil things of life, 
induced each time there is an execution, is bound to have evil consequences on 
the mental and moral life of many individuals and on society as a whole. At 
the worst it induces imitative crime. ' Ol 
The media coverage of the death penalty reveals inherent paradoxes concerning the 
legitiM'acy of the punishment. In 1953, the investigations into the possible 
brutalising effect of the punishment were not included in the Royal Warrant for the 
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, but it did note that when executions 
were in public before 1868 that "though the publicity was deterrent in 
intention-became in practice a degrading form of popular entertainment, which 
could serve only to deprave the minds of the spectators. " 102 Lord Templewood 
101 ibid, Memorandum. 
102Tbe Royal Commission cited an unspecified report form the Home Office, RCCP, above, fn. 
8, p. 246. See also, Charles Dickens similarly observed, "I observe the strange fascination which 
everything connected with this punishment, or the object of it, possesses tens of thousands of 
decent, virtuous, well-conducted people who are quite unable to resist the published portraits, 
letters, anecdotes, smilings, snuff-takings of the bloodiest and most unnatural scoundrel with the 
gallows before him. I observe that this strange interest does not prevail to anything like the same 
degree where death is not the penalty, " Charles Dickens to Macey Napier, July 28,1845, in, 
Mamie Dickens and Georgina Hogarth (eds), The Letters of Charles Dickens, vol. III (London: 
Chapman and Hall, 1882), pp. 79-80, cited in Tuttle, p. 14; and Pieter Spirenberg, The Spectacle 
ofSuffering: Executions and the Evolution ofRepression, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1984). 
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confirmed that the "talk of the taking of human life convinces me that the publicity 
given to atrocities in the Press, on films, and in the Nuremberg trials has had the 
exact opposite of the effect that was intended, and has lowered rather than raised 
civilized standards. " 103 Similarly, of the death penalty in Germany, Hans-Heinrich 
Jeschtck argued that the punishment "can even be a psychological stimulus of 
crimes of violence. " 
104 
This brutalising effect was also recorded in France. The well-known history of the 
effort§ of Dr. Joseph Ignace Guillotin, to apply medical science to end executions by 
mutilation, and substitute it with the more "humane" method of beheading, has been 
scrutinised and Guillontin's efforts are now considered to have been misguided. 105 
The last public execution in France took place with the death of Eugene Weidmann, 
on June 17,1939. Weidmann was beheaded outside the prison Saint-Pierre in 
Versailles, and the body was photographed and the pictures appeared in the Paris- 
Soir. Camus stated that the govermnent took the "publicity very badly and protested 
that the press had tried to satisfy the sadistic instincts of its readers. " 106 But the 
outbursts by spectators were considered so scandalous that French President Albert 
103 Templewood, above, fa. 25, pp. 11-12. 
104 Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, 'Modem Criminal Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the German Democratic Republic, ' p. 511, in Roger Hood (ed), Crime, Criminology and Public 
Policy: Essays in Honour ofSir Leon Radzinowicz, (London: Heinemann, 1974). 
105 See, James Q Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment and the Widening Divide 
between American and Europe, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) p. I 10; and for a 
biography of Dr. Guillotin, see, Andrd Soubiran, The Good Doctor Guillotin and His Strange 
Device, (trans: Malcolm MacCraw) (London: Souvenir Press, 1964). 
106 Camus, above, fh. 29, p. 180. 
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Lebruh immediately banned all future public executions. Camus argued that the 
death penalty "besmirches society, " 107 and that "publicity [of executions] not only 
arouses sadistic instincts with incalculable repercussions eventually leading to 
another murder; it also runs the risk of provoking revolt and disgust in the public 
3008 opinion. 
These arguments focused on demonstrating to governments that if they allow the 
administration of the death penalty a brutalising effect of society occurs, and as such 
they are not fulfilling their legitimate role applying effective and efficient penal 
policies. However, it must be observed that while it appeared more clearly 
demonstrated that the punishment possessed no special deterrent effect, these 
arguments were prima facie based upon social observations and phenomena: the 
effect " ýof executions may have a damaging psychological influence on society. From 
the reactions of governments, witness testimony and academic observations, it 
appears that this argument had significant political weight. 
107 ibid, p. 205. 
108 ibid, p. 187. Furthermore, Violet van der Elst recounts the execution of a man known as 
Russmusen in Denmark in 1887. Russmusen was to be beheaded by the axe of the executioner. 
However, the executioner missed his neck and imbedded the blade in his shoulder which caused 
a violent scene of secreting blood and Russmusen screaming in pain. The second attempt hit his 
shoulder again, and the further violent scene caused the crowd to panic. The third blow finally 
cut off Russmusen's head. The public outcry against the atrocity caused by the 
botched 
execution, resulted in King Christian IX of Denmark immediately renouncing the 
death penalty, 
and he ordered that all capital criminals be given clemency and serve prison terms, 
in On the 
Gallow, v, (London: The Doge Press, 1937), pp. 249-50. 
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3.8 Methods of Execution 
The next issue to consider in the dismantling of the death penalty in Europe is the 
investigation into the different methods of execution. While Britain, France, and 
Spain, still imposed executions within the normal criminal law following the war, 
the question arose as to whether there was a "humane" way of executing a person, 
or whether it was merely a matter of finding the method which was the "most 
humane. " 
In 1953 the Royal Commission set three criteria to asses execution methods; 
"humanity, " "certainty" and "decency. " 109 The requirements of "humanity" werýe 
divided into two; firstly that, "the preliminaries to the act of execution should be as 
quick and as simple as possible, and free from anything that unnecessarily sharpens 
the poignancy of the prisoner's apprehension. "' 10 Secondly that, "the act of 
execution should produce immediate unconsciousness passing quickly into 
death. " III The issue of "certainty" was to consider "which method is most likely to 
avoid mishaps, due either to the complexity of the machinery or to an error of the 
executioner. " 112 Finally, "decency" in the execution was thought to be recognised 
1. 
through two circumstances: firstly, that the "civilised state [should] conduct its 
judicial executions with decorum, " and secondly, that "judicial executions should be 
109 RCCP, above, fh. 8, p. 248. 
110 1ý ibid, * p. 253. 
111 ibid 
112 ibid, p. 255. 
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performed without brutality, that it should avoid gross physical violence and should 
not mutilate or distort the body. "' 13 
Of the methods of execution in operation in 1950s Europe, it was noted that the 
guillotine was the method in France and Belgium, and that hanging was in use in 
England and Scotland. ' 14 The use of the guillotine was quickly relegated as barbaric 
to English sentiments as the Royal Commission observed, "[n]o doubt the guillotine 
is an effective instrument - quick, certain and fool proof But we are sure that the 
mutilation it produces would be shocking to public opinion in [England]. "' 15 Also, 
the firing squad was dismissed as being replete with uncertainty in "causing 
immediate death. "' 16 Hanging, electrocution, lethal gas, and the possibility of lethal 
injection were all considered, but on the predominance of "humanity" the Royal 
Commission relied on the evidence of the Prison Medical Officers who claimed, 
"[w]e cannot conceive any other method which would be more humane, efficient or 
expeditious than judicial hanging. " 117 The Prison Chaplains maintained that 
hanging was "simple, humane and expeditious, "' 18 and the British Medical 
Association stated that, "hanging is probably as speedy and certain as any other 
method and could be adopted. "' 19 
113 ibid. 
114 The application of the death penalty in Spain and Portugal were not considered by the Royal 
Commission on Capital Punishment. 
115 RCCP, above, fn. 8, p. 249. 
116 
ibid, 
117 All quotes from ibid, p. 247. 
118 ibid 
119 ibid 
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As such, the Royal Commission was of the opinion that "a method of execution 
whose special merit was formerly thought to be that it was peculiarly degrading is 
now defended on the ground that it is uniquely humane. " 120 However, this was 
perhaps the most ill-founded statement of the Royal Commission. On January I oth 
1925, wa confidential Home Office instruction to the Prison Governors stated: 
[a]ny reference to the manner in which an execution has been carried out 
should be confined to as few words as possible, e. g., "it was carried out 
expeditiously and without a hitch. " No record should be taken as to the 
number of seconds and, if pressed for details of this kind, the Governor should 
say he cannot give them, and he did not time the proceedings, but "a very 
short interval elapsed, " or some general expression of opinion to the same 
effect. 
121 (emphasis added) 
The Royal Commission relied on evidence which appeared to adhere to such an 
instruction, which fundamentally focused upon making sure that the method was 
perceived as being effective. However, some condemned inmates did indeed 
struggle before the gallows and some were dragged to the noose, and some did not 
die "expeditiously, " but suffocated to death, and some inmate's bowels opened. The 
execution of Edith Thompson, was discussed in the House of Commons and 
K 
120 ibid, p. 247 
12 1 This Home Office instruction was included in the trial of Major Blake, the former Governor 
of Pentonville, for official secrets in December 1926. The trial was covered 
in The Times, 
November Wh, December 8 th and December 16'h 1926, cited in Koestler, above, fh. 30, p. 140. 
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Beverly Baxter M. P., stated that two of the warders had told him that "Edith 
55122 Thompson had disintegrated as a human creature on her way to the gallows and 
Major Blake recorded in his memoirs: 
[t]hey hanged Mrs. Thompson. Her end was terrible. She had been moaning 
for days 
... In the last few days of her life, her hair was going grey, and her 
sufferings had been so great, that she had had a complete collapse. They 
carried her to the scaffold, and had to hold her while they fixed the cap around 
her head; she was moaning all the time. They hanged a practically 
unconscious woman. 
123 
Following Edith Thompson's execution, the executioner attempted suicide. Also the 
Governor of Holloway Prison, Dr. Morton, was met a few days after the execution 
by Margery Fry, and she stated, "I have never seen a person look so changed in 
124 
appearance by mental suffering as the Governor appeared to me to be. " 
Furthermore, the evidence by the last British executioner, Alfred Pierrepoint, to the 
Royal Commission, at first appeared to confirm the Home Office instruction, when 
he stated that there had "never" been any problems with executions. Then the 
Commissioners pressed Pierrepoint and he replied that there was one moment "with 
a foreign spy who had to be carried to the gallows strapped to a chair. " When 
questioned further, he stated that "probably three more" cases were not expedient, 
122 Parliamentary Debates, above, fn. 76,14 April, 1948, vol. 449, col. 1098. 
'4. 
123 The'memoir of Major Blake, Ex-Governor of Pentonville was given to Violet Van der Elst by 
his son, and she reproduced the extract in On the Gallows, above, fh. 108, p. 150. 
124 Mi 
. rs. Thompson's Execution, included as Appendix VIII, ss Margery Fry's Statement on M 
in Templewood, above, fn. 25, p. 155. 
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as hestated that what occurred was "like a faint at the last minute or something like 
that, but it has not been anything to speak about. " 125 His gradual revealing of details 
of the circumstances in which some condemned inmates approached the scaffold 
clearly does not demonstrate that hanging was without its unacceptable 
vicissitudes. 1 26 
Forensic pathologists at Sheffield University, Deryk James and Rachel Nasmyth- 
Jones, recently examined the skeletons of thirty-four persons executed by hanging 
betw&n 1882 and 1945 and found that only six skeletons had a cervical dislocation 
- the so-called "hangman's fracture. " 127 Hence, it appears that in twenty-eight cases 
death did not occur instantly, or within a few seconds, and thus this evidence is 
incompatible with the Royal Commission's statement that hanging produces an 
4CI 
expedient" death. Furthermore, Harold Hillman, Director of the Applied 
Neurobiology Program at the University of Surrey noted that, respiration and 
heartbeat does not stop instantaneously but they "both start to slow immediately, but 
whereas breathing stops in seconds, the heart may beat for up to twenty minutes 
'41 
125 RCCP, above, fn. 8, Minutes of Evidence, para, 8402-10. 
126 George Orwell wrote about the inherent wrongness of hanging in his essay, A Hanging, and 
he stated, "It is curious, but till that moment I had never realised what it means to destroy a 
healthy, conscious man. When I saw the prisoner step aside to avoid the puddle, I saw the 
mystery, the unspeakable wrongness, of cutting a life short when it is ftill stride, " p. 16, in 
George Orwell, Essays, (ed. Bernard Crick) (London: Penguin, 1984). 
127 Deryk James and Rachel Nasmyth-Jones, The Occurrence of Cervical Fractures in Victims of 
Judicial Hanging, Forensic Science International, 54, (1992) pp. 81-9 1, cited in Timothy V. 
Kaufman-Osbom, From Noose to Needle: Capital Punishment and the Late Liberal State, (Ann 
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002). 
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128 
after the drop. " The official protection of the execution process by the Home 
Office and the Royal Commission provided a fagade which can be neatly confirmed 
through Timothy Kaufman-Osborn's description that the execution process is 
observed as a "body that suffers no pain, and a hangman who can never err. " 129 
½ 
The French government had the same challenge to protect the guillotine as a 
legitimate method of execution. Dr. Joseph Ignace Guillotin and the idea of his 
"simple machine" in 1789, attempted to eradicate the barbaric mutilations in the 
punishment in France and substitute it with a method which would swiftly behead 
condemned prisoners. 130 However, at the first use of the guillotine, a joumalist 
known as Duplan reported the inaugural execution in the Journal de la France, in 
th April 27 , 1792 as: 
[y]esterday there was a trial of little Louison and a head was cut off- the 
culprit Lepelletier ... underwent this sombre experience. 
I have never in my life 
been able to go near a hanged man; but I admit that I still feel more 
repugnance for this type of execution; the preparations make one shiver and 
aggravate the mental torture. 
131 
128 Geoffrey Abbott, The Book ofExecution: An Encyclopedia of Methods ofJudicial Execution, 
(London: Headline Book Publishing, 1995), p. 263. 
129Kaufman-Osboum, above fti. 127, p. 92. 
130 James Q. Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment and the Widening Divide between 
America and Europe, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) p. 
I 10- 113. 
131 Cited in Andre Soubiran, The Good Doctor Guillotine and his Strange Device, (trans: 
Malcolm MacCraw) (London: Souvenir Press, 1964), p. 142. 
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It appears that the repugnant feeling towards the guillotine lasted within many until 
its abrogation in 1981. The incidence of the final public execution in 1939 
demonstrated an important challenge to the guillotine as a legitimate method of 
, execution in France. Dr. Guillotin's sentiments that he wanted to create a humane 
way to execute criminals had failed. From the French Academy of Medicine, 
Doctors Piedelievere and Fournier examined the bodies of guillotined criminals in 
1956 and diagnosed: 
such sights are frightfully painful. The blood flows from the blood vessels at 
the speed of the severed carotids, then it coagulates. The muscles contract and 
their fibrillation is stupefying; the intestines ripple and the heart moves 
irregularly, incompletely, fascinatingly. The mouth puckers at certain 
moments in a terrible pout. It is true that in that severed head the eyes are 
motionless with dilated pupils; fortunately they look at nothing and, if they are 
devoid of the cloudiness and opalescence of the corpse, they have no motion; 
their transparence belongs to life, but their fixity belongs to death. All this can 
last minutes, even hours, in sound specimens: death is not immediate ... Thus, 
every vital element survives decapitation. The doctor is left with this 
impression of a horrible experience, of a murderous vivisection, followed by a 
premature burial. 
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Confirming the doctor's observation that death was not instantaneous, Camus cites 
examples from witnesses who saw the head die instantly, but momentarily the body 
continued to live, and visa versa. A French executioner's assistant stated, "[t]he 
132 Justice sans bourreau, No. 2 (June 1956), cited in Camus, above, fn. 29, p. 183. 
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head dies at once. But the body literally jumps about in the basket, straining on the 
cords. " 133 The chaplain of Sante prison, Father Devoyod, stated that after the 
beheading he could, "see the condemned man's eyes fixed on me with a look of 
supplication ... then the lids blinked, the expression of the eyes softened, and finally 
the look, that had remained full of expression, became vague. ý034 As with hanging, 
even the guillotine did not appear to render a "humane" execution. 
3.9 The Application of the Convention within this Historical Period 
In order to understand whether the Convention can be seen to specifically contribute 
to the removal of the death penalty within Western Europe we need to reassess the 
genealogy of abolition to determine which countries the Convention could apply to 
and which it could not. The countries which had removed the death penalty for 
ordinary crimes before the Convention came into force were the Netherlands in 
1870, and Norway (1905), Sweden (1921), Iceland (1928), Demnark (1933)) 
Switzerland (1942), West Germany (1949), Italy (1947), Finland (1949), and 
Austria (1950). 
Then in both Belgium and Luxembourg, although they had ratified the Convention 
in 1955 and 1953, they were not applying the death penalty for ordinary crimes. 
135 
133 Published by Roger Grenier in Les Monstres, (Gallimard), ibid, p. 184. 
134 ibid, p. 185. 
135 For all Convention signatures and ratifications see, Conventionfor the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, CETS No. 005, signatures and ratifications. 
hitp: //con ventions. coe. int/Treaty. 
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At this time, there would not have been thought any scope for the Convention to 
ly,.. 136 app . 
Furthermore, any challenges to Portugal's penal code under the 
Convention, could only be applied after its ratification in 1978. But as it removed 
the punishment from its statutes following the 1978 Constitution, there could be no 
legal effect given to any human rights challenges and these would appear to be non- 
applicable since Portugal had not imposed any executions since 1867. In Spain, the 
death penalty was removed in 1976, and it then signed the Convention in 1977 and 
it was ratified in 1979. As such, Spain is to be viewed in the same way as Portugal 
in that the Convention did not apply to the executions it had previously 
admiiiistered. This leaves the United Kingdom and France. 
The United Kingdom had ratified the Convention in 1953, and its last execution was 
in 1964. However, it had not accepted the right of individual petition and the 
jurisdIction of the European Commission on Human Rights and the European Court 
of Human Rights until 1966,137 and so the Convention could not have been 
specifically used against the post-war executions. A similar legal restriction of the 
Convention was applied by France. It had removed the punishment from its statutes 
for oPdinary crimes in 1981, and its last execution was in 1977. Although it had 
signed the Convention in 1950, it had not posted its ratification until 1974 and the 
right of individual petition was refused until 198 1. 
136 The perception will change after 1983 with the formulation of the Council's specific human 
rights discourse against the punishment, and this is discussed in the next chapter. 
137 For a detailed discussion of the British political manoeuvrings which led up to the accepted 
this legal mechanism, see A. W. B. Simpson, Human Rights and the End ofEmpire. - Britain and 
the Genesis of the European Convention, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 1053- 
1101. 
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By 1 ? 60, the European Commission had received 715 applications in total, with 
only two by states, both by Greece. Of the 713 individual applications only two 
were declared admissible. The mass refusal was predominately because the 
individuals had failed to exhaust domestic remedies as specified by Convention 
Article 26. Also, although the United Kingdom use of the death penalty in colonial 
territories could potentially be reviewed by the Commission, 138 the French use of 
the punishment in Algeria could not be reviewed as at this time France had not 
acceded to the jurisdiction of the Commission. ' 39 
11 
What this reveals is that through a technical legal interpretation, the Convention 
could not have had any direct impact on the removal of the death penalty from 
Western Europe before 198 1. The specific provisions of the right to life under 
Articýe 2(l) and the prohibition of inhuman punishment under Article 3 were not 
referred to and enforced. However, as detailed above, the humanism interwoven 
within two Articles, as evidenced in Chapter Two, was certainly present in the 
138 In 1956, the signatory and ratification states which implemented the jurisdiction of the 
European Commission were Belgium, Denmark, the German Federal Republic, Iceland, Ireland 
and Sweden. Under Convention Article 25(l) they allowed individual petitions, and at this time, 
it is significant to note that neither the United Kingdom nor France allowed individual petitions. 
See, Mauro Cappelleti, 'Fundamental Guarantees of the Parties in Civil Litigation: Comparative 
Constitutional, International, and Social Trends, ' 25 Stan. L. Rev. 651 (1973), pp. 665-668; 
Gehard Behr, 'Review: European Yearbook, Vol I, ' Yale L. J. 437 (1956), p. 438. 
139 Gordon Weil argues that this was predominantly because of the French government in 
Algeria, see, 'Decisions on Inadmissibility Applications by the European Commission of Human 
Rights, ' 54 AJI. L. 874,4, (1960), p. 876, fn. 8. 
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municipal arguments that the punishment may be imposed on innocent people and 
that the methods of executions are inhuman. Where the interweaving of the 
discourses appeared to have had a more limited impact would have been in the 
arguments disproving the special deterrent quality, that retribution in the 
punishment was delegitimized, and that the punishment brutalizes society. 
3.10 Conclusion 
The Convention was not specifically referred to in the arguments for the 
renunciation of the death penalty in Western Europe by 198 1. But it can be seen that 
the humanistic sentiments within the Convention right to life and the prohibition 
against inhuman punishment were significant for abolitionist arguments. However, 
it must be remembered that since the Enlightenment, for some of the arguments, 
since Ancient Greece, 140 the humanistic sentiments were evolving and utilised, but it 
was at least 200 years before they became hegemonic across Westem Europe. This 
displays that the sovereign states were resistant to the cries of humanism which 
sought to protect individuals against the state. Following the war the most cogent 
argument for governments was that it was not an effective penal policy. This is not 
an argument based upon humanitarian notions, but in effect, presents the value 
European politics places on the utilitarian actuarial calculation. It was only after the 
devastation of war that the collective governments because sympathetic to these 
14" For"example, see Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, (trans: Rex Warner) 
(London: Penguin, 1972), pp. 212-222. 
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arguments. Then the humanistic notions were the icing-on-the-cake for the downfall 
of the ineffective penal policy. 
As suCh the reason(s) for the removal of the death penalty within Western Europe 
should be viewed as predominantly a consequence of policy considerations, in that 
the death penalty was demonstrated not to provide a special deterrent value. But this 
prominence is importantly based upon the contingency of peace and security in 
Euroýe. If peace goes it was thought at this time that the punishment could return. 
This is seen as the majority of European countries reserved the punishment in times 
of war. The significance of this will be returned to later in Chapters Five and Six. 
However, if peace endures, the governments are more likely to accept the 
humanitarian arguments, and it will be charted in the next chapter that the 
humanism present within the Convention actually did significantly contribute to the 
affirmation and further demise of the punishment. 
Only after France had abolished the death penalty in 198 1, and the Western 
European governments joined and accepted this change did human rights have a 
role in questioning the legitimacy of the death penalty. The next chapter charts the 
evolution of the anti-death penalty discourse in the European human rights system. 
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Chapter Four: 
The Attempt to Create the Death Penalty as a Question of 
Human Rights 
4. The Attempt to Create the Death Penalty as a 
Question of Human Rights 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter argued that the Western European govemments had, by 1981, 
independently chosen not to apply the death penalty in peacetime for ordinary 
crimes. This choice to renounce the punishment was made without any centralised 
Council position against the punishment. This chapter charts a similar historical 
period beginning from the post-1953 adoption of the Convention through to 1983 
(the previous chapter ended in 1981). However the analysis within this chapter is 
not from the perspective of individual states and municipal law, but of the Council's 
supra-national consideration of the punishment, and its development as a question 
of human rights. 
Three historical periods are considered. Firstly, between 1953 and 1972, as this 
period includes the first Council Convention, the first European Commission on 
Human rights decision, and the first specific Council report, to consider specifically 
the issue of the death penalty. It is investigated whether the Council, through the 
initial considerations of the punishment within these three circumstances, was able 
to formulate solutions to the problematical question of how to develop human rights 
standards within the political and legal evolution that was taking place. As such it is 
analysed whether in this period the Council had demonstrated the death penalty was 
considered to be a specific human rights issue at all. Secondly, the period between 
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1973 and 1982 is considered and the different discussions and enactments within the 
Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers. The attempts of the 
Assembly to elevate human rights above the political decisions to choose to 
implement the death penalty is analysed. It will be investigated whether there was a 
coherent policy proposed by the Assembly or whether there were elements of 
uncertainty and ambivalence within the developing and evolving discourse. 
Finally, this chapter deconstructs the formulation of Protocol No. 6 in 1983 which 
calls for the abolition of the death penalty in peacetime. ' It was the first legal 
instrument in international law to restrict the punishment to wartime offences. The 
fundamental issue which this section addresses is what effect the legislation had on 
this period of the history of the Council? It will be asked whether this period can be 
shown to identify that the formulation of a protocol had the function of either 
directly or indirectly furthering the human rights discourse or whether the protocol 
merely affirms the sovereign Member State's right to choose whether or not to 
apply the death penalty in certain circumstances. Intrinsic to the analysis will be the 
relationship and dialogue between the Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee 
of Ministers. 
4.2 Tentative Beginnings and Uncertainties: 1953 to 1972 
' Protocol No. 6 to the Conventionfor the protection ofhuman rights andfundamentalfteedoms 
concerning the abolition of the 
death penalty, CETS No. 114, Strasbourg, 28h April 1983. 
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The Council's approach to the question of the death penalty should first be seen in 
the context of analysis concerning the organisation's success between 1953 and 
1972. The then Secretariat-General of the Council of Europe, A. H. Robertson, 
reviewed the history of the organisation from 1950 to 1961 and stated in general 
terms, "the Council of Europe had not achieved great success with its long-term 
,, 2 political objectives. In his reports on the "juristic activity" of the Council, Frank 
Dowrick noted that during this period the Council still appeared to be a "weak 
confederation of states. ,3 However, Robertson also observed that the Council had 
"established a technique of convention making which constituted one of its real 
,, 4 achievements. Although the Council was not seen to have a significant impact on 
state actions, the conventions adopted at least placed its objectives on the Member 
State agendas. This included the initial steps dealing with the possibility that the 
death penalty could become a human rights question. 
Following the adoption of the Convention, the first Article to specifically engage 
with the death penalty appeared in the 1957 European Convention on Extradition 
5 
(hereinafter, "Extradition Convention"). It attempted to regulate transfer 
proceedings on a multilateral basis, and enhance the regional mechanisms alongside 
2 A. H. Robertson, 'The Legal Work of the Council of Europe, ' 1,1. C. L. Q. 10,143 (196 1), p. 165. 
3 Frank Dowrick, 'Council of Europe: Juristic Activity 1974-86, Part 1, ' 36 I. CL. Q. 3,633 (1987), p. 
634. See also, ibid, 'Council of Europe: Juristic Activity 1974-86, Part 11, ' 36 1 C. L. Q. 4,878 (1987). 
This two part report updated the report in F. E. Dowrick, 'Juristic Activity in the Council of Europe: 
25ýh Year, ' 23 1CL. Q. 3,610 (1974) 
Robertson, above, fn. 2, p, 165. 
5 European Convention on Extradition, CETS No. 024 (1957), entered into force on 18'h April 1960, 
with the ratifications of six states: Denmark, 
Greece, Italy, Norway, Sweden and Turkey. 
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the individual state bilateral treaties. 6 It represented the first regional attempt to 
regulate state cooperation in apprehending criminal suspects, and also provided for 
punishments which were acceptable to the Council Member States following 
extradition proceedings. The Consultative Assembly had proposed in 1951 that the 
x E' tradition Convention should be adopted with "a view to the punishment of those 
committing crimes on the territory on one of the Members of the Council of Europe, 
and taking refuge on the territory of another Member. 137 The Preamble considered 
the "aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its 
members, " and that "the acceptance of uniform rules with regard to extradition is 
likely to assist this work of unification. " Hence, the inherent motivation of the 
Extradition Convention was to facilitate these aims of the Council. It sought to 
achieve this through establishing inter alia a multilateral obligation to extradite, 8a 
prohibition on extradition for political offences, 9 and a right to refuse the requesting 
See, A. H. Robertson, 'The Contribution of the Council of Europe to the Development of 
Intemational Law, ' 59 Am. Socy Int'l L. Proc. 201 (1965), p. 205, 
' Recommendation 16, on the preparatory measures to be taken to achieve the conclusion of a 
European Convention on Extradition, adopted, Wh December 1951, (35 th sitting). Also, to facilitate 
greater cooperation within criminal law issues the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters, CETS No. 030,20 April 1959, entered into force in 1962. It did not consider the 
issue of the death penalty, but related generally to state cooperation in communication of criminal 
records and judicial verdicts in criminal cases. 
Convention on Extradition, above, fn. 5, Article 1. Robertson has stated that this Convention, 
"showed the desirability of establishing ... methods of co-operation 
between the European States in 
the administration of justice, " above, fti. 6, p. 206. 
ibid, Article 3. 
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state's extradition application. ' 0 Article II specifically concerns the death penalty. 
It states: 
[ilf the offence for which extradition is requested is punishable by death under 
the law of the requesting Party, and if in respect of such offence the death- 
penalty is not provided for by the law of the requested Party or is not normally 
carried out, extradition may be refused unless the requesting Party gives such 
assurances as the requested Party considers sufficient that the death-penalty 
will not be carried out. 
In the Explanatory Report to the European Convention on Extradition, concerning 
Article IIý it indicated that the criteria for determining whether requesting states' 
assurances are "sufficient" may vary according to different country's standards, and 
that it may constitute either; (a) a formal undertaking not to carry out the death 
penalty, (b) an undertaking to recommend to the Head of State that the death penalty 
be commuted, (c) a simple statement that it is intended to make such a 
recommendation,, or, (d) an undertaking to return the person extradited if he is 
condemned to death. The Explanatory Report affirmed that it "is in any case for the 
requested Party to decide whether the assurances given are satisfactory. " 
II 
This reveals that the question was fundamentally a state choice issue, and it was not 
for the Council, but the Member States to initiate restrictive proceedings on the 
10 ibid, Article 6. 
11 Explanatory Report: European Convention on Extradition, ETS No. 024, Paris, 13 December 
C 1957 , Commentaries on 
the Articles of the Multilateral Convention on Extradition, ' Article 11. 
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death penalty. It should be noted that Article II does not prohibit states which had 
removed the death penalty from their domestic statutes from extraditing a suspect to 
face a capital trial, only that the Article "may" provide the option of non-extradition. 
Furthermore, the requirement for assurances was not as watertight as it may appear 
on a first reading. Points (b) and (c) above appear to only be initiated once a capital 
trial had been concluded and when the execution date approached. In addition, (d) 
inherently accepts that the suspect would have gone through a capital trial, was on 
death row and awaited execution. Point (a) appears to be the only provision to 
provi er an adequate assurance which would have prevented not only an 
execution but also that no capital charges would be allowed. 12 Furthermore, it could 
have been argued that the explanations provided under points (b) and (c) would not 
be strong enough to prevent an execution following a capital trial as only a 
"recommendation" or "simple statement" is required. 
Article II does provide a mechanism for international relations to determine the 
question. It is a specific mechanism which did not directly allow for human rights 
considerations to determine the extradition circumstances. This is further supported 
by the fact that Article 11 does not explicitly give any reasons why the death penalty 
is not considered acceptable, and furthermore, makes no attempt to engage the 
punishment under Convention Articles 2(l) and 3 within the text or the Explanatory 
Report. 
12 1 have discussed the issue of extradition circumstances and "adequate assurances" elsewhere, see 
Jon Yorke, 'Europe's Judicial Inquiry in Extradition Cases: Closing the Door on the Death Penalty, ' 
EL. Rev. 2004,29 (4), 546. 
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A. H. Robertson did not appear to consider these issues when he stated that Article 
II ý6continues with a number of detailed provisions about the procedure to be 
followed in making, considering and complying with requests for extradition. " 13 He 
made these statements when the Council human rights thresholds on extradition and 
the death penalty were just beginning to evolve. The reservations and declarations 
on Article II displayed that in some cases a capital trial can ensue, 14 and 
furthermore, it is a policy question to be determined by the states and not the 
Council. 15 
Italy had provided a declaration in 1957 that "it will not, under any circumstances, 
grant extradition in respect of offences punishable by death under the law of the 
requesting Party. " 16 However, in a 1977 decision by the Italian Corte di Cassazione, 
an extradition request of a suspect charged with a capital offence by France, who 
was not a party to the Extradition Convention, was granted under the 1870 
13 Robertson, above, fh. 2, pp. 151-2. 
14 For a detailed account of reservations in Council Conventions, see, Sia Spiliopoulou Akermark, 
'Reservation Clauses in Treaties Concluded within the Council of Europe, ' 48 L C. L. Q. 3,479 
(1999). 
15 See Explanatory Report, above, fh, 11, Austria made a reservation confirming that it would not 
extradite an individual to face the death penalty; also, Italy, Liechtenstein, Spain's declaration on 
Article II allowed for a capital trial, but that the execution could not be carried out ... but Greece 
inserted a reservation that it would extradite an individual to face a capital trial as long as the charge 
was in conformity with Article 437 (1) of the Greek Code of Criminal Procedure. As this article 
would "continue to be applied in place of Article II of the Convention. " Switzerland also made a 
similar reservation to that of Greece. 
16 ibid, Italy: Declaration made at the time of signature, on 13 December 1957, and confirmed at the 
time of despoit of the instrument of ratification, on 6 August 1963. 
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Extradition Treaty between Italy and France. 17 The reason provided by the court 
was that Article II only applied to parties to the Convention. However5 in 1979, the 
Italian Constitutional Court in Re Cuiller, Ciamborrani and Vallon held that the rule 
in the Italian-French bilateral treaty was void, insofar as it permitted the extradition 
of a suspect to face a capital trial, and it held that such transfer proceedings violated 
the Italian Constitution. ' 8 Turkey's reservation reveals another example of the state 
reserving to itself the right to choose the death penalty in certain circumstances 
when it stated: 
The assurance mentioned in Article II will be limited to the following 
procedure: 
In the event of extradition to Turkey of an individual under sentence of death 
or accused of an offence punishable by death, any requested Party whose law 
does not provide for capital punishment shall be authorised to transmit a 
request for commutation of death sentence to life imprisonment. Such request 
shall be transmitted by the Turkish Government to the Grand National 
Assembly, which is the final instance for confirming a death sentence, insofar 
as the Assembly has not already pronounced on the matter. 19 
17 See, Cassazione penale, sez. 19 maggio 1977,21 Rivista Italiana di Diritto e Procedura Penale 
(1978), cited in Stefano Manacorda, 'Restraints on death penalty in Europe: a circular process, ' I 
JI. CJ 262, (2003), p. 277. 
18 Re Cullier, Ciamborrani and Vallon, 78 ILR 93,99 (Corte cost. 1979), cited in, Andrea Bianchi, 
'Venezia v. Ministero di Grazia E Giustizia, Judgment No. 223.79 Rivista di Diritto Intemazionale 
815 (1996), ' 91 A. JI. L. 4, (1997), 727, p. 728. 
19 Explanatory Report, above, fn. 11. 
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Like the United Kingdom and France, Turkey still imposed executions, and this 
reservation clearly attempts to keep open the possibility of the punishment . 
20 Turkey 
would only "transmit a request" but the request did not prevent the death penalty 
from being imposed. By 1974 the United Kingdom, France and Germany had not 
ratified the Extradition Convention, and this demonstrated their intentions to deal 
with extradition through municipally controlled mechanisms within bilateral 
treaties. 
The Extradition Convention had not directly contributed to the human rights 
discourse, but facilitated the already existent observation that the death penalty was 
a domestic issue. It should be understood within this historical context as providing 
the Western European governments with the option to promote their abolition of the 
punishment in peacetime. 
4.2.1 The Cyprus Revolt 
The first case which the European Commission of Human Rights considered that 
included capital laws and executions, 21 was the 1957 case of Greece v. United 
Kingdom . 
22 A special Sub-Committee of the European Commission of Human 
20 Turkey's last execution was in 1984, see Chapter Six below. 
21 The European Commission of Human Rights and the extent of its jurisdiction was mandated 
within the original Convention, Articles 20-37. 
22 Council of Europe, Application by the Government of the Kingdom of Greece, 
lodged against the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Application 
No. 176/56, 
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Rights (hereinafter, "Sub-Committee") was established with an investigatory 
mandate restricted to scrutinising the emergency situation in Cyprus. 23 From 1954 
the United Kingdom colonial government adopted emergency legislation in various 
forms to suppress the terrorist activities of the EOKA (National Organisation of 
Cypriot Fighters). 24 To counter the uprising, emergency measures were adopted 
which included the imposition of the death penalty for the newly classified crimes. 
Before the emergency the death penalty was reserved for treason and murder but, 
Regulations 52, 53,53A and 53B considerably extended its scope and introduced 
the mandatory application of the punishment in terrorist cases. 
25 Regulation 52 
provided the death penalty or life imprisonment for discharging a firearm at a 
person, throwing or exploding bombs with intent to cause homicide, bodily injury, 
Application of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms to the Island 
of Cyprus, Report of the European Commission ofHuman Rights, Doc. No. A 42.048, (Article 31 of 
the Convention) (Strasbourg, 26 September, 1958), in A. H. Robertson et al (ed) European 
Commission on Human Rights: Documents and Decisions 1955-1956-1957, (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1959), pp. 48-9. 
23 Robert Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 
133. For a detailed analysis of the two cases brought by Greece against the United Kingdom. see 
A. W. Brian Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the 
European Convention, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp, 924-1052. 
24 The Greek translation being, Ethniki Organosis Kyprison Agoniston. 
25 Supplement to Cyprus Gazette, No. 4001 (Nov. 22,1956), cited in A. W. Brian Simpson, 'Round 
Up the Usual Suspects: The Legacy of British Colonialism and the European Convention on Human 
Rights, ' 41 Loy. L. Rev. 629 (1996), p. 658, fn. 264. As outlined in Chapter Two above, the drafters 
of the Convention did not debate the mandatory death penalty and the 
final Convention text is silent 
on the issue. For arguments against the mandatory 
death penalty, see, David Pannick, who stated, it 
is "neither fair nor reasonable, and lacks the procedural safeguards demanded 
by the rule of law, " in 
Judicial Review of the Death Penalty, (London: Duckworth, 1983), p. 114. 
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or damage to property. Furthermore, the mandatory death penalty for discharging 
weapons, throwing or detonating bombs, being in possession of bombs or weapons, 
and for consorting with insurgents were also extended. In addition, Regulation 53A 
provided a general offence of- 
consorting or being in the company of [anyone] carrying or has in his 
possession or under his control [a firearm or explosive] in circumstances 
which arise a reasonable presumption that he intends, or is about to act, or has 
recently acted, with such other person in a manner prejudicial to public safety 
or the maintenance of public order. 
26 
The punishment for this loosely defined Regulation was the mandatory death 
penalty. These draconian laws were applied to administer the executions of two 
Cypriots, Andreas Demetriou on IOh May 1956 and Evagoras Pallikarides on 14 th 
March 1957. Demetriou was found guilty of wounding, and Pallikarides, who was 
only 18 years old, was arrested in December 1955 when an army patrol came across 
an armed EOKA group making its way to their winter hide-out. Pallikarides's 
companions escaped but he surrendered without resistance and following a trial was 
executed. 27 Nancy Crawshaw observed concerning the two executions of Demetriou 
and Pallikarides, that in the former case under normal criminal law he would have 
26 Simpson, above, ffi. 23, p. 975. 
27 Times of Cyprus, 14thMarch 1957, cited in Robert Holland, Britain and the Revolt in 
Cyprus: 
1954-1959, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 173. 
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been liable for only a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, and in the later case, 
no severe charges would have been possible. 28 
The adoption of the Regulations brought international pressure upon the British 
government, and ultimately Greece's application to the European Commission of 
Human Rights claiming that the British government, in its occupation of Cyprus, 
had violated virtually all of the substantive Articles of the Convention . 
29 Brian 
Simpson records in detail the political manoeuvrings and legal submissions for the 
First Cyprus Case, which predominantly concerned Convention Article 15 and the 
application of governmental emergency powers in derogation. 
The Second Cyprus Case was then to consider Articles 2 to 11, but after many legal 
petitions by the British government, it was never heard. 30 On 7 th May 1956, Greece 
submitted an application outlining a general argument against the British use of 
emergency laws and stated, "[t]he exceptional measures adopted by the British 
administration authorities in Cyprus have meant the denial of nearly all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the island. ý, 
31 In reply the British government 
accused the Greek government of supporting terrorism, and referred to the United 
28 Nancy Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Strugglefor Union with Greece, 
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978), pp. 232-3. 
It was initially claimed by the Greek government that Articles 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11 and 15, 
had been violated, see Application No. 17611956. 
30 See, Simpson, above, fn. 24, p. 924-1052; A. H. Robertson (ed) European Commission on Human 
Rights. - Documents and Decisions 1955-1956-1957, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), pp. 48-9. 
31 ibid, Simpson, p. 930. 
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Nations Charter and the sovereignty of individual states and non-interference of 
intemal affairs. 
32 
On 4 th April 1956, before the Greek application, the British government had began 
to amend Regulations 52,52A, 53,53A and 53B. The mandatory death penalty was 
replaced and a discretionary punishment reintroduced. The scope of the punishment 
was then refined to the discharging or carrying firearms and using explosives to 
endanger life or cause bodily harm. 33 Furthermore, nine executions had taken place 
under the emergency legislation, 34 and only the executions of Demetriou and 
Pallikarides, did not involve a homicide. However, the British government stated to 
the Sub-Committee in the oral hearings of the 2 nd to 3 rd July, that the state of 
emergency would have to continue, "until the remaining terrorists are killed, 
captured or leave Cyprus, and until it becomes certain that there exists no further 
danger of a renewal of terrorism. , 
35 
The identified emergency situation penetrates the dividing line between the "reason 
of state" and "self-defence" as recognised by the drafters of the Convention, but 
there is one important difference, that such measures were not being claimed to 
apply to domestic sovereignty over territory, but sovereignty over colonial territory. 
This was a situation not envisioned by the drafters, and as the second case was 
11 abandoned, the Sub-Committee did not specifically engage with 
Convention 
32 ibid, p. 935, 
33 ibid, P. 971. 
34 ibid, p. 920. 
35 ibid, p. 974. 
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Articles 2(l) or 3. On the general issue of the emergency laws as a function to 
protect the life of the nation, the Sub-Committee held: 
[o]ne must however consider that these incidents emanated from a fast 
growing and militant organisation which, according to its own statements, 
aimed at obtaining self-determination for Cyprus by all possible means, 
including force and violence. These two factors together make it at least 
plausible to assume that there already existed, before the proclamation of the 
state of emergency, a public danger threatening the life of the nation. The 
assessment of whether or not a public danger existed is a question of 
appreciation. The United Kingdom government made such an assessment of 
the situation prevailing at the time and concluded that there existed a public 
danger threatening the life of the nation. That this appreciation by the British 
government was correct was subsequently proved by the great increase in 
violence which occurred between November 1955 and March 1957 (emphasis 
added). 
36 
The Sub-Committee's focus on the violence which threatened the "life of the 
nation" is fundamentally important. It was considered legitimate that the death 
penalty could be imposed as part of emergency (re)action. In the drafting dialogues, 
as outlined in Chapter Two, Maccas argued that the state must be able to defend 
itself or perish in suicide. 
37 The Sub-Committee identified that the "United 
Kingdom government made such an assessment" of actions perceived for legitimate 
36 Report, para 132.1, p, 140, cited in ibid, p. 975. 
37 TP, 1, P. 108. 
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defence. In observing the role of the state in determining the extent of Convention 
rights, it applied what has become known as the doctrine of "margin of 
appreciation" for the Council Member States. 38 It adopted the language appropriate 
for a legitimate Article 15 derogation because the "life of the state" was perceived 
to be threatened. 39 
The Sub-Committee's decision can be seen as manifesting the political sentiments 
of the drafters of both the Statute and Convention. Such reasoning must first be 
viewed in its historical setting, representing an initial refusal of the European 
Commission of Human Rights to place human rights on par with sovereign rights 
but also as a manifestation of the sovereign right to protect itself if it can prove that 
its very existence is being threatened. Of course, each claim of threat must turn on 
the individual facts. A further point to note, as the previous chapter explained, is 
that between 1955 and 1981, none of the executions which occurred in the Member 
States were challenged within the Commission or the Court. The case discussed 
above was not brought by any individuals, but by a state (Greece) against another 
state (United Kingdom). The European Commission of Human Rights did not hand 
down a specific judgment on whether the death penalty was a human rights question 
38 Colin Warbrick states that the "margin of appreciation is the discretion left to a State by the 
Convention in determining the necessity of measures of derogation from protected rights in the 
circumstances prevailing within its jurisdiction, " 'The European Convention on Human Rights and 
the Prevention of Terrorism, ' 32 1 CL. Q. 1,82, (1983), p. 99. 
39 Marie-Benedict Dembour, argued that the Sub-Committee's reasoning provided the foundation for 
the future development of the jurisprudence on derogation under Article 15, see, Who Believes in 
Human Rights? Refletions on the European Convention, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006) pp. 44-47. 
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and whether the punishment violated the Convention. It had accepted that, 
ultimately, the issue of the death penalty was a Member State issue, and not yet one 
of human rights. 
So far this chapter has observed that the Council, through the Extradition 
Convention, and the first European Commission of Human Rights decision, 
accepted the death penalty as a domestic issue. Below we now investigate the 
research and publication of the first specific report on the death penalty by the 
European Committee on Crime Problems, and consider whether this publication was 
the first real attempt to bring the punishment within a human rights discourse. 
4.2.2 The Creation of the European Committee on Crime Problems 
In reviewing the first 25 years work of the Council, Frank Dowrick stated that the 
various "organs of the Council of Europe are very much alive to the need to revise 
and extend the basic doctrine of Human Rights.,, 
40 To demonstrate this,, the revision 
and extension of the Council's human rights framework was initiated 
by the 
Parliamentary Assembly formulating subordinate bodies such as the Legal Affairs 
Committee and the European Committee on Crime Problems (hereinafter 
"ECCP"). 
The ECCP held its first meetings between 3 
oth June and 3d jUly 1958. It elected Sir 
Lionel Fox as its chairman, Marc Ancel as its vice-chairman and 
Paul Comil as its 
rapporteUr. 4 1 The programme of the ECCP derived to a 
large extent from the 
40 Dowrick, above, fn. 3, p. 616. 
1 Robertson, above, fri. 2, p. 159. 
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"biennial meetings of the Conference of European Ministers of Justice, ý42 and it 
conducted its work through Sub-Committees. There were five initial Sub- 
committees, 
43 
with a specific Sub-Committee on the Death Penalty set-up to study 
"the death penalty and its alternative in the member countries of the Council of 
,, 44 Europe. 
In 1957 the ECCP identified the death penalty as a "problem" in the first program 
that it drew up. 45 In 1962, Marc Ancel, as the new Chairman of the Sub-Committee, 
noted in the first specific Council publication on the death penalty that the 
punishment was "one of the first subjects" to be investigated. 46 This was primarily 
because the Council was unsure to what extent the application of the death penalty 
42 Dowrick, above, fn. 3, p. 630. 
43 The five European Committee on Crime Problems sub-committees were 1) Sub-Committee on the 
Death Penalty; 2) Sub-Committee on the Civil and Political Rights of Prisoners, 3) Sub-Committee 
on Co-operation between European States with Regards to Traffic Offences, 4) Sub-Committee on 
After-Care (for post- imprisonment treatment), and 5) Sub-Committee on Juvenile Delinquency, see, 
Robertson, above, fn. 2, pp. 159-160. 
44 Hugh J. Mare, 'Notes: The Work of the European Committee on Crime Problems, ' I Brit. J. 
Criminology, 377, (1960-1961), p. 378. 
45 Hans Christian KrOger stated, "barely four years after the entry into force of the Convention, there 
was a move at expert level of the Council of Europe to study the problem of capital punishment in 
Europe, " in Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention on Human Rights, in Council of Europe, 
Death Penalty - Beyond Abolition, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2004), p. 87, See 
also, Marc Ancel, 'The Problem of the Death Penalty, ' in Thorsten Sellin, (ed) Capital Punishment, 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1967). 
46 Marc Ancel, The Death Penalty in European Countries, (European Committee on Crime 
Problems) (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1962), p. 3. 
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was compatible with the evolving human rights discourse. Ancel was confronted 
with this difficulty and he stated it "was understood that the question of the 
abolition or otherwise of the death penalty was not to be examined as such. 947 He 
set out the methodological mandate for the report as being to investigate the death 
penalty, "principally from the angle of substantive law and current practice in 
,, 48 Council countries. 
This report can be viewed as an updating and widening of the comparative material 
compiled by the Howard League for Penal Reform in 1928, the 1930 Select 
Committee on Capital Punishment and the 1953 Royal Commission on Capital 
Punishment. Indeed, all the countries selected for the report, except the Federal 
Republic of Germany, had already appeared in one or all of the previous studies. 49 
In maintaining this formal positive law approach, the report outlined four themes for 
the collection of data on the punishment in Europe being; (a) legislation on the 
death penalty, (b) judicial and administrative practice, (c) sociological and 
criminological factors, and (d) proposed legislative reform and crime policy. These 
four categories were designed to reflect the state practices in 1962. 
However, Ancel knew that there was much more to the death penalty than the report 
could reflect. He gave pointers of the problem and it is worth citing his observations 
at length. He stated: 
47 
ibid 
48 
ibid 
49The countries selected by the European Committee on Crime Problems were: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands, Federal Republic of 
Germany, United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey, ibid, p. 4. 
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the subject was to be considered in relation to ordinary law crimes and 
criminals only, excluding political crimes, espionage, collaboration with the 
enemy and crimes punishable by military law. This has become a particularly 
thorny question in recent years when countries which were resolutely 
abolitionist have, temporarily at least, re-introduced capital punishment. It 
would be a mistake, however, to think that these countries had abandoned their 
abolitionist principles, even in part. Similarly, the fact that a country's military 
law still provides for the death penalty is not enough to classify it as a country 
where capital punishment still exists. As Beccaria said two centuries ago, even 
the most convinced abolitionists realise that there may be special 
circumstances, or particularly troublous times, which justify the re- 
introduction of the death penalty for a limited period. Such questions are 
outside the scope of a study of capital punishment in relation to ordinary 
criminal law, which is our only purpose here. 50 
There is a clear absence of human rights considerations in this passage. Ancel had 
not provided an answer to how human rights might contribute to the "thorny 
question" of the exceptional circumstances in which the states may choose to 
impose the death penalty. It was further accepted that "the countries of Western 
Europe are yet divided in their attitude to capital punishment. , 51 As such, the report 
can be seen as replicating the issues which were considered in the two previous 
chapters. Ancel accepted the punishment was ultimately a state question and human 
50 ibid, P. I 
51 ibid, p. 8. 
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rights were not investigated as a possible infringement of this political 
circumstance. Furthermore, in the restriction and removal of the punishment, the 
52 penological issues of deterrence and protection of society, miscarriages of justice 
and the execution of the innocent, 53 along with other sociological factors, were the 
predominant factors to consider. 
Such an approach was consistent with not only the above mentioned European 
Commission of Human Rights case in Greece v. United Kingdom, but it also reflects 
the sentiments of a respected jurist of the time, Jean Graven, Judge of the Court of 
Appeal of Geneva, and Professor of Law at the University of Geneva. Graven 
54 
published a monograph entitled, 'New Reflections on the Death Penalty' in 1961 , 
which was a response to the views expressed by Albert Camus and Arthur Koestler 
as outlined in the previous chapter. Graven agreed with most of the anti-death 
penalty arguments but he maintained that there was one basic objection to the 
abolitionist's case in that "the true problem is the protection of the organised, 
civilized community. , 55 He further argued, in Westphalian rhetoric, that "[i]t is not 
war or 4 peace') which should be the decisive factor in justifying measures of social 
defence; the criterion should be the danger incurred and what protection is 
,, 56 neede . 
52 ibid, p. 42-44. 
53 ibid, P. 51. 
54 Jean Graven, New Reflections on the Death Penalty, (Institute of Comparative Law, University of 
Paris, 196 1), reviewed with translations by James Avery Joyce, The Right to 
Life: A Worldview of 
Capital Punishment, (London: Victor Gollancz, 1962). 
55 ibid, p. 269. 
56 ibid, p. 270. 
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Graven's arguments could be recognised as a distinction between civil and military 
protection, because "capital punishment cannot be separated from that man- 
produced and man-continued violence which we call war. ý, 
57 While Graven agreed 
that the death penalty should be renounced outside war circumstances, he thought 
that in times when military action ensues the possibility of the death penalty 
emerges. Graven's opinions will become very important in the Council's policy in 
1982-3, and this is considered below. 
Ancel's report included many aspects which were similar to Graven's arguments. 
He revealed the prominence of the state choice of the death penalty at this time in 
European penal history because "politics have a very great influence either in favour 
of the legal abolition of the death penalty or in favour of its reintroduction. , 58 He 
was aware that the death penalty may be applied in a "state of emergency, , 59 noting 
that in France the death penalty is applied for crimes against the "nutrition and 
health of the nation, 9ý60 and in Greece for crimes "against the integrity of national 
territory, ý61 and that when abolition has been initiated it may "not be ... 
lasting. , 62 He 
also noted that: 
57 
ibid, p. 27 1. 
58 Ancel, above, fn. 46, p. 13. 
59 ibid 
60 
ibid, P. IT 
61 
ibid, p. 18. 
62 ibid, p. 48. 
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[plolitical circumstances are of the utmost importance in this connection. They 
may precipitate the movement but they may also, like all upheavals, such as 
foreign or civil war, compromise the general trend. They may sometimes 
impose on an abolitionist country a reintroduction of capital punishment as 
fleeting as is its abolition in other countries... History has shown that certain 
striking events, namely the commission of particularly atrocious crimes 
repeated with alarming frequency over a short period or in the same locality 
may provoke a sudden reversal of opinion and even lead to the reintroduction 
of the death penalty. 
63 
What Ancel did not venture to explore was whether in what circumstances human 
rights could be compatible with state action to choose to implement the death 
penalty. The Convention text was not specifically engaged with, and no analysis of 
Article 2(l) or 3 was provided or whether the death penalty could be seen to violate 
the Convention in any way. However, the absence of a consideration of the 
Convention, did not prevent the report from encouraging the continued removal of 
the punishment in Council Member States. Ancel concluded by predicting the 
continued trend of state renunciation when he observed: 
[m]embers of the Council of Europe abolitionist countries are well 
in the 
majority. Elsewhere, apart from the various accidents of 
legislation in France, 
capital punishment simply survives in theory and 
its application is declining 
steadily. An impartial glance at the facts clearly shows that 
the death penalty is 
63 ibid, pp. 49-50. 
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regarded in Europe as something of an anachronism, surviving precariously 
for the moment but perhaps doomed to disappear. 64 
At this time Britain France and Spain maintained the death penalty, although it was 
administered infrequently. It is significant to note that the evaluation by the Sub- 
Committee is not to be interpreted as promoting a specific human rights agenda, but 
acceptance and encouragement of state renunciation. As such it is appropriate to 
situate this text as maintaining the political status quo. 
We can place this initial work within the general criticisms by Sir Leon 
Radzinowicz. He was instrumental in the early work of the ECCP and he was the 
first Chairman of the Sub-Committee, the Criminological Scientific Council in 
1963 . 
65Radzinowicz presented a report which was a frank evaluation of the work of 
the ECCP in 1968, and he stated: 
[i]ntemational activities [of the ECCP] were ... 
fraught with difficulties and 
disappointment: the working tempo was inevitably sluggish, considerable 
circumspection was necessary, only limited projects could be tackled, while 
64 ibid, p. 55. 
65 Inkeri Anttila, 'The Foundation of Co-operation in European Criminological Research: Sir Leon 
Radzinowicz and the Criminological Scientific Council at the Council of Europe, ' p. 25, in Roger 
Hood (ed), Crime, Criminology and Public Policy: Essays in Honour ofSir Leon Radzinowicz, 
(London: Heinemann, 1974). 
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more important issues had to be shelved, and there was no immediate visible 
result. 
66 
Ancel's report had not produced any "immediate visible result, " with regards to 
developing the death penalty as a human rights issue in the Council. Radzinowicz's 
general observations can be specifically applied to the death penalty when Hans 
Christian KrUger, a later rapporteur for the Committee of Legal Affairs, also 
remarked that the ECCP's work had "[flor a long time ... not yield results. ýý67 
Following the limited provisions for restricting the punishment under the 
. PXtradition Convention, the inadequacy of the first European Commission of 
Human Rights consideration of executions in Cyprus, and the limited value of the 
first report on the death penalty, the Parliamentary Assembly saw that, in order to 
formulate a specific human rights analysis of the death penalty, the investigations 
into the punishment needed to become more specific and more radical. We now 
consider the Parliamentary Assembly's strategies for incorporating the death penalty 
as a question of human rights. 
4.3 The Attempts to Encompass the Death Penalty into a Specific Human 
Rights Question: 1972-1982 
66 Leon Radzinowicz, Fifth European Conference of Criminological Research Institutes, 
(Strasbourg: Council of Europe Press, 1968), p. 16. 
67 Hans Christian KrUger, 'Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention on Human Rights, ' p. 70, in 
Council of Europe, The Death Penalty Abolition in Europe, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Press, 
1999). 
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The Parliamentary Assembly was initially tentative in its own consideration of the 
death penalty. There is a clear omission of the punishment in Recommendation 654 
68 (1972) on the role on the Council of Europe in the field of penal law. The 
recommendation welcomed that "substantial achievements" in the field of penal law 
had taken place within Member States, 69 and noted that "the Council of Europe will 
continue in the years to come to play a central role in European co-operation in 
,, 70 matters of penal law. It did not comment on the rate of abolition but 
recommended that the Committee of Ministers invite the remaining member states 
to sign and ratify inter alia the European Convention on Extradition, 71 and also to: 
instruct the European Committee on Crime Problems to study what fields of 
substantive and adjective penal law the Council of Europe might usefully 
work on with a view to the harmonisation of penal law in Europe, such as 
environmental questions, the protection of the private life of the individual, the 
taking of hostages and kidnapping in connection with crimes against 
property. 
72 
One of the central issues within this recommendation was to promote harmonisation 
in penal law. But there was no parliamentarian yet prepared to place a specific 
68 Recommendation 654 (1972) on the role on the Council ofEurope in thefield ofpenal law, text 
adopted by the Assembly on 20 January 1972 (17th Sitting). 
69 ibid, Point I- 
70 ibid, Point 4. 
" ibid, Point 7(a)(i). 
72 ibid Point 7(c). 
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debate of the punishment on the Assembly's agenda. What is observed is that with 
the encouragement of the ratification of the Extradition Convention, the restriction 
of the death penalty through indirect means was a possible human rights strategy. 
Also, the Parliamentary Assembly's recommendations on the combat of terrorism in 
1973 73 and 197974 condemned the acts of terrorism in the 1970s, and mandated the 
importance of punishing terrorists but both recommendations did not call for the 
death penalty. This can be interpreted as demonstrating that the punishment of 
terrorists should encompass alternative penal measures. 
75 But all of these issues 
included within the above mentioned recommendations were peripheral to a specific 
adoption of the punishment within a general discourse of human rights. 
The initial proposal for the death penalty to develop as a human rights question 
appeared in 1973. Astrid Bergegren, a Swedish parliamentarian, presented a Motion 
in the Parliamentary Assembly on the abolition of the death penalty. 76 This first 
specific motion to call for abolition began with Point 2 referring to the irrevocability 
of the punishment and the infallibility of the judiciary and that innocent people may 
73 Recommendation 703 (1973) on international terrorism, adopted by the Assembly on 16 May 
1973 (4h sitting). 
74 Recommendation 852 (1979) on terrorism in Europe, adopted by the Assembly on 31 January 
1979(22 nd sitting). 
75 This specific argument has been made within the modern European context at 
least since Frangois 
Guizot in 1848 in his 'A Treatise on Death Punishments, ' in, ibid, General History of Civilisation in 
Europe: From the Fall of the Roman Empire Till the French Revolution, (Edingurgh: William and 
Robert Chambers Press, 1848). 
76MOtionfor a resolution on the abolition of capital punishment 
(Doc. 3297), Legal Affairs 
Committee, 8th Sitting 18 May 1973. 
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77 be killed. Point 3 argued that "capital punishment has not been shown to have any 
deterrent effect, " and Points 5 and 6 noted that the executions contributes to a 
brutalising of society. The first six points replicated the issues which the Western 
European governments used to renounce the punishment in peacetime, and the 
discourse presented in the Parliamentary Assembly can thus be seen as engaging 
with the reasons for removal outlined in the previous chapter. 
However, Point 7 is a moment of departure in the proposed discourse. It affirmed 
that "capital punishment must now be seen to be inhuman and degrading within the 
meaning of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. " This was the 
first specific argument calling for the Parliamentary Assembly to encompass the 
death penalty within, and be rejected by, the Convention prohibition against torture. 
But between 1973 and 1976 there were unfruitful discussions within the Committee 
on Legal Affairs. In 1973, Bergegren's motion was sent back to the Committee on 
Legal Affairs for consideration, and then a newly appointed rapporteur, Bertil 
Lidgard, presented a report to the Committee and after "lengthy discussion at 
several meetings the committee decided, in January 1975, not to submit the report to 
the Parliamentary Assembly. , 78 
Then in April 1975 the Parliamentary Assembly decided not to remove the issue 
from its register and the rapporteur presented an unpublished report, which stated 
77 ibid, Point 2. 
18 Unpublished Report submitted to the Legal Affairs Committee in 1975, cited in Report on the 
abolition of capital punishment, Doc 4509, 
(2 nd and 3rd Sittings) 22 April 1980, p. 2. 
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that the "abolition of the death penalty is one of those problems that involves the 
very principles of moral, philosophical, legal and criminological, political and other 
sciences .,, 
79He went on to declare that the "debate on the death penalty ought ... to 
be carried on ... Attention should be drawn to various new developments as well as 
certain familiar arguments which militate strongly in favour of the abolition 
cause. ýM Lidgard attempted to place human rights considerations on an equal 
footing with state policy reasons for abandoning the punishment when he stated, 
"capital punishment is being called into question both from the human rights 
standpoint and in the light of modem trends in criminology. ,81 This is not 
insignificant because it reveals a growing confidence of the rapporteurs to place 
human rights considerations next to, and equal with, the state monopoly over its 
internal jurisdiction and formulation of penal sanctions. 
However in 1976 the Committee on Legal Affairs frustrated Lidgard's efforts and 
stated that the question of the death penalty should be "deferred. 5582 Then he 
resigned as rapporteur and so the punishment was not debated for a further three 
years. 83 The European Ministers of Justice considered the issue at their Conference 
79 
ibid 
80 
ibid, p. 3. 
81 
ibid 
82 ibid, See also, Parliamentary Assembly, Official Report of Debates, 32'd Ordinary Session, 
Abolition of capital punishment, Debate on the report of the Legal Affairs Committee, Doc, 4509 
and amendments, (2 nd and 3 rd Sittings), 22 April 1980, address during debate by Mr. Stoffelen, p. 60. 
83 During the debates, Mr. Grieve of the United Kingdom demonstrated the rapporteur's emotion of 
the mid- I 970s when he described Bertil Lidgard as "sorrowful" after the Legal Affairs Committee 
voted against he report, at ibid, p. 86. 
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held in Copenhagen, " and the Austrian Minister of Justice, Christian Broda, led the 
conference in formulating Resolution No. 4, and it recommended that the 
Committee of Ministers "refer questions concerning the death penalty to the 
appropriate Council of Europe bodies for study as part of the Council's work 
,, 85 programme, Then the following year, the Ministers of Justice reiterated their 
position but were also more pointed when they held, "Article 2 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights does not adequately reflect the situation actually 
attained with regard to the death penalty in Europe. " They recommended the 
Parliamentary Assembly to, "study the possibilities for the elaboration of new and 
appropriate European standards concerning abolition of the death penalty. 9. )86 
The Committee on Legal Affairs rapporteur, Carl Lidbom, authored the next 
abolitionist report in 198 0.87 In his address during the Parliamentary Assembly 
debates on his report, he recalled that "[i]ncontestably, time was lost, for our file 
gathered dust on the committee's shelves for years before anything was done. , 88 
This was specific reference to the attempts within the Assembly since 1973. During 
84 European Ministers of Justice, II 
th Conference, Copenhagen, 21" to 22 "d June 1978. 
85 Resolution No. 4 of the II thConference of European Ministers of Justice on the death penalty, 
Copenhagen, 2 Is' to 22 nd June 1978. 
86 Ministers of Justice, 12thConference, (Luxembourg, 20-21 May, 1980). 
87 Report, above, fn, 78. 
88 Parliamentary Assembly, Official Report of Debates, 32 nd Ordinary Session, Abolition of capital 
punishment, Debate on the report of the Legal Affairs Committee, Doc, 4509 and amendments, (2 
nd 
and 3 rd Sittings), 22 April 1980, p. 53. 
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the debates, Mr. Berrier of France recalled his agreement with Bergegren in 1973, 
and confirmed that they "had already waited too long" to agree on abolition 89 
He also stated to the Assembly that "there is no doubt that abolition of capital 
punishment is one of the most controversial topics we can tackle, and at the same 
time one of the most important subjects for an organisation whose calling is to 
further liberty and human rights. "90 During the debates, Mr. Koehl of France agreed 
when he stated that the "abolition of capital punishment is ... one of the greatest 
issues of our time. "91 
It needs to be asked, what were the issues debated in 1980 in the Parliamentary 
Assembly on the abolition of the punishment? The published records of the drafting 
debates reveal a similar outline to that put forward by Bergregen in 1973, and as 
such, we see the prominence of the arguments, outlined previously in Chapter 
Three, which led to the removal of the death penalty within the individual Member 
States: including a the lack of special deterrent effect, 92 the renunciation of 
89 ibid, p. 67; see also, for agreement to the dissatisfaction with the delay by Mr. Bardens of 
Germany, p. 74. 
90 ibid, p. 52. 
91 
ibid, 84. 
92 ibid, as argued by Mr. Lidbom of Sweden, p. 53; Mr. Flanagan of Ireland, p. 56; Mr. Stoffelen of 
the Netherlands, p. 60; Mr. Meier of Switzerland, p. 60-61; Mr. Bacelar of Portugal, p. 62; Mrs. 
Hawlicek of Austria, p. 63; Mr. Reddemann of the Federal Republic of Gen-nany, p. 65; Mr. Batliner 
of Liechtenstein, p. 66; Mrs. Aasen of Norway, p. 67; Mr. Bardens of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, p. 74; Mr. Beith of the United Kingdom, p. 80; Mr. Belin of France, p. 84; Mr. Koehl of 
France, p. 84. 
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retribution and the lex talionis, 93 the probability that innocent people have and will 
94 95 be executed, that the punishment brutalizes society, but the methods of execution 
by hanging and guillotine were not debated, and it is argued that the methods were 
considered as inhuman within the general propositions under Article 3. In recalling 
these arguments, Lidbom "came to realise ... that the topic of capital punishment was 
4worn out from the intellectual point of view, "' and that, "advocates of the death 
penalty, like its opponents, have long since exhausted all their arguments. " 96 These 
exhausted arguments were then used to support the debated positions focusing 
around Articles 2(l) and 3, in that the punishment was a violation of the right to life 
and was thus inhuman. 
He stated that he "confined himself to times of peace because I think it is realistic to 
,, 97 proceed by stages . This 
is significant because it again facilitated the sovereign 
state choice but made the claim that the death penalty in peacetime attracts human 
rights considerations. In peacetime, the death penalty was no longer to be seen as an 
exclusive issue for the state. But he had not yet formulated a separate discourse and 
scattered throughout the report are moments of ambivalence. Lidbom held the view 
that the death penalty should be abolished because it was barbaric, but he 
93 ibid, as argued by Mr. Lidbom of Sweden, p. 53; Mr. Aksoy of Turkey, p. 57; Mrs. Hawlicek of 
Austria, p. 63; Mr. Batliner of Liechtenstein, p. 66; Mrs. Aasen of Norway, p. 67. 
94 ibid, as argued by Mr. Lidbom of Sweden, p. 53; Mr Mercier of France, p. 55; Mr. Flanagan, p. 56; 
Mr. Stoffelen of the Netherlands, p. 60; Mr. Meier of Switzerland, p. 6 1; Mrs. Hawlicek, p. 63; Mrs. 
Aasen of Norway, p. 67; Mr. Urwin of the United Kingdom, p. 69. 
95 ibid, as argued by Mr. Lidbom of Sweden, p. 54; Mr. Stoffelen of the Netherlands, p, 60; 
96 ibid, p. 53, Mr. Lidborn cited the Italian criminologist, Enrico Ferri. 
97 Report, above, fn. 78, p. 5. 
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maintained, "it is an illusion to believe that in the present state of the world we can 
put an end to barbarism in times of war. Unfortunately times of war are, by 
definition, times of barbarism and cruelty. ýM 
This was the specific beginning of the encroachment into the sovereign monopoly 
over the death penalty, and Mr. Ruperez Rubio of Spain declared: 
we believe that nobody in this world should have a monopoly or claim the 
right to put an end to the life of others, not even the state. 99 
Mrs Meier of Switzerland eloquently stated: 
we set the right to life in the first place on the list of human rights because 
without this all other rights are meaningless, but if life is our most valuable 
possession we are not entitled, as human beings, to dispose of that of others. ' 00 
Many parliamentarians agreed that the death penalty should be viewed as not only a 
violation of human rights but specifically the right to life. 
101 
98 
ibid. 
99 Debate on Report, above, fn. 82, p. 71, 
loo ibid, p. 61. 
101 ibid, including, Mr. Flanagan of Ireland, p. 56; Mrs Lindquist of Sweden stated, "[ilf we really 
mean what we say, we cannot deprive human beings of the most fundamental 
human right, namely, 
the right to life, " p. 65. 
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But Mr. Smith of the United Kingdom stated that "[i]t is up to each individual 
country at the end of the day to make its own decision, , 
102 
and that the states 
themselves should grapple with the penological questions and that the Parliamentary 
Assembly "should stop interfering. " 
103 Mr. Banks of the United Kingdom was 
equally vehement when he stated: 
[t]he subject of the death penalty has always been left to the individual 
conscience of members of parliament, and I believe that it is right and proper 
that that should be so ... I challenge the authority of the Council of Europe to 
submit recommendations on this very sensitive subject and to seek to impose 
them on the member parliaments of the Assembly. 104 
Mr. Batliner of Liechtenstein proposed that the states should decide the issue 
because: 
the only argument that is to some extent convincing is that of self-defence in 
the wider sense. In cases where the state and the community is in a sort of self- 
defence situation, in a case of extreme necessity, it seems to me that this kind 
of self-defence cannot be completely excluded in principle. 
105 
102 ibid, p. 58. 
103 ibid, p. 59, and this position was supported by Mr. Karamollaoglu of 
Turkey, p. 68. 
104 ibid, p. 78. 
105 ibid, p. 66. 
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Mr. Grieve of the United Kingdom, who was the Chairman of the Legal Affairs 
Committee similarly argued: 
in the end it is for each country to decide what is right for its own society and 
whether a reserve power which, after all, has been kept by nearly all human 
societies since the beginning of time, should be withdrawn. I respectfully 
suggest that it is not for this Assembly to say that countries that still believe 
that it is right to retain that power are wrong and inhuman. 
106 
Mr. Michel from Belgium, argued that the Parliamentary Assembly had no business 
in concerning themselves in the political problems surrounding the death penalty in 
Member States, as it was a sovereign state issue. 
107 
A Turkish representative, Mr. Karamollaoglu, stated that he agreed with the report 
"in principle" but argued that it did not take into account sensitive economic, social 
and political circumstances in certain states in Europe. He argued that it would be 
inappropriate to adopt such a provision in a state where political assassination and 
terrorism was prolific. 
108 
106 
ibid, p. 87. 
107 ibid, p. 58-59. See also Mr. Banks of the United Kingdom, at pp. 78-9; Mr. Beith of the United 
Kingdom at pp. 80-8 1; Mr. Grieve of the United Kingdom at pp. 86-87; Mr. Michel of Belgium, p. 
59. 
108 ibid, p. 57-58. Also the Mr. Karamollaoglu of Turkey, stated that he would vote against the 
proposition, p. 68. 
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Another Turkish representative, Mr. Ak, soy, proposed an amendment to the effect 
that abolition should be promoted. His proposal intricately reflected the Member 
State right to choose to impose the death penalty in specific circumstances, when he 
maintained that the punishment "be kept during peacetime for organised murder in 
those states in which people are frequently assassinated by terrorist acts because of 
their political opinions and where the right to life of all People is thus seriously 
threatened. "' 09 But Aksoy was not present at the time of the voting for his 
amendment, and as no other member present spoke in defence of the amendment, 
the chairman declared it withdrawn. ' 10 
As such the state issues of the choice of the death penalty were still present and this 
is also confirmed by Lidbom's consideration of deterrence, "' that miscarriages of 
justice may occur, 112 that the use of the death penalty for retribution is out-dated, ' 13 
but that human rights can now be engaged with the Enlightenment theory of the 
social contract. 114 
'09 Amendment No. 2, to the report on the abolition of capital punishment, presented by Mr. Aksoy, 
Doc. 4509,2 1" April, 1980, p. 1. 
1"' Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, 22 April 1980, p. 88. An amendment by Cavaliere 
of Italy adding the words 'at least for political offences and for all other offences which have not 
intentionally resulted in the death of one or more persons' to paragraph 2 was also withdrawn; Doc. 
4509, Amendment No. 1; Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, 22 April 1980, pp. 63-64,87. 
1]1 ibid, p. 7-8. 
112 ibid, p. 11. 
113 
ibid 
114 Lidbom stated, "[h]urnan rights theory has restated and modernised certain affirmations already 
made by the [Enlightenment] philosophers who based 'sovereignty and 
law' on the idea of a social 
contract according to which each citizen should 
forego some of his rights and freedoms and submit 
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Although he used the utilitarian arguments adopted in 1981 by the Member States in 
his report, it should be identified that he also attempted to push the boundaries of 
human rights considerations. Mrs. Hawlicek provided a cogent speech outlining all 
of the above arguments, and she plainly began, "[flirstly, the death penalty is 
incompatible with the protection of human rights. " 115 Indeed, Lidbom forcefully put 
forward that "the crucial argument is ... that capital punishment is inhuman and thus 
incompatible with human rights" and that the death penalty: 
is unworthy of any civilised nation, an appalling torment for the condemned 
person and a degrading and demoralising act for those who participate in or 
attend the execution. That is why it should be done away with. ' 16 
He even engaged with political philosophy and appears to state that the new social 
contract of 1980s Europe would not include the acceptance of the death penalty 
in 
peacetime. 117 Furthermore, his report should be seen as a significant moment 
in the 
history of the Parliamentary Assembly's formulation of a human rights 
discourse 
against the punishment. In many ways the time was now right to make such an 
argument, as in Western Europe, France was now the only country who would 
be 
likely to impose executions. The report was accepted and adopted 
by the 
to the common will represented by the pooling of these 
individual rights and freedoms, " ibid, pp. 12- 
13. 
115 ibid, p. 63. 
116 ibid, p. 54. 
117 The ramifications of this are explored 
in the thesis conclusion below. 
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Parliamentary Assembly and it was Used as the basis for Resolution 727 which 
stated: 
The Assembly, 
1. Considering that capital punishment is inhuman 
2. Appeals to the parliaments of those member states of the Council of Europe 
which have retained capital punishment for crimes committed in times of 
'I'k 118 peace, to abolish it from their penal systems 
Point I adopted the Convention, Article 3 prohibition of "inhuman" punishments, 
and appeared to be making a per se claim that the death penalty is thus a violation of 
the Article because the punishment is inhuman. Such a position was a Parliamentary 
Assembly opinion, and was not supported by the drafting debates in the travaux 
preparatoires, or within the jurisprudence of the European Commission of Human 
Rights. Point 2 clearly aimed to reduce the scope of the punishment, as it called for 
a renunciation of the death penalty in peacetime. This Resolution was then referred 
to in a Recommendation to the Committee of Ministers, by the Parliamentary 
Assembly. ' 19 Recommendation 891 stated: 
The Assembly, 
118 Resolution 727 (1980) on the abolition of capital punishment, text adopted by the Parliamentary 
Assembly, (3 d sitting), 22 April 1980. 
'19 Recommendation 891 (1980) on the abolition of capital punishment, text adopted by the 
Assembly on 22 April 1980 (2nd and 3rd Sittings). 
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1. Referring to its Resolution 727 (1980) on the abolition of capital 
punishment; 
2. Considering that Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
recognises everyone's right to life, but provides that a person may be deprived 
of his life intentionally in the execution of a sentence of a court following his 
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law, 
3. Recommends that the Committee of Ministers amend Article 2 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights to bring it into line with Assembly 
Resolution 727(1980). 
Point I refers back to Resolution 727, which calls for a restriction of the punishment 
to times of war, and although not specifically expressed in the Recommendation, 
but included in Resolution Point 1, the death penalty is specifically expressed as 
"inhuman" which would be a violation of Article 3. Here the Parliamentary 
Assembly is attempting to create a new discourse on the death penalty. It also 
restricted the scope of the death penalty and Resolution Point 2 was the first attempt 
within the Council to curtail the death penalty to wartime offences. In accordance 
with these positions an amendment of Convention Article 2 was proposed. Lidbom 
had stated in his report that "[flegally speaking ... the 
European Convention on 
Human Rights does not preclude capital punishment. Article 2 even allows it 
expressis verbis. 120 Recommendation point 3 was an attempt to rectify this, and it 
121 
called on the Committee of Ministers to implement amendment. 
120 Report, above, fn. 78, p. 13. 
12 1 Robert Badinter, the French Minister of Justice and advocate against the death penalty viewed this 
period and argued the "tolerance" of Article 
2(l) could only be "temporary, " see, 'Preface - Moving 
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The Parliamentary Assembly was now engaging with the issues surrounding the 
death penalty, which the drafters of the Convention did not consider. Lidbom 
reiterated Recommendation 891, and stated: 
[i]f the resolution in this report is approved by the Assembly it will be 
necessary to amend Article 2 of the European Convention ... Any decision to 
amend the Convention can be taken solely by the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe and it is for that reason that the report proposes a draft 
recommendation in addition to a draft resolution. 122 
But a proposed amendment mechanism was put forward by the Chairman of the 
Legal Affairs Committee, Mr. Grieves of the United Kingdom, when he argued that 
the Committee of Ministers could not amend the Convention text itself, but that it 
could draft an additional Protocol, "which would require the consent of every one of 
the ... countries that make up our Assembly. " 
123 They then argued because of this 
incorrect amendment mechanism the recommendation should not be adopted. 
However, even with the disagreement on the amendment mechanism, the draft 
resolution and recommendation were adopted. The Parliamentary Assembly 
initiated a dialogue with the Committee of Ministers on the issue. 124 
towards abolition of the death penalty, ' p. 7, in Council of Europe, Death Penalty: BeyondAbolition 
(Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2004). 
Report, above, fn. 78, p. 22. 
123 ibid, p. 87. 
124 Resolution 727 (1980), above, fn. 118; Recommendation 89 1, above, fn. 119; and Report, above, 
fn. 7 8. 
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These provisions led to the Committee of Ministers drafting what would become the 
first regional treaty to call for a restriction of the death penalty to wartime 
application. Its significance is considered below. 
4.4 The AdoPtion of Protocol No. 6 to the Convention: 1983 
Protocol No. 6 to the Convention was drafted by the Committee of Ministers after it 
had considered the recommendations by the Parliamentary Assembly. What the 
protocol fundamentally aimed to achieve was a curtailment of the death penalty by 
reducing the unconfined scope of Article 2(l) to mandate that executions in 
peacetime are contrary to the Convention. ' 25 As such this protocol allowed the 
n t" abolitionist Member States to confirm their commitment to a centralised, regional, 
instrument, not to impose the death penalty for ordinary crimes in peacetime, and at 
the same time encourage those Member States which had not yet restricted the death 
penalty to do so. Protocol No. 6, Articles I to 3 stated: 
Article I- Abolition of the death penalty 
The death penalty shall be abolished. No-one shall be condemned to such 
penalty or executed. 
Article 2- Death penalty in time of war 
125 Protocol No. 6 above, fn. 1. 
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A state may make provision in its law for the death penalty in respect of acts 
committed in time of war or of immanent threat of war; such penalty shall be 
applied only in the instances laid down in the law and in accordance with its 
provisions 
Article 3- Prohibition of derogations 
No derogation from the provisions of this Protocol shall be made under Article 
15 of the Convention. 
The Commentary on the provisions of the Protocol, Article I stated that the Article 
should be read in conjunction with Article 2, and that the two Articles "affirms the 
principle of abolition of the death penalty. " 126 However, the mechanism which the 
protocol utilised was not specifically a "human rights" mandate to reduce the 
punishment. Article 2 clearly recognises the role of the state in deciding not to 
implement the death penalty in peacetime, and this is also confirmed in the 
Preamble to Protocol No. 6 when it considers "the evolution that has occurred in 
several member states of the Council of Europe expresses a general tendency in 
favour of abolition. " Nowhere in any of the articles of Protocol No. 6 does it state 
that the death penalty is contrary to Convention Articles 2(l) or 3, or that Article 
2(l) is amended. So the agreement produced by Protocol No. 6 was primarily 
reflective of the domestic penal evolution by 198 1. 
126 Explanatory Report of Protocol No. 6 to the Conventionfor the protection of human rights and 
jundamentalfteedoms concerning the abolition of the death penalty, p. 6. 
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One area where the death penalty discourse may have significantly changed 
following the drafting of the protocol was the possible amendment of Convention, 
Article 2(l). Protocol No. 6, Article 6, states that it shall be "regarded as additional 
articles to the Convention and all the provisions of the Convention shall apply 
accordingly. " 127 Article 2(l) therefore still allowed for the death penalty to be 
applied, but following Protocol No. 6 it appears that the scope of Article 2(1) had 
been restricted to wartime offences. The Committee of Ministers did not follow the 
Parliamentary Assembly's Recommendation 891 
, that it should "amend Article 2 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights to bring it into line with Resolution 
727. ýý128 The Committee of Ministers did not allow for any specific amendment of 
the text itself and so Protocol No. 6 is to be seen as applying alongside Article 2(1) 
from 1983. 
These restricted measures must be read in context with state abolition in Western 
Europe. As the previous chapter outlined, the death penalty was not applied in any 
Western European government by 1981, and so by 1983 Protocol No. 6 mandated a 
seal of approval of an already existing Western European state practice. It had not 
been revolutionary in its application. The Council was playing catch-up with state 
practice in that the sovereign states, as Petri-dishes of what human rights are to be 
protected, had already accepted this penological position. However, Protocol No. 6 
did create a symbolic Europeanization of state practice which is a powerful symbol 
and should be seen as the first time that the Convention human rights discourse 
attempt to reflected an Enlightenment position: the death penalty may be reserved 
127 Resolution 727, above, fii. 118. 
128 Recommendation 89 1, above, fn. 119. 
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for circumstances which threaten the life of the nation. The Council had for the first 
time attempted to rectify the inadequate position created by the inability of the 
drafters of the Convention to deal with the relationship of state sovereignty and the 
punishment. The Convention drafters had conceded too much ground on the state's 
side, and not enough for the human rights of the individual. Of course, the state may 
decide not to impose a death penalty upon such an individual, but the possibility 
remained in the state's arsenal. 
Even though Protocol No. 6 reflected the position of the Western European 
governments post-1981, some were reluctant to sign and ratify a document which 
would symbolise an acceptance that this was evolving into a regional norm. An 
example of this can be seen from a resolution adopted in the European Community, 
by the European Commission. In 1985 a European Commission Resolution spoke 
against a reluctance of some European Community Member States to sign and ratify 
Protocol No. 6.129 Of the twelve Members States of the European Community in 
1985, the Resolution noted that Ireland and the United Kingdom had not signed the 
Protocol, 130 and Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal, 
had not ratified the Protocol. 131 Point 3 states that the European Parliament 
"[e]xpresses its misgivings over the delay, " and Preamble E noted a regret that "the 
procedures for the ratification ... are 
being carried out very slowly, which might be 
129Resolution on the abolition of the death penalty and the accession to the Sixth Protocol to the 
Conventionfor the Protection ofHuman Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Doc. A2-167/85, OJ, C 
36,17/2/1986. 
130 ibid, Point I- 
131 ibid, Point 3. 
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considered as an expression of some hesitation on the part of those States over being 
bound by an international undertaking to abolish the death penalty. " 132 
In the 1980s, during the initial activity of Resolutions within the Council and even 
after the signatures of Protocol No. 6, there was intrinsic insecurity on the part of 
Council Member States to relinquish part of their sovereign right of the death 
penalty. Chapter Three has demonstrated that the individual European states had 
decided to renounce the death penalty on their own, but their independence of 
decision was an important factor. Having an international body monitoring their 
application or otherwise of the death penalty was another matter. Hence, the 1980s r 
can be seen as a period of tentative acceptance of the evolving Convention human 
rights discourse and the questioning of the death penalty. Furthermore, the lack of 
quick ratifications revealed that even though the regionalising of the discourse 
reflected what the states had already decided individually, they were cautious about 
the centralising process facilitated through Protocol No. 6. The states were aware 
that the ratifications would facilitate the development of a human rights "norm" 
against the punishment. 133 This is more significant than individual states renouncing 
the punishment by themselves and remaining separate and autonomous in their 
decision making. 
132 ibid, Preamble E. 
133 See Sonia Rosena and Stephen Journey, 'Abolition of the Death Penalty: An Emerging Norm of 
Intemational Law, ' Hamline J Pub. L, & Pol'y 163 (1993), pp. 166-169; and Sagmin Bae, When the 
State no Longer Kills: International Human Rights Norms and Abolition of the Death Penalty, (New 
York: State University of New York Press, 2007), p. 1- 12. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
The events analysed above engage with a similar historical period to the previous 
chapter. It has investigated the beginning of the Council discourse from the 
restriction of the application of the punishment in the Extradition Convention, to the 
jurisprudence of the first European Commission of Human Rights case to consider 
capital laws and executions, to the first report on the death penalty by the ECCP. It 
has also considered the discussions on the death penalty within the Parliamentary 
Assembly, and the adoption of Protocol No. 6 as the first protocol which provides 
for the restriction of the death penalty to wartime circumstances. 
When reading this chapter alongside the previous one, it is clear that the evolution 
of the Council's human rights discourse against the punishment significantly 
mirrored state parameters formulating renunciation of the punishment. It did not 
seek to make itself a hegemonic discourse against state policies, but sought to affirm 
and encourage state abolition in peacetime. Protocol No. 6 is a landmark abolition 
legislation which identified the threshold of the Council's human rights standards at 
this time. But underneath, the Parliamentary Assembly was dissatisfied with the 
reach of the legislation. It argued that Article 3 should now provide a per se 
prohibition against the punishment, 134 and also that Article 2(1) should be amended. 
The Committee of Ministers did not endorse either of these provisions and instead 
progressed at the rate the Member States dictated. As such the period to 1983 can be 
described as a cautious evolving of the Council's human rights standards, 
134 This will be discussed further in Chapter Six below. 
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It was perhaps, reasonable, for the Council to initially tread carefully so that a 
greater degree of confidence could be formulated. Indeed, the Parliamentary 
Assembly can be seen to be the most confident in the development of the discourse 
and which will be demonstrated in the following chapters as it radically advanced 
the human rights parameters. Furthermore, this initial steady pace will be supported 
and furthered by the development of the jurisprudence of the European Commission 
on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights, and also the adoption 
of Protocol No. 13 in 2002 which calls for the abolition of the death penalty in all 
circumstances. In the next chapter we now consider Article 20) and also the 
significance of Protocol No. 6 and following its adoption, Protocol No. 13 on its 
interpretation. 
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Chapter Five: 
The Council Debates and the Interpretation of the Right to Life 
5. The Council Debates and the Interpretation of the 
Right to Life 
5.1 Introduction 
The drafting of Article 2(l) outlined in Chapter Two revealed that at the beginning 
of the Council and the creation of the Convention system of human rights, the death 
penalty was an acceptable right of the sovereign Member State. It was perceived as 
a legitimate exception to the "right to life. " The central focus of this chapter is then 
to consider whether the same perception remains today and to discover whether 
there has been a change within the Council which now sees the punishment a 
violation of Article 2(l). 
The Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers debates on the 
application of the death penalty under Article 2(1) is analysed to determine this 
question. Also the case-law of the European Commission of Human Rights and the 
European Court of Human Rights is critiqued to determine the judicial response to 
the political dialogue between the Assembly and the Committee, and the resultant 
legislation on the issue. As such it will be investigated whether the original right of 
the state to impose the death penalty has been modified by an evolved interpretation 
of the right to life of the individual. 
It will be seen that the specific text of Article 2(l) has yet to be amended, but that in 
juxtaposition Protocol No. 6 provides for the abolition of the death penalty in times 
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of peace, and that Protocol No. 13 provides for abolition in all circumstances. The 
question arises as to how the abolitionist position provided through the protocols 
can be reconciled with the possibility of the death penalty under Article 2(1)? 
To engage with this central issue, this chapter is divided into two jurisprudential 
questions. Firstly, the debates on Protocol No. 6 are considered along with the 
Court's jurisprudence of Article 2(l), and secondly, the debates on Protocol No. 13 
and the subsequent evolution of the case-law. The primary focus of this analysis 
will be to discover whether the protocols can be seen as amending Article 2(1) by 
implication, and whether any such amendment has affected the Member State right 
to choose whether or not to impose the death penalty. 
5.2 The Interpretation of Article 2(1) and Protocol No. 6 
To isolate the right to life and attempt to provide an interpretation of what it means 
is no easy task. James Griffin, Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford 
University, 
has observed that in a human rights context the right to life does not 
have a "clear 
boundary" and that what "starts off as the least problematic of rights 
becomes, on 
reflection, distinctly problematic. " 
I Similarly, the European human rights academic, 
1 James Griffin, On Human Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 213. 
For an analysis 
of Griffin's contribution to the human rights 
discourse, see, Bill Bowring, The Degradation of the 
International Legal Order? The Rehabilitation of Law and the Possibility of 
Politics, (Abington: 
Routledge-Cavendish, 2008), p. 115-116. 
172 
Torkel Opsahl stated, "Article 2 of the Convention and the context in which it 
operates will show that what at first seemed simple may have problematic points. ýý2 
We have already charted the lack of debates on the death penalty in the travaux 
preparatoires and that in the period from 1953 to 1980, the Council had not been 
, ý'k able to identify how it wanted to attempt an interpretation of the Article. Peter 
Hodgkinson the Director of the Centre of Capital Punishment Studies, at the 
University of Westminster, noted that the interpretive difficulty of Article 2 resulted 
from a paradox in that the article protecting the right to life, allowed the "state to 
take life. 9ý3 It is also this paradox which has resulted in the Council originally 
viewing the death penalty as a "problem" in the 1960s and this interpretive 
vicissitude has not gone away. 4 The predominant factor which caused this 
conundrum was historically the sovereign had claimed the right to put to death, but 
the Convention had legislated that there was a right to life of the individual. 
It has been recognised that the rectifying of the interpretive problem is of the utmost 
importance to the Council as Mark Janis and his colleagues argued that, "a violation 
2 Torkel Opsahl, 'The Right to Life, ' p. 207, in R. St. J. Macdonald, et al, (eds), The European 
System for the Protection of Human Rights, (Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993). 
Peter Hodgkinson, 'Europe -A Death Penalty Free Zone: Commentary and Critique of 
Abolitionist 
Strategies, ' 26 Ohio. N. UL. Rev. 625 (2000), p. 627. 
4 The former Deputy Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Hans Christian KrUger also noted 
that the death penalty was a "problem, " see, 'Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention on Human 
Rights, ' p. 88, in Council of Europe, Death Penalty: Beyond Abolition, (Strasbourg: 
Council of 
Europe Press, 2004). 
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of this right makes meaningless the recognition of any other rights. 555 Douwe Korff 
has similarly stated that if a person was deprived of their "right to life, all other 
,, 6 rights would become illusory. Bertrand Mathieu has confirmed, "we must 
consider the right to life to be the primary right of every human being. -)57 
The European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human 
Rights has developed different interpretive mechanisms for Article 2(l ). 8 
Concerning the death penalty, the essential question which the Court faced was 
whether it should apply judicial restraint and allow the states to dictate policy on the 
death penalty, or whether it should utilise judicial activism and initiate new human 
rights standards. The Court held in Tyrer v, United Kingdom, 9 that the Convention 
must not be interpreted in a vacuum and that the document is a "living instrument, " 
which "should be interpreted in the light of present day conditions. "10 This has been 
confirmed in McCann et al, v. United Kingdom, where the Court declared that 
' Mark W. Janis, Richard S. Kay and Anthony W. Bradley, European Human Rights Law Text and 
Materials, 3 rd ed, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 119. 
Douwe Korff, The Right to Life: A Guide to the Implementation ofArticle 2 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Human lUghts Handbooks, No. 8) (Strasbourg: Council of Europe 
Press, 2006), p. 6. 
7 Bertrand Mathieu, The Right to Life in European Constitutional and International Case Law, 
(Strasbourg: Council of Europe Press, 2006), p. 9. 
' For an overview of the interpretive mechanism which the European Court of Human Fights 
has 
adopted see, George Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on 
Human 
Rights, (oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
9 Tyrer v. United Kingdom, Application Nos. 5856/72; 5775/72,14 
December 1976. 
10 ibid, Para 31. 
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Article 2(l) should be applied in a "practical and effective" way. " In Vo. v. France, 
it held it must be interpreted in line with "present day conditions. " 12 
This interpretive mechanism has been utilised within the development of 
Convention human rights to comprehend the widening context of the Convention 
and obligations of states towards European citizens. 13 Alastair Mowbray noted that 
the European Court of Human Rights has "interpreted the Convention in such ways 
to encompass situations that would not have been envisaged by the framers. ý04 Paul 
McKaskle also observed that the Court has applied the "living instrument" doctrine 
and "present day conditions" analysis to depart from its own previous decisions in 
that "the Court has found that a result it had reached at an earlier time should no 
longer apply because of changed conditions. " 15 
The living instrument doctrine is extremely important for the Court's evolution of 
its interpretation of the death penalty. On this specific issue, Ann Sherlock observed 
"[g]iven that the Convention is a living instrument to be interpreted in the light of 
evolving standards and values, the scope of its obligations may develop over 
11 McCann et al v. United Kingdom, (17/1994/464/545) 27th September, 1995, para 146. 
12 Vo. v. France, Application No. 53924/00,8 July 2004. 
" See, Alastair Mowbray, 'The Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights, ' (2005) 5 HRLR 
57, p. 58; Caroline Ravaud, 'The case-law of the institutions of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, ' pp. 92-124, in Council of Europe, Death Penalty - Beyond Abolition, (Strasbourg: Council 
of Europe Press, 2004). 
14 Mowbray, ibid, p. 58. 
15 Paul L. McKaskle, 'The European Court of Human Rights: What it is, How it Works, and its 
Future, '40 US. FL. Rev 1 (2005), p. 52-53. 
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time, ý-) 16 In Deweer v. Belgium, the Court noted that the "Convention permits under 
certain conditions some very serious forms of treatment, such as the death 
penalty. " 17 In Kirkwood v. United Kingdom, 18 the United Kingdom govemment had 
argued that extradition circumstances where the person extradited would face a 
capital trial could not violate Article 2(l), as it specifically allowed for the 
punishment as an exception to the right to life. 19 The Commission stated that "the 
provisions of Article 2(l) of the Convention ... expressly recognises the ending of 
life through the death penalty following appropriate criminal conviction. 9520 In 
Kirkwood the Commission provided a literal application of Article 2(l). 
However, five years later the Commission again considered the application of 
Article 2(l) to extradition proceedings in Soering v. the United Kingdom. 21 Hans 
Soering was detained in the United Kingdom and the Virginian government 
requested his extradition to stand trial for murder. The Commission was of the 
opinion that there was a real prospect he would be sentenced to death and await 
execution on death row for six to eight years, and that he would suffer mental 
anguish. The Commission considered it significant that Soering was only 18 at the 
16 Ann Sherlock, 'Extradition, death row and the Convention, ' E. L. Rev. 1990,15(l), 87-92, p. 92. 
17 Deweer v. Belgium, Application No. 6903/75,27 February 1980, para 53. 
18 Kirkwood v. United Kingdom, Application No. 10479/83,12 March 1984. In Amekrane v. United 
Kingdom, Application No. 5961/72,19 July 1974, The United Kingdom reached a friendly 
settlement with Mrs. Amekrane, as it had extradited her husband back to Morocco for a capital crime 
and he was executed. 
19 Kirkwood v. United Kingdom, Application No. 10479/83,12 March 1984, para. 183-4. 
20 ibid, para. 188,190. 
21 Soering v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 1403 8/88,19 January 1989. 
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time of the crime that he suffered from the mental condition "folie a deux", and the 
extreme conditions of death row in the State of Virginia were enhanced by 
prolonged incarceration of up to eight years. 22 The Commission relied on the 
interpretation of Article 2(1) that it established in Kirkwood, and held that Soering 
could be extradited to the State of Virginia to face a capital trial. The Commission 
did not apply any evolutive interpretation to move away from the Kirkwood 
decision, but on appeal to the European Court of Human Rights a different judicial 
approach was adopted. 
Before Protocol No. 6 was adopted in 1983, the European Court of Human Rights 
had not considered the specific question of the amendment of Article 2(l). But 
when Soering reached the European Court of Human Rights, the Court sought to 
evolve its jurisprudence. In 1989, thirteen Member States of the Council of Europe 
had signed and ratified Protocol No. 6 (but not the United KingdOM)23 and so the 
question arose as to how Article 2(l) was to be balanced against the Protocol. The 
Court considered the issue at length and stated: 
[s]ubsequent practice in national penal policy, in the form of a generalised 
abolition of capital punishment, could be taken as establishing the agreement 
of the Contracting States to abrogate the exception provided for under Article 
2(l) ... However, 
Protocol No. 6, as a subsequent written agreement, shows that 
22 Both the Commission and the Court situated the most important analysis of this case under 
Convention Article 3 and this is considered in the next chapter. 
23 Soering v, United Kingdom, Application No. 1403 8/88, decision, 7hJuly, 1989, para, 103; The 
then thirteen ratifying states were: Austria, Denmark, France, Gennany, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, (San Marino), Spain, Sweden, Switzerland. 
177 
the intention of the Contracting Parties as recently as 1983 was to adopt the 
normal method of amendment of the text in order to introduce a new 
obligation to abolish capital punishment in time of peace and, what is more, to 
do so by an optional instrument allowing each State to choose the moment 
when to undertake such an agreement. 
24 
The Court in effect determined that the location of the right to decide whether or not 
to apply the death penalty ultimately resided with the Member States. State choice 
was predominant ensuring that the amendment of Article 2(1) was only possible 
through explicit Member State agreement. Alastair Mowbray has argued that the 
Court wanted to display a legitimate basis for its decision, 25 thus providing an 
"important limitation on the use of the 'living instrument' doctrine. iiM The Court 
stated that there was not a consensus for saying that Article 2(l) had been 
n, k 
27 
abrogated. It therefore applied judicial restraint in order to reinforce the notion that 
this was a matter for Member States. 
24 ibid In considering the harmony of Convention Article 2(l) and Protocol 6, Article 1, no other 
case law was referred to, and Soering can be seen as the first time the European Court of Human 
Rights considered the death penalty as an Article 2(l) issue. 
25 See, Mowbray, above, fn. 13, pp. 58,66-69. For a general discussion of the question of the 
legitimacy of the Court's judgments when it departs from the drafter's intentions, see Lawrence 
Helfer, 'Consensus, Coherence and the European Convention on Human Rights, ' 26 Cornell Int'l L. 
J (1993) 135. 
26 ibid, p. 66 
27 Soering above, fn. 23, para 103. 
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At this time the Protocol No. 6 signatories and ratifications had not amounted to a 
44norm" in Convention human rights. Sangmin Bae has conducted research on norm 
development within international human rights and the death penalty and she is of 
the opinion that, "the norm against the death penalty is a 'hard' case. , 28 Illustrating 
the hard case, Bae has argued that norm creation in the death penalty is an 
extremely complex and difficult exercise. The Court looked for Member States 
unanimity to enable it to present an interpretation that Article 2(l) had been 
amended. It appeared that universal state acceptance is required for the creation of a 
legal "norm" against the death penalty. 
As such the Court did not succumb to the fears of the former registrar of the Court, 
Paul Mahoney, of the possibility of the Court making law. 29 Although Lawrence 
Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter have argued that the Council possesses the power 
of supranational adjudication and that it is "empowered to exercise some of the 
functions otherwise reserved to stateS,, 30 the Court held back and allowed the 
amendment of Article 2(l) to remain a question for the Member States. Human 
rights in this respect did not trump the sovereignty of states. 
28 Sangmin Bae, When the State No Longer Kills: International Human Rights Norms and Abolition 
of Capital Punishment, (Albany: SUNY, 2007), p. 109. 
29 Paul Mahoney, 'Marvellous Richness of Diversity or invidious Cultural Relativism' 19 HRLJ 
(1998) 2; ibid, 'Judicial Activism and Judicial Self-Restraint in the European Court of Human 
Rights: two sides of the same coin, ' II HRLJ (1990) 57. 
30 Lawrence Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'Towards a Theory of Effective Supranational 
Adjudication, ' 107 Yale. L. J. 2, (1997), p. 287. 
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The political debates and jurisprudence concerning Article 2(1) reveals that the 
locus of the authority to dictate the final decision of whether or not to apply the 
death penalty is identified through a process of Committee of Ministers legislating 
protocols and then the acceptance or rejection of the provisions of the protocols by 
the Member States, and finally the Court's ad udication on this legislative and i 
ratification process. The Court's analysis is necessary, and will continue to be, 
because the issue of Protocol No. 6 and the extent of Article 2(l) is still open for 
debate. 
In his 1980 Report for the Parliamentary Assembly, Carl Lidbom stated that it was 
the Committee of Ministers who could only amend the Convention text itself ,31 and 
Soering agreed to this amendment process. This displays that the driving force 
behind where the right of the death penalty is located is in different power 
determinates, but in 1989, the Committee of Ministers and the Court thought that 
the ultimate authority presided with the state. Chapters Two and Three identify that 
it is a sensitive political project to engage the sovereign states in relinquishing such 
an intrinsic component of its right, and the human rights standards were carefully 
being applied to this issue. But Judge De Meyer held the view that the Soering 
Court should have gone further and he stated in his concurring opinion that: 
[t]he second sentence of Article 2(l) of the Convention was adopted nearly 
forty years ago, in particular historical circumstances, shortly after the Second 
World War. In so far as it still may seem to permit, under certain conditions, 
1 Report on the abolition of capital punishment, Doc. 4509, 
(2 nd and 3 rd sitting), 22 April 1980, p. 
22. 
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capita punishment in times of peace, it does not reflect the contemporary 
situation, and is now overridden by the development of legal conscience and 
practice. 32 
Judge De Meyer's concurring opinion is more strongly worded than the majority's 
and it echoed the Parliamentary Assembly resolutions and recommendations. In 
effect, he was arguing that the Member States had arrived at a better understanding 
of the penal issues of the death penalty, which can be compared to the Court's 
reasoning in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, when it stated "[a]s compared with the 
era when that legislation [making homosexually illegal] was enacted, there is now a 
,, 33 better understanding. George Lestas, the European human rights scholar, views 
the importance of the Member States endeavouring to develop "better" legislation as 
he argues "it is not enough to there being a different understanding evolved, this 
understanding must also be better, ie, towards the truth of the substantive protected 
right. 9934 
Even though the Soering Court did not hold that the Member States had agreed to 
amend Article 2(l), it is evident that the states were formulating a collective 
understanding of more effective penal policy. Whilst the Court did observe this 
32 Soering, above, fn. 23, p. 51. 
33 Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, Application No. 7525/76,22 October 198 1, para 60 
34 George Letsas, A Theory ofInterpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 79; Michel Foucault has observed that in the Enlightenment the 
European governments were searching for ways to not "punish less, but to punish better", in 
Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, (London: Penguin, 1976), p. 73. It appears that this is 
an ever evolving European govemmental quest. 
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development, it did not see that it had a judicial function in furthering this new 
penal perspective. It merely observed what was happening in 1989.35 However, the 
Parliamentary Assembly endeavoured to contribute to the search through the 
eradication of the deficiencies within Protocol No. 6. Renate Woh1wend, the former 
rapporteur for the Committee on Legal Affairs, stated in her Explanatory 
Memorandum that Protocol No. 6 had three essential weaknesses, in that firstly it 
did not abolish the death penalty in times of war or imminent threat of war, 
secondly that it provided no formal obstacle to a reinstating of the death penalty, 
and finally that it did not amend Article 2(l). 36 Stephano Manacorda, the human 
rights scholar, noted the weaknesses of Protocol No. 6 and added that the death 
penalty could be applied "in the threat of war" and that there is "no mention of the 
,, 37 seriousness and the nature of the offence. 
The Parliamentary Assembly wanted the Committee of Ministers to eradicate these 
weaknesses and fonnulate a better protocol which would seek to abolish the death 
penalty in all circumstances. With the introduction of new legislation, the 
Court 
may then have to reassess the status of Article 2(l). 
35 It is argued that the Court was more proactive under its Article 
3 analysis and this is considered in 
the next chapter. 
36 Report: Draft Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights concerning the abolition of 
the death penalty in all circumstances, Parliamentary Assembly, 
Doc. 93 16,15 January 2002, 
Explanatory Memorandum, para 3. 
37 Stephano Manacorda, 'Restraints on Death Penalty in Europe: 
A Circular Process, ' JICJ 1,263 
(2003), p. 274. 
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5.3 The Interpretation of Article 2(1) and Protocol No. 13 
In Recommendation 1246 (1994), the Parliamentary Assembly deplored the fact that 
eleven Member States had the death penalty as a possible legal punishment. 38 
Paragraphs 4 and 5 outlined the failure of the deterrent effect of the death penalty 
and that innocent people may be executed, and that for these reasons, the death 
penalty should not apply even in wartime. The Parliamentary Assembly 
recommended that the Committee of Ministers "draw up an additional protocol to 
the European Convention on Human Rights, abolishing the death penalty both in 
,, 39 peace- and wartime. In its interim reply to Recommendation 1246, the 
Committee of Ministers noted that it would "examine" the Parliamentary 
Assembly's recommendations, and also emphasised that the Committee of Ministers 
"encouraged member states which have not abolished the death penalty to operate 
de facto or de jure a moratorium on the execution of death sentences. 40 
However by 1996 the Committee of Ministers still had not responded to 
Recommendation 1246 and the Parliamentary Assembly then adopted 
Recommendation 1302 (1996), 41 which welcomed the Committee's encouragement 
of moratoria, but regretted "that the Committee of Ministers has not yet taken any 
38 Recommendation 1246 (1994) on the abolition of capital punishment, text adopted by the 
Assembly on the 4th October 1994 (25b sitting), para 1. 
" ibid, para 6(i). 
40 Interim reply to Recommendation 1246 (1994) on the abolition of capital punishment, Doc. 7466, 
adopted on 22 January 1996. 
41 Recommendation 13,02 (1996) on the abolition of the death penalty in Europe, text adopted by the 
Assembly on 28 June 1996 (24h sitting). 
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action on the most important proposals, contained in paragraph 6 of this 
recommendation. , 42 The regret was focused on the fact that the Committee had not 
drafted a specific protocol to amend Article 2(l). 
To further confirm the point the Assembly recommended "that the Committee of 
Ministers follow up the proposals of Recommendation 1246 (1994) without further 
delay. , 43 Paragraph 3 highlighted the frustrations within the Parliamentary 
Assembly. It was not satisfied with the Committee dragging its feet on the new 
protocol, and called for complete abolition and a greater monitoring of Member 
States which imposed the punishment. Then in 1997, the Committee put forward an 
interim reply to Recommendation 1302,44 stating that it "fully shares the concern 
voiced by the Parliamentary Assembly, " but that the Committee also considered: 
Bearing in mind that, at national level, parliaments and governments share 
responsibility regarding the abolition of the death penalty. 
a. It welcomes the constructive dialogue that has been developed between the 
Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly concerning this issue 
and would emphasise its strong commitment to pursue this dialogue on the 
abolition of capital punishment in all member states of the Council of Europe. 
42 ibid, para 
43 ibid, para 
44 Reply to Recommendation 1246 (1994) and 1302 (1996) of the Parliamentary Assembly, 555h 
meeting (January 1996) and 5Wh meeting 
(April 1997). 
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d. The Committee of Ministers considers that the process of monitoring 
compliance with commitments accepted by member States of the Council of 
Europe can contribute, in a spirit of dialogue and co-operation, to the process 
of putting an end to capital punishment. It also considers that the 
Parliamentary Assembly has an important role to play in this regard (emphasis 
added). 
This interim reply clearly reveals that the Committee considered the sovereignty of 
Member States to be of crucial importance in the development of abolition 
strategies against the death penalty. Abolition was the goal, but to be effective, it 
must come from a "spirit of dialogue" with the Member States. What this appears to 
demonstrate is that the Committee were intertwined within the historical, and 
contemporary, political issues surrounding sovereignty and the state right of the 
punishment. The Assembly was attempting to expand the boundaries of human 
rights, but the Committee placed a demarcation because of political considerations. 
This example can be placed in a more general context. Danny Nicol noted that the 
Parliamentary Assembly was "enthusiastic" in the drafting of human rights 
legislation but the Committee of Ministers was more "cautious .,, 
45This 
can be seen 
in the above examples on the death penalty. But then in 1998, the Committee 
replied to both Assembly Recommendations, and stated that it: 
45 Danny Nicol, 'Original intent and the European Convention on Human Rights, ' P. L. 152 (2005), p. 
154. 
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considers that the priority is to obtain and maintain moratoria on executions, to 
be consolidated by complete abolition of the death penalty. In exercising 
influence to this end, it considers it important to act in partnership and 
constructive dialogue with the Assembly, particularly in view, on the one 
hand, of the essential responsibility of the legislator in this field and on the 
other of the need to sensitise public opinion. 46 
The Committee, at this stage, did not engage with the specific paragraphs of the 
Assembly Recommendations, but merely reinforced its commitment against the 
death penalty. It joined the Assembly in this endeavour. It should also be understood 
that what the Committee were affirming through emphasising the maintenance of 
ccmoratoria" was the state internal consideration of the suspension and removal of 
the punishment, It considered the issues surrounding the death penalty required 
more careful attention of Member States issues, and there was unease at hastily 
creating the protocol. Although it favoured abolition it was hesitant in its role as 
Council legislature, to impose punishment criteria on Member States. But the push 
to create a new protocol did not abate. At the Ministerial Conference held in Rome 
on 3-4 November 2000, a further Resolution was adopted inviting the Committee of 
Ministers: 
46 Abolition of capital punishment, reply to Recommendation 1246 (1994); Abolition of the death 
penalty in Europe, reply to Recommendation 1302 (1996), adopted, 16'h April 1998 at the 628h 
meeting of the Minister's Deputies, Doc 8079,21 April, 1998. 
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to consider the feasibility of a new additional protocol to the Convention 
which would exclude the possibility of maintaining the death penalty in 
respect of acts committed in time of war or of immanent threat of war. 47 
Following this Resolution, the Committee adopted a "Declaration for a European 
Death Penalty-Free Area. " It stated that the achievement of abolition of all Member 
States was "our common goal. 548 This was not quite the same as specifically stating 
that the Committee would adopt a protocol in order to abolish the death penalty in 
wartime, or that, even, Article 2 (1) would be amended. Then the Rapporteur Group 
on Human Rights submitted the Draft Protocolfor the abolition q the death penalty ?f 
in all circumstances. 49 The text called for abolition in all circumstances but no 
provisions were included which specifically amended Article 2(l). Itconsidered and 
accepted the draft and Explanatory Report and presented it to the Assembly for 
opinion. 
50 
In her "Explanatory Memorandum" to the Draft Protocol, Renate Wohlwend, noted 
initially that "the Assembly has expressed its contempt for the death penalty for 
47 Paragraph 14 (ii) of Resolution IIB (2000). 
48 Declaration "For a Death Penalty-Free Area" adopted by the Committee of Ministers, 9h 
November 2000,107 Ih Session. 
49 Draft Protocol No. 13 to the Conventionfor the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances, Ministers' Deputies 
Meeting (773 d meeting) 21 November 200 1. 
50 European Convention on Human Rights - Draft Protocol No. 13 on abolition of the death penalty 
in all circumstances, Parliamentary Assembly, Doc. 9291,14 December 200 1. 
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decadeS,,, 51 and that the first official Assembly initiative to abolish the death penalty 
was Recommendation 891 (1980). However, the Protocol did not include such 
provision. The Opinion on the Draft Protocol stated that the unsatisfactory situation 
of Article 2(l) remained under the draft and that: 
5. The second sentence of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights still provides for the death penalty. It has long been in the interests of 
the Assembly to delete this sentence, thus matching theory with reality. This 
interest is strengthened by the fact that more modem national constitutional 
documents and international treaties no longer include such provisions. 
6. In consequence the Assembly recommends to the Committee of Ministers 
that, in the interest of updating the European Convention on Human Rights as 
such on this important matter, a second paragraph be added to Article 5 of the 
draft protocol ("Relationship to the Convention") worded as follows: 
When this Protocol has come into force in all States Parties to the Convention, 
the second sentence of Article 2 paragraph I of the Convention shall be 
replaced with the text of Article I of this Protocol, and in the first sentence of 
51 Explanatory Memorandum, by Mrs. Renate Woh1wend, rapporteur, point, 1, in Draft Protocol to 
the European Convention on Human Rights concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all 
circumstances, Doc. 9316,15 January, 2002. 
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Article 47 of the Convention, after the words 'provision of the Convention' 
52 the words 'except for Article 2, paragraph F shall be added . 
Wohlwend indicated that Protocol No. 13 was an opportunity to finally amend 
Article 2(l) and along with the ratification, and the process of abolishing the death 
penalty in all circumstances, the Member States could signal a simultaneous 
acceptance of an amendment to the Article. 53 However, the Committee of Ministers, 
in the final drafting of Protocol 13, did not include Wohlwend's provisions of a 
"hybrid protocol, ý554 and the rapporteur in paragraphs 9- 10, strongly questioned: 
are we then going to draw up another (the third! ) Protocol on the same subject 
- the abolition of the death penalty - in order to at long last amend 
Article 2 of 
the Convention itself? In treaty law, this is a very inelegant solution ... I would 
suggest a "hybrid" Protocol, which starts out as an additional Protocol, and 
becomes an amending Protocol when it has entered into force in all State 
Parties to the Convention. 
This seemingly unimpeachable approach was not followed by the Committee of 
Ministers as they would not "think the unthinkablp. "55 As a result, the Council may 
now have to adopt the "inelegant solution" of drafting a further protocol 
in the 
52 Opinion No. 233 (2002), Draft protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights concerning "P 
the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances, I" Sitting, 
Assembly Debate, 21 January 
2002. 
53 See, Explanatory Memorandum by Mrs Wohlwend, Rapporteur, above, fn. 5 1, paras. 1- 12. 
54 ibid, para 10. 
55 ibid, para 
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future. In this context Wohlwend's observation would support the argument that the 
theoretical possibility of the death penalty remains. She indicated the problematic 
circumstance as some Member State's parliaments demonstrate the sovereign right 
to internal jurisdiction. She observed: 
[c]onceming the inclusion of an obligation for signatories not to re-introduce 
the death penalty, one might argue that this is not necessary, since there is no 
withdrawal clause in the draft Protocol. It might also not be politically 
opportune to add such an obligation, since some countries will always insist 
that their parliaments should be at complete liberty to have thefinal say in this 
56 
matter (emphasis added). 
On the issue of reintroduction of the death penalty, Wohlwend conceded the 
question of sovereign internal jurisdiction. Such an observation would be in 
accordance with the sentiments of the Committee of Ministers and the European 
Court of Human Rights in Soering on identifying a prominent role of the sovereign 
state within the abolition process. But the exchange of opinions between the 
Assembly and the Committee on the status of Article 2(l) and its possible 
amendment, displayed that the Assembly did not want to allow the Member States 
to rest on this political position. It attempted to close the door on state application 
by achieving a textual amendment of Article 2(l). However, the Rapporteur Group 
on Human Rights considered the Assembly's Opinion and stated: 
56 
ibid. 
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[w]ith regards to the Assembly's Opinion the Group, whilst welcoming its 
strong political support for such a protocol, came to the conclusion that it was 
not advisable to accede to the Recommendation ... In the Group's view such an 
amendment would present only limited interest given that the purported legal 
effect in respect of Article 2, ECHR will in practice also be achieved through 
an additional protocol. Furthermore, the amendment could, in the opinion of 
the [Rapporteur Group on Human Rights], give rise to some legal questions, 
not least with regard to territorial declarations and reservations, extending 
beyond the scope of the consideration of the protocol itself, which could delay 
unduly the adoption of this important text. 57 
The Rapporteur Group on Human Rights were advancing complex legal arguments 
which had the effect of thwarting the efforts of the Parliamentary Assembly. The 
Group was of the opinion that Protocol No. 13 would amend Article 2(l) by 
implication, and that the "purported legal effect" will be achieved "in practice. " 
However, such an interpretation seems to be irreconcilable with Protocol No. 13, 
Article 5 on the relationship of the protocol with the Convention as it stated that the 
"Protocol shall be regarded as additional articles to the Convention, " but not that it 
amends the Convention. Furthermore, the final Commentary on the provisions of the 
Protocol, on Article 5, confusingly stated: 
57 Reference Documents: 4,5 European Convention on Human Rights, Draft Protocol No. 13 on the 
abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances, Ministers' Deputies Meeting (784h Meeting), 21 
February, 2002, sixth unnumbered paragraph. 
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[a]s an additional Protocol, it does not, as far as the Parties to the Protocol are 
concerned, supersede Article 2 of the Convention, since the first sentence of 
paragraph I and the whole of paragraph 2 of that article still remain valid ... It is 
clear that the second sentence of paragraph I is no longer applicable in respect 
58 of the States Parties to this Protocol . 
Although the Commentary proposed that "the second sentence of paragraph I is no 
longer applicable, " the Protocol nevertheless allowed Article 2(1) to preserve the 
possibility of the death penalty within the main text of the Convention. The 
Committee allowed this complex human rights position for two reasons: both 
relating to Member State's opinions of such an amendment. Firstly, it presumed that 
the amendment of Article 2(l) would only be of "limited interest" to the signatories, 
and secondly, that the proposal of such amendment may "give rise to some legal 
questions, not least with regard to territorial declarations and reservations. " As 
discussed in Chapter Two, the territorial considerations have been a central factor of 
the sovereignty of states since their creation following the Treaty of Westphalia in 
1648, so the importance of the recognition of state issues should not have been 
underestimated. 
In the final draft wording of Protocol No. 13, the Committee did not adhere to the 
Parliamentary Assembly's requests and recommendations to amend Article 2(l), but 
sought to renounce its application without providing for amendment. This was a 
51 Protocol No. 13 to the Conventionfor the protection of human rights andfundamentalfteedoms, 
concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances, Vilnius, 3 
May, 2002, 
Commentary on the provisions of the Protocol, Article 5: Relationship to the Convention. 
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political middle-way. However, the Preamble to Protocol No. 13 states, "everyone's 
right to life is a basic value in a democratic society and that the abolition of the 
death penalty is essential for the protection of this right. " Wishing to strengthen the 
protection of the right to life, Article I states that the "death penalty shall be 
abolished. No one shall be condemned to such penalty or executed. " 
The right to life is stated twice in the preamble, although not in the Protocol 
Articles, and furthermore, Convention Articles 2(l) or 3 are not specifically referred 
to. The important question remains as to why Article 2(1) was not amended if the 
right to life is such an intrinsic aspect of the protocol? The Explanatory Report point 
1, refers to the European Court of Human Rights judgment in Streletz, Kessler and 
Krenz v. Germany, which held that the right to life is "an inalienable attribute of 
human beings, " and that this right possesses "supreme value in the international 
,, 59 hierarchy of human rights. Nowhere is it stated that 'life' itself is inalienable, 
only that it is an "inalienable attribute. " An attribute is an aspect of something and 
not the essence of it, and here we see the root issue again. Can the right to life be 
used as an end to eradicate the death penalty, or is it only a means with which to 
challenge the punishment? 
Protocol No. 13, Article 2, states "No derogation from the provisions of this 
Protocol shall be made under Article 15 of the Convention. 
40 If the states wish to 
59 Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany, Application Nos. 34044/96; 35532/97; 44801/98,22 
March 2001, paras, 72,85,87 and 94. 
60 Protocol No. 13, above, fn. 58, Article 2- Prohibition of Derogations, "No derogation from the 
provisions of this Protocol shall be made under Article 15 of the Convention. " 
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impose the death penalty if the life of the state is threatened then the prohibition of 
derogation would potentially be nullified. This is because Convention, Article 15 
authorises the Contracting states, "in time of war or other public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation, " to derogate theoretically, and at least, reintroduce 
the death penalty. This would be inapplicable under Protocol No. 13, Article 2. But 
if the life of the nation is threatened, then ultimately, the state will have a choice. 
This may be more an extreme hypothetical than political reality, but it should be 
observed that the possible legal loophole remains. 
Stephano Manacorda highlighted Italy's previous reservation and stated that even 
under Protocol No. 13, the "residual role of the death penalty" has been exploited 
through reservations. 61 Allowing the death penalty in wartime does not encompass 
all threats challenging the nation, such as states of emergency. In the specific 
example of Turkey, Mehmet Gemalmaz argued that there may have been a loophole 
for Turkey to reintroduce the death penalty outside war circumstances, in that the 
Turkish Constitution, Article 38 provided for the death penalty for the "crime of 
61 Manacorda, above, fn. 37, p. 274. Georgia declared that until the full jurisdiction of Georgia is 
restored on the territories of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region, it cannot be held liable for the 
violations on these territories of the provisions of Protocol No. 13; Moldova declares that, until the 
full re-establishment of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova, the provisions of the 
Protocol shall be applied only on the territory controlled effectively by the authorities of the Republic 
of Moldova, see list of declarations made with respect to Protocol No. 13. 
htip: //conventions. coe. int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations. asp? NT= I 87&CM=8&DF=3/10/2008 
&CL=ENG&VL= I (last accessed, 3 rd March 2008). 
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terror" which, he argued, was not recognised under Protocol No. 6.62 On similar 
lines, Andrew Clapham has observed that, "we cannot absolutely discount the 
th th 5,63 possibility that states may in the future try to denounce the 6 or 13 Protocols . 
The question will be one of degree, as to whether the life of the state can be 
maintained by the incarceration of threatening individuals or if it is argued to be 
necessary to execute them. 
The European Court of Human Rights has confirmed that even with Protocol No. 
13, the Council has not yet managed a specific amendment of the Convention text. 
In Ocalan v. Turkey, 64 Turkey had imposed a death sentence on Abdullah Ocalan, 
the leader of the PKK (Kurdistan Worker's Part Y)65 for the Kurdish uprisings and 
,, 66 forming an army "in order to destroy the integrity of the Turkish state . 
Ocalan 
62 Mehmet Gernalmaz, 'The Death Penalty in Turkey (1920-200 1): Facts, Truths and Illusions, ' 
(2002) 13 Crim. L. Forum. 91, p. 122. 
63 Andrew Clapham, 'Symbiosis in International Human Rights Law: The Ocalan case and the 
Evolving Law on the Death Sentence, ' JICJ 1, (2003) 475, p. 450. 
64 Ocalan v. Turkey, Application No. 46221/99,12 March 2003. 
65 For an outline of the history of the Kurdistan Worker's Party see, Hanz Chiapetta, 'Rome, 
11/15/1998: Extradition or Political Asylum for the Kurdistan Worker's Party Leader Abdullah 
Ocalan, ' (2001) 13 Pace Int'l L. Rev 117. For a review of the legal and political polices adopted by 
Turkey in an attempt to join the European Union, see David Kanarek, 'Turkey and the European 
Union: The Path to Accession, ' (2003) 9 Colum. J Eur. L. 457. 
66 Mirja Trilsh and Alexandra ROth, 'Case Comment: Ocalan v. Turke , 100 AJI. L. 180 (2006), p. y 
180; Ann Sherlock, 'Case Comment: Ocalan v, Turkey (46221/99)(unreported, December 14,2000), ' 
EL. Rev. 133 (2001). Sherlock's note was on the admissibility stage of the trial, and see also, 
William Schabas, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law, 3 rd ed, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 277-279. 
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had fled Turkey and sought refuge in Greece and Italy, before hiding in Kenya. He 
was arrested in Nairobi and extradited back to Turkey to face a capital trial and was 
sentenced to death. This was the first case to come before the European Court of 
Human Rights to involve a Member State's application of the death penalty, as Sir 
Sydney Kentridge, one of the lawyers for Abdullah Ocalan, pointed out in his 
opening statement: 
[t]his is one of the most significant and high-profile cases ever to come before 
the European Court of Human Rights .... it is a case in which the passing and 
proposed implementation of the death penalty within a signatory state has 
resulted in litigation before the court. 67 
The Ocalan Chamber noted the Parliamentary Assembly's Opinion No. 233 (2002) 
on the Draft Protocol No. 13, and specifically cited paragraph 5 when the Assembly 
stated concerning the second sentence of Article 2 (1) that,, "[i]t has long been in the 
interest of the Assembly to delete this sentence, thus matching theory with 
reality. , 68 This demonstrates that the Chamber was specifically engaging with the 
dialogue between the Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers on 
the amendment of Article 2. Following this Parliamentary Assembly position and 
the ratifications of Protocol No. 6 and Protocol No. 13, it was argued for the 
, applicant that "the practice of the Contracting States in this area can be taken as 
67 Cited by Colin Wells, who was an observer at the trial, see, 'Human Rights in Turkey: Death by 
State Hanging, ' (2003) 9 Amicus Journal 8, p. 9. 
680calan v. Turkey, above, fti. 64, para. 189. 
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establishing an agreement to abrogate the exception provided for in the second 
sentence of Article 2(l 
However, the Chamber in Ocalan followed the reasoning in Soering, that the 
normal method of Convention amendment is through state practice in signing and 
ratifying optional protocols. So ultimately, amendment must be initiated by the 
Committee of Ministers and accepted by the states. 70 It is worth considering the 
Ocalan Chamber judgment, paragraphs 196-8. The Court held: 
[s]uch a marked development could now be taken as signalling the agreement 
of the Contracting States to abrogate, or at the very least to modify, the second 
sentence of Article 2 (1), particularly when regard is had to the fact that all the 
Contracting States have now signed Protocol No. 6 and that it has been ratified 
by forty-one States. It may be questioned whether it is necessary to await 
ratification of Protocol No. 6 by the three remaining States before concluding 
that the death penalty exception in Article 2 has been significantly modified. 
Against such a consistent background, it can be said that capital punishment in 
peacetime has come to be regarded as an unacceptable, if not inhuman, form 
of punishment which is no longer permissible under Article 2. 
In expressing this view, the Court is aware of the opening for signature 
Protocol 13 which provides an indication that the Contracting States have 
chosen the traditional method of amendment of the text of the Convention in 
69 
ibid 
70 ibid, Para 191. 
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pursuit of their policy of abolition. However this Protocol seeks to extend the 
prohibition by providing for the abolition of the death penalty in all 
circumstances - that is to say both in times of peace and in times of war. This 
final step toward complete abolition of the death penalty can be seen as a 
confirmation of the abolitionist trend established by the practice of the 
Contracting States. It does not necessarily run counter to the view that Article 
2 has been amended in so far as it permits the death penalty in times of peace. 
In the Court's view, it cannot now be excluded, in the light of the 
developments that have taken place in this area, that the States have agreed 
through their practice to modify the second sentence in Article 2(l) in so far as 
it permits capital punishment in peacetime. 
The court's language is imprecise and does not say simply and categorically, that 
Article 2(l) is amended. It outlines the fact that the development of abolition in 
Member States, "could, " and "can, " but "does not necessarily run counter" to the 
signalling to "abrogate" Article 2(l). Then the Chamber held that "it can" be said 
that the death penalty is "unacceptable" in peacetime. 
The Chamber was of the opinion that the final determination is a state choice issue, 
as concerning the signature of Protocol No. 13 that the, "Contracting States have 
chosen the traditional method of amendment of the text of the Convention in pursuit 
of their policy of abolition. " The Chamber also states that the death penalty has 
come to be "unacceptable, if not inhuman" in peacetime, but not that it is a violation 
of Article 2(l) or the right to life. 
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As such, the Chamber affirmed that the appropriate jurisprudential analysis is 
adopted by viewing the actions of the Member States. It specifically identified "their 
policy, " in that the "abolitionist trend established by the practice of the Contracting 
States, " was predominant because the "States have agreed through their practice" to 
renounce the punishment. Hence, this decision can be seen as a jurisprudential 
acceptance of the development of the Western European practice post 1981 which is 
also reflected in Protocol No. 6, that the death penalty is an illegitimate punishment 
in peacetime. The Chamber held that the ratifications of Protocol No. 13 did not yet 
create a per se rule for Member States in 2003. 
Alastair Mowbray has affirmed that the Chamber was "circumspect in applying the 
'living instrument' doctrine to determine the (il)legality of the death penalty, " and 
as such the Chamber "would not unequivocally rule that the State's contemporary 
practice had modified Article 2(l )., ý7 
1 The partly dissenting opinion of Judge 
RIrmen furthers the argument. He stated: 
[it] is true that all Contracting States have now signed Protocol No. 6 and 41 
of them have ratified it. However, such a development cannot be taken as 
signalling the agreement of the Contracting States to abrogate the exception in 
Article 2(l). The existence of such an agreement would require clear evidence 
over and above the uniform amendment of Penal policy in favour of abolition. 
71 Mowbray, above, fn. 13, p. 67. 
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Such evidence is, however, lacking. It still remains the practice of the States to 
amend the Convention in pursuit of their policy of abolition by an optional 
instrument allowing each State to choose the moment when to undertake such 
an agreement. The most recent example is the opening for signature of 
Protocol No. 13 to the Convention, which amends the Convention by 
providing for the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances - that is to 
say, both in times of peace and times of war. 
In the Preamble to Protocol 13, the Member States of the Council of Europe 
signatory to the Protocol indicate their wish to strengthen the protection of the 
right to life in the Convention, expressly take note that Protocol No. 6 does not 
exclude the death penalty in respect of acts committed in times of war and 
resolve to take the final step in order to abolish it in all circumstances. 
Such language runs directly counter to the suggestion that the States have, 
t 1- -- hrough their practice, already taken "the final step" towards abolition. In 
reality there is no basis for the view that this new Protocol represents the treaty 
confirmation of any previous agreement between the States to complete 
abrogation - only partially achieved in Protocol 
No. 6- of the exception 
contained in Article 2(l). Against such a clear background, the conclusion 
reached in the judgment that the exception in Article 2(l) is abrogated is not 
tenable. 
200 
Accordingly, Article 2(1) must still be read as permitting the imposition of the 
death penalty. 72 
Andrew Clapham has argued that the "implication could... be drawn that a death 
penalty which results from a fair trial is indeed permissible. 9373 Even with the 
presence of Protocol No. 6 which abolishes the death penalty in peacetime, and 
Protocol No. 13 which abolishes the death penalty in all circumstances, the death 
penalty is still possible in restricted circumstances. 
This decision also affirms that the Explanatory Report and the Rapporteur Group on 
Human Rights were not completely accurate on the extent of Protocol No. 13. It 
appears that the lack of express reference to Article 2(1) is the "clear evidence" 
which Judge Tilrmen required, but which the Rapporteur Group thought was not 
necessary. Furthermore, there was a lack of unanimity in that only thirteen states 
had ratified Protocol No. 13 in 2003. A consensus of the states is required to 
demonstrate consent on the issue in creating a "norm" against the death penalty. 74 
Significantly, it was the "agreement of the Contracting States" which was identified 
to be the determining factor, and that each state should "choose the moment" and as 
such there was "no basis" to suggest that Article 2(l) was amended. Trilsh and 
720calan v. Turkey, above, fn. 64, para. 70. 
73 Clapbam, above, fn. 63, p. 482. 
74 Jens David Ohlin has argued that when states have not ratified international agreements against the 
death penalty that they "have not consented to withdrawing capital punishment from their penal 
systems, " and that "[u]nder the [consent model] the human right to life is applied only against a state 
that has voluntarily agreed to be bound by the legal norm, " in 'Applying the Death Penalty to Crimes 
of Genocide, ' 99 AJIL 747 (2005), p. 773. 
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Mith's observation that the "final step toward complete abolition had yet to be 
made 9,, 
75 
is to be understood in this context. 
Judge TUrmen recognised the issue of state choice as he identified, "by an optional 
instrument allowing each State to choose the moment, " of signature and ratification. 
But this leaves the possibility of the state reversing its choice. Human rights merely 
strengthens "the protection of the right to life, " so the strengthening reveals that life 
is not inalienable. This is in apparent contradiction to what is maintained in the 
Preamble to Protocol No. 13. Judge TUrmen also made reference to the Preamble, 
noting that "the final step, " had not been taken, but it is difficult to see how the final 
step could be taken if the Committee does not legislate for this possibility. It is for 
the Committee to open the door, and then it will be for the states to consider. But it 
also appears that Judge TiIrmen is confused about the majority judgment, as it does 
not specifically state that Article 2 is abrogated. The majority judgment states that it 
"could, " and "can, " not that it "does" abrogate. 76 
The Ocalan Chamber judgment was appealed to the Grand Chamber, and one of the 
arguments presented by counsel for the defence was that the Grand Chamber should 
state that the practice of the Member States had "abrogated" Article 2(l). The Grand 
Chamber stated that the applicant asked it to take "it a stage ftirther by concluding 
that the States had, by their practice, abrogated the exception set out in the second 
sentence of Article 2(l y977 This confirms that the Chamber had not abrogated 
75 Trilsh and Rilth, above, fn. 66, p. 183. 
76 
ibid, Para 196. 
77 Ocalan v. Turkey, Application No. 46221/99, Grand Chamber Judgment, 12 May 2005, para 175. 
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Article 2(l). In effect, Ocalan was trying to persuade the Grand Chamber to adopt 
an c4evolutive" interpretation of the Convention, and in effect create European 
policy. 
78 But the Grand Chamber did not comply as it held, in comparing Article 
2(l) with Article 3, "if Article 2 is to be read as permitting capital punishment, 
notwithstanding the almost universal abolition of the death penalty in Europe, 
Article 3 cannot be interpreted as prohibiting the death penalty since that would 
nullify the clear wording of Article 2( 1). "79 This is a complicated judgment and 
displays the difficulty the Grand Chamber had in dealing with Article 2(l) in the 
presence of Protocol No. 13. As such, the Grand Chamber did not pronounce 
specifically on the issue itself, as it identified the current irreconcilability of the 
texts of Articles 2(l) and 3. It deferred the question to the practice of the Member 
States as it stated: 
[t]he Court notes that by opening for signature Protocol No. 13 concerning the 
-all abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances the 
Contracting States have 
chosen the traditional method of amendment of the text of the Convention in 
pursuit of their policy of abolition. 80 
However, it should also be seen that the Grand Chamber was playing an active role 
in restricting the scope of the punishment. Clare Ovey and Robin White observed 
that the Grand Chamber "speculated" on whether the Protocol ratifications could 
78 This would be in line with Paul Maloney's views on the role of the 
Court and the reluctance of the 
use of judicial activism, see above, fn. 29. 
79 Ocalan v. Turkey, (GC), above, fn. 77, paras 162-3. 
ibid, para, 164, 
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signal a modification of Article 2(l), and found it unnecessary "to resolve the point 
because of its finding that it would be a breach of Article 2 to implement a death 
sentence after an unfair trial. ý81 When the Grand Chamber could rely on a reduction 
of the scope of the punishment, it enabled it not to resolve the question of actual 
amendment. The Grand Chamber was holding back on formulating an evolutive 
human rights policy in order to wait for universal verification from the Member 
States through ratification of Protocol No. 13. Hence the Grand Chamber side- 
stepped the issue in its dictum and this abstinence brought a concurring opinion by 
Judge Garlicki. He stated: 
[floday the Court, while agreeing that "it can be said that capital punishment in 
peacetime has come to be regarded as an unacceptable ... 
form of punishment 
which is no longer permissible under Article 2, " seems to be convinced that 
there is no room for the death penalty even in the original text of the 
Convention. But, at the same time, it has chosen not to express that position in 
a universally binding manner. In my opinion, there are some arguments 
suggesting that the Court could and should have gone further in this case. 82 
The judge then cited the Opinion of the Parliamentary Assembly and could not give, 
in his mind, "a good reason" why the Court did not follow the statement, as he held 
that the Court did have jurisdictional competence. 83 He stated, "[t]he only problem 
81 Clary Ovey and Robin C. A. Vvlhite, Jacobs and White, The European Convention on Human 
Rights, 4th ed, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 62. 
82 See, Ocalan v. Turkey, above, En. 77, Partly Concurring, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Garlicki, para 2. 
83 ibid, paras 3-7. 
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is: who shall have the power to declare, in a binding manner, that such modification 
has taken place? So this is a problem not of substance, but of jurisdiction 
(competence). 5ý)84 However, if Judge Garlicki had considered Lidbom's 1980 report 
and the subsequent Parliamentary Assembly recommendations to the Committee of 
Ministers, he would have been able to identify the Committee of Minister's role. In 
effect, Judge Garlicki was asking, "where does the authority to amendment lie? " As 
he further stated: 
I am not convinced by the majority's replication of the Soering approach. I do 
not think that there are any legal obstacles to this Court's taking a decision 
with respect to the nature of capital punishment. 85 
It would have been useful if Judge Garlicki had engaged with the Lidbom report and 
perhaps distinguished the observation that the Committee of Ministers is the only 
Council organ which can amend the text of the Convention. Lidbom stated that the 
amendment authority lies with the Committee and the Grand Chamber followed 
this. It appears that amendment of Article 2(l) may need to follow a three pronged 
process: firstly, the Committee drafting of a Protocol, secondly, the Member State 
acceptance and ratification of this protocol; and thirdly, the Court pronounces a 
judgment based upon state ratification. If this is correct the European Court of 
Human Rights must adhere to the wording of the protocol. In this case, neither 
Protocol No. 6 nor Protocol No. 13 expressly amend Article 2(l). So it would 
84 ibid, para 3. 
85 ibid, para 5. 
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appear that the Grand Chamber did not have jurisdiction at this time. The majority 
were correct. 
The European Court of Human Rights has considered cases post-Ocalan and has 
evolved its jurisprudence. Trilsh and Riith argued that in Ocalan the "Court's 
interpretation of Article 2 was ... too narrow, 5586 and Peter Hodgkinson had predicted 
in 2000 that the "Court will probably be obliged to go beyond the principles laid 
down in the Soering judgment. , 87 However, post Ocalan v. Turkey, the Court has 
not reconsidered its decisions as to the complicated balancing of Article 2(l) and 
Protocol No. 13, with the right to life per se, because no other Member States has 
sought to directly impose the death penalty. But it has considered the application of 
the right to life in extradition circumstances where a suspect may be extradited by a 
Member State to a receiving state to face a capital charge. 
88 
In between the two Ocalan judgments, the Court considered G. B. v. Bulgaria, 
where the applicant was convicted and sentenced to death in 1989. Then a 
moratorium was put in place and Bulgaria abolished the death penalty in 1998 and 
ratified Protocol No. 6 in 1999. No Article 2(l) violation was held, and this 
reasoning was followed in Iorgov v. Bulgaria. 
89 In Mamatkulov and Askarov v. 
Turkey, 90 the court held unanimously that when in extradition circumstances the 
86 Trilsh and Rilth, above, fn. 66, p. 182. 
87 Hodgkinson, above, fn. 3, p. 630. 
88 G. B. v. Bulgaria, Application No. 42346/98,11 March 2004. 
89 Iorgov v. Bulgaria, Application No. 40653/98,11 March 2004. 
90 Mamatkulov andAskarov v. Turkey Applications nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99,4 February 2005, 
were the assurances that the death penalty are sufficient, 
Article 2 is not violated. See also, S. R. v. 
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courts finds that if a death penalty would be applied then there is violation of Article 
3 under Soering, and so it does not need to consider the case under Article 2(l). 91 
This was held in February 2005, and two months later in, Shamayev and 12 others 
v. Georgia and Russia, 92 the Court confirmed that extradition would not expose the 
applicants to a real risk of extra-judicial execution, contrary to Article 2(l). But then 
in November 2005, the court modified its jurisprudence. 
In Bader and Others v. Sweden, 93 the case concerned the deportation of a suspect to 
Syria with the possibility of facing a capital trial. The Court considered that "an 
issue may arise under [Article 21 of the Convention if a Contracting State deports an 
alien who has suffered or risks suffering a flagrant denial of a fair trial in the 
receiving state, the outcome of which was or is likely to be the death penalty . -)ý94 It 
found that "the deportation of the applicants to Syria, if implemented, would give 
rise to [a violation of Article 2]. ýý95 As such, the Court was extending its 
jurisprudence on the right to life and the death penalty, and it now declared that an 
execution does not have to take place to initiate an Article 2(l) violation, Only the 
potential of an execution is required. The determining factor in this case was the 
possibility of an arbitrary deprivation of life. Judge Cabral Barreto stated in his 
concurring opinion that this was the first time "the Court has plainly stated that the 
Sweden, Application No. 62806/00,23 April 2002; Ismaili v. Germany, Application No. 58128/00, 
15 March 200 1; Bahaddar v. the Netherlands, (145/1996/764/965) 19 February 1998, paras. 75-78. 
" Mamatkulov andAskarov v. Turkey, ibid, para 78. 
92 Shamayev and 12 others v. Georgia and Russia, Application No. 36378/02,12 April 2005 
93 Bader and others v. Sweden, Application No. 13284/04,8 November 2005. 
94 
ibid, para 42. 
95 
ibid, para 48. 
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extradition or deportation of a person to a country where he or she risks an unfair 
trial followed by capital punishment will violate Article 2 of the Convention. ýý96 So 
although the Court has extended the right to life, it was in the circumstances of an 
unfair trial. But these cases still have not amended the text of Article 2(l). 
Finally, it is appropriate to mention the application by Saddam Hussein, to initiate 
the jurisdiction of the Convention. Saddam Hussein claimed that his arrest, 
detention, handover and trial violated inter alia, Convention Article 2 and Protocols 
No. 6 and No. 13.97 Hussein argued that he would be executed,, and that his case fell 
under the jurisdiction of the respondent states because of their occupation of Iraq. 
The Court held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case because the applicant 
had not demonstrated that the states "had jurisdiction on the basis of their control of 
the territory where the alleged violations took place, " and also that even "if he could 
have fallen within a State's jurisdiction because of his detention by it, he has not 
shown that any one of the respondent States had any responsibility for, or any 
involvement or role in, his arrest and subsequent detention. , 98 As such the Court 
held that there was no jurisdictional link within the meaning of Article I of the 
Convention. 99 This reasoning can be placed with the hypocritical stances made by 
some of the governments of the Member States. A spokesman for Tony Blair stated: 
96 ibid, Concurring opinion of Judge Cabral Barreto. 
97 Hussein v. Albania and Other States, Application No. 23276/04,14 March 2006. 
98 ibid 
99 Article I states, "The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within its jurisdiction the 
rights and fteedoms defined in [the Convention. ]" However, the House of Lords has suggest that the 
Convention may have extra-territorial effect in occupied Iraq following its decision in Regina (Al- 
Skeini and others) v. Secretary of Statefor Defence (The Redress Trust and another intervening) 
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we emphasised that if the executions were to be carried out then they should 
be done so in a dignified way. Now if, as appears to be the case, that didn't 
happen, that clearly was wrong. "I 
The International Herald Tribune reported that, "the Czech Republic's right-wing 
prime minister, Mirek Topolanek, welcomed the Hussein sentence, calling it "an act 
of justice" and a warning to other dictators. President Lech Kaczynski of Poland 
called it "the only possible outcome. ""' An EU Commissioner echoed this 
ambivalence when he stated, "[t]he passing of Saddam Hussein closes a long, 
painful chapter in the history of Iraq. While the EU opposes capital punishment as a 
matter of principle, Saddam's trial and punishment mean that those who commit 
crimes against humanity cannot escape justice. His career and legacy show the 
futility of the politics of violence and terror. " 102 However, in the Council of Europe, 
the statements were unanimous in their renunciation of the execution. Rene van der 
Linden, President of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly stated, "today's 
[2005] EWCA Civ 1609. See for a discussion of this case see, Bill Bowring, The Degradation of the 
International Legal Order? The Rehabilitation ofLaw and the Possibility of Politics (Abington: 
Routledge-Cavendish, 2008), pp. 74-76. 
""' In Quotes: Iraq Hangings Reaction, BBC News website, accessed, 3 rd March 2008, 
http: //news. bbc. co. uk/I/hi/world/middle-east/6264177. stm 
101 International Herald Tribune, November 19,2006, 
http: //www. iht. com/articles/2006/11/19/curope/web. II 19hangRIW. php 
102 Statement by Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner on the passing of Saddam Hussein. 30/12/2006, 
http: //europa. culrapidlpressReleasesAction. do? reference=MEM01061516&format=HTML&aged=O 
&Ianguage=EN&9uiLanguage=en. 
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sentence of the death penalty send a dangerous message to the region, " 103 and Terry 
Davis, Secretary General of the Council of Europe, stated that what "Iraqi people 
need is justice not retribution. "' 04 
What these statements reflect is that there is still deep ambivalence within Europe 
on the extent of the "right to life" and Article 2(l), and whether there are 
exceptional circumstances when the death penalty can be applied. 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has engaged with the propositions for the amendment of Article 2(l) 
and the significance of Protocols No. 6 and Protocol No. 13 for this issue. It has 
been argued that firstly, there is an intrinsic friction between the Parliamentary 
Assembly and the Committee of Ministers and this dialogue has resulted in the 
Committee not specifically providing a Protocol for the textual change of Article 
2(l). As a result, the majority of the Member States have hitherto provided their 
consent to remove the death penalty under the Protocols, but as there was no legal 
provision for the textual change, no state consent can be identified for specific 
amendment. 
103 'Pace President reacts to verdict on the trial of Saddam Hussein, ' Press Release, 666 (2006), 
Strasbourg, 5/11/2006. 
104 'Council of Europe Secretary General: Iraqi people need justice not retribution, ' Strasbourg 
5/11/2006. 
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Furthermore, it should be noted as Judge De Meyer identified, a "development of 
legal conscience and practice" may have occurred, but that this conscience is not yet 
reffected in the Convention. This may be the case, but the European Court of 
Human Rights has not held it to be so, even with the interpretive tools provided to 
itself by the analysis of "present day conditions" and that the Convention is a 
"living instrument. " As such, Trilsh and Rifth correctly identify that IsItill 
absent ... is a clear determination by the Court that the prohibition of capital 
punishment is an integral part of [the Convention]. 5005 
This reveals the ever-present questions surrounding the extent of the individual's 
c4right" to life as apposed to the state's "right" to judicially kill as a penal sanction, 
and the scholarship on this question has evolved since the adoption of the 
Convention to the present time. After the adoption of the Convention, Robertson 
noted that Article 2(l) was "careful to protect the legality of capital punishment, "' 06 
and William Schabas has argued that Article 2(l) "seems woefully inadequate in 
terms of limiting the use of the death penalty. " 107 These statements reveal the 
possibility that remains unless the Article is amended. 
It would appear that the origin of the right to impose the death penalty still rests 
with the Member States, but it is also true that if the Committee drafts another 
Protocol to amend Article 2, that the states can choose to ratify and make the legal 
105 Tilsh and Ruth, above, fh. 66, p. 186. 
106 A. H. Robertson, 'The Contribution of the Council of Europe to the Development of International 
Law, ' 59 Am. Socy Intl L. Proc. 201 (1965), pý 205. 
107 William A. Schabas, The Abolition o the Death Penalty in International Law, 3 rd ed, (Cambridge: )f 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 266. 
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statement that it does not intent to apply thedeath penalty in any circumstances. As 
the states ratify the human rights provisions the discourse on the right to life will be 
strengthened. 
We now consider in the next chapter how Protocols No. 6 and Protocol No. 13 have 
affected the Court's jurisprudence on the Convention Article 3 prohibition on 
inhuman punishment. 
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Chapter Six: 
The Parameters of the Prohibition Against Inhuman Punishment 
6. The Parameters of the Prohibition Against Inhuman 
Punishment 
6.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to engage with the evolution of the interpretation of 
Article 3. Previously, Chapter Two outlined the acceptance of the death penalty at the 
drafting of the Convention and revealed that the punishment was not considýered to be 
a violation of Article 3. The analysis which follows considers how this initial 
presumption may have been challenged by Council organs. 
The specific questions to be addressed are: has the compatibility of Article 2(1) with 
Article 3 been resolved by the Parliamentary Assembly, and/or the Commission and 
Court? Is there unanimity within the Council organs on how to implement Article 3 
for scrutiny of the death penalty? How has Article 3 been used to penetrate the 
Member States' right to impose the death penalty? What follows engages with these 
questions by first examining the Parliamentary Assembly's approach to Article 3. 
Then the jurisprudence is outlined and the issue of the compatibility of Article 3 with 
Article 2(l) is considered. This is followed by a consideration of the "death row 
phenomenon" which encompasses an evaluation of the various aspects of the capital 
judicial system, and how it impacts upon the capital defendant and inmates. The 
Commission and Court decisions concerning the capital charge and trial, the 
commutation of death sentences to prison terms, the issues surrounding extradition 
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and deportation, death sentences under moratorium, death row conditions, and 
method of execution are considered. 
In conclusion, it is observed that both the Parliamentary Assembly and the European 
Court of Human Rights have adopted a notion of legitimacy to assess the different 
aspects of the death penalty. This may be seen to create a new norm against the 
punishment, by specifically expanding the language of Convention human rights. It is 
investigated whether a new argument is being formulated which does not explicitly 
refer to the text of Article 3, but which represents the "spirit" of the prohibition 
against torture and inhuman punishment. 
6.2 The Parliamentary Assembly Scrutiny of the Death Penalty Under Article 3 
The travaux preparatoires do not indicate that in 1949-50 the drafting committees of 
the Convention considered that Article 3 affected the scope or general application of 
the death penalty. However, as revealed in the previous chapters, underlying 
humanistic and human rights arguments began to have an influence on the 
interpretation of the Convention. 
In 1973, Astrid Bergegren's Motion in the Parliamentary Assembly stated, "capital 
punishment must now be seen to be inhuman and degrading within the meaning of 
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Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. "' Bergegren called on the 
Consultative Assembly to unify its position and initiate a new Convention human 
rights discourse and identify that the death penalty was an inhuman punishment. 
As described in Chapter Four, the Motion was sent back to the Committee on Legal 
Affairs, who shelved it, and also Bertil Lidgard's efforts were thwarted. It was not 
until 1980 when Carl Lidborn presented his report to the Committee and affirmed that 
"the debate on the death penalty ought ... to be carried on" because the punishment "is 
being called into question ... from the human rights standpoint. ,2 There is scholarly 
work from this period reflecting that the death penalty was not yet considered an 
Article 3 issue. Francis Jacobs argued in 1975 that "Article 3 should be considered as 
imposing an absolute prohibition on certain forms of punishment such as, perhaps, 
flogging, which are by their very nature inhuman and degrading. 5ý3 Jacobs had 
recognised that Article 3 was intrinsic for scrutinising punishment practices in 
Member States,, but he had not envisioned, or at least expressed, at this time that the 
reach of the prohibition grasped the death penalty. 
For the history of the anti-death penalty movement in Europe, the 1977 Amnesty 
International conference in Stockholm is extremely significant as it mandated in its 
Declaration that the "death penalty is the ultimate cruel, inhuman and degrading 
1 Motionfor a Resolution on the abolition of the death penalty, Assembly Doc. 3297,1973, para 7. See 
also, Hans Gbran Franck, The Barbaric Punishment: Abolishing the Death Penalty, (ed: William A. 
Schabas) (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2003), p. 62. 
2 Bertil Lidgard's unpublished report was reprinted in the Report on the abolition of capital punishment 
Assembly Doc. 4509 (2 nd and 3d sittings) 22 April 1980. 
3 Francis Jacobs, The European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 3 1. 
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punishment. ,4 Amnesty International were echoing Bergegren and Lidgard and called 
for a firm identification that the punishment is the "ultimate" violation of this human 
5 rights threshold, and this should be recognised internationally. Following this 
declaration Christian Broda, the Austrian Minister of Justice, invited the Committee 
6 of Ministers to consider the death penalty as an "inhuman" punishment. It should 
also be recalled that by the late 1970s Spain and Portugal had removed the 
punishment for peacetime offences, and only France within the Western European 
region was not considered a de facto abolitionist Member State. Hence, there was 
now an almost uniform Western European government rejection of the punishment. 
This was a fertile political circumstance from which the Parliamentary Assembly was 
nil able to act. In 1980, as detailed in the previous chapter, it issued its strongest human 
rights platform through a Resolution, Recommendation and Report on this very 
issue. 7 The report specifically engaged with the death penalty being inhuman. 8 Carl 
In fact in 1977 Amnesty International stated in the Preamble to the 1977 Stockholm Declaration that it, 
"Recalls that the death penalty is the ultimate cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment, " and so it 
would appear that it had decided this before 1977. See, Amnesty International, Report on the Amnesty 
International Conference on the Death Penalty, Stockholm, 10- 11 December 1977, Al Index: CDP 
02/01/78. 
Since 1977, Amnesty International have become an international authority on the human rights 
mechanisms for the restriction and abolition of the death penalty. See, www. amnesty. org/deathpenalty 
Christian Broda, 'The Elimination of the Death Penalty in Europe, ' paper presented to the meeting of 
the European death penalty coordinators of Amnesty International, Stockholm, 30 March 1985, Al Index: 
EUR 01 /0 1/8 5. 
7 See, Report, above, fh. 2; Resolution 727 (1980) on the abolition of capital punishment, text adopted by 
the Assembly, (3 d sitting) 22 April 1980; Recommendation 891 (1980) on the abolition of capital 
punishmentý text adopted by the Assembly, (31d sitting) 22 April 1980, 
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Lidbom noted that capital punishment could also be regarded as "inhuman" within the 
meaning of Article 3 of the Convention, 9 and the Parliamentary Assembly followed 
its 1980 Resolution when it considered "that capital punishment is inhuman. "10 The 
1980 Report declared that the death penalty "is" a violation of Article 3, and 
emphasised the argument that, "[c]apital punishment certainly constitutes 'inhuman 
and degrading treatment or punishment. ""' 
The Parliamentary Assembly was attempting to isolate and renounce the punishment 
and this strategy advanced a new interpretive technique for Article 3; from one where 
the Article is used to scrutinise the application of the punishment, to one which 
actually challenges the Member State right to the punishment. It first proposed an 
interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights decision in Tyrer v. the United 
Kingdom. 12 In Tyrer the Court held that corporal punishment of school children was 
inhuman and degrading, but the Report relied on this judgment to argue that the death 
penalty "is" contrary to Article 3. 
' Report, ibid, pp. 2-3; Renate Woh1wend, The role of the Council ofEurope's Parliamentary Assembly, 
p. 66, in Council of Europe, Death Penalty - Beyond Abolition, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe 
Publishing, 2004). 
The report stated that the death penalty was "undoubtedly" contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, ibid, 
para 4, p. 14. 
Resolution 727, above, fn. 7, p. I- 
11 ibid, p. 13, para 25. 
12 ibid, p. 14, para 4, citing Tyrer v. United Kingdom, Application Nos. 5 856/72; 5775/72,14 December 
1976. 
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William Schabas identified that this was a "rather bold" 13 interpretation of Tyrer, and, 
this research would agree, as indeed, the Court's subsequent majority decisions have 
not (yet) envisioned such interpretation. 14 However, Manfred Nowak has argued that 
if human right experts, such as the Judges of the European Court of Human Rights, 
can hold that corporal punishment, as in Tyrer to be "inhuman, " then why can they 
"at the same time arrive at the conclusion that capital punishment is not inhuman? "' 5 
Lidbom's conclusion to his 1980 Report parallels Nowak's argument when he stated: 
[i]n my opinion, the Council of Europe must now state firmly and clearly that 
capital punishment should be abolished for the simple reason that it is inhuman 
and thus incompatible with our system of values. 16 
When he presented this report for debate, Lidbom reiterated the position that the 
Legal Affairs Committee proposed that the Council should now consider the 
" William A. Schabas, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law, 3 rd ed, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 283, fn. 129. 
14 Subsequent cases have confinned this interpretation, and they are considered below, including, inter 
alia, Kirkwood v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 10308/83,12 March 1984; Soering v. the United 
Kingdom, Application No. 14038/88,7 July 1989; and Ocalan v. Turkey, Application No. 46221/99,12 
March 2003 (Chamber); 12 May 2005 (Grand Chamber). 
15 Manfred Nowak, 'Is the Death Penalty an Inhuman Punishment? ' p. 42, in Theodore S. Orlin, Allan 
Rosas and Martin Scheinin, (eds) The Jurisprudence of Human Rights Law: A Comparative Interpretive 
Approach, (Abo: Abo Akademi University, 2000). 
16 Report, above, fn. 2, p. 22 para 4. 
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punishment to be inhuman' 7 and he emphasised this by stating that this provided the 
"crucial argument. " 18 Various other speakers supported this view. 19 Even though 
Lidbom had not solved all of the technical issues relating to the death penalty, his 
arguments were symptomatic of the evolving sentiments within Council Member 
States. 
The penological standards relating to the death penalty had dramatically evolved and 
the vast majority of Member States and Parliamentarians were more receptive to the 
anti-death penalty position. The seedlings of a new discourse against the death 
penalty had been planted, and as such, the Article 3 prohibition was now to be 
juxtaposed against Article 2(l). We now turn to consider the case-law of the 
European Commission of Human Rights and European Court of Human Rights, to 
analyse whether the judicial organs agreed with this juxtaposition. 
6.3. The Jurisprudence of Article 3 
6.3.1 The Compatibility of Article 3 and Article 2(1) 
17 Parliamentary Assembly, Official Report of Debates, 32 nd Ordinary Session, Abolition of capital 
punishment, Debate on the report of the Legal Affairs Committee, Doe, 
4509 and amendments, (2 nd and 
3 rd Sittings), 22 April 1980, p. 52. 
18 ibid, Lidbom stated, "The crucial argument is the one contained in our 
draft resolution: that capital 
punishment is inhuman and thus incompatible with 
human rights, " p. 54. 
19 See, ibid, Mr. Flanagan of Ireland, p. 56; Mr. Stoffelen of the Netherlands, pp. 60; Mr. 
Meier of 
Switzerland, p. 6 1; and Mrs Aasen of Norway, p. 67. 
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The Parliamentary Assembly's claims that the death penalty was to be considered 
inhuman, must be placed within a jurisprudential context. The judicial organs of the 
European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights, 
have engaged interpretive techniques to consider the difficult issue of how to 
reconcile Articles 2(l) and 3. The initial juridical question was to consider whether 
Article 3 per se rendered the death penalty a violation of the Convention: or to hold 
that Article 3 only applies to scrutinise each aspect of the capital judicial system. The 
former would be in line with the Assembly, but the later would curtail the promoted 
discourse. 
In Kirkwood v. the United Kingdom, 20 the European Commission of Human Rights 
first considered this intricate question and held that: 
one may see a certain disharmony between Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. 
Whereas Article 3 prohibits all forms of inhuman and degrading treatment and 
punishment without qualification of any kind, the right to life is not protected in 
an absolute manner. Article 2(l) expressly envisages the possibility of imposing 
the death penalty. 21 
This Commission jurisprudence in 1985 conflicted with the Assembly's position from 
1980, and it may be interpreted as reflecting an ambivalent element, or at least a point 
20 Kirkwood v. the United Kingdom, above, fn. 14, p. 184. Carl Lidborn has stated in the debates for the 
1980 report that contrasting Articles 2(l) and 3 revealed a, "contradiction in the European Court of 
Human Rights, " above, fh. 17, p. 53. 
21 ibid, p. 190. 
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of disagreement, within the Convention organs. The Commission established a 
cardinal rule that the "right to life is not protected in an absolute manner, " and what 
this seems to mean in a practical sense is that there will be some (unspecified) 
circumstances where the death penalty was not considered to be an Article 3 
violation. As such the Commission was demonstrating that there were pragmatic 
issues to this attempted new discourse which the Assembly had not adequately 
engaged with. 
However, the Assembly were not alone in their determination to advance the 
argument that the death penalty should be seen as a per se violation of Article 3, as 
Amnesty International began to build on their 1977 Declaration and attempted to 
initiate their human rights arguments within the judicial fora. In Soering v. the United 
Kingdom, Amnesty International submitted an amicus curiae brief and argued that the 
evolving standards of interpretation meant that the death penalty should now be 
considered as a breach of Article 3.22 
Amnesty International argued in 1989, the year of the Soering judgment, that, "[n]o 
matter what reason a government gives for executing prisoners and what method of 
execution is used, the death penalty cannot be separated from the issue of human 
rights. The movement for abolition cannot be separated from the movement for 
22 Soering v. the United Kingdom, above, fn. 14, para 8. The Court noted, "Amnesty International in their 
written comments argued that the evolving standards in Western Europe regarding the existence and use 
of the death penalty required that the death penalty should now be considered as an inhuman and 
degrading punishment within the meaning of Article 3, " para 10 1. 
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,, 23 human rights. Also that, "The death penalty is not an act of self defence against an 
immediate threat to life. It is the premeditated killing of a prisoner who could be dealt 
with equally well with less harsh means. 9524 
But the Court followed the Commission's reasoning in Kirkwood and rejected the 
possibility of such evolutive interpretation which would have in effect made Article 
2(1) inoperative. 25 The Court considered the coming into force of Protocol No. 6 and 
Member State signature and ratification. It stated: 
[s]ubsequent practice in national penal policy, in the form of a generalised 
abolition of capital punishment, could be taken as establishing the agreement of 
the Contracting States to abrogate the exception provided for under article 2(l) 
and hence to remove a textual limit on the scope for evolutive interpretation of 
article 3. However, Protocol No. 6, as a subsequent written agreement, shows 
that the intention of the Contracting Parties as recently as 1983 was to adopt the 
normal method of amendment of the text in order to introduce a new obligation 
to abolish capital punishment in time of peace and, what is more, to do so by an 
optional instrument allowing each State to choose the moment when to 
undertake such an agreement. In these conditions, notwithstanding the special 
23 Amnesty International, When the State Kills... The Death Penalty v. Human Rights, (London: Amnesty 
International Publications, 1989), p. I- 
24 
ibid, p. 2. 
25 See, Alistair Mowbray, 'The Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights, ' 5 HRLR, 57 (2005), 
pp. 66-68; Schabas, above, fn. 13, p. 271. 
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character of the Convention, article 3 cannot be interpreted as generally 
prohibiting the death penalty. 26 
The Court's position was that Article 3 cannot "per se" be held to prohibit the death 
penalty. 27 The question that arises from this judgment is whether a "hierarchy of 
rights', 28 within the Convention was inferred. Clare Ovey and Robin White identify 
that the human rights guaranteed under the Convention can be generally divided into 
two categories: unqualified rights, some of which are non-derogable, and qualified 
rights which are derogable. 29 Generally speaking if an unqualified right comes into 
conflict with a qualified right, the unqualified right would take precedence. This is 
because the state may under certain circumstances interfere with qualified rights 
through derogation: for example in emergency situations which threaten the life of the 
nation under Convention Article 15. 
However, the Kirkwood and Soering identification of the potential conflict between 
Articles 2(l) and 3 poses an intricate problem. Firstly, the two Articles provide 
unqualified, non-derogable rights within Convention Article 15, and under Protocol 
26 Soering v. the United Kingdom, above, fn. 14, paras 103 -4. 
27 The Court here abstained from amending the human rights legislation itself and refrained from what 
could be interpreted as judicial activism. For scholarly work on this point see, Paul Mahoney, 'Judicial 
activism and judicial self-restraint in the European Court of Human Rights: two sides of the same coin, ' 
IIH. R. L. J57 (1990); George Letsas, A Theory ofInterpretation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 80-98. 
28 See, Clare Ovey and Robin C. A. White, Jacobs and White: The European Convention on Human 
Rights, 4 th ed, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) pp. 6-7. 
29 ibid, p. 7. 
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No. 6 no derogation of either is possible. 30 Secondly, the very nature of the 
applicability of Article 2(1) places a qualification on Article 3. This complex 
jurisprudential situation resulted in the Court giving prominence to Article 2(1) over 
Article 3. As such it will not be changed unless the text of either Article is amended, 
which would require a Protocol by the Committee of Ministers and ratification of 
such a Protocol by the Member States. The Soering decision can be seen as one which 
accepted the traditional role of the state in amending the Convention, and it did not 
want to make the decision to apply evolutionary interpretation to, in effect, judicially 
amend the Convention text. William Schabas observed that the Court "felt that to the 
extent articles 2(l) and 3 were in contradiction, this was a matter for the States parties 
to resolve by amendment to the Convention and not something to be tackled by the 
judiciary. , 31 
By 2004, all Member States except Russia had signed and ratified Protocol No. 6 and 
Protocol No. 13 had opened for signature and ratification. The Member States began 
to sign and ratify this new protocol and form a consensus that the death penalty is 
nll. abolished in all circumstances. This shift in collective penal policy was considered 
by 
30 Protocol No. 6 to the Conventionfor the Protection ofHuman Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
concerning the abolition of the death penalty, Article 4, "No derogation from the provisions of this 
Protocol shall be made under Article 15 of the Convention. " The same provision was included in 
Protocol No. 13 to the Conventionfor the Protection ofHuman Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty in all circumstances, Article 2, "No 
derogation from the 
provisions of this Protocol shall be made under Article 15 of the Convention. " 
31 William A. Schabas, The Death Penalty as Cruel Treatment and Torture: Capital Punishment in the 
World's Courts, (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1996), p. 9, 
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32 the European Court of Human Rights in Ocalan v. Turkey. The Chamber of the 
Court first outlined the general interpretive principles on Article 3 consistent with the 
Soering decision. 33 The textual limit provided by the harmonising of Articles 2(l) and 
3 prevented the Ocalan Court from adopting an "evolutive interpretation, 9,34 as this 
would nullify the wording of a Convention Article. The "intention of the States" was 
held to prevent the Court from taking an activist approach. 35 Although the Court was 
adhering to internal state jurisdiction, it noted that since 1950 the penal policy of 
Member States had evolved, 36 and since Soering, through the ratifications of Protocol 
No. 6 and Protocol No. 13, Member States have independently chosen not to impose 
the death penalty and restrict it, and remove it from their most current statutes. So the 
Chamber went on to further explain: 
[i]n the Court's view, it cannot now be excluded, in the light of the 
developments that have taken place in this area, that the States have agreed 
through their practice to modify the second sentence of Article 2 (1) in so far as 
it permits capital punishment in peacetime. Against this background it can also 
be argued that the implementation of the death penalty can be regarded as 
inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3. However it is not 
necessary for the Court to reach any firm conclusion on this point since for the 
following reasons it would run counter to the Convention, even if Article 2 were 
320calan v, Turkey [C] Application No. 46221/99,12 March 2003. 
33 ibid, p. 50 para 189, citing Soering, para 103. 
34 ibid, p. 50, para 19 1, citing Soerin, g, paras 103-4. 
35 See, Mowbray, above, fn. 25, pp. 61-72. 
360calan v. Turkey, above, fn. 32, p. 5 1, para 194. 
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to be construed as still permitting the death penalty, to implement a death 
sentence following an unfair trial. 37 
This part of the judgment establishes an interpretive mechanism detailing how Article 
3 can be utilised to question the very right of the Member State to impose the death 
penalty. The Court noted that "[s]tates have agreed to modify the second sentence of 
Article 2(l) in so far as it permits capital punishment in peacetime. " So Article 3 can 
be interpreted as prohibiting the death penalty in peacetime. 
Although not explicitly stated, but it appears to be the case with the presence of 
Protocol No. 6, that in peacetime Article 2(l) cannot now apply. It appears that the 
recognised "certain circumstances', 38 where the death penalty may be applied in 
Europe are limited to wartime, as William Schabas has argued that the Ocalan Court 
4ý clearly rules that the death penalty in peacetime is contrary to article 3, and thus it is 
not sheltered by article 2(l ).,, 
39The Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Turmen 
supports this argument as he held, "Article 2 still permits [the] death penalty in 
wartime. The logical conclusion would then be that the death penalty constitutes a 
breach of Article 3 in peacetime but not in wartime (because it is permitted in Article 
, 40 
37 ibid, p. 52, para 198. 
38 ibid, p. 52, para 199. 
39 William A. Schabas, 'International Law, Politics, Diplomacy and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, ' 
13 Wm, & Mary Bill Rts. J. 417 (2004), p. 428. 
40 Ocalan v. Turkey, above, fn. 32, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tfirmen, p. 7 1. It should also be 
argued that although Article 3 cannot be interpreted toper se prohibit the death penalty in wartime, 
it can 
be used to ensure that the death penalty is not applied in an inhuman way in wartime. 
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The refusal of the Chamber to hold that Article 3 now provides an absolute ban on the 
death penalty was challenged by Ocalan on appeal to the Grand Chamber of the 
European Court of Human Rights. The applicant submitted the argument that a 
penological evolution had taken place since the drafting of the Convention in 1950, 
and this change in Member State policy meant that Article 3 should now be 
interpreted as explicitly renouncing the death penalty. It was also argued there had 
been de facto abolition throughout Europe, and that no interpretation of Article 2(l) 
should allow a Member State to inflict inhuman and degrading treatment since the 
death penalty per se constituted such treatment. 41 Here Ocalan was utilising the same 
arguments as Amnesty International and the Parliamentary Assembly detailed above. 
However, the Grand Chamber affirmed that Article 3 cannot be interpreted as 
providing a per se ban on the death penalty. This is a holding which has not changed 
since Kirkwood in 1985.42 
The Grand Chamber also agreed with the conclusions of the Chamber on the 
compatibility of Articles 2(l) and 3 after the opening for signature of Protocol No. 
13,43 and followed the Soering "traditional method of amendment" analysis "in 
pursuit of their [the Member States] policy of abolition. , 
44 The Court in Soering gave 
prominence to the Member State signatures and ratifications of Protocol No. 6, and 
41 Ocalan v. Turkey, Application No. 46221/99 [GCI 12 May 2005, paras 157-158. 
42 ibid, para 162, stated, "[i]n practice, if Article 2 is to be read as permitting capital punishment, 
notwithstanding the almost universal abolition of the death penalty in Europe, Article 3 cannot be 
interpreted as prohibiting the death penalty since that would nullify the clear wording of Article 2. " 
43 ocalan v. Turkey, above, fh. 32, paras 189-196. 
44 Ocalan v. Turkey, above, fn. 4 1, para 164. 
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refused to initiate judicial amendment. Following the adoption of Protocol No. 13, the 
Grand Chamber in Ocalan, also refused to apply an evolutionary interpretation. The 
Grand Chamber was not prepared to reinterpret Article 3, but, significantly, it allowed 
the Member States to guide this penological issue. It further affirmed: 
[flor the time being, the fact that there are still a large number of States who 
have yet to sign or ratify Protocol No. 13 may prevent the Court from finding 
that it is the established practice of the Contracting States to regard the 
implementation of the death penalty as inhuman and degrading treatment 
contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. 45 
Although the Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers was advancing 
a human rights discourse for the restriction and abolition of the death penalty, and the 
Member States were signalling agreement through signature and ratifications. In 2005 
the Grand Chamber did not want to pre-empt any possible unanimous Member State 
position. It recognised that the restriction of the death penalty is an intricate question 
concerning the exercise of sovereignty and wanted to allow the states to restrict their 
practices through their own sovereign choices. 
However, Judge Garlicki provided a different argument: one which did not consider 
the sovereign question to be paramount. He supported the evolving human rights 
discourse that Article 3 had been violated because "any imposition of the death 
penalty represents per se inhuman and degrading treatment prohibited by the 
45 
ibid, paras 164-165. 
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, 46 Convention. He agreed with the majority's conclusion that a death sentence 
following an unfair trial is a violation of Article 3, but the restriction placed on the 
decision seemed to the Judge to "stop short of addressing the real problem. " He 
stated: 
am writing this separate opinion because I feel that, in this case, the Court 
should have decided, in the operative provisions of its judgment, that Article 3 
had been violated because any imposition of the death penalty represents per se 
inhuman and degrading treatment prohibited by the Convention. Thus, while 
correct, the majority's conclusion that the imposition of the death penalty 
following an unfair trial represents a violation of Article 3 seems to me to stop 
short of addressing the real problem. 
It is true that the majority's conclusion was sufficient to establish a violation in 
the instant case and that it was not absolutely necessary to produce any firm 
conclusion on the - more general - point whether the implementation of the 
death penalty should now be regarded as inhuman and degrading treatment 
contrary to Article 3 in all circumstances. I accept that there are many virtues of 
judicial restraint, but am not persuaded that this was the best occasion to 
exercise it. 
47 
However, to explain his judgement, Judge Garlicki does not engage with Article 3 but 
Article 2(l). He does not reveal specifically why the death penalty is per se inhuman, 
46 ibid, Partly Concurring, Partly Dissenting opinion of Judge Garlicki. 
47 
ibid, paras 1-2. 
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and does not explain why judicial restraint was not necessary in this case. As such he 
did not engage with the root issue of what he attempted to establish, and refused to 
provide any explanation as to how Article 3 would be applied to prohibit Article 2(l). 
In contrast, the Jointly Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Costa, Caflisch, Ttirmen 
and Borrego Borrego, held that Article 3 does not provide a per se prohibition, and 
that in Ocalan's case, they argue, "there is no ground to believe that there was a real 
and immediate risk that the applicant would be executed, " and that, "there is no 
violation of Article 3 on account of the death sentence. 9ý 48 These polarised ýopinions 
reveal the inherent conflict regarding the death penalty to be a per se violation of 
Article 3. 
Even though there is now a majority of Member States have now signed and ratified 
Protocol No. 13, the subsequent cases of the European Court of Human Rights 
concerning the death penalty have not held that Article 3 now provides a per se 
prohibition against the death penalty, or that Article 2(1) is amended. These are 
considered below. It appears that the Court is waiting for what Renate Wohlwend 
warned would need to happen, in the "inelegant position" of another Protocol to 
amend officially Article 2(l) and remove the possibility of the death penalty from the 
text of the Convention. 
49 
48 See, Ocalan v. Turkey, above, fh. 4 1, Joint Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Costa, Caflisch, 
Türrnen and Borrego Borrego. 
49 Explanatory Memorandum, by Mrs. Renate Woh1wend, rapporteur, point, 1, in Draft Protocol to the 
European Convention on Human Rights concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all 
circumstances, Doc. 9316,15 January, 2002. 
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The next jurisprudential issue to consider is how Article 3 can be used to scrutinize 
the different aspects of the capital judicial system. This will involve a wider analysis 
of how Article 3 interpretation has evolved. 
6.4 Article 3 Restriction of the Capital Judicial System 
The European Commission and Court of Human Rights has interpreted Article 3 to 
engage with contemporary human rights and criminological investigations into the 
effects of the capital judicial system. The case-law on the death penalty has 
demonstrated the prominent role of Article 3 and the jurisprudence has evolved as the 
50 governmental penological views have changed . 
50 In Poltoratskiy v. Ukraine, Application No. 38812/97,29 April 2003 the Court stated that, Article 3 
enshrines one of the "most fundamental values of a democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms 
torture or inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the 
victim's behaviour" at Para 30. In Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v. Greece, the 
Sub- 
Committee of the European Commission of Human Rights held that "inhuman treatment covers at 
least 
such treatment as deliberately causes severe suffering, physical or mental, which in the particular 
situation is unjustified, " Application No. 3321/67; 3322/67; 3323/67 and 3324/67,5 November 
1994. For 
a general outline of the state's positive duty not to impose inhuman treatment on 
individuals, see 
Stephanie Palmer, 'A wrong turning: Article 3 ECHR and proportionality, ' Cam. L. J. 2006,65 
(2), 43 8- 
451. 
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Antonio Cassese has noted that the European Commission and European Court of 
Human Rights has "gradually enlarged the areas to which Article 3 should apply. "51 
Malcolm Evans and Rod Morgan observe that "ideas of what amounts to severe or 
intense suffering will change over time, " and that "as with the thresholds between the 
elements of Article 3, the range of factors are not limited to the severity of suffering 
but can also embrace more policy-oriented factors. 5ý52 William Schabas has 
confirmed, "[t]he concept of what is ... inhuman, or degrading ought to change over 
time to reflect contemporary thinking and values. ýý53 
Although Article 3 applied to the death penalty as a human rights analysis, it also 
represented a restriction of the right of the sovereign Member State to impose the 
punishment. This is because the scope of the sovereign right to the punishment is 
being question and restricted. 54 The European Court of Human Rights has evolved its 
Article 3 analysis of the capital judicial system to cover; (a) the capital charge and 
trial process, (b) the circumstances when a death sentence is commuted to life 
imprisonment, (c) extradition and deportation cases, (d) moratoriums and the 
consequences of the suspension of executions, (e) the physiological and 
" Antonio Cassese, 'Prohibition of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ' p. 
228, in R. St. J. Mcdonald et al, (eds), The European Systemfor the Protection of Human Rights, 
(Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993). 
52 Malcolm D. Evans and Rod Morgan, Preventing Torture: A Study of the European Conventionfor the 
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1998), p. 93. 
53 Schabas, above, fn. 39, p. 426. 
54 See, Roger Hood, The Death Penalty A Worldwide Perspective, 3 rd ed, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), pp. 75,113. 
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psychological impact of incarceration conditions, (f) the different methods of 
execution, and (g) the death row phenomenon as a jurisprudential consideration of 
these factors collectively. These specific issues are considered separately below. 
6.5 The Capital Charge and Trial Process 
The European Court of Human Rights' jurisprudence is inconclusive on whether a 
capital charge is a violation of Article 3. In Talan v. TurkeY55 the applicant argued 
that the criminal proceedings before sentence in his death penalty trial amounted to a 
violation of Article 3. But the Court held, "that the mere fact that the applicant could 
have been sentenced to the death penalty and that he lived with this fear is in itself not 
enough to amount to a violation within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. ý56 
Specific evidence was supplied by the applicant that he feared for his life, but this 
evidence was held not to be enough to attract an Article 3 violation. 
A contrasting decision was reached in Ocalan v. Turkey even though the applicant 
had not given evidence that he feared the death sentence, the Court stated, "to impose 
a death sentence on a person after an unfair trial is to subject that person wrongfully 
to the fear that he will be executed. The fear and uncertainty as to the future generated 
by a sentence of death, in circumstances where there exists a real possibility that the 
sentence will be enforced, must give rise to a significant degree of human anguish. 5ý57 
55 Talan v. Turkey, Application no. 31096/02,30 March 2006. 
56 
ibid, para 3. 
" Ocalan v. Turkey, above, fn. 32, para 207. 
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In coming to this conclusion the Chamber joined the Convention Article 6 fair trial 
standards, 58with the imposition of inhuman treatment or punishment under Article 
3 . 
59As such the Chamber held that a death sentence following an unfair trial would 
amount to an Article 3 violation. 
The Chamber then identified by an objective test that an applicant would most likely 
suffer from "fear and anguish" while being tried for a capital offence, and such 
,, 60 "anguish cannot be dissociated from the unfairness of the proceedings. It is 
appropriate to question this objective analysis and consider what would be the 
Chamber's opinion if it found that the applicant had received a fair trial, as appeared 
to be the case in Talan v. Turkey. If a person is sentenced to death the "uncertainty as 
61 to the future" may be present both following a fair or unfair trial . In Soering it was 
held that the imposition of a fair trial did not alleviate the effects of the "death row 
phenomenon, " but the Ocalan Chamber did not consider this Soering position. 62 
Hence, the perceived unfairness of a capital trial makes a death sentence more certain, 
because the knowledge of a denial of due process would more likely lead to a death 
58 
ibid, paras III and 169. 
59 Stephano Manacorda, 'Restraints on Death Penalty in Europe: A Circular Process, ' JICJ, 1 (2003), 
263-283, p. 28 1. 
600calan v. Turkey, above, fn. 32, para 169. 
61 Whilst working on capital cases at the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System and the Federal Public 
Defender's Office, Oklahoma City, between 1996 and 1997, we had some clients who had received 
effective assistance, and some which had not. It appeared irrelevant to the anxiety which they felt 
concerning their approaching executions. 
62 The Soering Court accepted that the provisions in the Virginia Code "undoubtedly serve ... to prevent 
the arbitrary or capricious imposition of the death penalty ... They do not however remove the ... death row 
phenomenon for a given individual once condemned to death, " above, fn. 14, para 109. 
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sentence: not an uncertainty of one. Judge Tiirmen took issue with the Ocalan 
majority in a Partly Dissenting Opinion, when he stated: 
the judgment is confined to the death penalty following an unfair trial, that is to 
say a combination of Articles 6 and 3 of the Convention ... It must be 
underscored at the outset that the applicant has not made a complaint to the 
Strasbourg Court to this effect ... the applicant in his written or oral submissions 
never claimed under Article 3 that he felt fear and anguish due to the unfairness 
of the criminal proceedings which resulted in a violation of Article 3, that is to 
say a complaint that combines Articles 3 and 6 ... Inhuman treatment within the 
meaning of Article 3 is based on a subjective concept, that is to say fear and 
anguish felt by the applicant that reaches the threshold level required by Article 
3. In the absence of such a complaint, it is not possible for the Court to stand in 
the applicant's shoes and decide ex officio that there has been a violation of 
Article 3 in reliance on the assumption that the applicant must have felt such 
63 fear and anguish . 
" Ocalan v. Turkey, above, fn. 32 Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tilmen, and he further r, eminded 
the majority of Chamber of the basic principles of Article 3 analysis, "[flor a threat to constitute an 
inhuman treatment there must be a "real risk. " A mere possibility is not in itself sufficient. The threat 
should be "sufficiently real and immediate. " It must be shown that the risk is real, " citing, Vilvarajah v. 
the United Kingdom, Application Nos. 13163/87; 13164/87; 13165/87; 1344/87 and 13448/87,30 
October 199 1; Campbell and Cosans v. the United Kingdom, Application Nos. 7511/76 and 7743/76,25 
February 1982; and H. L. R. v. France, (11/1996/630/813) 29 April 1997. 
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Judge Ttirmen confirmed the absence of the subjective component of the Court's 
Article 3 assessment. 64 However, in later cases the Court has not followed Judge 
TUrnien's reasoning. The Court has appeared to affirm its objective test for fear of 
future punishment under Article 3, as it adopted this analytical reasoning in Bader 
and others v. Sweden. 65 This case concerned the deportation of the applicant from 
Sweden to possibly face a capital trial in Syria. The Court reiterated the objective 
analysis when it declared: 
because of the summary nature and the total disregard of the rights of the 
defence, the proceedings must be regarded as a flagrant denial of a fair trial. 
Naturally, this must give rise to a significant degree of added uncertainty and 
distress for the applicants as to the outcome of any retrial in Syria. In the light of 
the above, the Court considers that the death sentence imposed on the first 
application following an unfair trial would inevitably cause the applicants fear 
and anguish as to their future if they were forced to return to Syria as there 
exists a real possibility that the sentence will be enforced in that country. 
66 
Not only does the Bader decision follow in Ocalan that the death sentence "must 
have" caused a violation of the applicant's human rights, but also the problematical 
64 Judge TUrmen further took issue with the majority on whether the applicant's death sentence was more 
real than in Cinar v. Turkey Application No. 17864/91,5 September 1994, and he argued, I cannot 
accept the majority's opinion that in the present case the risk of execution for the applicant was more real 
than in (7inar, " ibid and this is discussed in more detail below. 
65 Bader and Others v. Sweden, Application No. 13284/04,8 February 2006. 
66 ibid, para 47; citing, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey Application Nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99,4 
February 2005. 
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argument that unfair trials cause "uncertainty" of future punishment is repeated. It 
would appear more appropriate for the Court's dictum to demonstrate through 
subjective evidence supplied by the applicant, whether the unfairness of the 
proceedings were understood and whether such understanding produced a detrimental 
cognitive impact. Such decisions by the European Court of Human Rights are clearly 
favourable for the applicant and the Court is using its jurisprudence to restrict the 
Member States' and receiving Third States' capital judicial systems. Whilst this is 
very welcome for anti-death penalty jurisprudence, the Court still needs to be careful 
not to undermine the authority, quality and legitimacy of its Article 3 jurisprudence. 
In the initiation of a possible "fair" capital trial, it would appear to depend on a 
subjective analysis of whether the applicant had fear and anguish resulting from the 
death sentence, as was held in Soering. But if the applicant did not fear his sentence, 
would the sentence independent of an adverse cognitive impact on the applicant be a 
violation of Article 3? If it was found, through psychological examination that no 
"fear" was present, then would his mental health be called into question? It is 
presumed that this would be the argument for the applicant. Following Article 2(l), a 
death sentence would prima facie not be a violation in these circumstances, but other 
aspects of the capital judicial system, such as incarceration conditions or a severe 
prison regime, 67 may be held to be a violation of Article 3. 
67 See Poltoratskiy, v. Ukraine, Application No. 38812/97,29 April 2003; Kuznetsov v. Ukraine, 
Application no. 39042/97,29 April 2003; Nazarenko v. Ukraine, Application no. 39483/98,29 April 
2003; Dankevich v. Ukraine, Application no. 40679/98,29 April 2003; Aliev v. Ukraine, Application no. 
41220/98,29 April 2003; Khokhlich v. Ukraine, Application no. 41707/98,29 April 2003. 
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6.6 The Death Sentence Commuted to Life Imprisonment 
The intricate issue of the commutation of the death sentence and determining 
appropriate alternative punishments has been considered by the Court in a number of 
cases. In Kotalla v. the Netherlands, the applicant was sentenced to death in 1948 for 
war crimes, but had his death sentence commuted to life imprisonment. 68 The 
Commission held "the sentence of life imprisonment replaced a death sentence, and 
as capital punishment is permitted by the Convention, it cannot hold that life 
imprisonment replacing it is itself a breach of Article 3. ýý69 
However, in flaýcu and others v. Russia and Moldova 70 the Court provided a 
modified reasoning and held that the applicant had suffered inhuman treatment under 
a sentence of death, even though his sentence was commuted: the commutation did 
not alleviate the previous inhuman treatment it merely discontinued its effect. In 
Ocalan v. Turkey, the applicant was also held to have suffered an Article 3 violation 
before his death sentence was commuted. 71 
6'Kotalla v. The Netherlands, Application No. 7994/77,6 May 1978. 
69 ibid, p. 24 1. See also, Lehideux and Isorni v. France, (55/1997/839/1045) 23 September 1998; 
Resolution DH (99) 713 Concerning the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, of 23 
September 1998 in the case of Lehideux and Isorni against France, Adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers on 3 December 1999 at the 688th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies. 
70 Ilaýcu and others v. Russia and Moldova, Application No. 48787/99,8 July 2004. 
71 Ocalan v. Turkey, above, fn. 4 1, para. 165. 
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In another aspect of this issue in Maksimov v. Azerbaijan 72 the applicant claimed that 
the commutation of the death penalty to life imprisonment was to his detriment, as 
when he was sentenced to death the maximum alternative sentence was fifteen years 
imprisonment. The Court held that the amendment of the law between death sentence 
73 
and commutation did not change the fact that he received a lesser sentence. The 
Court affirmed that a commutation of a death penalty to life imprisonment was not a 
violation of Article 3 or the prohibition of the imposition of a heavier sentence under 
Article 7 in Kajkaris v. Cyprus, 74 but it may be that the court is prepared to re- 
evaluate this jurisprudence as this decision was a narrow hold via a majority of ten 
votes to seven. 
75 
72 Maksimov v. Azerbaijan, Application No. 38228/05,1 February 2007. 
73 In this case the applicant relied on the Convention Article 7 prohibition of heavier sentences, but the 
Court gave an intricate holding stating that the new law had been adopted in Azerbaijan before the 
Convention was adopted, and as a result the Convention could not have retroactive effect, see, Hummatov 
v. AzerbaUan, Application Nos. 9852/03 and 13413/04,8 May 2006. 
74 Kq/karis v. Cyprus, Application No. 21906/04,12 February 2008. The Court stated in para 97, "[t]he 
imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment on an adult offender is not in itself prohibited by or 
incompatible with Article 3 or any other Article of the Convention" (see, inter alia, among many 
authorities, Kotdlla v. the Netherlands, Application No. 7994/77,6 May 1978; Bamber v. the United 
Kingdom, Application No. 13183/87,14 December 1988; and, Sawoniuk v. the United Kingdom, 
Application No. 63 716/00,29 May 200 1). At the same time, however, the Court has also held that the 
imposition of an irreducible life sentence may raise an issue under Article 3 (see, inter alia, 
Nivette v. 
France Application No. 44190/98,3 July 2001; Einhorn v. France, Application No. 71555/01,16 
October 200 1; Stanford v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 73299/01,12 December 2002; and 
Wynne v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 673 85/01,22 May 
2003). 
75 ibid, see Joint Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Tulkens, Cabral 
Barreto, Fura-Sandstrom, 
Spielmanm and Jebens; Partly Dissenting Opinion by Judge Loucaides 
joined by Judge Mciený. 
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The variations in the judgments is identified by a technical jurisprudential difference 
between an Article 3 analysis of a prima facie weighing of the impact of a death 
sentence with life imprisonment, and on a further analysis of the effect of the death 
sentence on the individual before the sentence was commuted. What can be observed 
from these cases is an evolved jurisprudence from one where Article 2(l) provided 
the negation of scrutiny following a death sentence, to an enhanced Article 3 position 
for scrutinising the effect of the death sentence upon the applicant before the 
punishment was commuted. 
Furthermore, even though the Court has held that a life sentence is a viable alternative 
following commutation, this may be questioned in future cases. 76 As the sovereign 
right of the death penalty is being restricted and renounced, so too the ability to 
determine a life sentence as an alternative, may no longer be an unfettered 
penological option. 
6.7 Extradition and Deportation 
When a criminal suspect flees from the country where the crime was claimed to have 
been committed, transfer proceedings may be initiated between the requesting and 
76 See, Abbas Sertkaya v. Turkey, Application No. 77113/01,11 December 2003; see also, Partington v. 
the United Kingdom, Application No. 58853/00,26 June 2003; Liger v. France, Application no. 
19324/02,11 April 2006. This case was submitted to the Grand Chamber. See also, Rachael Stokes, 'A 
Fate Worse that Death? The Problems with Life Imprisonment as an Alternative to the Death Penalty, ' in 
Jon Yorke (ed) Against the Death Penalty: International Initiatives and Implications, (Dartmouth: 
Ashgate, 2008). 
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requested state. If there is a bilateral treaty between the states, a procedure of request 
and consent will be regulated by the provisions included within the treaty. As such 
this is a mutual exchange which will be negotiated by the states. Furthermore, the 
states may be parties to a multilateral treaty, and the provisions within that treaty will 
also govern the transfer proceedings. Where no treaty exists, municipal and 
international law will be used to adjudicate on the proceedings adopted by the 
states. 77 Within the Convention system of human rights, the Convention, the 
multilateral European Convention on Extradition and its ProtocolS, 78 and bilateral 
treaties, 79 govern the extradition proceedings from Member States 80 to receiving 
states, and within the transfer proceedings of suspects facing capital charges, there 
77 In his scholarly work on public international law, Ian Brownlie has argued that the circumstances 
surrounding the legality of extradition procedures will depend on "questions of internal and particularly 
constitutional law and the effect of treaties on municipal rules, " Principles ofPublic International law, 
6thed, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 313. 
78 European Convention on Extradition, CETS No. 024,13 December 1957; Additional Protocol to the 
European Convention on Extradition, CETS No. 086, Strasbourg, 15 October 1975; Second Additional 
Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition, CETS No. 098, Strasbourg, 17 March 1978. See, 
Theodore Konstadinides, 'The Perils of the 'Europeanisation of Extradition Procedures in the EU: 
Mutuality, Fundamental Rights and Constitutional Guarantees, ' 14 MJEC. L. 2 (2007) 379-400, p. 380. 
The European Union have harmonised the extradition procedures within its Member States through the 
European Arrest Warrant, see, Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest 
warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, (2002/5 84/JHA), OJ, L/ 190/1 18.7.2002. 
79 See for example, Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States ofAmerica, (1977) 1049 UNTS 167. 
For a review of municipal cases which have not been considered by the European Commission on 
Human Rights and the European ýCourt of Human Rights see, Schabas, above, fn. 13, p. 26; Jon Yorke, 
'Europe's judicial inquiry in extradition cases: closing the door on the death penalty, ' E. L. Rev. 2004, 
29(4), 546-556, 
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has been an evolution in the juridical scrutiny. What follows below is an evolution of 
the weak provisions within the Convention on Extradition, Article 11, as outlined in 
Chapter Four, to the establishing of a firm human rights principle against extradition 
individuals to face the death penalty. 
An early case in 1963 demonstrated that extraditions may have occurred even though 
there was the possibility of torture or inhuman treatment or punishment being 
imposed by the receiving state. 81 However, in the 1970s the Commission began to 
accept that extradition circumstances may lead to a violation of the Convention. 82 
Ivan Shearer had noted in 1971 that extradition treaty provisions which included 
some kind of a prohibition against the death penalty were becoming more common. 83 
However, in Amekrane v. the United Kingdom, 84 the British government 
circumvented the judicial inquiry when extraditing Amekrane to Morocco to face a 
" See, X v. the Federal Republic of Germany, Application No, 1802/62,26 March 1963, p. 462, where 
the Commission held that in a now defunct reasoning that in exceptional circumstances, "due to the very 
nature of the regime of that country or to a particular situation in that country, basic human rights such as 
are guaranteed by the Convention might be either grossly violated or entirely suppressed, " p. 480. This 
decision was upheld in X v. Switzerland, Application No. 9012/80,9 December 1980, p. 205. 
82 See Kerkoub v. Belgium, Application No. 5012/7140 Collected Decisions 55 (1972); Altun v. Federal 
Republic of Germany, Application No. 10308/83,3 May 1983. 
83 I. A. Shearer, Extradition in International Law, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 197 1), p. 
149. For the general development of death penalty clauses in extradition treaties, see, J. S. Reeves, 
'Extradition Treaties and the Death Penalty, 18 AJI. L. 2,298-300 (1924); William A. Schabas, 'Indirect 
Abolition: Capital Punishment's Role in Extradition Law and Practice, ' 25 Loy. L. A. Int'l & Comp. L. 
Rev. 581 (2003). 
" Amakrane v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 5961/72,19 July 1974. 
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capital trial. He was executed and following negotiations a "friendly settlement" was 
agreed and the government paid compensation to Amekrane's widow. 85 This friendly 
settlement was affirmed by the Commission. Although this case did not create a 
jurisprudential renunciation of the United Kingdom's transfer procedure it is an 
example of both the state government's admission that it had acted illegitimately, and 
also the Commissions acceptance of this fact. 
The specific jurisprudence on the transfer of suspects to face a capital trial outside the 
Council Member State's boarders was considered in Kirkwood v. the United 
Kingdom. 86 In this case Kirkwood was to be extradited to California to face a capital 
trial, and the United Kingdom government had extradited him before adequate 
judicial enquiry, through the appeals process, had been completed. The United 
Kingdom was neither a party to the Convention on Extradition nor Protocol No. 6, 
and Nigel Price argued that these two instruments provided a "European context" 
against the death penalty at the time. 87 Price pointed out that no adequate European 
review could have been given because, "by the time of the admissibility question 
came before the Commission, Kirkwood's extradition had already been effected. iM 
85 The United Kingdom government and Mohamed Amakrane's widow reached a settlement and she 
received 05,000. See, ibid, p. 4. 
86 Kirkwood v. United Kingdom, above, fn. 14. 
87 Nigel S. Price, 'Human Rights, "Death Row, " and Administrative Law Remedies, ' 34 1 CL. Q. 1, 
(1985), 162-167, p. 163. As discussed in Chapter Three, the European Convention on Extradition, 
Article II prohibition on the extradition of suspects to face capital charges. 
88 ibid, p. 164. The United Kingdom had extradited Kirkwood, and as with the case of Amakrane, the 
government had not allowed for full judicial inquiry into the extradition circumstances. 
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Both Amekrane and Kirkwood demonstrate that the United Kingdom was attempting 
to protect its monopoly to decide extradition circumstances without recourse to any 
Convention standards. However, later cases demonstrate that the United Kingdom 
was brought within the scrutiny of the Commission and Court. 
In Soering v. the United Kingdom, 89 the Court considered the extradition of Jens 
Soering to face a capital trial in Virginia, United States. The Court was of the opinion 
that there was a real prospect he would be sentenced to death and await execution on 
death row for six to eight years and that the mental anguish he would suffer would be 
a violation of Article 3.90 
Several factors contributed to the Court's decision to hold that extradition would 
cause Soering "inhuman and degrading treatment. " The Court considered it 
significant that he was only eighteen at the time of the crime, that he suffered from 
the mental condition "folie a deux, " that the conditions on death row enhanced by the 
prolonged detention would contribute to his suffering, and finally, that Germany had 
requested that as a German citizen, Soering be extradited to its jurisdiction to stand 
trial. 91 
The United Kingdom had not signed or ratified Protocol No. 6 at this time nor had it 
become a Party to the European Convention on Extradition. However, there was a 
Soering; see also, Richard B. Lillich, 'The Soering Case, ' (1991) 85 A. JI. L. 128; Ann Sherlock, 
'Extradition, Death Row and the Convention, ' (1990) E. L. Rev. 15 () 87; Susan Marks, 'Yes, Virginia, 
Extradition May Breach the European Convention on Human Rights, ' (1990) 49 Cam, L. J 194. 
90 ibid, para 106. 
91 ibid, Para III- 
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bilateral extradition treaty between the governments of the United Kingdom and the 
United States. 92 Article 4 of the treaty allowed for either government to refuse 
extradition of a suspect unless there were "assurances satisfactory" that the death 
penalty would not be imposed. During extradition negotiations between the two 
governments, Virginia modified the assurance and the state prosecutor indicated that 
he would seek the death penalty, but would submit to the jury the wishes against the 
administration of the punishment by the United Kingdom government. 
Under such circumstances the Court held that there were substantial grounds for 
believing that the applicant would be sentenced to death. 93 This assurance did not 
meet the treaty requirement, and it was held to violate Convention Article 3.94 Judge 
De Meyer stated in his Concurring Opinion that extradition would only be lawful, "if 
the United States were to give absolute assurances that he would not be put to 
death. 1595 The assurance was only an undertaking of representation to the Virginian 
capital jury, and not an absolute assurance against a capital trial. 96 
92 Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the United States ofAmerica, (1977) 1049 UNTS 167, Article 4 states: 
If the offence for which extradition is requested is punishable by death under the relevant law of the 
requesting Party, but the relevant law of the requested Party does not provide for the death penalty in a 
similar case, extradition may be refused unless the requesting Party gives assurances satisfactory to the 
requested Party that the death penalty will not be carried out. This Extradition Treaty was referred to by 
the Soering above, fii. 14, at para 36. 
93 
ibid, para 98. 
94 John Andrews and Ann Sherlock, argued that the Soering decision "has great significance in the area 
of the potential conflict of treaty obligations, " in 'Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights: 
Extradition, Death Row and the Convention (Country Survey), E. L. Rev. 15,87,1990, p, 92. 
95 See ibid, Concurring Opinion of Judge De Meyer. 
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As a consequence of this decision the Commission, Court and Member States 97 could 
utilise extradition proceedings to restrict and prohibit the death penalty in a specific 
case in receiving states outside of the Council sphere. It had become a mechanism to 
challenge directly the sovereign right of the punishment. Richard Lillich noted that 
the Soering decision was the "pebble thrown in the pond" and the ripples would be 
felt intemationally. 98 The scope of the Convention to restrict Member States from 
sending suspects to face a capital trial in receiving states had been widened. This 
would also have implications for the sovereign monopoly to determine the application 
of the capital judicial system. 
A conflict has arisen between a sovereign ideology which refuses to impose the death 
penalty, and one which continues to try to do so. It implicates the Member States as 
"states parties are now responsible for breaches of Article 3 that are the foreseeable 
consequence of extradition. "99 
Furthermore, there is scope here to argue that the principle of "non-refoulement" is 
being violated. This principle is developing into a human rights position to prohibit 
96 Soering v. the United Kingdom, Resolution DH (90) 8. 
97 There are recorded cases of Member State's courts applying the Convention to prevent the extradition 
of suspects to face capital trials in receiving states. See, Short v. the Kingdom of the Netherlands (1990) 
translated in 29 I. L. M. 1378; Venezia v. Ministero di Grazia e Guistizia, (1996) 79 Rivista di Diritto 
Intemazionale 815. 
98 Richard B. Lillich, 'Harmonizing Human Rights Law Nationally and Internationally: The Death Row 
Phenomenon as a Case Study, ' 40 St. Louis U L. J. 699 (1996), p. 704. 
99 Marks, above, fn. 89, p. 196. 
246 
the transfer of an individual from a Member State to a receiving state where there is a 
risk of ill-treatment under Article 3.100 As the European Court of Human Rights 
considers whether there are "substantial grounds have been shown for believing that 
the person concerned [if extradited or deported] faces a real risk of being subjected to 
treatment contrary to Article 3, "101 this principle may now be seen to incorporate 
capital extradition and deportation cases. 
William Schabas has observed that the Council and its Member States "exports its 
philosophy by refusing extradition to states on other continents where capital 
punishment still exiStS, ý002 and Roger Hood and Carolyn Hoyle have considered this 
as an example of what they term as the development of an ideology of "non- 
cooperation. " 103 What is significant is that the states themselves are turning their 
backs on the possibility of the death penalty in specific cases, and signing bilateral 
extradition treaty procedures which restrict the capital judicial process, and also 
through the multilateral fora by the Convention on Extradition. What this displays is 
that the human rights discourse is creating a norm that in extradition circumstances 
100 This argument had been utilised in the case of Mohammed Ramzy in Ramzy v. the Netherlands, 
Application No. 25424/05, and submitted to the European Court of Human Rights in the Written 
Comments by Amnesty International, the Associationfor the Prevention of Torture, Human Rights 
Watch, Interights, the International Commission ofJurists, Open Society Justice Initiative and Redress, 
22 November 2005. The case of Ramzy v. the Netherlands, is currently before a Chamber of the Third 
Section of the European Court of Human Rights. 
101 Saadi v. Italy, Application No. 37201/06,28 February, 2008. See also, Vilvarajah and Others v. the 
United Kingdom, above, fh. 63, para 103; and H. L. R. v. France, above, fh. 63, para. 34. 
102 Schabas, above, fn. 13, p. 22 1. 
103 Roger Hood and Carolyn Hoyle, The Death Penalty A Worldwide Perspective, 4h ed, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 24. 
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the receiving state's capital judicial system will be circumvented. We had seen that 
previously it was the other way around, with the British government circumventing 
the appeals process to allow extradition and executions were implemented. 
In Chahal v. the United Kingdom, the UK goverment argued that issues of national 
security could be taken into consideration when it decided whether or not to extradite 
the applicant. The Court held that there was no "room for balancing the risk of ill- 
treatment against the reasons for expulsion in determining whether a State's 
responsibility under Article 3 is engaged. "' 04 It further stated that "the activities of the 
individual in question, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be a material 
consideration, " and so national security considerations, "could not be invoked to 
override the interests of the individual where substantive grounds had been shown for 
believing that he would be subject to ill-treatment if expelled. " 105 
Colin Warbrick has also argued that the "[s]tate is not permitted to put considerations 
of security above the requirement that it comply with Article 3.5006 Here we see that 
Article 3 is evolving not only as a human rights principle to challenge the receiving 
state's capital judicial system, but it is being used to limit the circumstances under 
104 Chahal v. the United Kingdom, (70/1995/576/662), 15 November 1996, para 8 1. In Klass and Others 
v. Germany, Application No. 5029/71,6 September 1978, the Court held that "the Contracting States 
may not, in the name of the struggle against espionage and terrorism, adopt whatever measures they 
deem appropriate, " at, para 49. 
105 ibid, paras 80 and 78. This judgment was confirmed in Ahmed v. Austria, Application No. 25964/94, 
17 December 1996, para 41. 
106 Colin Warbrick, 'The European Convention on Human Rights and the Prevention of Terrorism, ' 32 
I. C L. Q. 1, (1983), 82-119, P. 106. 
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which states can extradite individuals. Following the ruling in Saadi v. Italy, this 
principle still appears to be observed. 107 The Commission has also accepted the 
judgment of the Portuguese Constitutional Court when it held that it was 
unconstitutional to extradite a person to face capital charges in China for drugs 
trafficking. 108 
Furthermore, in Shamayev and others v. Georgia and Russia, the Court held that there 
was a violation of Article 3 when a group of Chechens were extradited by Georgia to 
Russia. 109 The Chechen applicants claimed that the extradition (and some others were 
awaiting extradition) violated Articles 2(l) and 3 because of the risk of the death 
penalty in Russia. The Court noted that the Russian government had implemented 
"gradual elimination of the death penalty, " I10 through the moratorium in the country, 
but it held that there was still a "real and personal risk of inhuman or degrading 
treatment within the meaning of Article 3. " 111 
107 Saadi v. Italy, above, fn . 10 1, para 125. The case of 
Ramzy v. the Netherlands, will also consider this 
question. 
108 See, Lei Ch'an Wa v. Portugal, Application No. 25410/94, unreported, 27 November 1995; Yenng 
Yuk Leung v. Portugal, Application No. 24464/94, unreported, 27 November 1995, cited in Schabas, 
above, fn. 13, p. 277, fn 95. 
"'9 Shamayev and others v. Georgia and Russia, Application No. 363 78/02,12 April 2005. Georgia 
acceded to the European Convention on Extradition on 13 September 200 1, and Russia on 9 March 2000, 
and so the death penalty provision under Article II applied, 
110 ibid, para 330. 
111 ibid, para 3 53; see also paras 3 68 and 3 86. It appears that this decision was an attempt to encourage 
Russia to ratify Protocol No. 6, and this issue is discussed in Chapter Seven. This analysis would also 
apply to deportation proceedings. See, Bader and Others v. Sweden, Application No. 13284/04,8 
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However, extradition is prima facie permitted where the receiving state demonstrates 
that it will not impose the death penalty. In Aylor-Davis v. France, the European 
Commission on Human Rights considered the extradition proceedings of Joy Aylor- 
Davis who was charged with a capital offence in Texas. ' 12 The Dallas County 
prosecutor guaranteed that he would not pursue the death penalty and the 
Commission held that the Convention would not be violated under the circumstances. 
In Nivette v. France the Commission held that if assurances are sufficient then there 
is no violation of Article 3 113 and in Einhorn v. France, which concerned the 
infamous Ira Einhorn saga and extradition to the United States a similar decision was 
reached. 1 
14 
Furthermore, in Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, ' 15 the Uzbekistan authorities 
gave assurances that it would not impose the death penalty if the suspect was 
extradited and this was held to not violate Article 3. In Ismaili v. Germany, the 
Moroccan government had declared to Germany that the offence the suspect was 
February 2006. In 199 1, and Richard Lillich had argued that the Socring principles could be applied to 
deportation proceedings, see, Richard B. Lillich, 'The Soering Case, ' 85 AJI. L. 128 (1991), p. 142. 
112 Aylor-Davis v. France, Application No. 22742/93,20 January 1994, removed from European Court of 
Human Rights website, cited in Schabas, above, fii. 83, pp. 589-590. 
113 Nivette v. France, above, fh. 74. 
114 Einhorn v. France, above, fn. 74. For a scholarly article on the Ira Einhom saga, see Rachel K. David, 
'Ira Einhorn's Trial in Absentia: French Law Judging United States Law, ' 22 N. YL. Sch. J Int'l & 
Comp. L. 611 (2003); Matthew Henning, 'Note: Extradition Controversies: How Enthusiastic Prosecutors 
Can Lead to International Incidents, ' 22 B. C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 247 (1999). 
115 Mamatkulov and, 4skarov v. Turkey, Application Nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99,4 February 2005, see 
para 62. 
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charged with did not carry a death sentence. So the specific claim that a possible 
death penalty would be imposed in violate Article 3 was nullified. ' 16 
Following the II September 2001 attacks on the United States, the Committee of 
Ministers adopted the Guidelines on human rights and the fight against terrorism. 117 
These Guidelines were intended to endorse the "top political priority" of not only 
contributing to the fight against terrorism, but also to ensure that the state does "not 
use indiscriminate measures which would only undermine ... fundamental values. "' 
18 
Concerning the punishment of terrorists, Chapter X (2) states that the death penalty is 
prohibited for terrorist offences, 119 and Chapter XIII (2) specifically details 
extradition procedures and the prohibition of the death penalty. It states: 
116 Ismaili v. Germany, Application No. 58128/00,15 March 2001. The European Commission of Human 
Rights made similar judgments in cases where capital punishment would not be imposed in the receiving 
state. See, H. v. Sweden, Application No. 22408/93,5 September 1994, (no risk of capital punishment for 
avoiding military service). 
117 Guidelines of the Committee ofMinisters of the Council o Europe on human rights and thefight )f 
against terrorism, adopted by the Committee of Ministers, II July 2002, at the 804 th meeting of the 
Minister's Deputies. Also, the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, ETS No. 
196, Warsaw, 16 May 2005, Articles 17-19 outline the extradition procedure for terrorist suspects. 
Article II details that the punishment of terrorists must comply with domestic law. As the Member States 
have abolished the death penalty, this would rule out recourse to the punishment in terrorist cases. See 
also Explanatory Report, Article II- Sanctions and measures, para 142. 
118 ibid, Preface, p. 5, by Walter Schwimmer, Secretary General, Council of Europe. 
119 Article X (2) "Under no circumstances may a person convicted of terrorist activities be sentenced to 
the death penalty; in the event of such sentencing being imposed, it may not be carried Out, " 
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2. The extradition of a person to a country where he/she risks being sentenced to 
the death penalty may not be granted. A requested State may however grant an 
extradition if it has obtained adequate guarantees that: 
(i) the person whose extradition has been requested will not be sentenced to 
death; or 
(ii) in the event of such a sentence being imposed, it will not be carried out. 
The provision for a possible death sentence within Chapters X (2) and XIII (2) 
appears to give political flexibility to states which have implemented a moratorium on 
executions, or have de facto abolished the death penalty. However, both Chapters X 
(2) and XIII (2) (ii) may open the door for possible death row phenomenon claims as 
in terrorist cases where mass homicide has occurred, public sentiment may be high 
for an execution, and moratoriums are not necessarily a guarantee for a ceasing of 
executions. Oscillation between moratorium, administration of execution, and 
reintroduction of moratorium is always a danger. 120 It is perhaps in compromise with 
those countries which have capital judicial systems that the possibility of a death 
sentence was included. 
However, this provision would appear to be incompatible with the Court's separate 
opinions and indeed, Soering itself Following Talan v. Turkey, it would appear that a 
capital trial may not be a violation of the Convention, but if the death penalty is not 
allowed, it seems an oddity to allow a capital trial to ensue. The conflict of the 
120 For example in the case of the reintroduction of executions in the Ukraine which is discussed in the 
next chapter. 
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sovereign state's right to formulate a capital judicial system and the scrutiny of the 
human rights discourse, appears to be evident here. It would appear that if these 
guidelines were applied to the transfer proceedings of Ocalan from Kenya to Turkey, 
they would not have provided a legal basis to prevent his death sentence. 
6.8 Moratorium of Executions 
What is noticeable from the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights is that 
when moratoriums have been initiated, and in some cases, violated, the Court has 
displayed judicial deference towards the governments. It is predominantly held that 
under moratoriums Article 3 is not violated. This can be seen as giving room and 
discretion for the municipal governments to guide the legislation process towards 
abolition by not holding them to be in violation of the Convention for keeping an 
inmate on death row until the legal status of the death penalty is determined. 
When the Ukraine joined the Council of Europe in 1995 a moratorium on executions 
was initiated, however between 9 November 1995 and II March 1997,212 people 
were executed. Following this violation of the moratorium in the case of Poltorasby 
v. Ukraine, 
121 
and other Ukrainian cases decided on the same day, 
122 
the European 
Court of Human Rights noted that the applicants were under sentence of death before 
121 Poltoraskiy v. Ukraine, above, fn. 50. 
122 See, Kuznetsov v. Ukraine, above, fh. 67, para 115; Nazarenko v. Ukraine, above, fh. 67, para 129; 
Dankevich v. Ukraine, above, fh. 67, para 126; Aliev v. Ukraine, above, fh. 67, para 134; Khokhlich v. 
Ukraine, above, fh. 67, para 167. 
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the moratorium came into force and it cited the Parliamentary Assembly Reports in 
1996,1997, and Recommendation in 1999, recording the Ukrainian government's 
violation of the moratorium. ' 23 But the Court held that: 
the applicant was sentenced to death in December 1995, some fifteen months 
before the moratorium came into effect. The Court accepts that, until the formal 
abolition of the death penalty and the commutation of his sentence, the applicant 
must have been in a state of some uncertainty, fear and anxiety as to his future. 
However, it considers that the risk that the sentence would be carried out, and 
the accompanying feelings of fear and anxiety on the part of those sentenced to 
death, must have diminished as time went on and as the de facto moratorium 
continued in force. 
124 
It is difficult to reconcile the breach of the moratorium with the possible diminishing 
of the psychological effect on the applicant's death sentence and incarceration on 
death row. The Court applied an objective test to the case and did not specifically 
123 See, Resolution 1097 (1996) of the Parliamentary Assembly on the abolition of the death penalty in 
Europe, text adopted by the Assembly on 28 June 1996 (24th sitting); Resolution 1112 (1997) on the 
honouring of the commitment entered into by Ukraine upon accession to the Council ofEurope to put 
into place a moratorium on executions, text adopted by the Assembly on 29 January 1997 (5 th sitting); 
and Resolution 1179 (1999) honouring of obligations and commitments by Ukraine, text adopted by the 
Assembly on 27 January 1999 (5h sitting); and Recommendation 1395 (1999) on the honouring of 
obligations and commitments by Ukraine, text adopted by the Assembly on 27 January 1999 (5 th sitting). 
These Resolutions and Recommendation were cited in Poltoraskiy v. Ukraine, above, fn. 50, paras 106- 
108. See also, Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Ukraine, Parliamentary Assembly Doc. 
8272,2 December 1998. 
124 Poltoraskiy v. Ukraine, above fh. 50, para 135. 
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consider the subjective cognitive impact on those sentenced to death. The decision 
that the moratorium "must have" diminished the applicant's fear and anguish was 
applied to all of the Ukrainian applications, 125 and the consequence of this judgment 
and its affirmation in the other Ukrainian cases, is that the government was given 
judicial leniency when it attempted to remove the death penalty from its statute books 
through the political process of moratorium, and then official constitutional 
amendment. 
This reasoning was followed in two Bulgarian cases, Iorgov v. Bulgaria, and G. B. v. 
Bulgaria, 126 where the Parliamentary Assembly argued that there were high crime 
rates and political instability which could challenge the moratorium. 127 In a 1998 
Report the Parliamentary Assembly stated: 
the context of an exceptional increase in crime and a situation highly conducive 
to crime, has sparked a broad public debate on the need for repeal of the 
moratorium. The debate has featured numerous contradictory arguments 
revealing that the state institutions do not agree on a single unified position on 
the matter. 
128 
125 See, Kusnetsov v. Ukraine, above, fn. 67, para 115; Nazarenko v. Ukraine, above, fn. 67, para 129; 
Dankevich v. Ukraine, above, ffi 67, para 126, Aliev v. Ukraine, above, fn. 67, para 134; Khokhlich v. 
Ukraine, above, fh. 67, para 167. 
126 Iorgov v. Bulgaria, Application no. 40653/98,11 March 2004; G. B. v. Bulgaria, Application no. 
42346/98,11 March 2004. 
127 Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Bulgaria, Doc. 8180,2 September 1998. 
128 Iorgov v. Bulgaria, above, fn. 126, para 128. 
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Furthermore, a psychologist's report concluded that the applicant feared for his life 
during the moratorium, which would appear to satisfy a subjective diagnosis enabling 
the judicial determination that the applicant was treated in an inhuman way, However 
the Court held, following the same objective reasoning it adopted in the Ukrainian 
cases, that in the presence of the moratorium the inmate's fear must have diminished 
over time. 
129 
This decision clearly favours the Bulgarian government over the applicant, which 
appears to be because judicial deference was given to the political circumstances. 
Even considering the evidence of the Parliamentary Assembly Report, and the 
psychologist's diagnosis, the Court did not give any reasons or a reliance on any 
evidence as to why the applicant's fear and anxiety would diminish. However, Judge 
Tulkens gave a Concurring Opinion in both cases noting that the Court, in its Article 
3 analysis, did not include the "fact that for many years he suffered uncertainty as to 
whether the death penalty to which he had been sentenced would be carried out. " 130 
She stated: 
I feel that the Court should have taken into account the length of the period in 
issue and the ever-present risk of the death penalty being carried out. Firstly, 
while a moratorium on executions was an indispensable, and probably the only 
possible, first step in the political process leading to the abolition of the death 
penalty, the applicant's sufferings must have been exacerbated by the very fact 
that no change in his legal position as a person sentenced to death occurred for 
129 G. B. v. Bulgaria, above, fn. 126, para 76. 
130 Iorgov v. Bulgaira, and G. B. v. Bulgaria, Concurring Opinion of Judge Tulkens. 
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more than eight years. It took that long, including more than six years after the 
Convention's entry into force in respect of Bulgaria, for the Bulgarian 
legislature to abolish the death penalty. Secondly, the moratorium had been 
introduced by means of a mere decision by Parliament which could have been 
amended at any stage. That eventuality was by no means hypothetical, as is 
clear from the political debate on the death penalty in Bulgaria until its abolition 
in 1998 ... Lastly, as to the consideration that not a single violation of the 
moratorium on executions occurred in Bulgaria during these eight years, that 
fact could only be observed with hindsight and was therefore not capable of 
reducing the risk of the applicant's feelings of fear throughout that lengthy 
period. 
131 
This Concurring Opinion is perhaps the most thorough analysis of the effectiveness 
and legitimacy of moratoriums by any Judge on the Court. Judge Tulkens found fault 
with the general acceptance, displayed in the majority decision, of the Court's 
jurisprudence on the solidity of the political suspension of the death penalty. She 
identified that moratoriums can only be determined "with hindsight" and are never to 
be substitutýed for constitutional amendment. 
As moratoriums extend in time there may be underlying political circumstances 
within a country which could reinstate the death penalty. Such time spent under a 
moratorium should prima facie be distinguished from time spent under sentence of 
death when moratoriums are not in place, and subjective psychological diagnosis 
should be made to determine the extent of any possible violation of Article 3. Judge 
131 ibid 
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Tulkens in Iorgov v. Bulgaria and G. B. v. Bulgaria, was clearly not comfortable with 
a person under sentence of death for eight years under a moratorium, but the majority 
have not identified what moratorium duration would exceed the threshold of Article 
3. As such there is currently no specific guidance as to how long a moratorium would 
have to be to attract an Article 3 violation. 
Turkey has not executed anyone since 1984. In 1995 the Turkish government stated 
that its policy was not towards abolition, but to reducing the offences carrying the 
death penalty. 1 32 Between 1994 and 2000 there were at least 100 people sentenced to 
death. 133 Mehmet Gemalmaz has argued that the Turkish legislative activity primarily 
concerned defunct capital statutes, and that "the true political will of the legislation 
organ in Turkey aims at retention of the death penalty and its regular and intensive 
application. " 134 In 1994 the European Commission of Human Rights considered 
Turkey's moratorium in (ýinar v. Turkey and observed that the moratorium had been 
applied consistently and that the threat of the execution of the applicant was 
"illusory. " 135 By the time of the (7inar decision the Turkish moratorium had been in 
132 Hood, above, fn. 54, p. 27. 
133 
ibid, p. 148. 
134 Mehmet Gernalmaz, 'The Death Penalty in Turkey (1920-200 1): Facts, Truths and Illusions, ' (2002) 
13 Criminal Law Forum 9 1, p. 100. For a contrasting view see, ZYv. Germany, where the European 
Commission on Human Rights stated that "in legal writing in Turkey the opinion prevails that the death 
penalty should be abolished, " Application No. 16846/90, Admissibility Decision, 13 July 1990. 
135 Cinar v. Turkey, Application no. 17864/91,5 September 1994, page 9, para 5; Patrick Hudson, 'Does 
the Death Row Phenomenon Violate a Prisoner's Human Rights under International Law? ' E. I. L. J. 
(2000) vo. 11, No. 4,833, p. 843. 
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place for ten years and the European Commission of Human Rights considered that to 
be a "long-standing moratorium. ý5136 
However, a dramatic shift in the jurisprudence was witnessed in Ocalan v. Turkey 137 
when the moratorium had been in place for 19 years. The Chamber considered that 
Abdullah Ocalan's case was distinguished from Cinar because of the specific 
political circumstances. Ocalan was the founder and political leader of the Kurdistan 
Worker's Party and his Kurdish militia had "sustained violence causing many 
thousands of casualties, [which] had made him Turkey's most wanted person. " 138 As 
a result, even with a moratorium which had lasted until 2003, the Chamber held, 
"surrounding the question of whether he should be executed, it cannot be open to 
doubt that the risk that the sentence would be implemented was a real one. " 139The 
applicant was held to face a real risk of an execution during his three years under 
sentence of death, until the moratorium was concluded with an official abolition of 
the death penalty by the Constitutional Court of Turkey on 27th December 2002. On 
appeal the Grand Chamber confirmed the Chamber's decision and stated that 
Ocalan's case was a "special circumstance, ý9140 which did challenge the political 
mechanisms enforcing the moratorium on the death penalty. 
What the political and legal circumstances surrounding moratorium cases 
demonstrate is that the Court considers the death penalty ultimately to still be a 
136 ibid, para 5. 
137 Ocalan v. Turkey, above, fh- 32. 
1380calan v. Turke , above, 
fn. 32, para 2 10. y 
139 ibid. 
140 Ocalan v. Turkey, above, fn. 4 1, para 172. 
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sovereign state quýestion. That is unless the possibility of the reintroduction of the 
punishment becomes a real one and then the human rights threshold of Article 3 is 
activated to trump the sovereign Member State internal jurisdiction to dictate its 
capital judicial system. It is significant "who" the capital criminal is, and whether 
their crimes can be argued to threaten the stability of the state in some way. The final 
measure of the state action was whether Ocalan's instigated violence had threatened 
the very life of the nation and it may be argued that he fundamentally challenged the 
stability of the country. 
Furthermore, the Ocalan reasoning and the detailed Concurring Opinion by Judge 
Tulkens in the Bulgarian cases, should be encompassed to formulate an Article 3 
analysis which states that even in moratoria circumstances which are considered to be 
solid, the possibility will always remain that firstly, the death penalty can return, and 
secondly, it is a subjective question as to whether applicants are not aware of the 
intricate political processes. Hence there will always be a possibility that the inmate 
will suffer from subjective inhuman treatment. However, the final measure will be 
more to do with who the applicant is. 
6.9 The European Committee Against Torture and the Evaluation of Death Row 
Conditions 
To evaluate the conditions on various death row prisons the 
European Court of 
Human Rights has considered numerous reports and investigations carried out 
by the 
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
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Treatment or Punishment (hereinafter, the "CPT"). 141 Under the European 
Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Article 1, the task of the CPT is to "examine the treatment of persons 
deprived of their liberty with a view to strengthening, if necessary, the protection of 
such persons from torture and from inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. " 
142 
Jim Murdoch, an expert on the CPT, has described the Committee as a "central 
player" and that the CPT is advancing human rights through an "on-going dialogue" 
with the governments of Member States. 143 Murdoch notes that as human rights 
lawyers become more aware of the work of the CPT, its impact will be enhanced 
through the jurisprudence that will be developed utilising the CPT's reports. 144 The 
141 See, generally the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, www. ept. coe. int 
142 European Conventionfor the Prevention of Torture or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ETS, 
No. 126, Article 1. Text amended according to the provisions of the Protocol No. I to the European 
Conventionfor the Prevention of Torture or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, CETS No. 151 
Strasbourg, 4 November 1993; and Protocol No. 2 European Conventionfor the Prevention of Torture or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, CETS No. 152, Strasbourg, 4 November, 1993 which entered into 
force on I March 2002. 
143 Jim Murdoch, 'The European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment: activities in 1996 and 1997, ' EL. Rev. 1998,23 Supp (Human rights survey), 
199-2 10, p. 199-200. 
144 ibid, p. 2 10; Jim Murdoch emphasised that the "essential prerequisites for CPT success is awareness 
of its work, " in 'The Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment: 
1998 survey, ' EL. Rev. 1999,24 Supp (Human rights survey), 204-215, p. 204. 
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CPT has also developed its own "corpus of standards" 145 and the standards expressed 
within the reports are of "potential relevance in applications to Strasbourg both in 
helping establish the factual circumstances of detention and also in encouraging 
revision of existing Article 3 case law. " 
146 
The CPT is only concerned with fact finding investigations, 147 and it takes Article 3 
as a "source of guidance" for its investigations. 148 The Directorate General of Human 
Rights has noted that the role of the CPT is to "visit any place where persons are 
being deprived of their liberty to ensure that all such persons are kept in human 
conditions. " 
149 
Murdoch's opinion of the potential impact of the CPT appeared prophetic as the 
European Court of Human Rights heavily relied upon the CPT's reports in the 2003 
Ukrainian death row cases. The CPT's Report to the Ukrainian government in 1998 
stated: 
145 Jim Murdoch, The European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment: activities in 200 1, ' E. L. Rev. 2002,27 Supp (Human rights survey 2002), 47- 
62, p. 55. 
146 ibid, p. 59. 
147 See, Antonio Cassese, 'A New Approach to Human Rights: The European Convention for the 
Prevention of Torture, 83 AJI. L. 128 (1989), p. 136. 
148 
jbjdý P. 139. 
149 Counci I of Europe, Death is notjustice. - the Council of Europe and the death penalty, (Strasbourg: 
Directorate General of Human Rights, 2007), p. 23-24. 
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[p]risoners sentenced to death were locked up for 24 hours a day in cells which 
offered only a very restricted amount of living space and had no access to 
natural light and sometimes very meagre artificial lighting, with virtually no 
activities to occupy their time and very little opportunity for human contact. 
Most of them were kept in such deleterious conditions for considerable periods 
of time (ranging from 10 months to over two years). Such a situation may be 
fully consistent with the legal provisions currently in force in Ukraine 
concerning the treatment of prisoners sentenced to death. However, this does not 
alter the fact that, in the CPT's opinion, it amounts to inhuman and degrading 
treatment. 150 (emphasis added) 
It is significant that although the CPT identified that the death row conditions may 
have complied with the then existent Ukrainian law, this did not prevent the CPT 
from declaring that the conditions amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. 
This finding of fact was then translated into Convention jurisprudence by the Court to 
hold that the death row prison conditions in the Ukraine were a specific violation of 
Article 3.151 
150 Report to the Ukrainian Government on the visit to Ukraine carried out by the European Committee 
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 8 to 24 
February 1998. The debates in the travaux priparatoires would have provided guidance through Mr. 
Cocks, a United Kingdom representative, who stated that individuals should "not be subjected to 
imprisonment with such an excess of light, darkness, noise or silence as to cause mental suffering, " TP, 
2, p. 4, 
151 See, Pottoratskiy v. Ukraine, above, fn. 50, para 109-117; Kuznetsov v. Ukraine, above, fh. 67, para 
89-96; Nazarenko v. Ukraine, above, fn. 67, para 94-102; Dankievich v. Ukraine, above, fn. 67, para 94- 
102; A liev v. Ukraine, above, fn. 67, para 92-100; Khokhlich v. Ukraine, above, fh. 67, para 13 3 -14 1. 
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Since Soering, not only has the jurisprudence evolved on death row conditions, but 
the CPT reports have contributed to this evolution. What is now considered are the 
personal circumstances of the applicant including the age, sex, mental and physical 
health both before and during incarceration on death row. 152 The material conditions 
of the prison are also scrutinised with emphasis placed on access to natural light, 
fresh air and adequate living conditions. 153 The prison regime is evaluated with an 
expectation of access to medical care, sufficient outdoor exercise and a reasonable 
quality of food, 1 54 and the length of detention on death row is assessed but no 
decisions have been made as to what length of detention on death row reaches the 
threshold of Article 3. In addition the Court held that poor economic circumstances 
are not primafacie an excuse for not rectifying the above conditions. 155 
152 For example see, Soering v. the United Kingdom, above, fn. 14, para, 64. The nineteenth century 
Russian writer and political activist, Fyodor Dostoevsky, famously described the psychological impact of 
the death sentence on an individual. He stated: 
"After all, the greatest, the most intense pain lies not so much in injuries perhaps, so much as the fact 
that you know for certain that in an hours time, then in ten minutes, then thirty seconds, then now, at 
this moment, the soul will take wings from the body and you will cease to be a man. " 
Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Idiot, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 23. See pages 21-23 for his 
monologue on the inhumanity of the death penalty. 
153 See the Ukrainian cases above, fns. 50 and 67. 
154 See Soering above, fn. 14, and ibid 
155 Poltoratskiy above, fh. 50, para 148; Kuznetsov above, fn. 67, para 128; Nazarenk-o above, fn. 67, para 
144; Dankievich above, ffi. 67, para 144; Aliev above, fh. 67, para 15 1; Khokhlich above, ffi. 67, para 
18 1; see also, Philip Leach, Taking a Case to the European Court of Human Rights, 2 nd ed, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 210, 
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In Iorgov v. Bulgaria and G. B. v. Bulgaria the Court held that a violation of Article 3 
had occurred because of the detention conditions in Sofia Prison including isolation in 
cells for 23 hours per day and minimal contact with other inmates and family. 156 The 
Court relied on the CPT report in 1995 which recorded the results of a visit to Stara 
Zagora Prison, and the Court used the findings for comparative analysis. 157 
Furthermore, in flaýcu and others v. Russia and Moldova 158 the Court held that the 
death sentence, strict isolation for eight years and the anxiety of the death sentence, in 
the Moldovian Republic of Transdniestria, were acts of torture within the meaning of 
Article 3,159 The Court relied on the CPT's report on Moldova which included a visit 
to the region of Transdniesta. The CPT doctors examined llaýcu and the other 
applicants who were detained for eight years under conditions of solitary 
confinement. The CPT stated that "solitary confinement could, in certain 
circumstances, amount to inhuman and degrading treatment. " 160 
The analysis of the incarceration conditions have been used to challenge the Member 
State's capital judicial systems. This is clearly demonstrated as an effective human 
156 Iorgov v. Bulgaria, above, fn. 126, para 48-50; G. B. v. Bulgaria, above, fn. 126, para 49-50. 
157 The Report of the European Committeefor the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishmentftom 26 March to 7 April 1995, CPT /Inf (97) 1. 
158 flaýcu and others v. Russia and Moldova, Application No. 48787/99,8 July 2004. 
159 ibid, paras 429,430 and 440. This is in contrast with Abdullah Ocalan's imprisonment on Imrali 
Island, were his cell and bed was an adequate size, he had a table a bookcase, air conditioning and a 
window. See Ocalan v. Turkey, above, fn. 41, para 333, when the Grand Chamber cited the CPT Report 
in 200 1. 
160 The Report on the visit to the Transnistian region of the Republic of Moldova carried out by the 
European Committeefor the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
from 27 to 30 November 2000, CPT/Inf (2002) 35, para 289. 
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rights policy. But what would happen if the CPT was so suýccessful in their 
recommendations to new and existing Member States, that countries wishing to 
reintroduce the death penalty, remedy the structural problems to create a "humane" 
death row? This question is perhaps answered in two ways. Firstly, as the death 
penalty is now removed under Protocol No. 6 and Protocol No. 13, the constructions 
of new death rows is more a hypothetical possibility than a real prospect. Secondly, 
no matter how comfortable a death row prison may be, such conditions could not 
negate the psychological impact and mental torture of the impending execution, and 
the physical torture of the execution itself. These issues are now explored in more 
detail. 
6.10 Methods of Execution 
There is a distinct lacuna in the jurisprudence concerning execution methods. As 
detailed in Chapter Three, it is seen that hanging adopted in the United Kingdom was 
not challenged in the 1950s, and Caroline Ravaud and Stephan Trechsel note 
specifically that neither the garrotte in Spain nor the guillotine in France was 
challenged within the Commission when executions were implemented in the 
1970s. ' 61 The European Commission of Human Rights decision in Soering 
considered the application of the electric chair 162 but the decision in the appeal to the 
161 Caroline Ravaud and Stephen Trechsel, 'The death penalty and case-law of the institutions of the 
European Convention of Human Rights, ' in Council of Europe, The Death Penalty Abolition in Europe, 
(Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2004), p. 85. 
162 Soering v. the UnitedKingdom, Application No. 14038/88,19 January 1989, para 141-143, where the 
Commission held that electrocution did not "attain a level of severity contrary to Article 3. " 
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Court did not specifically rule on the method of execution. It confined its holding to 
state that the accumulative effects of death row caused the death row phenomenon, 
and the method of execution was placed within this analysis. A separate considered of 
the electric chair was not provided. 
In N. E. v. the United Kingdom, the applicant was being extradited to Florida to face a 
capital trial and if convicted he would face the electric chair, but before the 
Commission could adjudicate on the case the applicant withdrew his petition. 163 In 
Dejbakhsh and Mohmoud Zedeh v. Sweden, the applicant claimed that she would be 
sentenced to death by stoning if deported back to Iran. However, the Court found no 
merit in her claim and declared the petition inadmissible and did not rule on the 
execution method. 
164 
There is currently no specific decision of the Court concerning the method of 
execution, and on its face, another example of the harmonisation of Article 2(l) with 
Article 3 would prevent the Court from holding that executions are per se inhuman. 
However, it would prima facie appear extremely difficult for the Court to find that 
any execution method did satisfy the Convention, the Protocols, and the European 
Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment. 165 Furthermore, the Parliamentary Assembly has specifically attempted 
163 N. E. v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 10308/83, (1985) 37 DR 158, p. 184. 
164 In Dejbakhsh and Mahmoud Zedeh v. Sweden, Application No. 11682/04, admissibility 
decision, 13 
December 2005. 
16' European Conventionfor the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Strasbourg, above, fn. 143. 
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to create a human rights principle which would nullify the acceptance of any 
execution method when it stated in its 1980 Report that: 
none of the execution methods employed today succeeds in completely 
eliminating the physical suffering which necessarily accompanies violent death, 
since death cannot be instantaneous. To this must be added the mental and 
moral suffering caused by long periods of waiting and by uncertainty. 166 
and also: 
[c]apital punishment certainly constitutes "inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punis ent, " 167 both by its very nature and by the awesome, even revolting 
character of an execution, whatever the procedure chosen. 
168 
In 1980 the Parliamentary Assembly did not think that any method of execution could 
satisfy Article 3 and the prohibition of inhuman punishment could be used to 
scrutinise each execution method. The Amnesty International expert on the death 
penalty, Eric Prokosch, gave evidence to the Legal Affairs Committee on 21 
December 1987. He argued: 
[w]hen a prisoner is given electric shocks, it is torture which is unacceptable 
under any circumstances. Why could it be acceptable to attach electrodes to a 
Report, above, fn. 2, p. 6 para 2. 
167 ibid, quoting Convention Article 3. 
168 
ibid, p. 13. 
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prisoner's body and give such a massive jolt of electricity that is life 
extinguishing? It is torture when a prisoner is forced to renounce his or her 
beliefs by the terrifying threat of being killed. Why then is it acceptable to keep 
a prisoner for days and years contemplating his promised death at the hands of 
the state? What is the death penalty if not the ultimate form of torture? 169 
Prokosch's compelling testimony challenges the very legitimacy of the death penalty 
in that it can be argued that the pain inflicted in an execution is indistinct from 
torture, and thus inhuman. He has further maintained that "[t]he cruelty of torture is 
evident. Like torture, an execution constitutes an extreme physical and mental assault 
on a person already rendered helpless by government authorities. " 170 To affirm the 
argument that the death penalty is akin to torture, Hans G6ran. Franck stated in his 
1994 Report that: 
[a]nother argument against the death penalty is that the execution itself might 
involve physical torture, because the execution methods used today cannot be 
guaranteed to cause instantaneous death in all cases. Errors in the judgment of 
the executioner can lead to torturous strangulation when hanging is the method 
of execution, and extreme pain and suffering when it is shooting, electrocution, 
lethal injection or gassing, beheading or stoning. It might be concluded on this 
169Report on the abolition of capital punishment, Doc. 7154,15 September, 1994, para 9. 
170 Eric Prokosch, 'The death penalty verses human rights, ' p. 18, in Council of Europe, The Death 
Penalty Abolition in Europe, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Press, 1999). Furthermore, Timothy 
Kaufman-Osborn has argued that it is an "oxymoronic question" to attempt to humanise executions, see 
Timothy V. Kaufman-Osborn, From Noose to Needle: Capital Punishment and the Late Liberal State, 
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002), p. 183. 
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evidence that an execution constitutes cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment as banned by several international legal instruments, such as the 
ECHR. 171 
Franck also affirmed that the "brutal execution methods and long periods inmates on 
death row spend waiting for executions can be likened to a form of torture. " 172 Both 
the 1980 and 1994 Parliamentary Reports and the work of Franck and Prokosch, 
would support a Convention discourse that no method of execution can be humane 
and the punishment is therefore not legitimate or justified. 173 Furthermore, the Oxford 
Ethicist, Jonathan Glover, has observed, "there is something so cruel about the kind 
of death in capital punishment that this rules out the possibility of it being 
justified. 074 The work cited above clearly calls into question the legitimacy of the 
sovereign imposition of executions. Below we now consider further the question of 
how Article 3 has been used to de-legitimise the punishment. 
6.11. The Death Row Phenomenon 
17 1 Report, above, fh. 170, para 9. The report omits hanging as a method of execution. 
172 Hans Gbran Franck, The Barbaric Punishment: Abolishing the Death Penalty, (ed: William A. 
Schabas) (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2003), pp. 35. 
173 See, Tom Goeghegan, 'The search for a humane execution, ' BBC News, 14 July 2008.1 was 
interviewed by the BBC to respond to Michael Portillo's quest to search for a humane execution method 
for the BBC Horizon series. 
174 Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, (London: Penguin, 1990), p. 23 1. 
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The accumulative affects of the capital judicial system can be identified as the "death 
row phenomenon. " This was first recognised in Kirkwood v. the United Kingdom, 175 
as being the circumstances which lead to an inmates' prolonged detention on death 
row leading to his execution. Kirkwood argued that the Article 3 prohibition against 
inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment was violated by the "inordinate 
delay in carrying out the death penalty in California, " and that "after he has 
completed all possible appeals ... in the interval he will be exposed to the rigours of the 
death row phenomenon. " 176 The applicant further stated that "[s]uch a delay, coupled 
with the uncertainty of the outcome, would act on the applicant's mind in such a way 
as to subject him to inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. 5077 The Soering 
Court confirmed that the death row phenomenon: 
17' Kirkwood v. the United Kingdom, above, fn. 14, p. 165. Under the heading, 'Implementation of the 
Death Penalty and the "Death Row" Phenomenon, ' the European Commission of Human Rights 
considered the fluctuation of the total number of people on death row in California and the time in mates 
waited on death row during their appeals up to their execution. Up to March 1983, the longest an inmate 
had to wait following appeals was a period of 5 years. 
176 ibid, p. 166. For a consideration of municipal constitutional court cases on the death row phenomenon 
see, Schabas, above, fn. 3 1, pp. 96-115; Markus G. Schmit, 'The Death Row Phenomenon: A 
Comparative Analysis, ' pp. 47-72, in Theodore S. Orlin, Allan Rosas and Martin Scheinin (eds), The 
Jurisprudence of Human Rights Law: A Comparative Interpretive Approach, (Abo: 
Abo Akedemi 
University Press, 2000). 
177 ibid, p. 17 1. A year before the Kirkwood decision, David Pannick argued that a 
"legalistic society will 
be unable to impose the death penalty without an unconstitutionally cruel 
delay, and hence it will be 
unable lawfully to impose the death penalty at all, " in Judicial 
Review of the Death Penalty (London: 
Duckworth, 1983), p. 84. 
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may be described as consisting in a combination of circumstances to which the 
applicant would be exposed if, after having been extradited to Virginia to face a 
capital murder charge, he were sentenced to death. 178 
William Schabas observed that "[w]ith the European Court's judgment in Soering, the 
term 'death row phenomenon' entered the mainstream of human rights 
vocabulary. " 179 He has argued that following the Soering decision, , prolonged 
detention of a person awaiting execution is per se cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment. " 180 
Schabas also argued that in (7inar v. Turkey, the Commission adopted a "large view" 
of Soering because it did not consider all the extenuating circumstances 181 As such 
the material circumstances of the death row phenomenon are intricately connected 
with Article 3, and they appear to be fluid concepts and change from case to case. In 
effect, what factors contribute to the phenomenon can be all or a selection of the 
issues discussed above. 
6.12 The Death Penalty as an Illegitimate Punishment 
178 Soering, above, fh. 14, para 8 1. Patrick Hudson describes the death row phenomenon as "prolonged 
delay under the harsh conditions of death row, " above, fh. 135, p. 836. 
179 Schabas, above, fh. 3 1, p. 115. 
William A. Schabas, 'International law and the death penalty: reflecting change or promoting 
changeT in Peter Hodgkinson and William Schabas, (eds) Capital Punishment., Strategiesfor Abolition 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 57. 
181 (ýinar v. Turkey, above, fn. 135, pp. 8-9, and see Schabas, above, fh. 13, p. 276. 
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Each aspect of the Article 3 analysis detailed in this chapter can also be viewed 
through a discussion on whether the death penalty is now considered to be an 
illegitimate punishment. The Parliamentary Assembly approach to Article 3 and the 
death penalty can be seen to adopt the liberal tradition of identifying "legitimate" 
state practice. This is a shift in discourse analysis and an attempt to formulate a new 
human rights position from which to tackle the death penalty. In its historical context, 
as set out in Chapters Two and Three, the death penalty was considered to be a 
legitimate penal practice. 
A recognisable shift in the human rights narrative occurred within the Parliamentary 
Assembly in 1994, when the then new rapporteur, Hans G6ran Franck, 182 who was 
the author of a 1994 'Report on the Abolition of Capital Punishment, ' stated: 
[t]he Assembly considers that the death penalty has no legitimate place in the 
penal systems of modern civilised societies, and that its application may well be 
compared with torture and can be seen as inhuman and degrading punishment 
within the meaning of Article 3 of the ECHR. 183 (emphasis added) 
The Parliamentary Assembly proposed that "modem civilised societies" in the 
Council considered the death penalty was not "legitimate" and hence an unjustifiable 
punishment. What had changed was that Article 3 was now analysed through a new 
182 Report on the Abolition of Capital Punishment, Doc. 7154,15 September 1994. 
183 ibid, para 3 Costas Douzinas has observed that "human rights have been turned from a discourse of 
rebellion and dissent into that of state legitimacy, " The end of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at 
the Turn of the Century, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000), p. 7. 
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human rights threshold and this was supported by placing it next to the generally 
accepted notion in international law of the illegality of torture-' 84 Furthermore, Roger 
Hood has noted that the "death penalty is an extreme example of torture, a form of 
punishment that violates human rights. It is therefore an illegitimate mode of 
punishment for a state to employ. " 185 
This rhetoric has been repeated by the rapporteur, Renate Wohlwend when she 
affirmed the 1994 position in a 2001 Resolution which stated, "The Assembly 
considers that the death penalty has no legitimate place in the penal systems of 
modem civilised societies, and that its application constitutes torture and inhuman 
and degrading punishment within the meaning of Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. " 186 
184 European Conventionfor the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment; Malcolm D. Evans and Rod Morgan, Preventing Torture: A Study of the European 
Conventionfor the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1998); Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur, The UnitedNations Convention 
Against Torture, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
185 Roger Hood, 'Introduction: The Importance of Abolishing the Death Penalty, ' p. 9, Council of 
Europe, The Death Penalty., Abolition in Europe, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 1999); and 
ibid, p. 13, Council of Europe, Death Penalty: Beyond Abolition, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe 
Publishing, 2004). Hood also stated, "It is counter productive in the moral message it conveys, for it 
legitimises the very behaviour - killing - which the law seeks to repress, 
" in ibid. 
186 Resolution 1253 (2001) abolition of the death penalty in Council of Europe observer states, text 
adopted by the Assembly on 25 June 2001 (17thsitting), Part 1, para 1, and IV 
1. inhuman and degrading, 
in Recommendation 1246 (1994) on the abolition of capital punishment, text adopted by the Assembly 
on 4 October 1994; Resolution 1187 (1999) on Europe -a 
death penalty-free continent, text adopted by 
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Post Protocol No. 6 there appears to be no turning back from the repeated expression 
of this position that the death penalty is illegitimate because it is inhuman. This is 
affirmed within successive Parliamentary Assembly Reports and Resolutions up until 
the adoption of Protocol 13 in 2003. In 2001, the Report, Abolition of the death 
penalty in Council of Europe observer states, stated "[t]he Assembly considers that 
the death penalty has no legitimate place in the penal systems of modem civilised 
societies, and that its application constitutes torture and inhuman and degrading 
punishment within the meaning of Article 3 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights. ý3187 The Draft Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights 
concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances, stated "[t]he 
Assembly ... reaffirmed its beliefs that the "application of the death penalty constitutes 
inhuman and degrading punishment. " 
188 
In 2003, Resolution 1349 stated, "[t]he Assembly once more reaffirms its complete 
opposition to capital punishment, which has no legitimate place in the penal systems 
of modem civilised societies. The Assembly considers that its application constitutes 
the Standing Committee, acting on behalf of the Assembly on 26 May 1999, para 1, as it, "reaffirms the 
belief that the application of the death penalty constitutes inhuman and degrading punishment. " 
187 Report, Abolition of the death penalty in Council ofEurope observer states, Doc. 9115,7 June 200 1, 
para 1. 
188 Draft Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights concerning the abolition of the death 
penalty in all circumstances, Doc. 9316,15 January 2002.1 Draft Opinion, para 2. 
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torture and inhuman and degrading punishment, and is thus a severe violation of 
universally recognised human rights. "189Furthermore, Wohlwend. stated in 2006 that: 
[o]ver the past twelve years, the Parliamentary Assembly has adopted no fewer 
than five resolutions and four recommendations on the abolition of the death 
penalty, ceaselessly reaffirming its absolute opposition to capital punishment, 
which it regards as an act of torture and an inhuman and degrading punishment, 
and undeniably the most serious of all human rights violations. 190 
And in 2007 it was again affirmed through the Directorate General of Human Rights 
that the, "death penalty is in clear violation of the ... right not to be subjected to cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment. ""' Furthermore, the Committee of Ministers was 
now changing its language on Article 3, as it declared in 2007 that the "Committee of 
Ministers wishes to reiterate its firm opposition to the death penalty which constitutes 
189 Resolution 1349 (2003) Abolition of the death penalty in Council of Europe observer states, text 
adopted by the Assembly on I October 2003 (30'h sitting), para 2. 
190 Report, Position of the Parliamentary Assembly as regards the Council of Europe member and 
observer states which have not abolished the death penalty, Doc. 10911,21 April 2006; B. Explanatory 
Memorandum, by Mrs. Renate Wohlwend, para 1. See also, Renate Wohlwend, 'The Role of the Council 
of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, ' p55 in Council of Europe, The Death Penalty: Abolition in 
Europe, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 1999), and ibid p. 65 in, Council of Europe, The 
Death Penalty Beyond Abolition, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Press, 2004). 
19'Counci I of Europe, Death is not Justice: The Council of Europe and the Death Penalty, (Strasbourg: 
Directorate General of Human Rights, 2007), p. 15. 
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an inhuman punishment in contradiction with the fundamental right to life which 
everyone must enjoy. ""' 
The Council is now explicitly formulating a new human rights platform for attacking 
the death penalty, and Article 3 is now the primary Convention Article for achieving 
this aim. This shift in the scrutiny of the death penalty is pushing the boundaries of 
European human rights discourse. Upendra Baxi, the human rights expert, has noted 
that "state sovereignty may no longer articulate itself wholly outside the zones of 
human rights to the point of restoration of legitimacy. ""' Costas Douzinas has 
observed "the recognition that human rights have the ability to create new worlds, by 
pushing and expanding the boundaries of society, identity and law. ""' 
Specifically concerning the boundaries of the prohibition of inhuman treatment as it is 
applied to the death penalty, Manfred Nowak has argued that the original acceptance 
that the death penalty is not a violation of inhuman treatment has, "been superseded 
192 Position of the Parliamentary Assembly as regards the Council of Europe member and observer states 
with have not abolished the death penalty, Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1760 (2006), Reply 
adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 31 January 2007, at the 985hmeeting of the Ministers' 
Deputies, CM/AS(2007)Rec 1760 final, 2 February 2007, para 2. 
19'Upendra Baxi, The Future ofHuman Rights, 2d ed, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 3 
194 See, Douzinas, above, fn. 184. In attempting to create a new human rights principle, the Parliamentary 
Assembly is advancing what Douzinas has observed as "the recognition that human rights have the 
ability to create new worlds, by pushing and expanding the boundaries of society, identity and law, " p. 
343, 
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by a dynamic interpretation of these legal terms in light of modem criminological 
experiences and socio-political developments. ""' 
Roger Hood and Carolyn Hoyle have also joined in this question of legitimacy as a 
means to attack the death penalty. In referring to Resolution 1044 (1994) they argue 
that the question of legitimacy identifies that the Council have identified a "principled 
opposition to the death penalty as a violation of fundamental human rights. ""' They 
also note that the "language is uncompromising. The Europeans will not accept the 
argument that capital punishment can be defended on relativistic grounds of religion 
or culture, or as a matter which sovereign powers ought to be left to decide simply for 
themselves. " 
197 
This is the central point. The Council is formulating a discourse which challenges the 
very sovereign right of the death penalty, and determining that the state can no longer 
decide the punishment for themselves. The Parliamentary Assembly does not now 
place any limitations on its formulation of human rights arguments. Leon 
Radzinowicz observed that the Council's strategy against the death penalty has "no 
restrictions of any kind, " and that it "became a universal question, an almost 
transcendental, absolute issue to be agitated for and put into effect, without regard for 
time, place, ethnicity or political system. " 
198 
19' Nowak, above, fn. 15, p. 44, 
196 Hood and Hoyle, above, fh. 103, p. 25. 
197 
ibid 
198 Leon Radzinowicz, Adventures in Criminology, (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 281-2. 
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Indeed, Franck's 1994 Report on the abolition of capital punishment displays an 
uncompromising stance as it is stated: 
the death penalty must be abolished because it is inhuman and thus 
incompatible with our system of values ... Capital punishment must come to be 
regarded in the same way as any other "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
and punishment" for the world to become a better place where mankind can live 
in peace and prosperity; this means the death penalty has to be abolished for all 
offences, be they peace-time or war-time offences, as soon as possible - 
worldwide. 1 
99 
Here Franck was presenting a consequentialist argument within utilitarian thought. If 
the death penalty is abolished the result would make for the "world to become a better 
place where mankind can live in peace and prosperity. " The "greatest good', 200 for 
society, not just Europeans, but the whole world's, is contributed to through the 
understanding that the death penalty is "cruel, inhuman or degrading. , 201 
199 Report on the abolition of capital punishment, Doc. 7154,15 September, 1994, para 10. 
200 Jeremy Bentham argued the central tenet of utilitarianism as, "By utility is meant the property in any 
object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good or happiness ... or ... to prevent the 
happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered: if that party 
be the community in general, then the happiness of the community: if a particular individual, then the 
happiness of that individual, " in Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation, (ed J. H. Bums and H. L. A. Hart, 1970), cited in M. D. A. Feldman, Lloyd's Introduction to 
Jurisprudence, (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2001), p. 222. 
20 1 The use of the term "cruel" may be seen as a comparison with the United States Constitution, 8 
th 
Amendment prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment, " and it would be accommodated within the 
Parliamentary Assembly's worldwide focus. 
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As such, the Parliamentary Assembly is seeking to create a norm against the death 
penalty. William Schabas has noted: 
[i]nternational law may also prohibit capital punishment by implication, through 
the effect of other norms that do not explicitly call for abolition, and more 
specifically by the prohibition of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or 
punis ent. 
202 
The Parliamentary Assembly's use of the term "legitimacy" as a principle of 
democratic values has not gone unnoticed by the European Court of Human Rights. 
In the Chamber judgment of Ocalan v. Turkey, the Court noted that the established 
trend of abolition of the death penalty, reflected that the Member States no longer see 
the death penalty "as having any legitimate place in a democratic society, " and if 
imposed following an unfair trial it amounted to "a form of inhuman treatment. , 
203 
Hood and Hoyle have also noted this issue from the judgment, and pointed to the 
connection of the death penalty as an inhuman punishment and the question of its 
legitimacy within democratic society. 
204 
However, the Court had placed the Member State as the arbiter of legitimate penal 
sanctions, as opposed to the Parliamentary Assembly, as in two Bulgarian cases it 
stated: 
202 Schabas, above, fti. 39, p. 425. 
203 Ocalan v. Turkey above, fn, 32, para. 207. 
204 Hood and Hoyle, above, fh. 103, p. 27. 
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[h]aving regard to the rejection by the Contracting States of capital punishment, 
which is no longer seen as having any legitimate place in a democratic society 
(forty-three states have abolished it and the remaining State, Russia, has 
introduced a moratorium), the imposition of capital punishment in certain 
circumstances, such as after an unfair trial, must be considered, in itself, to 
amount to a form of inhuman and degrading treatment. 205 (emphasis added) 
These cases demonstrate a specific evolution in the Court's jurisprudence on the 
death penalty. However, in this initial stage, the Court's adoption of the word 
"legitimate" is not used in the same way as the Parliamentary Assembly. The Court 
merely uses the word to hold that a death penalty is not legitimate following an unfair 
trial, and in such circumstances it would constitute inhuman and degrading treatment. 
So far the Court has not used the word "legitimate" to iterate that the death penalty is 
per se a violation of Article 3 and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights, can be read as a restriction of the human rights pronouncements in the 
Parliamentary Assembly, the Committee of Ministers and the above mentioned 
scholarship on human rights. 
6.13 Conclusion 
213' G. B. v. Bulgaria, above, fn. 126, para 72; and stated verbatim in Iorgov v. Bulgaria, above, 
fn. 126. 
para 72. 
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This chapter has engaged with the evolution of the interpretation of Article 3. It is 
argued that although Article 3 has not been used to completely trump Article 2(l), it 
can now be used to demonstrate that the application of the death penalty by a Member 
States is inhuman punishment. We have witnessed an evolution in the Article 3 
jurisprudence by the Commission and Court, but the judicial bodies have not gone as 
far as the Parliamentary Assembly would like. As such we see that the Court is 
reigning in the Assembly's attempted discourse to push the boundaries of Article 3 
interpretation. one of the problems, as set out in the previous chapter, is that the text 
of Article 2(l) prevents the Court from holding that the punishment is per se 
inhuman. There are grounds for arguing that the Court is behind the times on this 
specific issue. 
Furthermore, the relationship of the Member States with the death penalty has not 
gone away, but it appears that, unlike with the jurisprudence on Article 2(l), Article 3 
offers greater scope for penetrating this relationship. As such, the jurisprudence and 
the Assembly discourse, has been extremely successful in utilizing Article 3 for 
creating a "death penalty-free" zone of the Council. The Assembly and the Court's 
adoption of a new human rights position which aligns the Article 3 analysis with 
"legitimate" government, has contributed to this success. As such the human rights 
language of Article 3 is evolving to encompass a greater sphere of expression with 
which to renounce the death penalty. This has the potential to challenge the very right 
of the Member State to impose the death penalty. 
We now consider in the following chapter whether the Council has been successful in 
employing this evolved discourse to the expansion of Membership to include Central 
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and Eastern European states. Furthermore, it will be considered how the Council has 
built upon its successes in removing the death penalty from its region when it joined 
the European Union and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, in 
initiating arguments against the punishment on a global scale. 
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Chapter Seven: 
The Expansion of the Council of Europe and the Exporting of 
the Discourse Against the Death Penalty 
7. The Expansion of the Council of Europe and the Exporting 
of the Discourse Against the Death Penalty 
7.1 Introduction 
A test of the solidity of the Council's discourse would be to see how it has coped 
with the challenges posed during expansion through Central and Eastern Europe 
post-1994, and also to see how this discourse has been accepted internationally by 
the Council Observer States, and the European Union (hereinafter "EU") and the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (hereinafter, "OSCE") during 
their international initiatives against the death penalty. 
This thesis has recounted a legal history displaying that the Council's human rights 
discourse can be seen as intricately restricting the Member State's sovereign right of 
the death penalty. It has evolved into a hegemonic political force through the 
evolved arguments which renounce the death penalty. Hence, the aim of Part One of 
this chapter is to investigate whether this hegemony was extended into Central and 
Eastern Europe, as the Council expanded. Would the evolved arguments be 
embraced by the new joining countries? The evolution of the Convention human 
rights standards have demonstrated that it now is utilised to challenge the capital 
judicial systems of sovereign states, but have the Central and Eastern European 
states accepted this elevation of human rights and in a political and legal acceptance 
sign and ratify Protocol No. 6 and from 2002, Protocol No. 13? 
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Part Two engages with the Council's further globalising of its discourse. The 
strength of its arguments and the acceptance of human rights standards by countries 
outside of the Council's sphere are tested. This analysis scrutinises the impact of the 
evolved human rights standards on the sovereignty of states internationally. It firstly 
analyses the effectiveness of the human rights arguments on Observer States to the 
Council. These states are not official members but they have a partial association. 
The investigations are then taken to a wider focus concerning the Council's 
relationship with the EU and the OSCE. Specific examples are explored including 
the Council and EU's efforts in the United Nations General Assembly and the 
passing of the Resolution on a moratorium on the death penalty. ' 
Then the Council and EU as amici in the United States Supreme Court is considered 
and it is questioned whether the Council's intemationalising of its arguments are 
adopting more complex mechanisms which not only enhance its global position, but 
also strengthens its evolved regional position. This part concludes with the 
Council's support of the OSCE. It will be questioned whether this region has been 
the least effective in challenging the sovereign right of the death penalty through 
human rights arguments and dialogue. 
This chapter is primarily concerned with investigating the effectiveness of the 
Council's discourse globally, and whether the organisation can be seen as 
contributing to a global norm against the punishment. It is also concerned with 
'Moratorium on the use of the death penalty, A/RES/62/149,76h Plenary Session, 18 
December 
2007. 
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displaying whether the intemationalising of the arguments has any significance for 
its regional position. 
7.2 The Expansion of the Council of Europe 
7.2.1 The Dialogue Between the Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of 
Ministers 
It is now historical record that in 1989 the "fall of the Berlin Wall fundamentally 
changed the European political landscape. ,2 The dismantling of the dividing line 
between Western and Central and Eastern Europe paved the way for open dialogue. 
The Council was able to advance the spirit of its Statute to all European countries 
and promote democratic pluralism, human rights, and the rule of law. 3 In 1993 for 
the first time in the history of the Council, all the Member State governments met at 
the Vienna Summit. The adopted Vienna Declaration opened with the grand 
statement: 
[t]he end of the division of Europe offers an historic opportunity to consolidate 
peace and stability on the continent. All our countries are committed to 
2 Hans Christian Krilger, Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention on Human Rights, p, 70, in 
Council of Europe, The Death Penalty: Abolition in Europe, (Strasbourg: 
Council of Europe 
Publishing, 1999); and ibid, Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention on Human Rights, p. 
87, in 
Council of Europe, Death Penalty: Beyond Abolition, (Strasbourg: 
Council of Europe Publishing, 
2004). 
Statute of the Council of Europe, ETS. 001,1949, Articles 
I and 3. 
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pluralist and parliamentary democracy, the indivisibility and universality of 
human rights, the rule of law and a common cultural heritage enriched by its 
diversity. Europe can thus become a vast area of democratic security. 4 
Every Member State was expected to be committed to this homogenous vision and 
it marked a uniform renunciation of totalitarian and communist regimes. 5 Laying a 
secure platform for the future of the Council was a paramount consideration and the 
Vienna Declaration stated in meeting the future challenges which will face the 
organisation that expression must be given "in the legal field to the values that 
define our European identity. ,6 
It concluded that countries wishing to join the Council must, within a specified 
period, sign the Convention and accept the jurisdiction of the Convention's 
supervisory machinery. 7 Roger Hood described the Vienna Summit's condition of 
Vienna Declaration, Decl-09.10.93E, 9th October 1993. 
ibid, fifth paragraph, "The Council of Europe is the pre-eminent European political institution 
capable of welcoming, on an equal footing and in permanent structures, the democracies of Europe 
freed from communist oppression. For that reason the accession of those countries to the Council of 
Europe is a central factor in the process of European construction based on our Organisation's 
values. " 
ibid, ninth paragraph. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider the various difficulties of 
recognising a common "European identity, " or a "European consciousness" and only the specific 
issue of identifying a "European identity" as it concerns the death penalty, is considered. The 
difficulties of recognising a general "European identity" have been argued inter alia by Gerard 
Delanty, Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality, (London: Macmillan, 1995) and Chris Shore, 
Building Europe. - The Cultural Politics ofEuropean Integration, (London: Routledge, 2000). 
ibid, sixth paragraph. 
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acceptance of the Convention system as the "most important political decision"8 fo r 
the furtherance of human rights. Indeed, only one year after the Vienna Declaration) 
the Parliamentary Assembly sought to establish that an intrinsic component of such 
"European identity" was recognised through the organisation's discourse against the 
death penalty. 
In 1994 Hans G6ran Franck promoted this abolitionist agenda. 9 He authored a 
Report which initially focused on clearing up the existing capital laws within 
Member States. At this time although the Western Member States had removed the 
death penalty for ordinary crimes, Protocol No. 6 had not been signed and ratified 
by all of them. 10 As a consequence there was not a completely unified, and 
centralised, position against the punishment. Franck argued that a "control 
mechanism" should be set up under the Secretary General to analyse existing 
Member State's legislation on the death penalty. He also maintained that those 
states enjoying "special guest status, "" should be obliged to abolish the punishment 
and that "all states whose legislation still provides for the death penalty to set up a 
8 Roger Hood, Introduction: The Importance ofAbolishing the Death Penalty, p. 11, in Council of 
Europe, The Death Penalty Abolition in Europe (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 1999); 
ibid, Introduction: The Importance ofAbolishing the Death Penalty, p. 16, in Council of Europe, The 
Death Penalty: BeyondAbolition (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Press, 2004). 
9 See, Hans Goran Franck, The Barbaric Punishment: Abolishing the Death Penalty, (ed. William A. 
Schabas) (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2003), p. 64. 
10 These countries are listed here and the ratification dates are in brackets: Belgium (1998), Estonia 
(1998), Greece (1998), Ireland (1994), Romania (1994), Russia (still to ratify), Slovenia (1994), and 
United Kingdom (1999). 
11 Report on the abolition of capital punishment, Doc. 7145,15 September 1994, para 6 (ii). 
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commission as soon as possible in their country with a view to abolishing capital 
punisliment. " 
12 
A universal abolition position would lay the foundation for the expectation that new 
Member States should follow suit. A Draft Resolution was included in the Report 
which called for the signature and ratification of Protocol No. 6 to be a prerequisite 
for membership. 13 A Resolution was adopted which stated that the "willingness to 
ratify the protocol be made a prerequisite for membership. " 14 To affirm the 
Resolution, a Recommendation was sent to the Committee of Ministers inviting it to 
implement the outlined provisions. 15 
However, a difficult dialogue arose between the Assembly and the Committee. It 
concerned the prerequisite standards for membership, and also, the affirmation of 
the abolition position for existing members. The Committee did not initially respond 
to the 1994 provisions and in 1996, the Assembly adopted a further 
Recommendation calling on the Committee of Ministers to respond. 
16 This 
prompted the Assembly to reaffirm its position and in a Resolution in 1996 
it stated: 
12 ibid, para 6 (ii)(a). 
13 ibid, Part 11: Draft Resolution paras 5-6. 
14 Resolution 1044 (1994) on the abolition of capital punishment, text adopted 
by the Assembly on 
the 4 October 1994, (25h sitting), para 6. 
" Recommendation 1246 (1994) on the abolition of capital punishment, text adopted 
by the 
Assembly on the 4 October 1994, (25th sitting). 
16 Recommendation 1302 (1996) on the abolition of the death penalty in Europe, text adopted 
by the 
Assembly on 28 June 1996 (24th Sitting). This Recommendation was adopted 
following the Report 
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[w]ith reference to Resolution 1044 (1994), the Assembly reminds applicant 
states to the Council of Europe that the willingness to sign and ratify Protocol 
No. 6 to the European Convention on Human Rights and to introduce a 
moratorium upon accession has become a prerequisite for membership of the 
Council of Europe on the part of the Assembly (emphasis added). 17 
The Assembly did not wait for specific affirmation from the Committee and 
developed its own membership criteria. The language had clearly shifted from the 
invitation that states display a "willingness" to adopt the specified penal changes, to 
it becoming "a prerequisite for membership. " The Committee then provided interim 
replies, 18 but it did not deal specifically with the Assembly's points and instead 
made reference to the Final Declaration of the Second Summit held in Strasbourg on 
10- 11 October 1997.19 It sidestepped the call for a requirement of the need for 
prospective Member States to ratify Protocol No. 6, emphasising instead the 
-20 "maintenance, in the meantime, of existing moratoria of executions in Europe. 
on the abolition of the death penalty in Europe, Doc. 7589, text adopted by the Assembly on 28 June 
1996 (24h sitting). 
17 Resolution 1097 (1996) on the abolition of the death penalty in Europe, text adopted by the 
Assembly on 28 June 1996 (24th Sitting), para 6. 
18 See, Notes on the Agenda; Reference Documents, 628/4.6, Abolition of the death penalty in 
Europe: Draft Reply to Recommendation 1246 (1994) and 1302 (1996) of the Parliamentary 
Assembly; 555th meeting (January 1996) and 588h meeting (April 1997). 
19 Second Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 10- 11 
October, 1997: Final Declaration. 
20 
ibid 
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Following the preference of moratoria over the explicit calls for signature and 
ratification of Protocol No. 6, the Committee stated "it considers it important to act 
in partnership and constructive dialogue with the Assembly. "2 1 The Committee 
instructed the Rapporteur Group on Human Rights to examine both 
Recommendations with a view to proposing a draft reply. 22 This was not to the 
satisfaction of the Assembly. In their Recommendation 1302, although welcoming 
the Committee's encouragement for the continuation of moratoriums in Europe, it 
regretted that the "Committee of Ministers had not yet taken any action on the most 
important proposals, " which concerned the promotion of complete Member State 
ratification of Protocol No. 6, prospective Member States ratification, and the future 
23 legislation of Protocol No. 13 . 
The Assembly recommended that the Committee follow up the proposals "without 
further delay, " draw up the additional protocol, prohibit current Member States from 
reintroducing the death penalty, and consider the "attitude of applicant states 
towards the death penalty when deciding on their admission as full members to the 
Council of Europe. ýý24 
21 Reply to Recommendation 1246 (1994 and Recommendation 1302 (1996) from the Committee of 
Ministers, Doc. 8079,21 April 1998,628th meeting of the Minister's Deputies. 
22 See, Notes on the Agenda; Reference Documents, 628/4.6, Abolition of the 
death penalty in 
Europe: Draft Reply to Recommendation 1246 (1994) and 1302 (1996) of the Parliamentary 
Assembly. 
23 Recommendation 1302, above, fn. 16. 
24 ibid, para 2. 
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This dialogue displayed a more aggressive attitude on the part of the Assembly and 
a somewhat cautious approach by the Committee. In its Interim Reply to 
Recommendation 1302, the Committee merely reiterated that it "appreciates the 
determined efforts of the Parliamentary Assembly, " but again did not deal with the 
25 specific recommendations and reinforced the commitment to moratoria. The 
Committee stated: 
[b]earing in mind that, at national level, parliaments and governments share 
responsibility regarding the abolition of the death penalty, the Committee of 
Ministers regards the present interim reply as part of an ongoing dialogue 
between the Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers 
concerning this question. 26 
The Committee was giving a nod to state sovereignty over the radical human rights 
boundaries proposed by the Assembly. It also confirmed support for "all other 
initiatives taken at the national level by governments and parliaments in favour of 
n1l 1127 abolition of capital Punishment, and that it: 
considers that the process of monitoring compliance with commitments 
accepted by member states of the Council of Europe can contribute, 
in a spirit 
of dialogue and co-operation, to the process of putting an end to capital 
25 Interim Reply to Recommendation 1302 (1996), Abolition of the death penalty in Europe, 
Communication from the Committee of Ministers, Doc 7798,15 April 1997, adopted 9 April 1997, 
588'h Meeting of the Minister's Deputies. 
26 ibid, second unnumbered paragraph. 
27 ibid, point b. 
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punishment. It also considers that the Parliamentary Assembly has an 
important role to play in this regard. 28 
Within this initial dialogue concerning the applications of new Member States, the 
Assembly recommended legislative action concerning abolition through Protocol 
No. 6, but the Committee attempted to preserve moratoria as the appropriate 
standard. Alastair Mowbray, the human rights scholar, has affirmed that the 
,, 29 Assembly took a more "robust anti-death penalty stance. He further noted that the 
Committee wanted to focus on moratoria in an attempt to allow the states to adopt 
their own abolition processes as "the Committee of Ministers determined that the 
political imperative was the achievement of a moratorium on executions in all 
member states. , 
30 
The European Ministerial Conference on Human Rights held in Rome on 3-4 
November 2000, to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Convention, changed the 
legislative tide. 31 The Conference adopted Resolution 11 and the section on the death 
penalty, inter alia, invited Member States to consider the possibility of the abolition 
of the death penalty in all circumstances, which would in effect make abolition a 
28 ibid, point c. 
29 Alastair Mowbray, 'The European Convention on Human Rights: The Abolition of Capital 
Punishment and Recent Cases, ' HRLR, 2,2,2002, p. 311. 
30 
ibid, p. 312. 
31 For the draft documents see, Steering Committee for Human Rights, 49 
th Meeting, 3-6 October 
2000, CDDH (2000) 025 Addendum, Strasbourg, II October 2000; and for the adopted text, 
Proceedings: European Ministerial Conference on Human Rights and Commemorative Ceremony of 
the 50'fi Anniversary of the European Convention on Human Rights, Rome, 3-4 
November 2000. 
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condition of membership. 32 This was a departure from the singular focus on 
moratoria as a political mechanism to achieve abolition. During the Foreign 
Ministers' "Declaration 'For a European Death Penalty-Free Area, "' the Committee 
of Ministers began specifically to advocate the need for ratification of Protocol No. 
6, which would be in compliance with Resolution 11. 
However, the wording of the Draft Declaration was restricted as it stated that the 
Committee of Ministers was: 
[d]eeply convinced that the abolition of the death penalty is an important 
contribution to respect for human dignity and human rights and that the 
signing and the ratification of Protocol No. 6 by all member states are 
therefore highly advisable (emphasis added). 33 
Making ratification of Protocol No. 6a "highly advisable" position, as opposed to a 
"prerequisite for membership, " was a tentative step in the Parliamentary Assembly's 
direction. But the subsequent text adopted included convoluted wording which did 
not simply state that Member States should ratify Protocol No. 6, but that: 
32 ibid, Proceedings, Resolution 11: B. Abolition of the death penalty in times of war and times of 
peace, para. 14(ii) "invites the Committee of Ministers to consider the feasibility of a new additional 
protocol to the Convention, which would exclude the possibility of maintaining the death penalty in 
respect of acts committed in time of war or imminent threat of war. " 
33 Draft Declaration on the European Death Penalty-Free Area, CM(2000)163 (Restricted) 27 
October 2000,728th meeting, 30 October 2000, para 5. 
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[h]aving regard to Resolution [11] on Respect for Human Rights which inter 
alia requests that the member states ratify as soon as possible, if they have not 
yet done so, Protocol No. 6 and in the meantime, respect the moratoria on 
executions adopted by the European Ministerial Conference on Human Rights 
on the occasion of the 50 th Anniversary of the European Convention on 
Human Rights 34 
The Foreign Ministers relied upon the Resolution text, and did not propose a 
specific Committee of Minister's position. Again, recourse to moratoria is repeated 
and only a "request" for ratification of Protocol No. 6 is given. What resulted was a 
form of legislative stalemate. But the Committee did give ground to the Assembly. 
The Committee was not opposing the Assembly's prerequisites for future Member 
States, but it did not explicitly endorse them either. As a result, the Committee's 
position of a moratorium can be seen as a minimal requirement, but the Assembly's 
position provided a higher threshold. 
However, the Assembly was not deterred and it advanced its position in a radical 
manner. We now see below that in the expansion process the new countries 
did join 
the Council with the acceptance of the Committee's condition of the imposition of a 
moratorium, and also the vast majority accepted the Assembly's preconditions of 
signature and ratification of Protocol No. 6. 
34 Declaration "For a European Death Penalty-Free Area, " adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers at 
its 107th Session, 9 November 2000, para 4. 
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7.2.2 The Expansion of the Council to Central and Eastern European States 
It is a mark of the effectiveness of the Council's strategy against the death penalty 
that the vast majority of new Member States from Central and Eastern Europe 
removed the punishment from their laws, especially since many of the countries had 
previously imposed a large amount of executions. 35 In conjunction with setting 
prerequisites for membership, the Assembly strengthened its strategy by consulting 
the European Commission for Democracy through Law (more commonly known as 
the "Venice Commission") to remedy any municipal constitutional law questions 
regarding the adoption of the provisions for abolition. 36 This had the effect of 
making the transition to membership a less problematic exercise. The Council 
further promoted smooth change in the penal policies by enhancing the position of 
non-govemmental organisations and civil society. 37 These two capacity building 
mechanisms contributed to the strengthening of the abolitionist discourse. 
35 See below for the examples of the Ukraine and Russia. 
36 The Venice Commission is the Council of Europe's advisory body on Member State constitutional 
matters and it was established in 1990 by Resolution (90) 6 on a partial agreement establishing the 
European Commissionfor Democracy through Law, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 10 
May 1990 at its 86th Session. The current functions of the Venice Commission can be found 
in 
Resolution (2002) 3 revised statute of the European Commissionfor Democracy through Law, 
adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 21 February 2002 at the 784th meeting of the 
Ministers' 
Deputies. See the Venice Commission's website, 
http: //www. venice. coe. int/site/main/presentation E. asp? MenuL=E 
17 See the Council of Europe Conference of Nongovernmental Organisations website, at 
http: /, '/www. coe. int/T/E/NGO/public/ 
296 
Both the Assembly and the Committee monitored the compliance of the 
38 commitments by the new Member States. Before joining, the majority of countries 
abolished the punishment with either a new Constitutional provision 39 or through 
Constitutional Court decisions. 40 Furthermore, as Protocol No. 13 came into force in 
2002ý it was immediately relevant for the expansion process. The abolition of the 
death penalty in all circumstances was viewed as a natural consequence. Most of the 
joining countries had a fairly smooth route to formulating the penological change, 
but some did not and required help from the Parliamentary Assembly and the 
Venice Commission. These countries initiated a moratorium, but witnessed some 
legal and political difficulties which stalled ratification of Protocol No. 6, and then 
the transition to Protocol No. 13. 
31 Capital Punishment: Information Submitted by States; Compliance with Member State's 
Commitments, CM, Decl- AS/Inf [ 1999] 2,26 April 1999. 
For instance, the Constitutional of the Republic of Croatia, 1990, Article 21 states, "Every human 
being has the right to life. In the Republic of Croatia there shall be no capital punishment. " The 
Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, 1991, Article 10 states, "The human right to life is 
irrevocable. The death penalty shall not be imposed on any grounds whatsoever in the Republic of 
Macedonia. " 
40 For instance, in 1990 the Hungarian Constitutional Court declared the death penalty to be 
unconstitutional in Ruling 23/1990 (X 31 AB), Judgment of 24 October 1990, Magyar K&IOny 
(Official Gazette) 31 October 1991, cited in Eva Pahur, 'The Abolition of the Death Penalty in 
Central and Eatsem Europe: A Survey of Abolition Processes in former Communist 
Countries, ' p. 
86, in Centre for Capital Punishment Studies, Occasional Papers, vol. 2 August 2005. The 
Lithuanian Constitutional Court also declared the death penalty to be unconstitutional, see, The 
Constitutional Court of the Republic ofLithuania. - Ruling. - On the compliance of the 
death penalry 
providedfor by the sanction ofArticle 105 of the Republic ofLithuania 
Criminal Code within the 
Republic of Lithuania, Vilnius, 9 December 1998, CDL(l 999)013e-rev-restr, 
Venice Commission, 
Strasbourg, 26 April 1999. 
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For instance, the Albanian Constitutional Court considered Convention Article 2(l) 
and Protocol No. 6 and held that the death penalty in peacetime was a violation of 
the Albanian Constitution, but that the punishment could be implemented in 
41 
exceptional circumstances . Before Albania ratified Protocol No. 6, the Venice 
Commission investigated the possibility of the death penalty under Article 21 of the 
Albanian Constitution, which states, "[t]he life of the person is protected by law. , 42 
It argued that the "absolute lack of provision for exceptions to the protection of the 
right to life confirms that no exception was intended by the national legislator. , 43 
Albania then ratified Protocol No. 13 in 2007, removing the possibility of the death 
penalty in all circumstances. In another example, the Armenian Constitutional Court 
considered Article 17 of the Armenian Constitution, which states "the death penalty, 
until its abolition, may be prescribed by law for particular serious crimes, as an 
exceptional punishment. " The Court held that this was compatible with Protocol 
No. 6.44 The Venice Commission can also be seen as contributing to Armenia 
41 Case No. ALB-1999-3-008, Albanian Constitutional Court, 10 December 1999, cited in Bertrand 
Mathieu, The Right to Life in Constitutional and International Case-Law, (Strasbourg: Council of 
Europe Publishing, 2006), pp. 45-49. 
42 See, Giorgio Malinvemi and Hanna Suchocka, Opinion on the Compatibility of the Death Penalty 
with the Constitution ofAlbania, Strasbourg, II February 1999, CDL 
(1999) 00 1 e-restr- 
43 Mr. J. Klucka, 'Activities of the Venice Commission relating to the suppression of the death 
penalty, ' European Commission for Democracy through Law, CDL-JU 
(2002) 38, Strasbourg, 20 
November 2002, p. 4. 
44 Case No. ARM-2003-2-2004, Armenian Constitutional Court, 15 July 2003, cited in Mathieu, 
ibid, 
pp. 49-50. 
298 
ratifying Protocol No. 6 although it is still to ratify Protocol No. 13,45 and the 
exception dentified by the Constitutional Court still applies. 
The abolition process within Central and Eastern Europe can be viewed as a 
combination of top-down and bottom-up policy formation. The initiatives of the 
Council go hand-in-hand with the acceptance of the policies by the Member States 
as has been witnessed with the signing and ratifications of Protocol No. 6 46 and 
Protocol No. 13.47 Only Russia is yet to ratify Protocol No. 6, and it has not signed 
45 See, Report of the Venice Commission on the Revised Constitution of the Republic ofArmenia on 7 
July 2001, CDL-INF (2001) 114; Venice Commission, Conclusions of the Meeting of the Working 
Group on Legislative Reforms to be Carried Out in the Republic ofArmenia before the Entry into 
Force of the Revised Constitution, 12 July 2002. 
46 The complete list of ratifications of Protocol No. 6 by 16 April 2008 is: Albania, Andorra, 
Annenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the fonner Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United 
Kingdom. Russia is the only Member State which has not ratified the protocol, it deposited its 
signature on 16 April 1997. 
47 The list of ratifications of Protocol No. 13 as of 16 April 2008 is: Albania, Andorra, Austria, 
Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, San 
Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom. The countries which have signed but yet to ratify 
are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Latvia, Poland, Spain; Russia has not yet signed Protocol No. 13. 
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Protocol No. 13. As such the significance of protocols as international law has been 
considered by the Venice Commission when it stated in 1999: 
[i]t can therefore be asserted, and with confidence, that the national and 
international dimensions of European law tend both independently and 
together towards the abolition of capital punishment. The evolution in this 
direction is clear and is becoming a cornerstone of European public order. 48 
In addition Armenia, Azerbaijan, Latvia, Poland, Spain and Russia are yet to ratify 
Protocol No. 13. The expansion has not gone completely to plan as there has been, 
and continue to be, states which are resistant to the Council membership policies. 
However the Assembly has focused efforts on the specific cases where states have 
breached the agreement to initiate a moratorium and reintroduced executions. 
Renate Wohlwend had been especially attuned to Member States who administered 
death sentences and executed people before and during membership. She identified 
that such monitoring of Member States is a responsibility the Assembly should 
undertake. 49 In 1996, the Assembly deplored the executions which were carried out 
48 Mr. Giorgio Malinverni and Mrs. Hanna Suchocka, Opinion on the Compatibility of the Death 
Penalty with the Constitution ofAlbania, adopted by the Commission at its 38 
th Plenary meeting, 
Venice, 22-23 March 1999, Strasbourg, 24 March 1999, CDL-INF(1999)004e, section 2. 
49 See the articles by Renate Wohlwend in the Council of Europe publications on the 
death penalty, 
The Efforts of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council ofEurope, pp. 55-67, in Council of 
Europe, The Death Penalty: Abolition in Europe (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 1999); 
and ibid, The Role of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, pp. 
65-86, in Council of 
Europe, The Death Penalty Beyond Abolition, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2004). 
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in Latvia, Lithuania and the Ukraine. 50 Latvia and Lithuania abandoned the death 
penalty after the 1996 executions and both countries ratified Protocol No. 6 in 
1999.5 1 However, a more dramatic violation of a moratorium was witnessed in the 
Ukraine. 
On the 9th November 1995, the Ukraine acceded to the Counci152 and agreed to 
initiate a moratorium on executions and sign within one year Protocol No. 6 and 
ratify it within three years. The Parliamentary Assembly interpreted it as violating 
its commitments when executions resumed that same year. Renate Wohlwend was 
"shocked to find that thirteen executions had taken place in the Ukraine and equally 
shocked by the secrecy surrounding the death penalty and executions in the country, 
as well as by the living conditions on death row. , 53 
50 Resolution 1097 (1996) on the abolition of the death penalty in Europe, text adopted by the 
Assembly on 28 June 1996 (24th sitting), para 2. 
51 Resolution 1187 (1999) Europe: a death penalty-free continent, adopted by the Standing 
Committee, acting on behalf of the Assembly, on 26 May 1999, para 3. 
52 The Ukraine was granted special guest status in 1992 and when their application was considered 
in 
1995, the Council of Europe was aware of executions taking place in 1994 and 1995. When acceding 
to the Council of Europe, the Ukraine had agreed to sign and ratify in one year Protocol 
No. 6, but 
this was extended to three years in the event that a moratorium was 
in place to prevent execution up 
until ratification, see Report on the abolition of the death penalty in 
Europe, Doc. 7589, text adopted 
by the Assembly on 28 June 1996 (24th sitting) paras. 39,43. 
53 Renate Wohlwend, above, fn. 49, (2004), p. 73. This "shock" was also stated 
in, Honouring of 
commitments by Ukraine to introduce a moratorium on executions and abolish 
the death penalty, 
Doc. 7974,23 December 1997, Draft Resolution, para 1. 
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The executions were renounced by both the Assembly and human rights scholars 
within the Ukraine, 54 and the Assembly recalled Ukraine's commitments in the light 
of these executions. 55 But in an effort to restrict transparency of the capital judicial 
process, the Ukraine State Committee on Secrets and Technical Information, 
attempted to keep the information on executions away from the Council and 
nongovernmental organisations and declared that data regarding the administration 
of the death penalty was a state secret. 56 
The Ukrainian Minister of Justice, Mrs. S. Stanik, sent a letter to the Council 
informing them that between 1995 and 1997 212 people had been executed. 57 When 
thirteen further executions were recorded for the period between I January 1997 and 
II March 1997, Renate Wohlwend stated "I feel I cannot trust the Ukrainian 
54 See, T. Andrusiak, Ukrainian Thinkers against Capital Punishment, UJHR 2, (1997) 105; 0. 
Pavlychenko, Ukraine in the Council ofEurope. - Third Year ofMembership, UJHR 2 (1997) 114. 
55 See, Opinion No. 190 (1995) on the application by Ukrainefor membership of the Council of 
Europe, 26 th September 1995, para 12(ii), "The Parliamentary Assembly notes that the Ukraine 
shares its interpretation of commitments entered into ... and intends to sign within one year and ratify 
within three years from the time of accession Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on the abolition of the death penalty, and to put into 
place, with immediate effect from the day of accession, a moratorium on executions. " 
56 See, Secret Mass Executions in Ukraine Called "Barbaric, " Amnesty International Press Release, 
3 December 1996, EUR 50/16/96. 
57 Information given in a letter dated 31 March 1998, from Mrs S. Stanik, the Minister of Justice of 
the Ukraine to Mrs. Leni Ficher, (then) President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, included as Appendix I., in Honouring of the commitment entered into by Ukraine upon 
accession to the Council of Europe to put into place a moratorium of the death penalty, Report, Doc. 
7745, text adopted by the Assembly on 28 January 1997. 
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authorities any more, " and that "it is not enough to issue another warning; this 
would endanger the Assembly's credibility. "58 Furthermore, the Assembly 
recommended that the Committee suspend the Ukraine from the Council . 
59 This 
persistent pressure was emphasised in a further Resolution which warned the 
Ukraine that the Assembly will "take all necessary steps to ensure compliance with 
,, 60 commitments entered into. Again the Committee displayed a distancing from the 
conflict between the Ukraine and the Assembly, and provided a less radical 
approach, continuing to ensure constructive dialogue with the Ukrainian 
government. 61 
58 Honouring of the commitments by Ukraine to introduce a moratorium on executions and abolish 
the deathpenalty, Doc. 7974, text adopted by the Assembly on 23 December 1997. 
59 In Resolution 1194 (1999) Honouring of obligations and commitments by Ukraine, text adopted by 
the Assembly on 24 June 1999 (23 rd sitting), the Parliamentary Assembly noted that it shall, para Li. 
"proceed to the annulment of the credentials of the Ukrainian parliamentary delegation in accordance 
with Rule 6 of its Rules of Procedure, until these commitments have been fully complied with, " and 
in para Lii. "recommend that the Committee of Ministers proceed to suspend Ukraine from its right 
of representation, in conformity with Article 8 of the Statute of the Council of Europe. " 
60 Resolution 1112 (1997) on the honouring of the commitment entered into by Ukraine upon 
accession to the Council ofEurope to put into place a moratorium on executions, text adopted by the 
Assembly on 29 January 1997 (5 th sitting). 
61 See, Ukraine: Note on Council ofEurope action towards abolition of the death penalty, prepared 
by the Directorate of Legal Affairs, GR-EDS(98)26,9 April 1998. Also Sangmin Bae argued that in 
"light of Ukraine's ongoing failure to meet its obligations, the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe took a different approach from the PACE. Whereas the PACE did not hesitate to issue 
public warnings and criticisms, the Committee of Ministers took a less aggressive approach, 
maintaining a continuous dialogue at all levels, " When the State No Longer Kills: International 
Human Rights Norms andAbolition of the Death Penalty, (New York: State University of New York 
Press, 2007), p. 34. 
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Even with the executions taking place, which the Committee denounced, it acted as 
a buffer to the exertions by the Parliamentary Assembly, and ensured that the 
Ukraine was kept in a dialogue with the Council and notexcluded from the process. 
This was perhaps, as Sangmin Bae argued, because the Ukrainian situation was seen 
as a 44rare case. ýý62 But even so the Assembly intensified its efforts. 
In 1996 a seminar was held in Kyiv to bring together the Ukrainian authorities, 
Ukrainian human rights advocates and the Council of Europe. 63 One of the main 
strategies was to educate the authorities on the lack of deterrent effect of the death 
penalty, as its special deterrent quality was erroneously presumed by the Ukrainian 
authorities. 64 Roger Hood stated at the seminar, "[i]t is futile for ... states to retain the 
death penalty on the grounds that it is justified as a deterrent measure for unique 
,, 65 effectiveness. 
The Venice Commission were consulted by the Assembly and the Commission 
stated that the "question of the death penalty in Ukraine should ... be examined 
in the 
62 ibid, p. 32. 
63 Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights: The Abolition of the Death Penalty, Report, on the 
Seminar on the Abolition of the Death Penalty, held in Kyiv on 28 and 29 November 
1996, 
Strasbourg, 17 January 1997, AS/Jur (1996) 70. 
64 Two speakers focused on this point; see, ibid, Roger Hood, Capital Punishment, 
Deterrence and 
Crime Rates, and Peter Hodgkinson, Misconceptions on the Death Penalty 
Capital Punishment and 
Public Opinion, papers presented at Seminar on the Death Penalty, included as annex to the 
Report 
on the Seminar. 
65 ibid, p. 6. 
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light of the growing tendency in international law to proscribe the death penalty. 5566 
The Assembly said that "it was willing to grant the Ukraine all the assistance within 
47 its means, but confirmed that the Ukraine had failed to meet its deadline for 
68 
ratification of Protocol No. 6. Renate Woh1wend argued that it was not asking too 
much too quickly to require the Ukraine to fulfil obligations freely entered into with 
the Council. Even though the post-Communist country had rising crime rates other 
post-Communist countries with similar crime rates had managed to sustain a 
moratorium. 
69 
Furthermore, the Parliamentary Assembly passed a Resolution 70 which provided 
details of the human rights violations to various international organisations. 71 Then 
66 Venice Commission, Opinion of the Venice Commission on the Constitutional aspects of the Death 
Penalty in Ukraine, adopted by the Commission at its 33 d Plenary Meeting, (Venice, 12-13 
December 1997) CDL-INF (1998) 00 1 e-rev, Strasbourg, 17 April 1998; Mr. Gdrard Batliner, 
Comments on the Constitutional Issues which Might be Raised by the Death Penalty in Ukraine in 
the Light of the Constitution of 28 June 1996, Venice Commission, Strasbourg, 28 May 1997, 
CDL(1997)015e-restr. 
67 Resolution 1145 (1998) Executions in Ukraine, text adopted by the Assembly on 27 January 1998 
(2 nd Sitting), para 2. 
68See, Recommendation 1416 (1999) honouring of obligations and commitments by Ukraine, text 
adopted by the Assembly on 24 June 1999 (23 rd sitting); and Resolution 1194 (1999) honouring of 
obligations and commitments by Ukraine, text adopted by the Assembly on 24 June 1999 
(23 rd 
sitting). 
69 See, Renate Wohlwend, above, fn. 49, pp. 55-68. 
70 Resolution 1179 (1999) honouring, of obligations and commitments by Ukraine, text adopted by 
the Assembly on 27 January 1999 (5h sitting). 
71 Including the European Union organs of the European Parliament and the European Commission, 
the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the European Bank 
for 
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in December 1999 the death penalty was officially declared unconstitutional by the 
Constitutional Court of the Ukraine. 72 Then the Ukrainian Parliament officially 
abolished the death penalty on 22 February 2000. Protocol No. 6 was ratified on 4 
April 2000.73 
Wohlwend described the Ukraine as "one of the Council's success stories .,, 
74 It is 
evident that the Council's process of political dialogue was a decisive factor in the 
Ukraine adopting the human rights principles and recommitting itself to the 
conditions of membership. However, the situation in Russia, Poland and within 
break-away separatist territories is more complicated, and we now turn to consider 
these situations below. 
The Russian Federation is a source of frustration for the Parliamentary Assembly. 75 
Russia's application for membership to the Council of Europe considered the 
position of the death penalty in the country and it was noted in 1993 that 157 death 
Reconstruction and Development the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Congress of 
Local and Regional Authorities of Europe and the Social Development Fund. 
72 See above, fn. 66. 
73 Wohlwend, above fn. 49, (2004), p. 74; See, Bertrand Mathieu, The Right to Life, (Strasbourg: 
Council of Europe Press, 2006), p 54, translation of section of judgment, Constitutional Court Case, 
29-12-1999. 
74 ibid, p. 74. 
75 Russia's original application was suspended in January 1995 following Russia's intervention in 
Chechnya, but was reopened on 26 September 1995 with Resolution 1065 (1995); see also, Bureau 
of the Assembly, Report on the Conformity of the Legal Order of the Russian Federation with 
Council of Europe Standards, Strasbourg, (Parliamentary Assembly) 28 September 1994, 
AS/Bur/Russia (1994), para 7. 
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sentences were handed down and 3 people were executed, and 123 pardoned. In 
1994ý 160 death sentences were handed down, 10 people were executed and 151 
were pardoned. 76 Between 1995 and 1996, the number of executions rose to an 
estimate of 13 9.77 However, there was a discrepancy in the information given to the 
Assembly by the Russian authorities as to the actual execution total. Anatoly 
Pristavkin, a former Chairman of the Presidential Pardons Commission of Russia, 
and adviser to President Vladimir Putin, speaking at a seminar on the abolition of 
the death penalty in Kyiv, Ukraine, in November 1996, stated that from Russia's 
accession in February 1996 that over a hundred people were executed. " Mrs. Leni 
Fischer was informed by a Russian official that 96 executions had taken place. 79 
When Russia acceded to the Council in 1996, it initiated a moratorium on 
executions. These executions were in violation of its commitments. Bill Bowring, 
an expert on human rights in Russia, noted a further discrepancy between the then 
Justice Minister Konstantin Kovalyov claiming that all death sentences were 
commuted, with conflicting reports that executions were being administered. 
80 The 
76 Russia's applicationfor membership of the Council ofEurope, Doc. 7463,18 January 1996. 
77 This figure was provided by Anatoly Pristavkin, A Vast Place of Execution - The Death Penalty in 
Russia, p. 133, in Council of Europe, The Death Penalty: Abolition in Europe, (Strasbourg: 
Council 
of Europe Publishing, 1999). 
78 
ibid 
79 See, Honouring of the commitment entered into by Russia upon accession to the 
Council of Europe 
to put into place a moratorium on execution of the death penalty, 
Report, Doc. 7746,28 January 
1997, para. 11. 
80 Bill Bowring, 'Russia's accession to the Council of Europe and human rights: compliance or 
cross-purposesT E. H. R. L. R. 1997,6,628-643, p. 642. 
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1993 Russian Constitution, and the Criminal Code, which came into force on I 
January 1997 allows for the punishment .8' However, in February 1999 the Russian 
Federal Constitutional Court held that in capital trials, the person(s) charged must 
receive a trial by jury under Article 20(2) of the Constitution. 82 Bowring noted that 
trial by jury was only available in nine of the eighty-nine regions and so this 
provided a direct procedural bar to capital trials being carried out. As such this 
decision enabled the Constitution's equal protection clause in Article 19, the right to 
life in Article 20 (2), and the legal -protection of rights under Article 46(l) to be 
83 initiated. 
However, in 1999 the Council and the Clemency Commission of the Russian 
Presidential Administration held a conference in Moscow on the death penalty, and 
it was observed that the "opinion has been primed towards abolition by the 
President's Administration. , 84 Hans Christian Krilger described the conference as 
"ground breaking" because it was "almost surely the first forum in the Russian 
" Russian Constitution of 1993, Article 20, guarantees the right to life, but section 2 provides that, 
66 capital punishment until its complete abolition may be established by federal law as an exclusive 
form of punishment for particularly grave crimes against life, and the accused shall be granted the 
right to have his case examined by a court with the participation of a jury, " cited in Bill Bowring, 
'Russia's accession to the Council of Europe and human rights: four years on, ' E. H. R. L, R. 2000,4, 
362-379, p. 369. 
82 Decision of February 2,1999, No. 3-P, Rossiskaya Gazeta, February 10,1999, see, Venice 
Commission, Bulletin on Constitutional Case Law, 1999-1, pp. 96-98. 
83 Bowring, above, fn. 81, p. 371. 
84 Conference on Abolition of the Death Penalty, Moscow 3-4 June 1999, Mission Report 
by Mr. 
Pierre-Henri Imbert, Director of Human Rights, Human Rights Directorate, Mission Order No. 
DP310/1999/ddh, p. I. 
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Federation in which government officials opposed to capital punishment were in the 
majority. ý185 Bowring argued that concerning the ending of the death penalty in 
Russia in 1997, the "only hope for a moratorium is through the activities of the 
,, 86 Committee on Clemency. 
Even though there has been de facto abolition, Secretary Generals of the Council of 
Europe have called upon Russia to ratify Protocol No. 6, Walter Schwimmer called 
87 88 for ratification in 2003, and Terry Davis made a similar plea in October 2005. 
Anatoly Pristavkin appears to confirm that Russia is listening to the Council of 
Europe's pleas. 89 President Putin has advanced abolitionist arguments in the State 
Duma (the Russian lower house of parliament), and has argued for Russia to 
maintain a moratorium but to also ratify Protocol No. 6. However, the State Duma 
has not obliged the Kremlin, as in 2002 it adopted a non-binding resolution against 
the abolition of the death penalty. 90 This resolution prevented Russia from ratifying 
Protocol No. 6. The State Duma pointed to public support for the death penalty and 
so it was "premature" for it to change the capital laws. 91 
85 Speech presented by Hans Christian Kroger at the 'Clemency Conference in the Russian 
Federation: Launching a Three Year Campaign to Humanise Penal Policy, ' Veliky Novgorod, 25-26 
October 2000, p. 1. 
86 
ibid. 
87 Walter Schwimmer in talks with Russia Justice Minister Yury Chayka, 18 December, 2003, 
www. coe. int/News Search. 
88 Abolish the Death Penalty because of Belsan, 21 October 2005, www. con. int/News Search 
89 Anatoly Pristavkin, above, fn. 77, p. 203. 
90 'Russian Parliament Backs Death Penalty, ' BBC News, 15 February, 2002, 
http: //news. bbc. ac. uk/I/hi/world/europe/I823556. stm. 
91 ibid. 
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However, President Putin has spoken strongly against lifting the moratorium5 92 and 
even with the Duma's resistance to the President's abolitionist calls, it appears that 
the moratorium is strong for the moment. 93 The political arguments against the 
imposition of the death penalty were severely tested in the much publicised 2006 
trial of Nur-Pashi Kulayev for his part in the Beslan school siege in 2004 were after 
a three day hostage situation, 330 were killed. 94 Kulayev was found guilty and 
Judge Tamerlan Aguzarov stated that the defendant deserved the death penalty "but 
is sentenced to life in prison because a moratorium is in place. , 95 There was strong 
public support for Kulayev's execution but the court adhered to the President's 
order. 
Furthermore, the Russian government stated in 1998 that "Russia shares the 
international community's growing aspiration to universally abolish the death 
92 See, Tutin opposes return to death penalty, ' BBC News, 9 July 200 1, 
http: //news. bbc. co. uk/I /hi/world/europe/I 426443. stm; 'Putin speaks out against death penalty, 13 
March, 2002, http: //news. bbc. co. uk/I/hi/world/europe/1870916. stm 
93 However, we cannot be completely confident in Russia's observance of human rights. Bill 
Bowring has highlighted Russia's human rights violations, its refusal to ratify Protocol No. 14, and 
that a large amount of the Court's caseload involves applications against Russia, see Bill Bowring, 
The Degradation of the International Legal Order? The Rehabilitation ofLaw and the Possibility of 
Politics, (Abington: Routledge-Cavendish, 2008), pp. 97,184-6; see also Bowring, above, fitis. 80 
and 8 1. 
94 c Beslan attackerjailed for life, ' BBC News, 26 May, 2006, http: //news. 
bbc-co. uk/go/pr/fr/- 
/I /hi/world/europe/5018928 - stin. 
95 
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penalty. ýý96 Renate Wolhwend agreed in her speech to the 3 rd World Congress 
against the Death Penalty in Paris in 2007, that the "signals received from 
Moscow 
... show that complete abolition should be only a matter of time. 1997 
But there is ambivalence present concerning the purported inevitability of Russia 
ratifying Protocol No. 6 and take the next step towards abolition. In 2005, Alvaro 
Gil-Robles, Commissioner for Human Rights, stated in his report on his visits to the 
Russian Federation that it's "failure to honour its undertaking is a source of grave 
concern. 508 Part of his concern was based on the arguments within the political elites 
in favour of its reintroduction. He argued against this and repeated "with insistence 
that the abolition of the death penalty is essential to the establishment of a genuine 
modem democracy, which fully respects fundamental freedoms and rights. "99 In 
October 2007 the Committee: 
reiterated their strong support and urgent call on the Russian Federation, as the 
only member state which has not yet abolished the death penalty, to take 
96 Statement made by the Russian minister, A. F. Petrachkov, in, Hands Off Cain, Moratorium 2000: 
Abolition of the Death Penalty at the 54h UN Commission on Human Rights, (Rome: Associazione 
Mariateresa Di Lascia, 1998). 
97 Renate Wohlwend, 'Full text of Speech delivered by Renate Wohlwend (Liechtenstein/EPP/CD) 
on the occasion of the 3 rd World Congress against the Death Penalty' (Paris, 1-3 February 2007), 
included as appendix in, Promotion by Council of Europe member states of an international 
moratorium on the deathpenalty, Doc. 11303,11 June 2007. 
98 Report by Mr. Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissionerfor Human Rights, on his visits to the Russian 
Federation, 15 to 30 July 2004 and 19 to 29 September 2004, for the attention of the Committee of 
Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly, Strasbourg, 20 April 
2005, CommDH9(2005)2, para 90. 
99 
ibid, para 91. 
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without delay all the necessary steps to transform the existing moratorium on 
executions into dejure abolition of the death penalty and to ratify Protocol No. 
6.10() 
And this was because the Committee recalled that it "has repeatedly urged the 
Russian Federation to ratify Protocol No. 6, thus making the Council of Europe a de 
jure death penalty free zone, and will continue to follow progress towards 
ratification. "' 01 The essential issue here is that the Council wants Russia to adopt 
Protocol No. 6 so that it will place a legal mandate over the current political 
moratorium. 
The Council has also displayed concern at some countries calling for the 
reintroduction of the death penalty even after Protocol No. 6 has been ratified. The 
possible reinstating of the death penalty in Central and Eastern Europe has been of 
continual concern. Poland considered reintroduction in 2004-5,102 when the Law 
and Justice Party made the adoption of the death penalty one of the main points of 
100 Abolition of the death penalty in all member states of the Council of Europe, 
CM/Del/Dec(2007)985/4,4 and CM/Del/Dec(2007)993/4.1 adopted at the 1009 th meeting of the 
Minister's Deputies, 24 October 2007, para 1. 
101 Position of the Parliamentary Assembly as regards the Council of Europe member and observer 
states with have not abolished the death penalty, Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1760 
(2006), Reply adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 31 January 2007, at the 985 th meeting of the 
Ministers' Deputies, CM/AS(2007)Rec 1760 fmal, 2 February 2007, para 2. 
102 Aleksandra Gliszczyfiska, Katarzyna Sqkowska, and Roman Wieruszewski, 'The Abolition of the 
Death Penalty in Poland, ' pp. 19-26, in ODIHR, The Death Penalty in the OSCE Area: Background 
Paper 2006, (Warsaw: OSCE, 2006). 
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its election platform. Agata Fijalkowski stated that both Polish society and the 
political elites support the application of the death penalty as a "notion of a strong 
state. " 103 
Such support for the death penalty was revealed on 22 October 2004 when the lower 
house of the Polish Parliament rejected the proposal to reintroduce the punishment 
by a vote of 194 in favour and 198 against, with 14 abstentions. 104 Renate 
Wohlwend commented, "[t]he result hardly gives cause for rejoicing; there is, quite 
the contrary, every reason to be disturbed, even scandalised, by such a result. After 
all, 194 MPs were willing to vote for the restoration of the death penalty in 
Poland! " 105 Wohlwend noted in 2007 that the political challenge to reintroduce the 
death penalty was "dropped very quickly after it became clear what the 
consequences of such a move would be for their country's standing in Europe. " 106 
There are also some separatist territories within Europe, which are not officially 
recognised internationally and are not subject to international treaties. Abkhazia, 
Transnistria., and South Ossetia, have retained the death penalty as an appropriate 
103 Agata Fijalkowski, 'Capital Punishment in Poland: An Aspect of the "Cultural Life" Death 
Penalty Discourse, ' p. 162, in Austin Sarat and Christian Boulanger, (eds) The Cultural Lives of 
Capital Punishment: Comparative Perspectives, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). 
104 See, Position of the Parliamentary Assembly as regards the Council ofEurope member and 
observer states which have not abolished the death penalty, Doc. 10911,21 
April 2006; 
Recommendation 1760 (2006), Position of the Parliamentary Assembly as regards the Council of 
t th Europe member and observer states which have not abolished the 
death penal y, 28 June2006. 
105 ibid. 
106 Wohlwend, above, fn. 97. 
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punishment in both peacetime and wartime. 107 These break-away states are still 
heavily influenced by Russian and Georgian legislation, with South Ossetia making 
Russian law applicable within its territory in 1992, and Abkhazia and Transnistria, 
initiating a moratorium on executions although death sentences are still applied. 108 
Transnistria had retained the death penalty following its split from Moldova. The 
Parliamentary Assembly adopted a resolution in 2006 calling for the commutation 
of all death sentences in all the separatist states. 109 
Belarus is the only mainland European country which currently imposes executions 
and is also the only European state that is not a member of the Council of Europe. 
Elisabetta Zamparutti and Anna Zammit stated that "[fln Europe the only blemish 
on the otherwise completely death penalty free zone is Belarus, where 5 people 
were put to death in 2004. " 110 The statistics on the death penalty and executions in 
Belarus are a state secret, but what is known is that Belarus carried out four 
executions in 2004, two executions in 2005, but the actual figures are thought to be 
higher. "' In Resolution 1560, the Parliamentary Assembly noted that executions 
107 Rick Fawn, 'Death Penalty as Democratization: Is the Council of Europe Hanging Itselff 
Democratization, vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer, 2001), pp. 75-76. 
108 Position of the Parliamentary Assembly as regards the Council ofEurope member and observer 
states which have not abolished the death penalty, Doc. 10911,21 April 2006. 
109 Recommendation 1760 (2006), Position of the Parliamentary Assembly as regards the Council of 
Europe member and observer states which have not abolished the death penalty, text adopted by the 
Assembly on 28th June 2006 (20thsitting). 
110 Elisabetta Zamparutti and Anna Zammit, Hands Off Cain: The Death Penalty Worldwide: 2005 
Report, (Rome: Associazione Mariateresa Di Lascia, 1998), p. 10. 
111 Position of the Parliamentary Assembly as regards the Council ofEurope member and observer 
states which have not abolished the death penalty, Doc. 10911,21 April 2006. 
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were still being carried out in Belarus, 112 and further executions have been reported 
in the early part of 2008.1 13 Belarus has been described as the "sad exception. 3ý1 14 
The imposition of the punishment is one of the factors which prevents membership 
of the Council. 
Western Europe has not been immune against strong political calls for 
reintroduction either. The Parliamentary Assembly was particularly disturbed by a 
French National Assembly debate on 8 April 2004 for the reintroduction of the 
death penalty for terrorist offences. ' 15 This was a serious challenge to the current 
removal of the death penalty by a leading Council member. In arguing against the 
French National Assembly "proposition de loi, " members of the Parliamentary 
Assembly issued a Written Declaration which stated that the devastating 
consequences of France bringing the death penalty back would be, "[o]nce one 
exception is admitted, the same hollow arguments can be rephrased with increased 
confidence in calling for ftirther exceptions. " 116 
112 Resolution 1560 (2007) Promotion by Council of Europe member states of an international 
moratorium on the death penalty, text adopted by the Assembly on 26 Ih June 2007 (22 nd sitting). 
See also: Recent executions in Japan and Belarus. - Statement ofJdn Kubig, Chairman of the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Press Release, Strasbourg, 12.12.2007. 
113 Recent executions in Belarus: Statement by Jdn Kubig, Chairman of the Committee ofMinisters, 
Press Release, 13.02.2008; LluiS Maria de Puig: 'Belarus has one again optedfor Barbarism rather 
thanjustice, 'Press Release, Strasbourg, 06.02.2008; PACE rapporteur Andrea Rigoni condemns 
executions in Belarus, Press Release, Strasbourg, 07,02.2008. 
114 Wohlwend, above, fn. 97. 
115 Recent initiative in France to reintroduce the death penaltyfor the perpetrators of terrorist acts, 
Doc. 10211,17 June 2004. 
116 
ibid. 
315 
The possibility of a domino-effect for the reintroduction of the death penalty was 
clearly a concern. The symbolism of a country such as France bringing the 
punishment back would have severely damaged the credibility of the human rights 
discourse. However the Bill was not passed. The Assembly's voice again 
contributed to the maintenance of the anti-death penalty discourse. 
From such stalwart promotion within the Council Member States, we now consider 
the furtherance of the human rights arguments on a global scale. The legal 
anthropologist, Evi Girling, has argued that all people on death row around the 
world have become "significant" to the Council and that the "vocal stance against 
the death penalty fits in with its pursuit of an international role as promoter of 
norms. -)1117 It is to this worldwide view that we now turn. It will be argued in the 
section below that this abolitionist vision outside Council borders has contributed to 
the promotion of the abolitionist goal of worldwide renunciation of the punishment. 
7.3 Part Two: The Strategy Against the Death Penalty and Third Countries 
7.3.1 The Restriction of the Death Penalty in Council of Europe Observer 
States 
117 Evi Girling, European Identity and the Mission Against the Death 
Penalty, p. 119, in Austin Sarat 
and Christian Boulanger (ed) The Cultural Lives of 
Capital Punishment: Comparative Perspectives, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). 
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We first consider the issue of the Council of Europe Observer States. The Council 
currently has five observer states, which are, Canada, Japan, Mexico, Vatican City 
State, and the United States of America. The observer states which impose the death 
penalty are Japan and the United States, and this is a source of concern for the 
Council. The Statutory Resolution on observer status mandates that: 
[a]ny state willing to accept the principles of democracy, the rule of law and 
the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and wishing to co-operate with the Council of Europe 
may be granted by the Committee of Ministers, after consulting the 
Parliamentary Assembly, observer status with the Organisation. ' 18 
This Statutory Resolution has been interpreted by the Assembly to prohibit the 
application of the death penalty in observer states of the Council. 119 Having 
observer states that apply the death penalty is a difficult political and legal 
conundrum for the Council, and it was created by the fact that observer status was 
granted to retentionist countries in 1996 before the Assembly's requirement for 
Member States to ratify Protocol No. 6 gathered momentum. No universal position 
of abolition existed within Europe at that time and so Japan and the United States 
were accepted. However, no retentionist countries will be given observer status in 
118 Statutory Resolution (93) 26, adopted 14 May 1993, para 1. 
119 Abolition of the death penalty in Council of Europe observer states, Doc. 9115,7 June 200 1; 
Recommendation 1627 (2003) Abolition of the death penalty in Council of Europe observer states, 
text adopted by the Assembly on I October 2003 (30th sitting); and Resolution 1349 (2003); 
Abolition of the death penalty in Council of Europe observer states, text adopted by the Assembly on 
I October 2003 (30th sitting). 
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the future. For the status to be granted, at a minimum de facto abolition must be 
secured and dejure will be preferred. 
120 
The Council has condemned the capital judicial systems and executions that have 
taken place in the United States and Japan. 12 1 But their observer status has not been 
revoked primarily because the Council wants to continue a dialogue in an attempt to 
persuade the two countries to initiate a moratorium as part of a process of abolition. 
In a 2001 Report the Assembly "deeply deplore[d]" the death penalty systems of 
Japan and the United States. It called into question their continued observer status 
should there have been no "significant progress in the implementation of this 
Resolution [being] made by I January 2003.5022 
In fact no "significant progress" had been made by that date in either country and 
instead of revocation, the Assembly intensified its "dialogue" through 
120 
ibid, Doc. 9115, Part 1, para 11. 
121 See, The Council of Europe, a death penaltyftee area, 
http: //www. coe. int/T/E/Com/Files/Themes/Death-Penaliy/e briefing. asp. Updated in 2008. Indeed, 
the United States and Japan have been juxtaposed by death penalty scholars in comparative analysis 
of their capital judicial systems. See for example, Daniel H. Foote, 'The Door that Never Opens? 
Capital Punishment and Post-Conviction Review of Death Sentences in the United States and Japan, ' 
19 Brooklyn J ofInt'l L. (2003), pp. 367-52 1; David T. Johnson, The Death Penalty in Japan: 
Secrecy, Silence, and Salience, pp. 251-273, in Austin Sarat and Christian Boulanger (ed), The 
Cultural Lives of Capital Punishment. - Comparative Perspectives, (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2005). 
122 Resolution 1253 (200 1) abolition of the death penalty in Council of Europe observer states, text 
adopted by the Assembly on 25 June 2001 (17 th sitting), Part 1, para 10. 
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communications and seminars in both countries. 123 The Assembly is ensuring that 
the United States and Japan are kept within so that a transparent gaze into their 
criminal justice systems can be maintained. A political and legal compromise is 
being facilitated which allows sensitive diplomacy. 
David Johnson, a scholar on the death penalty in Japan, believes that there is "public 
apathy" towards the abolition of the death penalty and that this sentiment "serves 
the interest in avoiding scrutiny and opposition. " 124 The Japanese judicial system 
has ensured that executions are kept secret, and Johnson has stated that "[s]ilence, 
secrecy, passivity, and public opinion: these facts may suggest that the death penalty 
will not disappear from Japan anytime soon. " 125 Yoshihiro Yasuda, a Japanese 
lawyer and activist, is in agreement when he states "there is little possibility of 
improvement [through abolition] in the near future. " 126 
On 12 February 2007, a cross-party group of Japanese MPs submitted a proposal to 
the Japanese Diet for a moratorium on executions, 
127 but in December 2007 128 and 
123 See Wohlwend, above, fn. 49; Robert Badinter argued that in the dialogue with USA and Japan, 
Europe must adopt an "educational role, " see Preface - Moving Towards Universal Abolition of the 
Death Penalty, p. 9, in Council of Europe, Death Penalty - Beyond Abolition, (Strasbourg: 
Council 
of Europe Publishing, 2004). 
124 Johnson, above, fh. 121, p. 254. 
125 ibid, p. 265. 
126 Yoshihiro Yasuda, 'The death penalty in Japan, ' p. 23 1, in Councilof Europe, Death Penalty: 
Beyond Abolition, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2004). 
127 PACE President welcomes Japanese MPs proposal to suspend executions, 
Press Release, 
Strasbourg, 12.02.2007. 
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on 10 April 2008, the Japanese government still carried out executions in secret. 129 
Lluis Maria de Puig, the President of the Council of Europe Parliamentary 
Assembly stated: 
I reiterate the Assembly's appeal to Japan - as a state holding observer status 
with the Council of Europe - to place a moratorium on executions. The 
Assembly has in the past worked with the Japanese Diet to help bring this 
about, and is willing to do so again. ' 30 
Johnson identifies an interesting factor in state relationships and emulation of state 
activity outside of Europe, which may lead to Japan abolishing the death penalty 
when he stated that a: 
vital sign of change will be visible if South Korea, which has not executed 
anyone for more than seven years, abolished the death penalty. Some Japanese 
abolitionists believe that executives in the Liberal Democratic Party will not 
stand idly by if the neighbour that Japan once colonized abolishes first; that 
would be too much of a blow to their self-image as leaders of the premier 
regime in Asia .... 
Although South Korea is one country Japan could emulate, if 
the United States abolishes first the effect would be even more powerful ... In 
128 Recent executions in Japan and Belarus: Statement ofJcin Kubig, Chairman of the 
Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe, Press Release, Strasbourg, 12.12.2007. 
129 PACE President deplores secret, unannounced executions in Japan, Press Release, Strasbourg, 
10.04.2008. 
130 
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any event, when Japan abolishes capital punishment it will probably do so as 
4a follower. ' 131 
Both Japan and the United States are reluctant to allow the Council to export its 
human rights discourse on the death penalty into their countries. It appears that the 
Parliamentary Assembly is powerless to call both countries to abolition. All it can 
do is threaten to suspend their observer status. 132 The continual exercise of state 
sovereignty by the United States (which is considered in more detail below) and 
Japan against the Parliamentary Assembly, has left the Council weighing the costs 
and benefits of having the two countries as allies through observer status. So far the 
human rights factors have not overridden the benefit of a relationship with the two 
countries. 
The dialogue between the Assembly and Committee, as detailed in Chapters Five 
and Six above, which concerned the differences of opinion of the amendment of 
Article 2(l) and the extent to which Article 3 can restrict the death penalty, is now 
seen with relation to observer states. The Assembly has continually urged the 
Committee of Ministers to be more radical with the reprimand of observer states 
which impose the death penalty, but the Committee has been reluctant to adhere to 
the Assembly's recommendations. 
131 Johnson, above, fh. 12 1, p. 266. 
132 See, Recommendation 1760 (2006) Position of the Parliamentary Assembly as regards the 
Council of Europe member and observer States which have not abolished the death penalty, text 
adopted by the Assembly on 28th June 2006 (20thsitting); Position of the Parliamentary Assembly as 
regards the Council ofEurope member and observer countries which have not abolished the 
death 
penalty, Doc. 10 152,26 April 2004, 
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In January 2008 the Assembly adopted a detailed and pointed recommendation to 
the Committee of Minsters to call on Japan and the United States to initiate 
moratoriums on the death penalty by the end of 2008.133 The Recommendation 
called on the Committee of Ministers to: 
intensify its political dialogue with Japan and the United States, to urge both 
countries to finally place an immediate moratorium on executions, to abolish 
the death penalty as soon as possible, and to present to the Assembly by the 
end of 2008 a detailed account of its contacts with these countries. 134 
Significantly, this Recommendation also called for the amendment of Statutory 
Resolution (93) 26,135 and for the Committee to explore with the existing observer 
states their "readiness to subscribe voluntarily to any changes made to the statutory 
resolution. " 136 It also called for a new labelling mechanism called "new 
designations" which would appear to distinguish between the observer states which 
133 Recommendation 1827 (2008) The Council ofEurope and its observer states: the current 
situation and a wayforward, text adopted by the Assembly on 23 January 2008 (6"' Sitting); 
affirming the provisions under Resolution 1600 (2008) on the Council of Europe and its observer 
states - the current situation and the wayforward, text adopted 
by the Assembly on 23 January 2008 
(6'h sitting). 
134 ibid, Recommendation 1827 (2008) para 2.2. 
135 
ibid, para 2.4. 
136 ibid, para 2.5. 
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apply the death penalty and those which do not. 137 We are yet to see what the 
Committee's response will be, but it is expected that it will repeat its call for 
dialogue and not suspend the two countries. 
What the relationship of the Council with Japan and the United States demonstrates 
is that it is much more difficult for the human rights discourse to penetrate state 
sovereignty when the states are not a full Member State. But the Council will not 
back down. It has continually reminded the two countries of its interpretation of 
human rights and it publicises the executions by these countries as violations of 
human rights. 
This specific international dimension of the Council's discourse against the death 
penalty, reveals that the Council is confident in what it has achieved within its own 
region, and that it now wants to export the abolitionist agenda internationally. We 
now consider how the Council has furthered its global focus by partnering the EU 
and the OSCE in their international initiatives. 
7.4 Part Three: The Intern atio nalis ation of the Council's Discourse 
7.4.1 The Support of the European Union Initiatives 
137 ibid, see paras 2.6-2.6.2. The distinguishing of states through "new designations" 
determines 
those states which obtained observer status though no formal arrangements or under 
the current 
Statutory Resolution, and those states which could be granted observer status after possible 
amendment. It would be expected that those which fall under the 
later category would not be willing 
to impose the death penalty. 
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The Council now seeks to adopt a more international focus to advance abolition 
globally. The Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights welcomed the Italian 
and EU initiative in the United Nations General Assembly for a worldwide 
moratorium on the death penalty, 138 and the Parliamentary Assembly called on "all 
member and observer states of the Council of Europe to actively support the Italian 
moratorium initiative in the UN General Assembly and to make the best use of their 
influence in order to convince countries that are still on the sidelines to join in. 5ý139 
The Committee of Ministers also discussed the issue of co-operation between the 
Council of Europe and the UN in the draft United Nations Resolution for a 
moratorium on the death penalty. 140 The Committee made the decision to invite the 
Slovak Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers to support on behalf of the 
Council the UN Resolution, and it also invited Member States to offer their 
support. 
141 
138 Promotion by Council ofEurope Member States of an international moratorium on the death 
penalty, Doc. 11303,11 June 2007, Report, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, 
Rapporteur: Mr. Pietro Marcenaro, adopted on 8 June 2007, Summary, p. 1. 
139 
ibid, para 10. 
140 See, Co-operation between the Council of Europe and the United Nations - Draft United Nations 
Resolution for a moratorium on the use of the death penalty, item, 2.4, CM/Notes/ 10 11/2.4 of 
20.11.2007,1011 th meeting, 21 November 2007. 
141 Co-operation between the Council ofEurope and the United Nations - Draft United Nations 
Resolutionfor a moratorium on the use of the death penalty, Decision adopted at the 
10 11 th meeting, 
21 November 2007, paras 1-2. 
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The report concluded with stating that the Council joins the EU in promoting 
moratorium in the UN, 142 and provided three recommendations, firstly that all 
member and observer states of the Council support the moratorium of the death 
penalty in the UN, that all Member States ratify the Second Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and finally that all remaining 
Member States ratify Protocol 6 and Protocol No. 13.143 Fdtima Aburto Baselga 
stated that in the worldwide abolition of the death penalty "the Council of Europe 
should closely cooperate with other international organisations, including the 
European Union. " 144 
The EU now has a developed worldwide strategy, and at the Third World Congress 
against the Death Penalty, held in Paris, February 2007, the Council of the EU 
presented a Declaration which stated: 
[t]he European Union is at the forefront of abolitionist efforts around the 
world and will continue to oppose the death penalty in all cases and under all 
circumstances. 
145 
142 
ibid, para 22. 
143 ibid, para 23. 
144 Promotion by Council ofEurope member states of an international moratorium on the 
death 
penalty, Doc. 11321,25 June 2007, Political Affairs Committee: Rapporteur 
for Opinion: Mrs. 
Fdtima Aburto Baselga, para. 4. 
145 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the EU on the occasion of the Third World 
Congress 
against the Death Penalty (Paris, 1-3 February, 2007), Brussels, 
31 January, 2007,5863/07 (Presse 
14). 
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This abolitionist statement is very clear, and is a forceful declaration that it 
considers every country's capital judicial system in the world to be a target, Such a 
worldwide focus has been displayed by the EU at the United Nations. 146 Between 
1994 and 2007, the EU attempted to pass a Resolution for a worldwide moratorium 
on the use of the death penalty in the General Assembly were met with various 
political obstacles which thwarted the implementation of the Resolution. However, 
the European Parliament, with the behind the scenes political support of the non- 
governmental organisation, Hands Off Cain, led the Resolution at the 62 nd Session 
of the General Assembly, meeting on 18th December 2007. The Resolution was 
supported by the Council and it was passed. 
147 
7.4.2 The submission of Amicus Curiae briefs into the United States Supreme 
Court 
146 See, William A. Schabas, 'International Law, Politics, Diplomacy and the Abolition of the 
Death 
Penalty, ' 13 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 417 (2004) pp. 437-8. 
147 Moratorium on the use of the death penalty, GA Res. A/C. 3/62/L. 
29 
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The EU has filed amicus curiae briefs 148 into the US Supreme Court, and the 
Council has recorded its support of the arguments. 149 The amicus curiae brief 
provides an extra source of information which presents to the court the interests of 
global organisations and citizens. 150 As amici, the EU is becoming increasingly 
influential, contributing to the human rights discourse within the jurisprudence of 
the US Supreme Court. Research conducted by Paul M. Collins Jr, 151 suggests that 
cases are more likely to be granted certiorari and be successful when amicus curiae 
briefs are filed. The EU has argued that it has an identifiable, "interest" in filing 
amicus curiae briefs and in Roper v. Simmons stated its interest as: 
148 Amicus curiae (friend of the court) briefs are filed by (amici) persons or groups who are not 
parties to the proceedings that the court is considering. The amici need to demonstrate that they have 
a legitimate interest in one or more of the legal questions before the court. The UK death penalty 
charity Amicus has mirrored the European Union strategy and filed amicus curiae briefs in cases 
involving mentally regarded inmates and juveniles, see Julian Killingley, Execution ofJuveniles and 
Mentally Retarded Defendants in the United States: Report ofAmicus to the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, (London: The Andrew Lee Jones Fund Ltd, 2005). 
149 Death Penalty - Decision to submit a Statement ofInterest in support of the European 
Union's 
amicus curiae beief in a case before the United States Supreme Court (formerly before the Court of 
Criminal Appeals of the State of Texas) concerning a Mexican national sentenced to death, 
CM/Del/Dec(2004)894/3 1.1, CM/Del/Dec(2005)911/13.1, CM/DeUDec(2005)93 5/13.1, decision 
adopted at the 996h meeting of the Ministers' Deputies, 23 May 2007. 
150 J. D. Kearney and T. W. Merrill, 'The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, ' 
148 Uni. Pen. L. Rev, 743, (2000). 
151 See, Paul A Collins Jr., 'Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae 
Participation in U. S. Supreme Court Litigation, ' Law & Soc. Rev vol. 38, no. 4 (2004). 
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[t]he EU and its Member States, as members of the international community, 
have a strong interest in providing information to this Court on international 
human rights norms in a case in which those norms may be relevant. 152 
and the Council of Europe interest was declared as: 
[t]he Council of Europe ... fully concurs with the opinions and arguments 
submitted by the European Union. The Council of Europe has taken a firm 
position that everyone's right to life is a basic value and that the abolition of 
the death penalty is essential to the protection of this right and for the full 
recognition of the inherent dignity of all human beings. 153 
In 2001, the European Union submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of 
certiorari in the case of McCarver v. North Carolina, 154 which concemed the 
execution of a mentally retarded inmate. 155 But the US Supreme Court held the case 
to be moot as North Carolina introduced a mental retardation statute preventing the 
death penalty for inmates with the mental condition. However, another case 
concerning a mentally retarded inmate came to the US Supreme Court in 2002. In 
Atkins v. Virginia, in holding that the executions of mentally retarded inmates was 
152 Appendix A: Statement ofInterest: The Council ofEurope, p. I a, Richard J. Wilson, Brief of 
Amici Curiae: The European Union and Members of the International Community in Support of 
Respondent, in the case of Roper v. Simmons, 543 U. S. 551 (2005). 
153 
ibid 
154 533 U. S. 975 (2001). 
155 The mental health diagnosis "mental retardation" is termed as "learning 
difficulties" in the United 
Kingdom. 
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unconstitutional, Justice Stevens, referred to the European Union brief filed in 
McCarver, in a footnote, and stated that, "within the world community, the 
imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders 
is overwhelmingly disapproved. iý156 
The use of the European Union brief by Justice Stevens was severely criticized by 
both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia in their dissenting opinions. Both of 
the judges pointed to the sovereignty of the United States, and argued that the 
country itself was the ultimate decision-maker on punishment within its internal 
jurisdiction. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that he needed to "call attention to the 
defects in the Court's decision to place weight on foreign laws. " 157 He did not see 
"how the views of other countries regarding the punishment of their citizens provide 
any support for the Court's ultimate determination, " 
158 and that "if it is evidence of 
a national consensus for which we are looking, then the viewpoints of other 
countries simply are not relevant" (italics in original). 
159 Furthermore, a more 
vehement dissent came from Justice Scalia when he stated that "the 
Prize for the 
Court's Most Feeble Effort to fabricate "national consensus" must go to its appeal 
(deservedly relegated to a footnote) to the views of... members of the so-called 
"world community" (letters capitalised in original). 
160 Justice Scalia also cited his 
156 Atkins v, Virginia, 536 U. S. 304,317 (2002) fn. 21. 
For the European Union brief see, 
www. eurunion. orgýIeRislat/DeathpenaltyUSMcCarverBrief 
htm. 
157 ibid, p. 322. 
"' ibid, p. 324-325. 
ibid, p. 325. 
160 ibidl p. 347. 
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own dictum in a previous US Supreme Court case of Thompson v. Oklahoma, when 
he stated: 
[w]e must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States of America 
that we are expounding ... [W]here there is not first a settled consensus among our 
own people, the views of other nations, however enlightened the Justices of this 
Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans through the 
Constitution. 161 
Even though Justice Stevens merely referred to the EU brief in a footnote, it was 
enough to produce these two forceful dissenting opinions. Speedy Rice, an 
American Professor of Law and a death penalty litigator, is of the opinion that this 
brief revealed the central question as to the extent of an unfettered United States 
application of the death penalty. He argued that it helped pave the way for the 
introduction of international opinion against the United States capital judicial 
process. 
162 
What Atkins v. Virginia reveals is that as a legal strategy the EU amicus curiae brief 
is an effective tool which allowed the human rights discourse advanced by the EU 
and the Council to be incorporated within the decision making process of the US 
Supreme Court. 
161 ibid, p. 348, citing, Justice Scalia, dissenting opinion in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U. S. 815 
(1988), p. 868-869, n. 4. 
162 Speedy Rice and Dave Keefe, Impact of International Law on the Death Penalty in the USA, ' 
Warwick Law School Conference, 'Is the Death Penalty About to Execute Itself7 28th February 2004, 
www2. warwick. ac. uk/research_old/society/lawschoolforum2OO4. 
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The next case which the EU submitted an amicus curiae brief was in Roper v. 
Simmons, 163 which Justice Breyer referred to in holding for the majority that the 
execution of juvenile offenders was unconstitutional. 164 Justice Breyer only made a 
passing reference to the EU brief, 165 but concerning all international opinion, he 
held, "[i]t is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of international 
opinion against the juvenile death penalty. " 166 
Again this reliance on international opinion kindled the wrath of Justice Scalia. He 
held that "[t]hough the views of our own citizens are essentially irrelevant to the 
Court's decision today, the views of other countries and the so-called international 
community take center stage. 167 Justice Scalia stated that he did not "believe that 
approval by 'other nations and peoples' should buttress our commitment to 
American principles any more than (what should logically follow) disapproval by 
'other nations and peoples' should weaken that commitment. " 168 Then he continued 
"[a]cknowledgement of foreign approval has no place in the legal opinion of this 
163 Wilson, above, fn. 152. 
164 Roper v. Simmons, ibid, 555-578; see also, Dirk van Zyl Smit, 'The Abolition of 
Capital 
Punishment for Persons Under the Age of Eighteen Years in the United States of America. What 
NextT (2005) 5 HRLR 2,393 
165 ibid, opinion of Justice Breyer, part IV, 576-578 
166 
ibid, 578. 
167 ibid, part 111,624. 
168 
ibid, 625. 
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Court unless it is part of the basisfor the Court's judgment-which is surely what it 
parades as today. " 169 
Justice Scalia's renunciation of the effect of international law was criticised by 
Justice O'Connor, who although also dissented in the case, sought to open the door 
for international opinion in restricted circumstances. Justice O'Connor stated that 
international law could be used to provide a "confirmatory role" to an already 
existing United States penal practice, but that it should not be used to dictate change 
of the United States penal system. Justice O'Connor stated: 
this Nation's evolving understanding of human dignity certainly is neither 
wholly isolated from, nor inherently at odds with, the values prevailing in 
other countries. On the contrary, we should not be surprised to find 
congruence between domestic and international values, especially where the 
international community has reached clear agreement-expressed in 
international law or in the domestic laws of individual countries-that a 
particular form of punishment is inconsistent with fundamental human rights. 
At least,, the existence of an international consensus of this nature can serve to 
confirm the reasonableness of a consonant and genuine American consensus. 
The instant case presents no such domestic consensus, however, and the recent 
emergence of an otherwise global consensus does not alter that basic fact. 
1 70 
169 
ibid, 626. 
170 Dissenting opinion of Justice O'Connor, 604. 
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The last sentence of this passage of Justice O'Connor's dissenting judgment reaches 
the core of the question of sovereign right of the death penalty. Even if the whole 
international community had reached a consensus on a specific aspect of the death 
penalty, in this case the execution of juveniles, such consensus cannot influence the 
American consensus. The United States must come to the conclusion on its own, 
and then view the position of the international community. However, it is difficult to 
see the United States being able to totally isolate themselves from the Council and 
the European Union opinions. As such the policy of a sustained filing of amicus 
curiae briefs by the European organisations will have a significant impact as long as 
there are liberal judges like Stevens and Breyer who are willing to utilise them. 
The filing of amicus curiae briefs is significant because it demonstrates that the 
Council's discourse is penetrating the sovereign use of the death penalty outside its 
boarders. As such, it helps to confirm the legitimacy of the anti-death penalty 
arguments within its own boarders because the greater acceptance of the anti-death 
penalty arguments, moves the discourse closer to facilitating a world-wide norm 
against the punishment. 
Furthermore, it is demonstrated that although the Council has not been able to 
persuade the United States as an observer state to abolish the 
death penalty via 
political dialogue, it has been successful in contributing to a 
legal argument for the 
restriction of the punishment within the United States Supreme 
Court. As such, it 
can be seen how the discourse is intricately challenging the sovereign right of 
the 
death penalty internationally. 
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The next international sphere which is considered is the Council relationship with 
the Organisation for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 
7.4.3 The Support of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
The OCSE monitors the application of the death penalty within its forty-five 
participating states with the aim to increase transparency of the administration of the 
punishment and call for its restriction and abolition. 171 There are currently forty-six 
members of the OSCE who are Member States of the Council. 172 The United States, 
the Holy See and Canada, are members of the OSCE and are also observer states of 
the Council. The monitoring of the death penalty and the dissemination of 
information on the punishment in participating states has been recorded since 1999 
in the annual OSCE publication The Death Penalty in the OSCE Area. 173 
17 1 The Helsinki Final Act 1975 marked the creation of the Conference on Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (CSCE), and the Conference was transformed into the Organisation for the Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE currently has 55 participating states. 
172 The Council countries considered by the OSCE to be abolitionist are: Albania, Andorra, Armenia, 
Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Former Yugoslav Republic, Malta, Moldova, 
Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, and United Kingdom. 
173 The most recent edition is OSCE/ODIHR, The Death Penalty in the 
OSCE Area. - Background 
Paper, 2007 (Warsaw: OSCE, 2007). The annual publication covers the periods of June the previous 
year to June in the current year. 
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The OSCE participating states are not required to abolish the death penalty as a 
prerequisite r membership. 174 There are a number of conditions on the 
implementation of the punishment. The 'Concluding Document of the 1989 Vienna 
Follow-up Meeting, ' states that participating states may only implement the 
punishment for "the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the 
time of the commission of crime and not contrary to their international 
agreements. " 175 The OSCE places significant emphasis on the transparency of 
participating state practice, as the Copenhagen Meeting in 1990, the OSCE 
established that they must, "exchange information ... on the question of the abolition 
of the death penalty and keep that question under consideration5,, andl "make 
available to the public information regarding the use of the death penalty. " 176 
The death penalty is considered under the auspice of the OSCE's 'Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights' (0DIHR). The publication of materials 
on the use of the death penalty in participating states may be seen as part of the 
continual "work in progress" of the OSCE, and this consideration of the punishment 
174 The current OSCE participating states which retain the death penalty in wartime are Albania and 
Latvia, the countries which are dejacto, abolitionist are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian 
Federation and Tajikistan, and the countries which have the death penalty in peacetime and which 
administer executions are, Belarus, the United States of America and Uzbekistan. See, the Death 
Penalty in the OSCE Area: Background Paper, 2006, p. 2. 
175 Concluding Document of the 1989 Vienna Follow-up Meeting, Questions relating to security in 
Europe, para 24, included in, OSCE/ODIHR, OSCE Human Dimension Commitments, vol. 2., 
Chronological Compilation, 2 nd Ed, (Warsaw: OSCE, 2005), p. 51, 
176 Document of the 1990 Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the 
OSCE, para 17.7-8, included in OSCE Human Dimension Commitments vol. 2. - Chronological 
Compilation, p. 75. 
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can now be seen as part of its "normative formulations. " 177 The first time the OSCE 
considered the death penalty was in 1989 at its Vienna Follow-up Meeting, during 
"Questions relating to security in Europe, " when it stated: 
[w]ith regard to the question of capital punishment, the participating States 
note that capital punishment has been abolished in a number of them. In 
participating States where capital punishment has not been abolished, sentence 
of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with 
the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to 
their international commitments. This question will be kept under 
consideration. In this context, the participating State will co-operate within 
relevant international organisations. 178 
The OSCE promotes greater transparency of participating state's capital judicial 
systems and at the meeting in 1990 in Copenhagen, it established that participating 
states should exchange information at the Conference on the Human Dimension. ' 79 
This call for keeping the question of abolishing the death penalty at the forefront of 
177 The 'Thematic Compilation, ' states, "From the outset, the Conference on Security and Co- 
operation in Europe (CSCE), later transformed into the Organisation for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (OSCE), has been very much a 'work in progress, ' an ongoing process that has led to a 
significant expansion of its normative formulations, " in, OSCE/ODIHR, OSCE Human 
Dimension 
Commitments, vol. 1, Thematic Compilation, 2 nd ed, (Warsaw: OSCE, 2005), p. 
A 
178 Concluding Document of the 1989 Vienna Follow-up Meeting, 'Questions relating to security 
in 
Europe, ' para 24. 
179Document of the 1990 Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the 
Human Dimension of the 
OSCE, para 17.7. 
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participating state's Political consideration and for ensuring the transparency of the 
capital judicial process, is a common feature of proceeding OSCE Documents .1 
80 
Furthermore the OSCE has specific activities related to promoting abolition of the 
death penalty in retentionist participating states, which include providing support for 
awareness raising campaigns, conducting training for national capital lawyers, 
contributing to oral and written demarches on both specific case and general 
developments and publishing the annual report on the death penalty in the OSCE 
area. 181 
William Schabas has argued that the OSCE has only achieved "modest results. " 182 
Although the Documents adopted at the various meetings by the OSCE have 
progressed towards a promotion of restriction and abolition, the Vienna Document 
merely provided a "cautious statement, " and the Document of the Copenhagen 
Meeting only adopted "tame provisions. " 183 
During the drafting of the OSCE documents, motivations held by some participating 
states weakened the abolitionist positions which Schabas has recognised. Lydia 
180 See, Document of the 1991 Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the 
OSCE, para 36; Concluding Document of the 1992 Helsinki Summit, § 58; Concluding Document of 
the 1994 Budapest Summit, § 19, all included in, OSCE/ODIHR, OSCE Human Dimension 
Commitments, vol. 2. - Chronological Compilation, 2 nd Ed, (Warsaw: OSCE, 2005). 
181 See, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Feature: Abolishing the death penalty, 
http: //www. osce. org/odihr/iten_2_224. htm. 
182 William A. Schabas, The Abolition o the Death Penalty in International Law, 3 
rd ed, (Cambridge: )f 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 299. 
183 ibid, pp, 299-300. 
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Grigoreva, the Human Rights Adviser at the OSCE has also confirmed that with the 
United States of America as a participant State, it is extremely unlikely that the 
organisation will become abolitionist. 184 In the 2006 OSCE report on the death 
penalty, Margaret Griffey and Laurence Rothenberg, both from the US Department 
of Justice, argued that the existence of the death penalty in the United States was a 
product of a "robust American democratic process. 5ý185 
Some states are clearly attempting to hold onto the monopoly of the application of 
the death penalty, and this is recognised in selected Human Dimension 
Implementation Meetings. In 1989, a group of countries introduced a proposal on 
abolition and noted that the death penalty was being abolished in "most of the legal 
systems of the participating States within the context of a human rights movement, " 
and called for "progressive abolition in peacetime" for all participating States. But 
the text was not adopted. 
186 
Furthermore, at the 1990 Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human 
Dimension,, there was another proposal calling for progressive abolition of the death 
184 Information from Lydia Grigoreva, Human Rights Adviser, Human Rights Department, OSCE 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, email correspondence, I O'b July, 2007. 
"' Margaret Griffey and Laurence E. Rothenberg, The Death Penalty in the United States, p. 
35, in 
The Death Penalty in the OSCE Area, 2006. 
186 Abolition of the Death Penalty, Proposal Submitted by the Delegation of 
Portugal, Austria, 
Cyprus, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, San Marino, Spain and Switzerland, OSCE Doc. CSCE/CDHP. 28,19 
June 1989. 
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penalty in peacetime, 187 but two days after this proposal was submitted, the 
delegations of Austria, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, submitted 
a juxtaposed proposal which did not include a call for progressive abolition in 
peacetime. 1 88 It appeared that with the absence of the call for progressive abolition 
in the Copenhagen Document, that the second proposal was adopted, and this 
refusal to call the states to abolition has continued through to the adoption of the 
OSCE's 2006 report on the death penalty. 
Selected participating states have also refused to make available data on the 
application of the capital judicial system, and this is in violation of the Copenhagen 
Document. In 2000, the ODIHR noted that the governments of "Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, regard the information 
relating to capital punishment as a state secret and refuse to disclose relevant 
material -a practice that is in clear contradiction to paragraph 17.8 of the 
Copenhagen Document. ""' More recently, it was noted in the 2005 Report on the 
187 Abolition of the Death Penalty, Proposal Submitted by the Delegation of 
Portugal, and those of 
Belgium, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Romania, San 
Marino, Spain and Switzerland, OSCE Doc. CSCE/CHDC. 18,6 June 
1990. 
"' Abolition of the Death Penalty, Proposal Submitted by the Delegates ofAustria, 
Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, OSCE Doc. CSCE/CHDC. 13,8 
June 1990. 
189 'The Death Penalty in the OSCE Area, ' ODIHR background paper prepared 
for the seminar on 27 
March, 2000, Human Rights and Inhuman Treatment or Punishment, cited 
in Schabas, above, fn. 
183, p. 301. 
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death penalty that Albania and Tajikistan did not respond to the ODIHR's 
questionnaire for the dissemination of information on the death penalty. 190 
The OSCE is attempting to ensure that the dialogue on the death penalty continues. 
It places human rights considerations at the forefront to attempt to persuade 
retentionist participating states. Furthermore, in not requiring participating states to 
nil U00lish the death penalty as a prerequisite for membership, the organisation is 
encouraging a constructive dialogue which does not force retentionist states away. 
As such the process adopted by the OSCE can be seen to be more compatible with 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, rather than the Parliamentary 
Assembly. 
The OSCE approach reflects an engagement with the state right of the death 
penalty, and it seems the role of human rights is not immediately e ctive in 
renouncing the sovereign right of the punishment. However it does promote a 
discourse which can be used to encourage the state in making the decision to 
remove the punishment from its laws. 
7.7 Conclusion 
The fact that the Council is now a de facto abolitionist region means that as a 
human 
rights project, it has been extremely successful. Through the strategies adopted 
by 
190 OSCE/ODIHR, The Death Penalty in the OSCE Area. - Background Paper 
2005, (Warsaw: OSCE, 
2005), p. 13. 
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the Committee and the Assembly the death penalty has been removed. But if the 
surface of this success is scratched, there are identifiable areas of concern. Firstly, 
the proximity of the Committee to the Member States ensures that the sovereign 
issues of the governments will always manifest. This has been intricately displayed 
in the previous chapter on the issues of the amendment of Article 2 and in this 
chapter, we have seen it occur within the establishment of prerequisites for 
membership. 
Furthermore, the issue of the sovereign state's right to choose for itself whether or 
not to implement the death penalty, has been seen in the example of Russia. Russia 
has been a thom in the side of the Council through its refusal to ratify Protocol No. 
6. Both the Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers have 
"repeatedly urged the Russian Federation to ratify Protocol No. 6, thus making the 
Council of Europe a de jure death penalty free zone, and will continue to follow 
progress towards ratification. "' 91 There is a symbolic importance to Russia's 
ratification as it would produce a universal legal statement within the Council 
region. Without it the Council cannot make the claim that it has achieved de jure 
abolition of the punishment for all Member States. 
The Council has also exported its discourse against the death penalty. 
This is 
significant for two main reasons. Firstly, it displays that the 
Council has confidence 
191 Position of the Parliamentary Assembly as regards the Council of 
Europe member and observer 
states with have not abolished the death penalty, Parliamentary 
Assembly Recommendation 1760 
(2006), Reply adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 31 January 
2007, at the 985t" meeting of the 
Ministers' Deputies, CM/AS(2007)Rec 1760 final, 2 February 2007, para 
2. 
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in what it has achieved internally. Secondly, the successes which have been 
witnessed internationally, demonstrates that the human rights discourse has 
hegemonic force in the international arena and it is being utilised to restrict the 
sovereign application of the punishment. 
The Council has supported the EU in its various global initiatives, especially with 
the passing of the Resolution on the Moratorium on the use of the death penalty in 
December 2007 in the United Nations General Assembly. This was a landmark 
victory for all abolitionists around the world, and both the European Union and the 
Council of Europe played an important role in the passing of this motion. The 
amicus curiae briefs filed in the United States Supreme Court have also been 
effective in restricting the capital judicial system. What can be seen is that whereas 
the Council has not been effective in persuading the United States from abolishing 
the punishment for a requirement as an observer state, it has been effective in 
helping ensure that the United States cannot execute mentally retarded inmates or 
juvenile offenders. 
As a whole, the promotion of abolition within the expansion of Europe and the 
exporting of the discourse can be seen to be very effective. The nature of the 
discourse with its relationship with sovereignty, as discussed throughout this thesis 
is changing. There have been some essential shifts within the political relationships 
which locate the power and right to use the death penalty. The conclusion to this 
thesis will now review the work considered and evaluate the solidity of the project 
which the Council has constructed against this penal practice. 
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Chapter Eight: 
Conclusion: The Removal of the Death Penalty as a Continuous 
Human Rights Project 
8. qonclusion: The Removal of the Death Penalty as a 
Continuous Human Rights Project 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter is divided into three parts. In Part One, the preceding chapters are 
reviewed and a genealogy is summarised which demonstrates that a legal and 
political change has occurred with regards to the death penalty. A penological 
evolution has been witnessed whereby the death penalty, which was viewed as a 
legitimate punishment during the creation of the Council and the drafting of the 
Convention, now appears to be an illegitimate punishment. This shift occurred 
firstly within Western European states by 198 1, and then was developed by the 
Council and encompassed by the Central and Eastern European countries following 
expansion which began in 1994. 
In Part Two, the solidity of the Council's abolitionist discourse is analysed with the 
possibility of the return of the death penalty being considered. The theoretical and 
normative approaches to the sovereign state right of the punishment, and the 
relationship of law and the death penalty, are outlined. It will be questioned whether 
the gqnealogy charted in this thesis has now rendered it impossible for the death 
penalty to return, or whether there are exceptional circumstances in which the 
punishment may be restored. 
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Finally, in Part Three the current Council strategy and discourse against the death 
penalty is considered and its function is questioned with regards to the maintaining 
of the removal of the punishment in the Council and its Member States. It is argued 
that for the continual abolition of the death penalty, the human rights standards and 
political philosophy promoted by the Council must be seen as an ever evolving 
political and legal project. As such, this conclusion to the thesis is that the 
hegemonic Council anti-death penalty discourse should never be treated with 
complacency. For it to remain effective regionally and globally, there must be 
effective arguments placed against those movements for the death penalty to 
reappear in response to the fear of violence. 
8.2 The Evolving Political and Legal Mandate Against the Death Penalty 
The genealogy explored in this thesis reveals, essentially, a change in the 
acceplance of the death penalty by the Member States and the organs of the Council 
of Europe in 1949, to the opinion which now views the death penalty to be 
illegitimate. I At the creation of the Council of Europe the Statute facilitated the 
acceptance of the death penalty. Chapter Two demonstrated that the punishment 
was intricately woven within Statute Article I which promoted a European 
"common heritage. " The Statute mirrored the Enlightenment social contract theory 
As Sangmin Bae has observed, "[flhe focus shifted from the state's right to kill to a citizen's right 
z 
not to be executed by the state, " in When the State No Longer Kills: International Human 
Rights 
Norms and Abolition of Capital Punishment, (Albany: SUNY, 2007), p. 2. 
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and also the vast historical heritage of the punishment from the polity of Ancient 
Greece to the mid Twentieth Century European nation states. 
Further support can be seen as the Statute manifested the principles of internal 
jurisdiction of nation states, and the process of international relations laid down in 
the Treaty of Westphalia three hundred years earlier. 2 As a consequence the 
provisions for allowing European governments to formulate municipal capital laws 
were present at the genesis of the European human rights regime. The possibility of 
the punishment was also provided under the Statute Article 3 identification of the 
"rule of law: " as the death penalty was a legal sanction it was implicitly accepted. 
These z affirming legal and political mechanisms were then interwoven within the 
drafting of the Convention and thus facilitated the insertion of the punishment into 
the text of Article 2(l). The punishment was also not considered to be a violation of 
the prohibition of inhuman punishment under Article 3. In his work on sovereignty 
post 1989, Jacques Derrida, the French philosopher, aptly summed up this initial 
legislative position when he identified that the original texts of the international 
human rights instruments following World War Two: 
have remained, at least in their letter, highly precarious ... in a word we can say 
that they relied on a "right to life" whose concept and axiom are more than 
problematic ... with the 
best intentions in the world, [the drafters] had to stop at 
Immanuel Kant had also identified the benefits of an international social contract 
in his Perpetual 
Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in H. S. Reiss (ed), Kant: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1970). 
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the threshold of the sovereignty and right of exception of states - whom they 
only advised not to practice the death penalty expect in an exceptional way 
and according to legal procedures protecting the rights of the accused 
[emphasis in original]. 3 
The extracts from the travaux preparatoires in Chapter Two supports Derrida's 
observation. Such advice was a demonstration that the drafters of the Convention 
were not completely happy with the death penalty, but following war there was an 
overriding political sentiment that it was required for defence and the punishment of 
war criminals. Although following the atrocious devaluing of human life in war, this 
sentiment was not felt by all. 
However, even before the war, it would not be completely correct to argue that this 
punishment was universally accepted. In the British Select Committee on Capital 
Punishment in 1930, various European governments were recorded as stating 
categorically that they did not believe that the death penalty was necessary for the 
4 
general protection of their state . But the execution of war criminals 
following 
World War Two can be seen to be implemented under exceptional, but legitimate, 
circumstances. 
Jacques Derrida, 'Death Penalties, ' p. 153, in Jacques Derrida and Elizabeth Roudinesco, For What 
Tomorrow 
... A Dialogue, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004). 
4 See tlýe testimony from Belgium, Denmark and Sweden in, Report of the Select Committee on 
1" 
Capital Punishment 1930 (London: HMSO, 1930), pp. 257,353,358, and the conclusion that the 
death penalty may be abolished in the United Kingdom without "endangering life or property, or 
impairing the security of society, " at p. xcvi. 
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It was not a politically opportune time for the drafters of the Convention to legislate 
the abolition of the punishment, and here the influence of the United Kingdom was 
significant. As an Allied victor against the Nazis, the British government endorsed 
the executions of war criminals and thus any anti-death penalty provision within the 
Convention would have been incompatible with the hegemonic Allied political 
sentiment. What is also significant, as argued in Chapter Three, is that Denmark, 
Iceladxl, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, West Germany and Sweden, which did not 
impose the death penalty for ordinary criminal offences, were silent in the 
Convention drafting debates, and are not recorded as questioning the incorporation 
of the punishment within Article 2(l). 
Other issues were debated, such as the prohibition of torture, but the death penalty 
appeared to have unanimous acceptance. What this demonstrates is that at the 
beginning of the Convention system, even though the states were beginning to 
remove the death penalty from their own systems, the governments wanted to make 
the penal decisions and choose for themselves the extent of punishment. They did 
not, yet, want to allow a supra-national body dictate policy on the death penalty. 
This i"ndependence of choice was then explored in Chapter Three which considered 
the removal of the death penalty from Western European countries. Such use of the 
death penalty post-World War Two reveals that the punishment was thought of as 
an exclusive issue for the European states. But there was an evolution 
in sentiment, 
both 'olitical and legal. What occurred was that by 1981, the Western European p 
governments had all abandoned the death penalty for ordinary criminal offences. 
In 
effect, although the states were reserving for themselves the right to choose 
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punishment as a manifestation of internal jurisdiction, they had independently 
chosen not to impose the punishment. This penological development had occurred 
without any centralised position on the punishment by the Council. Significantly, 
this change occurred outside of any human rights instruments, but was implemented 
politically and through a renunciation of the utilitarian arguments for the 
punishment. 
Chapter Four investigated how the death penalty then became encompassed by the 
Council as a human rights issue. This can be seen as an initiation of catch-up with 
the Western European position. Initially, the Council organs adopted the 
punishment as a political issue reserved for the Member States to be implemented 
within their domestic, and colonial, jurisdictions. 
In 1957 the Sub-Committee of the European Commission of Human Rights in 
Greece v. the United Kingdom, concerned inter alia, the application of emergency 
provisions during colonial rule of Cyprus. The death penalty was used during the 
1956,.. Cypriot revolt, but the Commission did not specifically adjudicate on the 
punishment, but held that under Convention Article 15 the general actions of the 
United Kingdom government were permissible. Hence, the death penalty was 
considered a paramount political issue over any human rights considerations. 
Furthý, rrnore, the first European Committee on Crime Problems report on the death 
penalty in 1962 did not consider the death penalty as a human rights issue, but 
focused on the punishment as a municipal state question-5 As such, the report 
' Marc Ancel, The Death Penalty in Europe, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1962). 
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predominately was concerned with collecting data on the legislation of capital 
crimes in European. 
It should also be stated that in the 1950s the seedlings for a regional rejection of the 
punishment sprouted. The Convention on Extradition was debated and drafted and it 
came, *,, into force in 1960. Although it provided a multilateral procedure for 
restricting the death penalty, it was not specifically attached to human rights 
standards, but to the political processes of negotiation within extradition 
proceedings. Hence, it did not make a substantial contribution to the death penalty 
being'--, a human rights issue, but it was significant because, under Article 11, this 
Convention was the first regional document to provide for the restriction of the 
punishment within the Council and its Member States. 
The t1de then turned markedly when in 1973 Miss Astrid Bergegren, a Swedish 
Parliamentarian within the Parliamentary Assembly, presented a motion for the 
11 U. 
6 
abolition of the death penalty. Although 
her efforts, and those of the rapporteur 
Bertil Lidgard, who presented a report in 1975 building upon the first motion, did 
not directly bear fruit at this time, they laid a platform which was 
later successfully 
implemented. 
The first specific measures to challenge the punishment within the 
Council Member 
States', which was adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly, came 
in 1980. The then 
6 Motionfor a resolution on the abolition of capital punishment 
(Doc. 3297), Legal Affairs 
Committee, 8th sitthng, 18 May 1973. 
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rapporteur, Carl Lidbom, authored a report 7 that produced the platfonn for Protocol 
No. 6, which significantly restricted the death penalty as it abolished it in times of 
peace. What is significant for this period was that the Statute identification of 
"comTon heritage" was now changing from one which accepted the death penalty 
to one which did not. In the debates of Lidbom's 1980 report he stated, "[w]hat 
therefore remains for us to make is a political choice based on those values which 
form our common heritage. ,8 
Then in 1989 came the landmark decision in Soering v. the United Kingdom, 9 where 
the European Court of Human Rights delivered an intricate decision which held that 
human rights provisions can be utilised to curtail the death penalty. Issues such as 
the extraterritoriality of the Convention when extradition proceedings include 
capital charges, the death row phenomenon, the quality of the capital judicial system 
in requesting states, the age and mental condition of the defendant, and the 
application of these within Convention Articles 2(l) and 3, and the significance of 
Proto, col No. 6 were considered. 
Soering displayed that the Court affirmed the development of the human rights 
discourse of the Parliamentary Assembly. Through this decision, the Assembly now 
had a., precedent and judicial argument for the general promotion of abolition. 
Report on the abolition of capital punishment, Doc. 4509, text adopted at the 
2 Id and 3 rd sittings, 22 
April 1980. 
8Parliamentary Assembly, official Report of Debates, 32'dOrdinary Session, Abolition of capital 
punishment, Debate on the report of the Legal Affairs Committee, 
Doc, 4509 and amendments, (2 nd 
and 3d Sittings), 22 April 1980, p. 53. 
Soering v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 1403 
8/8 8,19 January 1989. 
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Although the intricate differences between the Assembly and Court's approaches to 
Articles 2(1) and 3 were discussed in Chapters Five and Six, what can be observed 
as a general principle is that both the Assembly and the Court agreed that human 
rights, and particularly the Convention, provided a legal mechanism to curtail the 
punishment. History reveals that the Court has, on the whole, utilised Article 3 in 
holding that capital suspects cannot be extradited, that the conditions on death row 
are inhuman in certain circumstances, that a death sentence following an unfair 
capital trial is prohibited, and that with the almost universal ratification of Protocol 
No. 6, the punishment in peacetime is inhuman. 
Furthermore, the signatures and ratifications of Protocol No. 13, which abolished 
the death penalty in all circumstances, have now confirmed this abolitionist 
discourse, both from the centralised position of the Council and also, from the 
perspective on the Member States. Significantly, as detailed in Chapter Seven, this 
U 
abolitionist discourse has also been accepted within Central and Eastem Europe, 
and is also being exported globally. The Council is promoting a norm of abolition 
both within its boarders and externally. 
%6 
This is nothing short of a penological revolution. But it is not merely confined to 
penology. We must return to the political philosophical considerations of the 
Enlightenment social contract, and the issues of international relations and 
sociological enquiry, which identifies the internal jurisdiction mandated at the 
Treaty of Westphalia. The Enlightenment social contract must now be read as being 
modified as a result of the Council's anti-death penalty discourse. We need to recall 
why the Enlightenment philosophers legitimised the citizens transferring to the 
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sovereign the right to life or more appropriately, the right to judicially kill them. 
The essential reason was that in giving the sovereign the right to life, the sovereign 
in return would have the power to protect their lives. The paradox was that, because 
of the need for law and order, and also, to prevent threats to the state and sovereign, 
the ruler must have the right to kill. 
Michel Foucault engaged with Rousseau's argument, "in putting the guilty to death, 
we slay not so much the citizen as an enerny"10 and recognised that during the 
Enlightenment the purpose of punishment had shifted from the "vengeance of the 
sovereign to the defence of the state. "" This followed Thomas Hobbes' 2 and John 
Locke 13 who both advocated a variation on the same theme: the sovereign can 
reserve the right to life and death. However, the circumstances in which the death 
penalty can be applied were greatly confined by the philosophers, and although they 
endor sed the death penalty within the general criminal law, they thought that the 4ý 
punishment was most significantly legitimised by circumstances when the defence 
of the state was threatened, and thus imposed in an act of self-defence. 
What is not revealed by most abolitionist scholars is that the great Enlightenment 
humanist Cesare Beccaria also reserved the death penalty for such national self- 
defence when he stated that the death penalty can be imposed on individual(s) 
10 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'The Social Contract, ' p. 209, in The Social Contract and Discourses, 
(trans: G. D. H. Cole) (London: Everyman, 2004). *A 
11 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish. - The Birth of the Prison, (London: Penguin, 1976), p. 90. 
12 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Oxford: Oxford University Press), Chapter 2 1, para 7. 
13 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, (ed: C. B. Macpherson) (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing, 1980), p. 8. 
362 
"when though deprived of his liberty, he has such power and connections as may 
endanger the security of the nation. " 14 This Enlightenment social contract clause on 
the right to life was reflected in the Convention drafting debates when in the First 
Session of the Consultative Assembly, Mr. Maccus, the Greek representative and 
Mr. Maxwell-Fyfe, the United Kingdom representative, spoke of the need for the 
state to be able to defend itself against tyrants. ' 5 
As we move away from 1949-50, the perspectives on the social contract shifted. The 
Council has contributed to both peace in Europe and also to the demise of the death 
penalty, and as such, it has rendered the political and social circumstances 
inapplicable for the legitimate application of the punishment. Foucault analysed the 
social contract theory and asked at the coming together of the individuals to form 
the sovereign for self-preservation, whether, "can life actually become one of the 
rM rights`ýof the sovereign. The answer appears to be that during the Enlightenment 
the transfer of the right to juýdicially kill was thought necessary. 
The human rights discourse which argues that the death penalty is a violation of the 
right to life and also that it is inhuman punishment, coupled with the governments 
signatures and ratifications of Protocol No. 6 and Protocol No. 13 indicate that the 
governments are agreeing that they no longer have the right of the death penalty and 
as a result, it is developing into a human rights norm with political acceptance. As 
14 Cesare Beccaria, An Essay on Crimes and Punishment, (Chicago: Branden Press, 1983), Chapter 
28. 
15 TP, 1, p. 108,120. 
16 Michel Foucault, Society Must be Defended, (trans: David Macey) (London: Penguin, 2003), p. 
241. 
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such the Council has modified the Enlightenment social contract and through its 
human rights discourse it has renounced this theoretical approach which attaches the 
right of capital punishment for ordinary criminal offences to the sovereign. Council 
Member States can no longer create capital legislation in peacetime, and it is the 
intention of the organisation that the Member States should also not have recourse 
to the punishment in wartime either. 
Furthermore, the Parliamentary Assembly can also be seen as challenging the state's 
monopoly of internal jurisdiction to create municipal capital laws as established 
within the Treaty of Westphalia, and also the sociological observation on this Point 
made by Max Weber. Within the Westphalian tradition, Weber identified that states 
possess "the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in a given territory. " 17 
In this specific construct, Weber had not incorporated the mechanisms of supra- 
nationalism and the effects of regionalism on such territorial monopolies. 
However, the European historical common heritage, outlined in Chapter Two, 
reveats that such legitimate physical force could include the death penalty. 
Following the evolution of the Council's discourse against the punishment, and the 
state's acceptance of this, the important words here are "monopoly" and 
"legitimacy. " The question arises as to once the sovereign state joins the Council to 
what extent has it relinquished its monopoly to decide whether or not to impose the 
death penalty. Caroline Ravaud and Stephen Trechsel have argued that "the 
Convention, like many international legal instruments, is a pledge of good conduct 
17 Max Weber, 'Politics as a Vocation, ' p. 87, in From Max Weber, (ed, H. H. Gerth and C. Wright 
Mills) (London: Routledge, 1991). 
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given by states, at which in theory, have a monopoly on the lawful use of 
violence. 9ý18 So adopting the Convention and ratifying Protocol No. 6 suggests that 
the abolition of the death penalty is consistent with a "pledge of good conduct. " 
The research presented within this study indicates that the states do play a 
prominent role in determining the renunciation of the death penalty. Once Member 
States have signed and ratified Protocol No. 6 and Protocol No. 13 they have 
surreýdered the monopoly to decide capital punishment: and as such departed from 
the orthodox Westphalian position. 19 The only way they can get the monopoly back 
is to renounce membership and leave the Council. However, this would be a 
politically and economically difficult decision to make. For some countries,, 
merntership of the Council rendered possible membership of the European Union 
and the political and economic benefits with it. No country has hither-to renounced 
its membership in order to reintroduce the death penalty. 
The qext issue is one of "legitimacy. " The Parliamentary Assembly has declared 
that the "death penalty has no legitimate place in the penal systems of modem 
civilised societies. , 20 How is the term "legitimacy" to be imputed into the discourse 
"Caroline Ravaud and Stephen Trechsel, 'The death penalty and the case-law of the institutions of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, ' p. 80, in Council of Europe, The Death Penalty: 
Beyond Abolition, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2004). 
19 In a different context, Bill Bowring has also identified fora of international law where the 
Westphalian model has now been departed from, see, The Degradation of the International Legal 
Order? The Rehabilitation ofLaw and the Possibility of Politics, (Abington: Routledge-Cavendish, 
2008), p. 59. 
20 Report, above, fn. 7. p. I 
365 
against the punishment? The term is not specifically used within Convention 
Articles 2(1) and 3, but it has been juxtaposed with the Assembly's analysis of 
Articlg 3. This Article is now viewed through a new notion of European values 
which advocates that the death penalty is not "legitimate. " By creating a new human 
rights position the Assembly has strengthened the prohibition of inhuman and 
degrading punishment. 
This rhetoric was adopted by the rapporteur, Renate Wohlwend when she affirmed 
the 1994 position in a 2001 Resolution which stated: 
that the death penalty has no legitimate place in the penal systems of modem z 
civilised societies, and that its application constitutes torture and inhuman and 
degrading punishment within the meaning of Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 21 
There appears to be no turning back from the Parliamentary Assembly's exclaiming 
that the death penalty is illegitimate, and this argument has been repeated like a 
mantra within successive Reports and Resolutions. 
22 The Assembly is seeking to 
develop a new human rights norm against the death penalty. Costas Douzinas 
has 
21 European Convention on Human Rights - Draft Protocol No. 13 on abolition of the 
death penalty 
in all circumstances, Assembly Doc. 9291 14 December 2001. 
22 See, Resolution 1349 (2003) Abolition of the death penalty in Council of Europe observer states, 
text adopted by the Assembly on I October 2003 (3 00' sitting); Report, 
Position of the Parliamentary 
4 
Assembly as regards the Council of Europe member and observer states which 
have not abolished 
the death penalty, Doc. 10911,21 April 2006; Promotion 
by Council of Europe member states of an 
international moratorium on the death penalty, Doc. 11321,25 
June 2007. 
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specifically observed that "human rights have the ability to create new worlds, by 
pushing and expanding the boundaries of society, identity and law. ý923 The 
Assembly is expanding the boundaries of the Council's human rights discourse, and 11 
has taken the reach of the arguments and policies away from a literal extraction of 
the Convention text. 
Chapter Seven then considered the further expansion of the boundaries of the 1ý 
Council's discourse to the joining Central and Eastern European states post 1994, 
and then to the internationalizing of the discourse through the Council's joining the 
EU and the OSCE in their abolition initiatives. 
During the Council's expansion it has been demonstrated that the anti-death penalty 
discourse has, on the whole, been successful. With some exceptions, most notably 
the Ukraine with its imposition of executions in its first two years of membership 
and Russia's stalwart refusal to ratify Protocol No. 6, expansion has led to a 
widening of the abolition sphýere. This is a testimony to the legitimacy of the 
Council's anti-death penalty position. The Council is also continuously monitoring 
the Member State's renunciation of the punishment, and the consequence of 
enlarqement has resulted in a greater acceptance and agreement with the anti-death 
4 
penalty position. 
23 Costas Douzinas, The End ofHuman Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the 
Turn of the Century, 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000), p. 343. 
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Fatimd Aburto Baselga has affirmed that "the Council of Europe should closely 
cooperate with other international organisations, ýý24 in the promotion of abolition. 
The Council has joined with the EU and the OSCE. Both these associations reveal 
that the international initiative against the death penalty is still a necessary project. 
The results within the OSCE have been limited, but the supporting of the Resolution 
for a moratorium on the use of the death penalty, which was adopted in the United 
Nations General Assembly on 18 December 2007 was a great success. 25 This was a 
remarkable achievement because this resolution marked the first time the General 
Assembly had supported a call for a worldwide moratorium. Furthermore, the 
Coun6il has joined the European Union in filing amicus curaie briefs into the 
United States Supreme Court, and the Court used the briefs to support its majority 
holdings that it was a violation of the Eighth Amendment to execute the mentally 
retardeC' 126 and also juvenile offenders. 
27 
The arguments against the death penalty in the international arena are still required 
and so too is an affirming discourse within the Council's region. 
There have been 
some strong, and some tentative, political attempts to reintroduce 
the punishment. 
'6 
We now consider these briefly below. 
24 Promotion by Council of Europe member states of an international moratorium on 
the death 
penalty, Doc. 11321,25 June 2007, Political 
Affairs Committee: Rapporteur for Opinion: Mrs. 
Fdtima Aburto Baselga, para. 4. 
25 Moratorium, above, fn. 1. 
26 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304 (2002). 
27 Rqpýr v. Simmons, 543 U. S. 551 (2005). 
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8.3. The Jurisprudence of Isolating and Renouncing the Exceptional Case 
Perceived threats to public order such as in times of war, during high crime rates or 
terrorist violence, sometimes create a sentiment for harsh punishments as a 
response. 28 As such it appears that the possibility of the return of the death penalty 
is an ýpvent which the Council will have to continually guard against. In Ocalan v. 
Turkey, Judge Garlicki stated in his Partly Concurring, Partly Dissenting opinion 
that: 
it may be true that the history of Europe demonstrates that there have been 
wars, like the Second World War, during which (or after which) there was 
justification for capital punishment ... 
it would be rather nalve to believe that if 
a war of a similar magnitude was to break out again, the Convention as a 
whole would be able to survive, even if concessions were made with regard to 
29 
capital punishment . 
Judge Garlicki's opinion here provides the exceptional circumstance where the 
deathýpenalty may have "justification. " He attempted to mark the threshold of the 
Convention system and argues that the power of the Convention resides in a 
28 Conor Gearty identified that within the British Constitutional tradition that "where there has never 
been a"Civil liberty to incite to kill, it has always been possible to campaign for the restoration 
[or 
extension] of the death penalty, " in Principles ofHuman Rights Adjudication 
(Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), p. 36. 
29 Ocalan v. Turkey, Application no. 46221/99, [GC] judgment, 12 
May. 2005, Partly Concurring, 
Partly Dissenting Judgment of Judge Garlicki. 
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peaceful equilibrium maintained in Europe. As such wars of the "magnitude" of 
World War Two have the potential to nullify the abolitionist mandate. 
The key point here is the possible reintroduction of the death penalty through 
44concessions. " It appears that the judge had in mind political concessions which 
would allow for the suspension of the Council's supervisory machinery, and/or 
extensive legal derogation under Convention Article 15. Jacques Derrida has 
identified a similar situation when he stated, "the abolition of the death penalty in 
any given society is always a contingent thing. It might be brought back at any time, 
depending on the state of political consensus . ', 
30 Adam Thurschwell similarly 
identified that the return of the death penalty depends upon political events as he 
argues that the punishment is "always ready to bubble up as a political option under 
the pressure of a particularly heinous crime or a political threat to the state. 31 
In response to the above arguments, the Council has adopted Protocol No. 6 and 
Protocol No. 13 which abolish the punishment in all circumstances, and provide a 
legal removal of the punishment. It is appropriate to analyse the use of the word 
"abolition" within the dialogue between the Parliamentary Assembly and the 
Committee of Ministers, and also the adoption of the word in Protocol No. 6 and 
Protocol No. 13. 
Jacques Derrida stated thisduring a seminar on the death penalty at Cardozo Law 
School, as 
recorded by Kyron Huigens, Derrida on the Death Penalty, Cardozo Life, 
Winter 200 1, p. 23, 
www. cardozo. net/life/winter2OO] /derrida 
1 Adam Thurschwell, 'Ethical Exception: Capital Punishment in the Figure of Sovereignty, 
' in 
Final Judgments, Austin Sarat and Jennifer Culbert, (ed) Killing States: Lethal Decisions, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 15 forthcoming. 
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The Latin etymological meaning of "abolition" derives from aboleri which means 
"to destroy, annihilate, " and it appears that the Council is advancing a principled 
position using the Protocols to identify that the Punishment can be abolished 
forever. Specific examples from Parliamentary Assembly documents can be seen 
including the citing of Albert Camus's ideological statement, "in the unified Europe 
of the future the solemn abolition of the death penalty ought to be the first article of 
32 the European Code we all hope for. " 
Such sentiments have been endorsed within Assembly reports. For instance, a 2006 
Report stated, "[c]apital punishment must be totally removed once and for all from 
the legislation of all countries which strive to uphold democracy, the rule of law and 
,, 33 human rights. Renate Wohlwend noted in her final report before retiring as 
rapporteur for the Parliamentary Assembly that, "[i]t is taking a long time to bring 
1-1'k about abolition of the death penalty, " and that "the anxieties felt by the Assembly 
,, 34 for the last decade remain. These statements are symptomatic of the principled 
position of once-abolished-alwa -abolished. But such a finite, immemorial, 
32 Albert Camus, Reflections on the Guillotine, p. 230, in Albert Camus, Resistance, Rebellion, and 
Death, (trans: Justin O'Brien)(New York: Vintage Press, 1988). Renate Wohlwend noted that 
Camus's phrase was quoted in some reports presented to the Parliamentary Assembly, and that some 
parliamentarians recited it in debates, see, Renate Wohlwend, The Role of the Council of 
Europe's 
Parliamentary Assembly, p. 84, in Council of Europe, Death Penalty Beyond Abolition, 
(Strasbourg: 
Council of Europe Publishing, 2004). 
33 Position, above, fn. 22, para. 1. 
34 
ibid, para 49-50. 
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position appears to be misguided, because it relies upon the law being unalterable, 
when in fact the law changes to reflect evolving societal sentiment. 
To ffilly understand how to situate the above observations within the Council's 
discourse, we must undertake a deeper jurisprudential enquiry on the relationship of 
law and the death penalty. Article 2(l) revealed that in Europe in 1949-50, the death 
penalty and rule of law were considered to be an important measure of sovereignty, 
whiS enabled the sovereign to be prepared for conflict. Foucault expressed the law 
and death penalty relationship as the law being "armed. " He stated, "[I]aw cannot 
help but be armed, and its arm par excellence is death. qiM For Maurice Blanchot: 
TtIhe law reveals itself for what it is: less the command that has death as its 
sanction, than death itself wearing the face of the law ... Death is always the 
horizon of the law: if you do this you will die. It kills whoever does not 
observe it. 
36 
Blanchot sought to describe death as a phenomenon of law, and even if the death 
penalty is suspended to its furthest horizon the condemnation remains. Peter 
Fitzpatrick has extended Blanchot's horizon, to attach it to positive law, as he 
%I 
argues "[d]eath is a horizon that cannot be gone beyond, " because the "'truth' of 
positive law, then, is to be found in death. ý537 In essence, what Fitzpatrick maintains 
35 Michel Foucault, The Will to Knowledge. - The I-Iistoty ofSexuality, vol I (trans: Robert Hurley) 
(Penguin, 1976), p. 144. 
36 Mautice Blanchot, The Step Not Beyond, (New York: SUNY Press, 1992) p. 24-25. 
37 Fitzpatrick, Modernism, p. 100. See also, Peter Fitzpatrick, Death as the Horizon of the Law, p. 2 1, 
in Desmond Manderson, (ed) Courting Death. - The Law ofMorality, (London: Pluto Press, 1999). 
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is that if death marks the ultimate event visited upon society and the state, nothing 
but the law must meet death at this ultimate limit, "[flor law to rule, it has to be able 
to do anything, if not everything. It has to ensure that law is ever responsive to 
change, otherwise law will eventually cease to rule the situation which has changed 
around it.,, 
38 
Fitzpatrick has described a further phenomenological component of law in that it 
possesses a transcendent quality as it is, "hovering ubiquitously over and incipiently 
occupying all finitudes, in its being ever able to 'cut' into, and render palpable, its 
own infinite possibility. , 39 According to Fitzpatrick, for law not to kill would be to 
deny the "infinite possibility" of law, and render defunct its ability to "cut" into 
prevailing or approaching vicissitudes. As a consequence he states, "any argument 
that law and capital punishment are incompatible must appear quixotic when 
confronted with those cogent claims that they are, rather, eminently suited. ý40 
These philosophical positions point to the potentiality of law. Fitzpatrick views the 
phenomenon of law as a reaction to external pressures aimed at it, such as the 
catastrophic events of war. Law must curtail all threats to survive. It would 
ultimately depend upon the murder rate, or serious crime rate, and what European 
'8 Peter Fitzpatrick, Modernism and the Grounds ofLaw, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), 
" , 
p. 71. 
4 
39 
ibid, p. 133. 
40 Peter Fitzpatrick, "Always More to Do ". - Capital Punishment and the (De)Composition of Law, p. 
118, in Austin Sarat (ed), The Killing State: Capital Punishment in Law, Politics and Culture, 
(New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
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society perceives as the maintenance of a peaceful, secure, equilibrium, for the law 
to mahdate the death penalty or not. 
However, this is not the whole story. It should also be argued that the law does not 
have to reach its potential to rule situations and promote legitimate governmental 
action'. Austin Sarat, the American death penalty scholar, argued that law does not 
41 need to reach its threshold of death . The Council's discourse against the 
punishment would be in complete agreement. Indeed, the theory which is proposed 
above has been tested throughout the evolution of the Council's discourse against 
the punishment. Below are some practical examples of the attempted return of the 
death penalty within the Council and the Member States. It should be appreciated 
that the Council's anti-death penalty discourse has, so far, prevented municipal law 
reaching its deathly threshold. 
In June 2007, the Parliamentary Assembly noted that Russia still had not ratified 
Protocol No. 6,42 and Chapter Six has argued that such refusal is an example of the 
difficulties within Central and Eastern Europe to expediently relinquish the 
punishment. Protocol No. 13 has still not been signed by Azerbaijan and the 
41 Austin Sarat, When the State Kills. - Capital Punishment and the American Condition, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 33. 
42 Resolutions 1455 (2005), 1277 (2002) and 1187 (1999), in all of which the Parliamentary 
Assembly repeated appeals to the Russian authorities on the matter of the abolition of the death 
penalty, urging them to ratify immediately Protocol No. 6. The Assembly points out that the deadline 
initiall set for honouring this commitment passed in 1999. 
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Russi'an Federation, and the protocol has not been ratif 43 ied by Poland, and Spain. 
Albania and Latvia have abolished the death penalty only for ordinary crimes, as 
they have retained the punishment for crimes with aggravating circumstances 
committed in wartime, and in the case of Albania during a state of emergency. 44 
Furthermore, the Parliamentary Assembly was particularly unnerved by a French 
National Assembly debate, on 8 April 2004, for the reintroduction of the death 
penalty for terrorists. 45 This was a serious challenge to the current removal of the 
death"'Penalty by a leading Council member, which is supposed to be fundamentally 
against the punishment. In challenging the French National Assembly "proposition 
de loi, " members of the Parliamentary Assembly issued a Written Declaration 
stating: 
[a]bolition of the death penalty across Europe is one of the greatest 
achievements of the Council of Europe. Any move to reintroduce it would 
reverse this progress. Once one exception is admitted, the same hollow 
arguments can be rephrased with increased confidence in calling for further 
46 
exceptions . 
4' Resolution 1560 (2007) Promotion by Council of Europe member states of an international 
moratorium on the death penalty, 26h June 2007, para. 13. 
44 Position of the Parliamentary Assembly as regards the Council ofEurope member and observer 
states which have not abolished the death penalty, Doc. 10911,21 April 2006, para. 11 (i) 8. 
45 See, Recent initiative in France to reintroduce the death penaltyfor the perpetrators of terrorist 
acts, Doc. 10211,17 June 2004. 
46 Renate Wohlwend later stated, "On 8 April 2004,48 members of the French National Assembly 
tabled a bill aimed at restoring the death penalty for terrorists. I personally reacted strongly to this 
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The possibility of the reintroduction of the death penalty was clearly a concern. A 
country such as France bringing the punishment back would have severely damaged 
the cr 
I 
edibility of the human rights discourse. The French National Assembly did not 
pass the law to reintroduce the death penalty, but the motion did display a certain 
ambivalence towards the Council's absolutist position. 
Some have argued that there is an underlying sentiment within Europe which calls 
for the reintroduction of the death penalty. They maintain that it is not European 
society which has endorsed this penological development, but European political 
elites. In the Council book on the death penalty published in 1999, three authors 
noted,. a possible political insensitivity in demanding new states swiftly abolish the 
death penalty. 47 Caroline Ravaud and Stephan Trechsel questioned whether the 
social and economic problems encountered in the swift transition to democracy in 
Central and Eastern Europe made it "premature and unrealistic to require them to 
abide by a rule which other European countries had taken decades to adopt. , 48 
idea, and many members of this Assembly joined me in publishing a declaration, (Doc 10211), " in 
4ý, Position of the Parliamentary Assembly as regards the Council of Europe member and observer 
states which have not abolished the death penalty, Doc. 10911,21 April 2006, para. 14. 
47 See, Roger Hood, 'Introduction, ' p. 12. Hood noted the contributions of Caroline Ravaud and 
Stefan Treschel, and Robert Fico, which questioned this expedient penological change, 
in Council of 
Europe, The Death Penalty Abolition in Europe, (Strasburg: Council of Europe Press, 1999). 
48 Caroline Ravaud and Stefan Trechsel, 'The death penalty and the case-law of the 
institutions of the 
European Convention of Human Rights, ' p. 83, in, ibid 
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Furthermore, Robert Fico argued that the quick route to abolition which Slovakia 
49 took did not provide sufficient debate on the punishment within the country. It has 
been argued that the Council promotes a democratic deficit in that the citizens of ilý 
Europe do not decide on appropriate government as the decisions are made centrally 
in a supra-national fonnulation. 'o Joshua Marshall has argued that abolition of the 
death penalty in Europe is not in response to public opinion but "in spite of it. 5ý51 
As an example, the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of 
Ukraine, in 1994, found that 67% of Ukrainians favoured the death penalty, while 
only 17% wanted gradual or immediate abolition. 52 This public support appeared to 
remain constant as in 1995,69% were in support of the punishment, and 16% called 11 
for abolition, and in 1996,63% supported it and 18% wanted abolition. In a review 
of a Gallop Poll on Eatsern Europe, Craig Smith has reported that a majority of 
Europeans would want the return of the death penalty but that "all of the politicians 
pronouncing their desire for a return of capital punishment admit" that the 
punishment will not return and that the statements are "nothing more than political 
49 Robert Fico, 'The death penalty in Slovakia, ' pp. 117-13 0,120-22, ibid 
50 See, Laurence E. Rothenberg, International Law, U. S. Sovereignty, and the Death Penalty, Geo. J. 
In'l L. vol. 3 5, No. 3 (2004) 547-595, at p. 556. 
51 Joshua Micah Marshall, Death in Venice: Europe's Death-Penalty Elitism, The New Republic, 
(July 31,2000), pp. 12-13. In comparing Europe with the United States, Marshall argued, "Europe 
doesn't have the death penalty because its political systems are less democratic, or at least more 
insulated from populist impulses, than in the U. S. govenunent, " p. 13. 
52 Cited in Serhiy Holovatiy, 'Abolishing the death penalty in Ukraine - difficulties real or 
imagined?, ' p. 114-115, in Council of Europe, The Death Penalty: Abolition in Europe (Strasbourg: 
Council of Europe Publishing, 1999). 
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,, 53 gamesmanship. Another example can be seen in the United Kingdom when an 
lCM survey in 200354 claimed that 62% wanted the return of the death penalty for 
child murderers, and 54% wanted the death penalty for all murderers. 
However, such claimed public support has not thwarted the Parliamentary 
Assembly's efforts to create and maintain abolition in Member States. Renate 
Wohlwend noted the success of the abolition program in Central and Eastern 
Europe after 1994: 
[t]he method proved to be efficient, albeit sometimes a little bit difficult on 
countries caught up in a difficult process of democratic transition, with public 
opinions at times disoriented by the speed of political, legal and economic 
change. But in fact the results were there: no candidate country walked away 
from the effort, and in fact or in law, all dropped the death penalty. I already 
mentioned that Russia is unfortunately running behind schedule as regards 
definitive abolition, but I can assure you that the Assembly will not stop 
55 
pushing until its commitment is fulfilled as well . 
53 Graig S. Smith, 'Many in Eatsern Europe support death penalty, ' International Herald Tribune, 20 
November 2006, http: //www. int. com/airticles2OO6/11/20/news/death. php. 
54 It rnýst be identified that the sample size was extremely small with only 1,012 people questioned 
by the ICM survey, see, Colin Brown and David Bamber, 'Shadow Home Secretary: 
Bring back the 
death penalty, ' Daily Telegraph, 16 November 2003. 
" Renate Wohlwend, 'Full text of Speech delivered by Renate Wohlwend (LiechtensteWEPP/CD) 
on the occasion of the 3d World Congress against the Death Penalty, 
' (Paris 1-3 February 2007). 
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Franklin Zimring supported Wohlwend's findings when he stated that "nowhere in 
Europe did the death penalty stay an important political issue for very long after 
abolition. "" These positions argue that there is not to be a deficit at all, and William 
Schabas has argued that the issue of public opinion must be viewed through 
paradox. He maintains that the human rights advocates argue that it is democratic to 
abolish the death penalty, but that politicians argue that the punishment is the "will 
of theýpeople. "' Intrinsic to this paradox is the "myth" of public support as it does 
not manifest into specific political action to change the abolition legislation. Robert 
Jay Lifton and Greg Mitchell have argued that there is a "mythology of decisive, 
unyielding support" for the death penalty. " Roger Hood and William Schabas, 
among others, have identified that there are many problems associated with opinion 
polls on the death penalty, which inter alia, concern the timing of questionnaires 
(for instance following horrific and violent crimes) sample size, sample 
demographics, and the context and focus of questions asked. " As such the elevation 
56 Franklin E. Zimring, The Contradictions ofAmerican Capital Punishment, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), p. 23. The question of general public opinion with reference to evidence for 
the World Coalition Against the Death Penalty, and 'Cities Against the Death Penalty, ' and the 
possible reinstating of the death penalty in Europe, is taken up in Chapter Seven. 
57 Willu tam A. Schabas, 'Public Opinion and the Death Penalty, ' p. 309 in Peter Hodgkinson and 
William A. Schabas, (ed) Capital Punishment: Strategiesfor Abolition, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004). 
58 This is an argument from the perspective of public support in the United States, 
but the same 
position can be used in the European context. See, Robert Jay Lifton and Greg Mitchell, 
Who Owns 
Death. - Capital Punishment, the American Condition and the End ofExecutions, 
(New York: 
Perennial, 2002), p. 213. 
59 Roger Hood, The Death Penalty: A Worldwide Perspective, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), pp. 233-246; Schabas, above, fn. 57, pp. 33 1. 
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of the pedagogy of human rights over the acceptance of published opinion polls, has 
been advocated by the Council in its expansion strategy through Central and Eastern 
Europe. Furthermore, Schabas is in agreement with this policy and firmly argues: 
-, [p]ublic opinion cannot be linked to democratic government in vulgar 
equation. If this were the case, international human rights and constitutions 
would be deemed anti-democratic. Courts, as well as legislators must be more 
aggressive in their role as moulders of public opinion, relying for guidance 
. ppon the values of 
dignity, equality, humane treatment that underpin 
international human rights norms. " 
In not accepting the arguments within Member States that any public outcry is a 
legitimate basis for the reintroduction of the death penalty, the Council is 
advocating this strong ideological position. The Parliamentary Assembly has 
legitimately demonstrated that it represents the "conscience of Europe, 61 in 
promoting abolition, and the governmental signatures and ratifications of Protocols 
No. 6, and No. 13 is testimony to this fact. 
60 ibid, p. 330. 
61 Woh1wend, above, fn. 55, stated that in promoting the abolition of the death penalty, 
"the 
Parliamentary Assembly has ... successfully played 
its role as the Council of Europe's conscience; " 
and Fdtima Aburto Baselga, affirmed, that the Parliamentary Assembly 
"represents the conscience of 
Europe, " in Promotion by Council of Europe member states of an international moratorium on the 
death penalty, Doc. 11321,25 June 2007, Political Affairs Committee, 
Rapporteur for Opinion: Mrs 
Fdtima Aburto Baselga. Approved by the committee, 25 June 2007, para I 
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But he arts and consciences can change. Sigmund Freud reminded us that emotional 
shifts can occur especially when questions of life and death are confronted. 62 Freud 
is useful here when he identified that "[c]onscience is the inner perception of the 
repudiation of a wishful impulse within US. ý963 In his leading work on social theory 
and punishment, David Garland has argued that "sensibilities and mentalities have 
major implications for the ways in which we punish offenders, ýý64 and that societal 
44sensibilities" are a manifestation of a cognitive component of the state. If there are 
powerful enough sentiments which call for the death penalty, it may be re-imposed. 
History has clearly demonstrated that there is an inherent impulse within to resort to 
the death penalty at the threshold of violent circumstances. At the 1980 debates on 
the death penalty within the Parliamentary Assembly, Mr. Mercier of France had 
stated in similar psychoanalytical diagnosis that "[d]eath ... 
is ever present in the 
human mind, despite everything; which everywhere casts so many shadows, 
darkening the brilliant colours of the world. ýý65 As such it should be remembered 
that this development of a European conscience which renounces the impulse is just 
in its neonatal stage: after 5 millennia, we have only had de facto abolition for 
around 10 years. The UN Human Rights Chamber, in the case of Sretko 
Damjanovic, identified that "at this particular moment of development the death 
62 Sigrqund Freud, On Murder, Mourning and Melancholia, (London: Penguin, 2005), pp. 167-194,219-232. 
63 ibid, p. 70. 
64 David Garland, Punishment and Modern Society: A Study in Social Theory, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1990), p. 195. The philosopher Bertrand Russell made a similar observation on the 
prominence of "sentiment" in creating the legitimacy of law, in Power (London: Routledge, 
2005), p. 
25. 
65 Mr. Mercier of France, above, fn 8. p. 55, 
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penalty is regarded as an alien institution within the system of European democratic 
, ý66 values. It is this particular moment that the punishment is considered to be 
repugnant towards European sentimentality and conscience. 
The possibility that the Council itself could change its policy on the death penalty 
should he considered. From the arguments presented in Chapters Five, Six, and 
Seven, the friction between the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary 
Assembly is witnessed on a number of issues including the appropriate method for 
amending Article 2(l), the prerequisites for new membership of the Council, and 
the acceptable human rights standards of Observer States. The Parliamentary 
Assembly has most radically advanced human rights boundaries, but the Committee 
of Whisters has, on many occasions, acted as a buffer and has adopted a very 
cautious approach to the formulation of human rights provisions: one which appears 
to give deference to governmental issues. Renate Wohlwend poignantly explained: 
can assure you that it was not so easy for the Council of Europe to adopt 
Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention on Human Rights, which 
mandates the abolition of the death penalty in peacetime. After all, it is the 
goverm-nents of the member states which dominate the Council's executive 
body, the Committee of Ministers, which has to approve all conventions and 
protocols opened for signature; and the Ministers, as a rule, strive to work 
by 
66 Damjanovi6 v. the Federation ofBosnia and Herzegoniva, Case 
No. CH/96/3 0,5 September 1997, 
Concurring opinion of Viktor Masenko-Mavi and Rona Aybay, para 
3. 
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consensus, and their decisions are often limited to the lowest common 
denominator. 67 
Another possible avenue for return would be if a Member State did not ratify either 
Protocol No. 6 or Protocol No. 13, and it attempted to remedy the defects identified 
within the European Court of Human Rights' decisions on the punishment. As 
demopstrated in Chapters Five and Six, the Court has not held that the death penalty 
is either a per se violation of the right to life under Article 2(l), nor that the 
punishment is a per se violation of the prohibition against inhuman punishment in 
Article 3. 
If a Member State was determined to impose the death penalty, it could attempt to 
dissect the jurisprudence of the Court and then rectify all of the violations recorded 
within the Article 3 case-law: for example, ensuring that the defendant receives a 
fair trial, constructing adequate death row conditions, providing appropriate appeals 
and administering executions within a certain period of time. 
If a Member State could implement such a capital judicial process (and this is 
certaiply bordering on an impossibility) and claim that a wartime circumstance 
exists, then it may be able to impose the punishment. This is an extreme theoretical 
example, but one way in which the Council could remedy this possible anomaly, 
would be to specifically amend Article 2(1) to delete the textual availability of the 
punisbment. If Article 2(1) merely stated "Everyone's right to 
life shall be 
protected, " that would nullify any possible loophole within the 
Convention itself 
" Wohlwend, above, fn. 55. 
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Chapter Five discussed the textual failings of Protocol No. 13 in not amending 
Convention Article 2(l), and the role of the Committee was seen as significant for 
this legislative deficiency. So the question should be proposed as to whether the 
Committee of Ministers would allow the return of the death penalty if the Member 
States., wanted it? The arguments presented within this thesis demonstrate that 
firstly, the Member States wanting the return of the death penalty is more a political 
theory rather than a serious normative proposition, and as a result, the Committee 
changing its stance on the death penalty is extremely unlikely. 
However, these theoretical questions do point to exceptional circumstances where a 
miniscule possibility remains. Hence, the final section of this conclusion 
investigates how to ensure that the punishment does not return in the future within 
Member States and the Council organs. 
8.4 Maintaining the Death Penalty-Free Zone 
Niccolo' Machiavelli offered his advice to the Magnificent Lorenzo, Son of Piero 
De' Medici, upon the Medici's return to power in Florence in 1513, and concerning 
the Prince's application of the death penalty, he stated, "reasons for taking 
life are 
not easily found, and are more readily exhausted. ýý68 Machiavelli was uncomfortable 
68 Niccolb Machiavelli, The Prince, (trans: C. E. Detmold) (Ware: Wordsworth Editions 
Limited, 
1997), p. 65. Machiavelli also stated that if Lorenzo should 
"be obliged to inflict capital punishment 
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with the administration of the punishment and warned against its application 
Michel Foucault similarly argued, "the authority that exercises the right to punish 
should always be uneasy about that strange power and never feel too sure about 
itself. , 69 
Withip both these statements there is an inherent understanding that the anti-death 
penalty advice to governments must be a continual one: at least an affirmation each 
time a new leader comes into power. The removal of the death penalty within 
ýCouncil Member States should be viewed as a never-ending story. It is a story 
which needs to be repeated to each generation. 
In 1969, Louis Blom-Cooper opened his edited collection, The Hanging Question5 
by stating, "[p]robably more words have been uttered - in public and in private- 
over Ihe issue of capital punishment than over any other single issue of public or 
I 
social policy ... 
Yet the debate rages on. , 70 The debate is still raging in Europe, and 
the interview of a capital lawyer in the United States by the death penalty scholar, 
Austin Sarat, is poignant when the lawyer stated, "[i]t doesn't matter if you live 
frompow until eternity, there will always be more to do. ,71 The debates over the 
upon any one, then be sure to do so only when there is manifest cause and proper justification for it, " 
ibid 
69 Michel Foucault, Against Replacement Penalties, p. 46 1, in, Michel Foucault, Power: Essential 
Works -, qfFoucault, 1954-1984, vol. 3, (ed. James D. Faubion) (London: Penguin, 1994). 
70 Louis Blom-Cooper, The Hanging Question. - Essays on the Death Penalty, (London: Duckworth 
Press, 1969), p. 1. 
71 Austin S arat, Narrative Strategy and Death Penalty Advocacy, Harv. C R-C L. L. Rev, 
31 (1996), 
p. 353. 
. 4' 
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death"Penalty will always be with us, and so for the punishment to be continually 
suspended, there needs to be a continual educative strategy. 
Aleksandras Dobryninas stated that although Lithuania had abolished the 
punAment, "nevertheless it would be a mistake to abandon continued public 
education on death penalty matters ... Lithuanian governmental and non- 
governmental institutions need to continue to develop educational strategies in 
support of abolitionist PoliCy.,, 72 Thomas Hammarberg, the Commissioner for 
Human Rights is in agreement, when he stated "[h]erein lies a challenge for us 
abolitionists: we need to inform and educate about the true nature of this 
punishment. On this issue, too many politicians have failed to take a leadership 
role. , 73 Michael Mansfield QC, an English trial lawyer, during an address at a 
A. 
conference on the death penalty at Warwick University in 2004, stated: 
there is a great need to ensure that we recognise that the job is, and always will 
be, education. There is a need to ensure that the British public regularly 
understand the arguments so that the threat is diminished. The threat of the 
return of capital punishment is diminished ... If the public did understand 
u 
72 Aleksandras Dobryninas, 'The Experience of Lithuania's Journey to Abolition, ' p. 252 in Peter 
Hodgkinson and William A. Schabas, (eds) Capital Punishment: Strategiesfor Abolition 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
73 Thomas Hammarberg, We need to educate about the true nature of the death penalty, presentation 
by the Commissioner for Human Rights at the III World Congress Against the Death Penalty, Paris, 
I February 2007, CommDH/Speech(2007)1. 
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properly what the debate was then one can be safe in the assurance that its 
return would be limited. 
74 
A moratorium on the death penalty was initiated in England in 1965, and it was 
officially removed from criminal legislation for ordinary offences in 1969. Yet 45 
years following removal, Mansfield still iterated the need for education against the 
death penalty in England. He recognised that there "always will be" the need for 
education against the death penalty. Hence the ever-present possibility of the return 
of the death penalty needs to be rebutted. This intricate role of education to keep the 
punishment suspended was also observed by Eric Prokosh, the Amnesty 
International expert on the death penalty, when he stated: 
the battle has to be fought over and over again. Each country has to go through 
a process that is often long and painful, examining for itself the arguments for 
and against, before finally, we hope, rejecting the death penalty ... Even after 
dbolition, there may be calls to bring the death penalty back. If the calls are 
serious enough, the arguments have to be gone though again. 
75 
To ensure that the death penalty remains in abeyance is to engage in a never ending 
battle, 'a battle which must be "fought over and over again, " On Convention Article 
2 litigation, Douwe Korff, the European human rights expert stated "[wle need to be 
74 Michael Mansfield QC, 'Keynote address: is the Death Penalty About to Execute Itselff 
Unive? sity of Warwick conference, School of Law, 28ýhFebruary 2004. 
75 Eric Prokosch, The Death Penalty verses Human Rights, p. 33, in Council of Europe, Death 
Penalty Beyond Abolition, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2004). 
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prepared to battle on for many years, McCann was a spring plank. 5ý76 Korff was an 
advocate for the applicant in McCann v. the United Kingdom, when the European 
Court of Human Rights described the Convention as a "living instrument. 5177 
The interpretation can change over time and this would include the possibility of 
oscillation from acceptance of the death penalty, to rejection, to re-acceptance. As 
such, I am in agreement with Bill Bowring who maintains that human rights should 
be viewed as "the product of, and constantly reanimated by, human struggle. "" 
Indeed, the struggle against the death penalty needs to be "reanimated" to place the 
abolitionist agenda against the ever evolving changes of state politics. 
At thý moment the majority of the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence 
reflects a severe restriction of the death penalty, but if political circumstances 
change in Europe, as described by Judge Garlicki above, the interpretation may 
change. Chapters Five and Six demonstrated that the Court has left the door ajar for 
the d(ýath penalty. It is a slim opening but it is still there. 
z 
One of the most pressing examples today which challenges the maintenance of the 
al, abolition of the death penalty is terrorist violence. Terrorism poses one of the main 
threatý to world peace and thus to peace in Europe. Even with the success in that 
76 Douwe Korff, stated this at his book launch of the, 'The Right to Life: A guide to the 
implementation of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, ' (Council of Europe 
Publications), London Metropolitan University, 5thJuly, 2007. 
77 McCann et al, v. United Kingdom, (17/1994/464/545), 27 September 
1995, para. 146. 
78 Bill Bowring, The Degradation of the International Legal Order? The Rehabilitation ofLaw and 
the Possibility ofPolitics, (Abington: Routlegde-Cavendish, 2008), p. 112. 
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France did not reintroduce the death penalty for terrorist crimes, and in Russia, Nur- 
Pashi Kulayev received a life sentence for his role in the Beslan tragedy, the 
Council of Europe is still concerned at the possibility of the return of the 
punishment for terrorist offences. In June 2007, Fdtima Aburto Baselga, the 
rapporteur for the Political Affairs Committee, stated in a Parliamentary Assembly 
Opinion: 
I am afraid that there is a real risk that in our times, in the context of the fight 
against terrorism, our societies lose sight of their principles and values and 
take steps backwards, driven by fear ... The fact that society is not prepared to 
Aý 
relinquish the death penalty is often invoked as an argument against its 
abolishment, and it is true that in this matter there is often a gap between the 
electorate on the one hand, and parliaments and governments on the other. 79 
Centrdl to Baselga's concern is the effect of terrorism on European society and the 
arousing of public support for the death penalty. Under the heading, "Some major 
concerns, " she also stated that, "[t]he risk that in the context created by the fight 
against terrorism, the recourse to the death penalty is considered 'more 
A. 80 
acceptable. "' One of the fundamental features of the Council's discourse must be 
the education of all European peoples, not just the elite. Following Michael 
Mansfield and Thomas Hammarberg's observation, if all Europeans are educated on 
79 Promotion by Council ofEurope member states of an international moratorium on the death 
penalty, Parliamentary Assembly, Doc. 11321,25 June 2007, Part B, paras 9- 10. 
80 
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the fallacies of the death penalty then its return, even for terrorist offences, would be 
diminished. 
The Beslan trial pointed the way forward in maintaining that the death penalty is 
illegitimate in terrorism cases. It was an educative decision on how European 
sentimentality is evolving to protect life even after terrorist violence. Robert 
Badinter promoted this policy when he stated: 
[i]n reality, no one is denying the threat posed by terrorism, but not only does 
the war against terrorism not require the death penalty, it must actually ensure 
that it does not resort to it. In the face of terrorism, abolition gives democracy 
an ethical dimension, essential in such a war. The terrorist kills innocent 
victims in the name of his ideology; democracy defends freedom and 
recognises all lives as sacred, even that of the terrorist. The conflict is one of 
values in which, eventually, democracy always triumphs and even more so 
when it upholds, loud and clear, the principles on which it is founded. Faced 
with crime and cruelty, a democracy's justice system rejects vengeance and 
death. It punishes but it does not kill; it prevents the terrorist from harming 
others but respects his life; by refusing to give him death, democracy 
guarantees the humanity the terrorist denies through his crimes. Democracy 
comes out as the moral victor of the test inflicted on it by terrorism. 
That will 
81 
not be the least of its victories in the eyes of generations to come. 
81 Robert Badinter, 'The OSCE and the Death Penalty', in The Death Penalty in the 
OSCE Area, 
(Warsa, w: OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights, 2006), p. 8. 
1 
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The promotion of life through democracy is being reaffirmed in the face of terrorist 
violeizce. 82 It is a returning to the sentiments of M. Francois Guizot, the Eighteenth 
Century European historian, who observed, "[p]unishments may destroy men, but 
they can neither change the interests nor sentiments of the people. ý83 An 
understanding that the death penalty will not change future terrorist's minds, is the 
appro#ch which Badinter argued Europe must continue to endorse. As Guizot had 
further argued that the death penalty: 
may i one or several individuals, and severely chastise one or several 
Conspiracies; but if it can do no more than this, it will find the same perils and 
the same enemies always before it. If it is able to do more, let it dispense with 
killing, for it has no more need of it: less terrible remedies will suffice. 84 
What, the evolution of arguments for better ways to punish terrorists must 
encompass is that there are other punishment options. The battle ground is that 
when a Council Member State does claim that its security is threatened to argue 
82 Jonathan Glover has made similar observations when he stated, "Danger to life does not deter 
4 
people from fighting wars, and a terrorist gunman may be just as committed to his cause as a soldier. 
And executions create martyrs, which help the terrorist cause, " Causing Death and Saving Lives, 
(London: Penguin, 1977), p. 241. 
83 M. F. Guizot, A Treatise on Death Punishments, p. 327, included in, M. F. Guizot, General History 
of Civiiisation in Europe: From the Fall of the Roman Empire Till the French Revolution, 
(Edinburgh: William and Robert Chambers Press, 1848). Mr. Preces-Barba of Spain similarly argued 
in the Parliamentary Assembly that "it is impossible to destroy ideologies by executions, " above, 
fn. 
8, P. 62. 
84 
ibid 
391 
that, firstly, why such threat is not a challenge to the very life of the state. Even by 
1980, arguments were being put in the Parliamentary Assembly by Mr. Lanner of 
Austria, that he did not believe "that in free societies there are crimes against the 
state which could justify the taking of life by the state itself. 5ý85 
Secondly, to argue why the imposition of executions would have future detrimental 
effects; for example, all of the arguments presented in Chapter Three, including the 
inevit, ability that innocent people will be executed, that the punishment does not z 
possess a special deterrent value, that the punishment brutalizes society, and the 
need to renounce the punishment as a form of retribution. Thirdly, that as a 
consequence of the first two arguments, the death penalty is not necessary and thus 
an illqgitimate practice of modem government for the preservation of the life the 
state. Indeed, Mr. Flanagan of Ireland argued in the 1980 Parliamentary Assembly 
debates on the death penalty that the respect for human rights necessarily "accepts 
1186 certain essential limits on the power of the state to coerce or to condemn. 
Furthermore, the argument can be placed within a deeper phenomenological horizon 
of political philosophy, in that if the questions by the government are actually being 
put forward then there will never be room for the death penalty. The existence of 
the possibility of the question renders the death penalty illegitimate. From the 
question should emanate the Derridean response that, "I can only say I prefer life, ', 
87 
85 Mr. Lanner of Austria, above, fn. 8, p. 73. 
86 ibid, Mr. Flanagan of Ireland, p. 56. 
87 S. Crosara, "I'm Against the Death Penalty, " University of Trieste, 9 November 2000, 
http: //www, triestecontemporanea. it/pag20-e. Mr. Calice of Italy made a similar argument 
in the 
Parliamentary Assembly in 1980 when he stated: "our European civilisation, our world, must work to 
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and as' we are alive, we prefer to begin with the promotion of life. The death penalty 
is antithetical to this aim of humanism and human rights. 
This Council is promoting "life" both regionally and internationally. Apart from its 
relationship with the EU and the OSCE mentioned above, it has strong relationships 
with anti-death penalty non-governmental organisations including Hands Off Cain, 
Amnesty International, and the World Coalition Against the Death Penalty. It also 
has connections with death penalty information centres such as the Centre for 
1ý 
Capital Punishment Studies, based at the University of Westminster in London, and 
the Death Penalty Information Center, in Washington DC. 
Furthermore, the Council renounced the execution of Saddam Hussein. In a 
Committee of Ministers press statement, the Chairman of the Committee of 
Ministers., Fiorenzo Stolfi, deplored the execution of the former Iraqi leader, when 
he stated: 
[t]he Council of Europe is opposed to the death penalty in all its 
forms ... Saddam Hussein should 
have paid differently for the terrible crimes 
for which he was convicted according to the law of his country. Capital 
punishment cannot repair the horror of the past. 
88 
During the search for Osama Bin Ladin, Renate Wohlwend stated in the opening 
sessions of the Conference in Springfield, Illinois, in 2003, that "if any 
Council of 
establish closer relations with life and not to become a messenger and harbinger of 
death, " ibid, 
71. 
" Execution ofSaddam Hussein, Press Release, Strasbourg, 30.12.2006, 
Decl-30.12.2006e. 
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Europe member state arrested Osama Bin Laden, for example, it would not be able 
to extradite him to the United States unless it was given assurances that the death 
penalty would not be sought. ýý89 Such an uncompromising global view on the death 
penalty, will inevitably lead to other countries renouncing the punishment, and this 
will create a global consensus. This in turn will strengthen the Council's regional 
discourse, as it will be seen not as a unique feature within the international picture, 
but inýtead reflective of a global abolitionist norm. I 
8.5 Conclusion 
This thesis has outlined a legal history and has engaged with the political processes 
which contributed to the Council becoming a de facto death penalty-free zone. 90 It 
has revealed the significant contribution made by the Parliamentary Assembly and 
the Cymmittee of Ministers in evolving the Council's human rights discourse, and 
also the Convention jurisprudence of the former European Commission of Human 
Rights, and the current European Court of Human Rights. 
Thereý-, has been examples of ambivalence within the different organs on various 
aspects of the promotion of the anti-death penalty position. These include 
89 European Parliamentarians to Engage US Congressmen and Senators in Debate over Death 
Penalty, Press Release, 4.4.2003; An Assembly Conference on the Death Penalty Opens in 
SpringCield, Press Release April 2003. 
1 
90 Promotion by Council of Europe Member States of an international moratorium on the death 
penalty, Doc. 113 03,11 June 2007, Report, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, 
Rapporteur: Mr. Pietro Marcenaro, adopted on 8 June 2007, p. I- 
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identifying the appropriate mechanisms for amending Article 2(l), the threshold of 
Article 3 and the standards expected of the United States and Japan as observer 
states. Furthermore, this research has identified that there are theoretical arguments 
which point to potential dangers of the position of Member States. It is seen that 
they have the power to undermine the created death penalty-free zone. However, it 
is conceded that the governments do not currently intend to reintroduce the 
punishment and, it is only a theoretical possibility. 
Consequentially, this research proposes that an effective way to combat the 
possibility of the return of the punishment is not to view the death penalty-free zone 
as a once-abolished-always-abolished position, but one which necessitates the 
renunciation of the punishment as a continual human rights project. The abolition of 
the death penalty in the Council must be viewed as the telling of a never-ending 
story. If the story of the repugnant vicissitudes of the punishment are reminded to 
each generation the Committee of Ministers claims of the "irreversible trend 
towards universal abolition, "91 will be realised, both inside and outside the 
Council's boarders. This work is a contribution to the need for continued education 
on the punishment. It is appropriate to conclude with the words of Hans Gbran 
Franck: 
" Position of the Parliamentary Assembly as regards the Council ofEurope member and observer 
states with have not abolished the death penalty, Parliamentary Assembly 
Recommendation 1760 
(2006), Reply adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 31 January 2007, at the 
985h meeting of the 
Ministers' Deputies, CM/AS(2007)Rec 1760 final, 2 February 2007, para 2. 
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the death penalty must be abolished because it is inhuman and thus incompatible 
with our system of values ... Capital punishment must come to be regarded in the 
same way as any other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment for 
the world to become a better place where mankind can live in peace and prosperity; 
this means the death penalty has to be abolished for all offences, be they peace-time 
or war-time offences, as soon as possible - worldwide. 
92 
92 Repd rt on the abolition of capital punishment, 
Doc. 7154,15 September 1994. 
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